Peterson v. State

Elijah Peterson v. State of Maryland, No. 14, September Term 2019. Opinion by Hotten, J. CRIMINAL LAW – POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – UNIFORM POST- CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT – The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”), codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7-101 (“Crim. Proc.”), states that the UPPA applies to a person “confined under sentence of imprisonment; or [ ] on parole or probation.” The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Peterson, who was found guilty but not criminally responsible, was not eligible for post-conviction relief under the UPPA, based on the plain language of the Act.

Although the Act is remedial in nature and construed liberally, the plain language of the Act only applies to an individual convicted in Maryland who is imprisoned or on parole or probation. CRIMINAL LAW – POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS – “The essential nature of the writ of coram nobis is that it is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ justified only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.” Hyman v. State, 463 Md. 656, 671 , 208 A.3d 807, 815-16 (2019) (emphasis omitted). The Court of Appeals held that coram nobis relief is available only to those who sufficiently plead the following five elements: (1) the grounds challenging a conviction are based on constitutional, jurisdictional, or fundamental grounds, (2) the burden to rebut the “presumption of regularity” is overcome, (3) the petitioner has suffered or is facing significant lingering collateral consequences from the conviction, (4) no other common law or statutory remedy is available, and (5) the issue is not being relitigated in the coram nobis proceeding. Mr. Peterson was unable to show that he suffered significant collateral consequences that would afford him relief through a writ of error coram nobis.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS – NOT CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE – Maryland’s habeas corpus statute, codified at MD. CODE ANN., COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 3-702(a) (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”), states that any “person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his lawful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any color or pretense or any person in his behalf, may petition for the writ of habeas corpus[.]” Defendants found guilty but not criminally responsible may be eligible for habeas corpus relief. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CT070616X Argued: October 8, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 14 September Term, 2019 __________________________________ ELIJAH PETERSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND __________________________________ Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Hotten, J. __________________________________ Filed: March 31, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

Suzanne Johnson 2020-03-31 12:42-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Section 3-110 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“Crim. Proc.”) provides defendants the opportunity to plead “not criminally responsible” to a criminal charge. The General Assembly enacted §§ 3-101–123 to outline the process for such a plea. When a defendant is found guilty but “not criminally responsible” (“NCR”), the defendant is committed to the Maryland Department of Health (“the Department”) for inpatient care or treatment.1 A court may thereafter authorize “conditional release” for a defendant with specified conditions recommended by the Department, and if the defendant violates those conditions, the defendant may be re-confined to an appropriate facility chosen by the Department.

The instant case addresses whether defendants found guilty, but not criminally responsible, may seek post-conviction relief through the Uniform Post- Conviction Procedure Act, a writ of error coram nobis, or a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner, Elijah Peterson (“Mr. Peterson”), seeks review of a ruling by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County that denied both Mr. Peterson’s request for post- conviction relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”) and his Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to answer the following three questions: 1.

Is post[-]conviction relief available to a person who has been convicted of a crime, found not to be criminally responsible, and is either committed to a psychiatric hospital or on conditional release? 2. Is coram nobis relief available to a person who has been convicted of a crime, found to be not criminally responsible, and is either committed to a psychiatric hospital or on conditional release? 1 At the time of Mr. Peterson’s commitment in 2007, the Department was known as the Department of Mental Health and Hygiene. It was renamed the Department of Health in July 2017. Chapter 214, Laws of Maryland 2017. 3.

Did the [Court of Special Appeals] err in holding that [Mr. Peterson], who was convicted of a crime and found not to be criminally responsible and was on conditional release, was not eligible to collaterally challenge his convictions by either a post[-]conviction petition or a petition for writ of coram nobis? For reasons discussed below, we affirm the well-reasoned analysis of the Court of Special Appeals on the questions presented. However, given the Court’s recent decision in Sabisch v. Moyer, a circuit court, upon receipt of an appropriate filing, could render a determination regarding whether Maryland’s habeas corpus statute is implicated with respect to Mr. Peterson. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Factual Background In March 2007, Mr. Peterson, while walking down the middle of the road on Marlboro Pike in Prince George’s County, pointed what appeared to be, a rifle at a police vehicle as it passed.

He was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of auto theft, one count of attempted theft over $500, one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, one count of attempted armed carjacking, two counts of first-degree assault, and two counts of second-degree assault. Mr. Peterson entered a plea of not guilty, but through counsel, proceeded to a bench trial on an agreed statement of facts. The bench trial consisted of the following colloquy: [THE STATE]: Your Honor, had this matter gone to trial, the State would have put on evidence that on March 6, 2007, members of the Washington Area Vehicle Enforcement Team were working in the area of Marlboro Pike and Brooks Drive. Corporal Stakes and Corporal Aponte of the Prince George’s County Police Department were driving west on Marlboro Pike when they observed the Defendant, Mr. [ ] Peterson, . . . entering the roadway 2 with what they believed to be a silver rifle, held with both hands, raised at shoulder level with his head tucked downward, pointing the perceived weapon at an oncoming vehicle.

The county cruiser was in the slow lane and the first vehicle was in the fast lane. The driver of the first vehicle slammed on its brakes and swerved in front of their vehicle to avoid [Mr. Peterson], who appeared to be pointing a silver rifle at that particular car. Mr. Peterson was still in the roadway, still advancing forward, pointing the apparent rifle at Corporal Aponte, who was driving a 1987 brown Chevrolet truck. Corpora[l] Aponte recognized the silver weapon and . . . [he] stopped his vehicle because he believed that [Mr. Peterson] was attempting to carjack both the Corporal and the other motorist.

At that time Corporal Aponte got out of his vehicle and confronted [Mr. Peterson]. He gave Mr. Peterson verbal commands to drop the weapon and get on the ground and placed him under arrest without incident. Further investigation revealed that what they believed to be a silver rifle[] was, in fact, a silver caulk gun[] and all events occurred in Prince George’s County, Maryland. THE COURT: Was the caulk gun loaded? [MR.

PETERSON]: No. THE COURT: It wasn’t loaded. Okay. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, those are the allegations. We believe it’s a true statement of facts as to what occurred on that particular date. THE COURT: Okay.

Well, that being the case, the Court finds him guilty of the offenses. *** [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What is supported [by the facts] would be second degree assault of both police officers. THE COURT: I find him guilty of that. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But the other charges, the auto theft, there was no auto theft. THE COURT: How about – okay. 3 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. They stopped.

THE COURT: All right. I find him not guilty of the other counts, then. And I also find him not criminally responsible based upon the report from Springfield. Overall, the circuit court found Mr. Peterson guilty of two counts of second-degree assault, and determined that he was NCR because he lacked substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

See Crim. Proc. § 3-109(a).2 Thereafter, the circuit court ordered Mr. Peterson to be civilly committed to the Department for inpatient treatment. The court never asked Mr. Peterson whether he was pleading guilty or not guilty. The court never advised Mr. Peterson that he had a right to a jury trial or asked whether he was waiving that right.

On December 5, 2007, the circuit court ordered Mr. Peterson to be conditionally released from the Department for a period of five years, subject to conditions that included mandatory mental health and substance abuse treatment. Mr. Peterson was also required to comply with recommendations from his mental health treatment provider and either reside on hospital grounds or in other housing approved by the Department. 3 He was 2 Crim. Proc. § 3-109(a) states: “A defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity to: (1) appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or (2) conform that conduct to the requirements of law.” 3 Mr. Peterson was ordered to comply with the following types of recommendations given by his mental health provider: A. Type and frequency of treatment interventions; (continued . . .) 4 required to voluntarily admit himself to a psychiatric facility as requested by his mental health provider. Mr. Peterson could not own, possess, or use a firearm of any kind or take illicit drugs, use alcohol, or abuse prescription drugs.

Between 2008 and 2013, the circuit court issued Mr. Peterson multiple orders for conditional release, in which the circuit court placed similar conditions on Mr. Peterson as the original order in December 2007. In March 2013, the circuit court maintained the previously imposed conditions, but also required Mr. Peterson to refrain from initiating contact with the victim of his crime. Procedural Background 1. Circuit Court Proceedings On July 24, 2012, during conditional release, Mr. Peterson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPPA”).4 After securing counsel, Mr. Peterson filed a Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which asserted (1) Mr. Peterson’s NCR plea was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea (. . . continued) B. Participation in other programs such as a day program, family therapy, marriage counseling, alcohol and substance abuse treatment, vocational rehabilitation, and job counseling; C. Taking prescribed psychiatric medication and submitting to such laboratory tests, as the prescriber of the psychiatric medication shall deem necessary to monitor the blood levels and the effectiveness of the medication; D. Applying for inpatient psychiatric treatment.

E. Employment. F. Travel outside of the State of Maryland. (parenthetical omitted). 4 Crim. Proc. § 7-103 states: “(a) For each trial or sentence, a person may file only one petition for relief under this title.

(b) Unless extraordinary cause is shown, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed.” 5 and was invalid because the record failed to demonstrate that he understood the nature of the charges and (2) Mr. Peterson’s original counsel was ineffective because he did not inform Mr. Peterson of the consequences of pleading NCR. On June 11, 2013, the circuit court conducted a hearing regarding Mr. Peterson’s post-conviction request. On November 15, 2013, the court denied Mr. Peterson’s request for post-conviction relief and held that Mr. Peterson was neither “confined” nor on “probation or parole,” for purposes of the UPPA. On January 10, 2014, while committed, Mr. Peterson filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis and requested a hearing to vacate the 2007 NCR judgment.

After a hearing, the circuit court found that Mr. Peterson’s commitment to the Department was a direct consequence of his NCR plea, and, therefore, not a collateral consequence. The court denied Mr. Peterson’s request for coram nobis relief. Mr. Peterson’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied because the court determined that Mr. Peterson was never “convicted” and that he failed to demonstrate significant collateral consequences. Mr. Peterson timely appealed both the denial of his respective petitions for post- conviction claim and his coram nobis relief to the Court of Special Appeals. 2.

The Court of Special Appeals Proceedings The Court of Special Appeals initially reviewed the history of the NCR plea to ascertain whether a defendant who enters such a plea, is eligible for post-conviction or coram nobis relief. Peterson v. State, 2019 WL 328416 at ³-5 (2019). The Court of Special Appeals held that the 6 NCR statutory scheme recognizes that ‘no valid purpose would be furthered by holding the [NCR defendant] accountable for his acts. [NCR] is a recognition that none of the theories which underlie our criminal law— prevention, restraint, rehabilitation, deterrence, education, and retribution— are furthered by punishing’ those found to be NCR. Id. at ⁵ (quoting State v. Garnett, 172 Md. App. 558, 564 , 916 A.2d 393, 396 (2007)).

Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals determined that a defendant convicted of a crime and subsequently found NCR was not subject to criminal punishment. Id. The Court held that commitment for those found NCR and the restrictions associated with conditional release were intended to protect the public and the patient, not to punish. Id.

(quoting Harrison-Solomon v. State, 442 Md. 254, 286-87 , 112 A.3d 408, 428 (2015)). In addressing the UPPA, the Court of Special Appeals held that “[Mr. Peterson] satisfie[d] the [UPPA] requirement of being ‘a person convicted in any court in the State,’ because he was found guilty of two counts of second degree assault.” Id. at ⁶. The Court then analyzed the following UPPA requirements: “(1) confined under sentence of imprisonment; or (2) on parole or probation.” Crim. Proc. § 7-101.

Although the Court held that Mr. Peterson satisfied the conviction component, it also held that conditional release was not the equivalent of being on parole or probation as required by the UPPA for two reasons: (1) parole and probation are unambiguous and defined by Black’s Law Dictionary and (2) the General Assembly did not intend to include conditional release when it expressly codified parole and probation. Id. at ⁶-7. The Court determined that parole and probation are criminal sanctions, whereas conditional release from civil commitment is not. Id. at ⁶.

Therefore, “[a]n NCR defendant on conditional release does not satisfy the requirement of the UPPA that the defendant be ‘on parole or probation.’ To interpret 7 the UPPA otherwise . . . would expand the UPPA beyond its clear scope.” Id. at ⁷. The Court also addressed confinement under the UPPA, indicating that confinement refers to defendants subject to criminal sanctions, not civil confinement. Id. Regarding the coram nobis issue, the Court outlined the factors relied on in Jones v. State, 445 Md. 324 , 126 A.2d 1162 (2015) and Anderson v. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, 310 Md. 217 , 528 A.2d 904 (1987), to adjudicate the instant case.

Relying on these cases, the Court of Special Appeals held Mr. Peterson’s “commitment and conditional release are a direct consequence of his conviction and subsequent NCR finding[,]” not merely a consequence of the NCR finding alone. Id. at ⁸. Since Mr. Peterson’s commitment was not a collateral consequence of the conviction, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that he was not entitled to coram nobis relief. Id.

Mr. Peterson timely appealed to this Court, and we granted certiorari. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review interpretations and applications of Maryland constitutional, statutory, or case law, under a de novo standard of review to establish “whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct.’” Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 , 907 A.2d 175, 184 (2006). This Court “will not disturb the factual findings of the post-conviction court unless they are clearly erroneous.” Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524, 551 , 983 A.2d 1071, 1086 (2009). When reviewing a lower court’s grant or denial of a coram nobis petition, we apply an “abuse of discretion” standard of review.

State v. Rich, 454 Md. 448, 471 , 164 A.3d 355, 368-69 (2017). 8 DISCUSSION A. In a criminal case, the court may declare the defendant NCR after a guilty finding, generating different consequences from those only found guilty. A defendant is NCR “if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity to: (1) appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or (2) conform that conduct to the requirements of law.” Crim. Proc. § 3-109(a). The defendant has the burden of proof on this issue by a preponderance of the evidence.

Crim. Proc. § 3-110(b).5 After the court finds the defendant NCR, “the court shall order the defendant committed to the facility that the Health Department designates for institutional inpatient care or treatment.” Crim. Proc. § 3-112(b). The defendant may be discharged “from commitment only if that person would not be a danger, as a result of mental disorder or mental retardation, to self or to the person or property of others if discharged.” Crim.

Proc. § 3-114(b). The defendant may be “eligible for conditional release from commitment only if that person would not be a danger, as a result of mental disorder or mental retardation, to self or to the person or property of others if released from confinement with conditions imposed by the court.” Crim. Proc. § 3-114(c). Before the court can release the defendant from civil confinement, with or without conditions, the court must determine whether the defendant is dangerous.

For conditional release, the court considers the defendant’s dangerousness within the context of the proposed conditions. Hawkes v. State, 433 Md. Crim. Proc. § 3-110(b) states: “The defendant has the burden to establish, by a 5 preponderance of the evidence, the defense of not criminally responsible.” 9 105, 133, 70 A.3d 308 , 325 (2013). If the defendant violates the terms of conditional release, the defendant may be re-confined to a designated facility.

See Crim. Proc. § 3- 121(i)(1). Finally, a defendant who has been civilly confined may apply for release, and the trier of fact shall decide whether the defendant must remain in confinement, may be conditionally released, or may be discharged from commitment. Crim.

Proc. § 3-119. In the case at bar, Mr. Peterson was civilly confined and conditionally released several times. B. The UPPA’s plain language does not support expanding post-conviction relief to those found NCR. The jurisdiction of the UPPA extends to “a person convicted in any court in the State who is: (1) confined under sentence of imprisonment; or (2) on parole or probation.” Crim.

Proc. § 7-101. Mr. Peterson was on conditional release when he filed his petition for post-conviction relief. This Court must decide whether the UPPA is available to one civilly confined or on conditional release. 1. Principles of statutory interpretation.

Our primary goals in the interpretation of a statute are to ascertain the General Assembly’s desired purpose and goals and remedy the issue addressed in the legislation. Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172 , 935 A.2d 699, 708 (2007). As [we have] explained, to determine [the General Assembly’s] purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.

When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the General Assembly’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute 10 as it is written. In addition, we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words that the General Assembly used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends.

If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives, and the purpose of the enactment under consideration. We have said that there is an ambiguity within a statute when there exist[s] two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, [our job] is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 481 , 157 A.3d 272, 280 (2017).

Moreover, we will avoid an absurd interpretation and interpret the plain language within the context in which it appears. Id. at 482 , 157 A.3d at 280 . In the case at bar, we must define the following words as they are used in the UPPA: “convicted,” “parole,” and “probation.” Mr. Peterson argues that “convicted,” “parole,” and “probation” are ambiguous and that the Court of Special Appeals should have considered the statutory scheme and legislative history to comport with the General Assembly’s intent. Mr. Peterson contends that we should avoid construing the UPPA to exclude defendants found NCR to avoid constitutional issues, because no other collateral remedy exists.

The State counters, indicating that the plain language of the UPPA limits its application to incarcerated defendants or those on parole or probation and that the plain language conveys the intent of the General Assembly. The State argues that civil commitment and conditional release are not equivalent to incarceration or parole and 11 probation. The State asserts that no constitutional issues arise, even if we exclude defendants found NCR from relief under the UPPA. Upon review, we determine that “convicted,” “parole,” and “probation” are unambiguous and apply the plain meaning of the words.6 We explain. 2.

Under the plain language of the UPPA, the General Assembly excluded conditional release from its application. The Court of Special Appeals applied a plain meaning analysis to “parole” and