Judefind v. State
Boyd, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff in error was arrested, under a warrant issued by a justice of the peace for Kent County, for husking corn on Sunday. He was tried, convicted, and fined five dollars and costs, in accordance with the provisions of Article 27, section 247, of the Code of Public General Laws. He appealed to the Circuit Court, where he elected to be tried before the Court, and was convicted and fined five dollars and costs by that Court.
He has brought the case to this Court by petition in the nature of a writ of error, in which he designates the following as the points of law to be reviewed: (1) That section 247 of Article 27 of the Code is void because it is in violation of the first paragraph of the fourteenth Article of the Constitution of the United States. (2) That said statute is void because it is in violation of Article thirty-six of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of Maryland. (3) That the Circuit Court for Kent County had no jurisdiction to try and convict the traverser, since the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction. First.
Because (a) the warrant charged no offence under the statute, as it failed to set forth that the husking of corn on Sunday was not a worP of necessity or charity. (?;) The warrant shows upon its face that it was issued on Sunday, and its mandate is to apprehend the traverser “immediately.” It is admitted that it was actually served on Sunday; for these reasons it is void, and 512 no jurisdiction could be acquired under it. Second. That the bond for appearance of the traverser in the Circuit Court is void because it held him to answer a charge of “Sabbath.-Breaking,” and no such offence is known to the laws of this State; and it is also in fatal variance with the warrant, which says nothing of Sabbath-breaking by the traverser, but charges him with husking corn on Sunday.
The Attorney-General, on behalf of the State, moved to quash the wrrit of error on the ground that no writ of error lies to this Court from the decision of the Circuit Court, on an appeal to it from tile judgment of a justice of the peace. That motion must prevail. It is well settled in this State that when the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide an appeal from a justice of the peace its decision is final, and an appeal or writ of error to this Court will not lie — unless of course the statute authorizes such appeal or writ of error to this Court. If the traverser desired to contest the constitutionality of the law under which he was arrested, and have that question properly presented for the consideration of this Court, he could have applied for the writ of certiorari upon the specific ground of the unconstitutionality of the law, and the consequent wrant of powmr and jurisdiction of the justice of the peace to proceed under it.
This Court could then have reviewed the judgment of the 'Circuit Court on an appeal or writ of error. Nor can we review the decision of the Circuit Court on the question of the alleged defects on the face of the warrant and bond. That Court had the power and authority to entertain the appeal from the judgment of the justice on the question of jurisdiction, as well as on other grounds, and, the plaintiff in error having invoked and submitted himself to its jurisdiction, its judgment is final and conclusive. The case of Rayner vs. State, 52 Md., 368 , is 513 directly in point, and it is unnecessary to refer to the other decisions of this Court.
The attorney for the plaintiff in error argued at considerable length the constitutionality of the Sunday law involved in this case, and urgently requested this Court to pass upon that question, regardless of our views on the motion to quash the writ of error. Having determined that the case is not properly before us, we do not feel called upon to discuss at length the cases cited or reasons assigned by the learned counsel, but as a refusal to state our conclusions might be deemed by some án indication of doubt on our part, we will briefly state our views on the subject. We have not the slightest hesitation in announcing that the law complained of is not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States or of Maryland. Although the argument of the attorney for the plaintiff in error gave evidence of thorough research and great labor, as well as ingenuity and ability, he was compelled to admit that if we were to be governed by precedent, he had no standing in Court, as the cases were opposed to his contention.
There have been numerous decisions in this country, as well as elsewhere, sustaining such laws, and we have no desire to be the exception to the general rule. Nature, experience, and observation suggest the propriety and necessity of one day of rest, and the day generally adopted is Sunday. There are, and always will be, honest differences of opinion as to how Sunday should be spent, but the advantages of having a weekly day of rest, “from a mere physical and political standpoint,” are too apparent to permit us to doubt the propriety of having reasonable laws to regulate work on that day. In interpreting them, Courts must not place unreasonable constructions upon them.
There may be some circumstances under which it would be deemed harsh and 514 severe to
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