Prince George's County v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.

ELDRIDGE, Judge. This case presents important questions concerning a charter county’s authority to enact a statute which provides that a county administrative agency, upon a finding of employment discrimination, may, in addition to other relief, award money damages “for humiliation and embarrassment” up to $100,-000.00. Unfortunately, we shall not be able to reach those issues because the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in this case was not appealable. ¹⁶⁸ I. Sections 2-185 through 2-281.01 of the Prince George’s County Code (1995, 1998 Supp.) prohibit various types of discrimination in Prince George’s County, including discrimination in employment. Those sections establish and provide for a Human Relations Commission to enforce the anti-discrimination laws, state that the Commission shall have 13 members, authorize the Commission, inter alia, to have hearing panels consisting of three members which render the initial decisions, and provide that final decisions of the Commission concluding that a respondent has engaged in prohibited discrimination must be supported “by a majority vote of the full Commission” (§ 2-195(a)).

The Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission is authorized to order various types of relief upon a finding of prohibited discrimination, including “cease and desist” orders (§ 2-195(a)), the award of back pay in employment discrimination cases (§ 2—195(b)), “reimbursement of actual expenses to the complainant” (ibid.), damages for injury to the complainant’s personal property (§ 2-195.01(a)(l)), and compensation for travel expenses incurred by the complainant (§ 2-195.01(a)(2)). Furthermore, .§ 2-195.01(a)(3) of the Prince George’s County Code states as follows: “(3) Damages may also be awarded to compensate complainant for humiliation and embarrassment suffered in an amount determined by the Commission panel to be appropriately and reasonably warranted considering all of the circumstances, but in no event shall the amount be in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00).” In addition, § 2-195.01(b), which was enacted in 1998 after the commencement of the case at bar, provides: “(b) In addition to other awards and relief set forth above, the Commission may impose a civil fine up to Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), in accordance with the standards of proof set forth in Section 2-195 [involving cease and desist orders], on a respondent found to have violated the provisions of Subdivisions 6 [discrimination in places of ¹⁶⁹ public accommodations] and 7 [discrimination in employment].” Finally, § 2—197(c) of the Prince George’s County Code provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by a final decision by the Commission is entitled to file an appeal pursuant to Subtitle B of the Maryland Rules of Procedure.” Former Subtitle B of the Maryland Rules of Procedure related to judicial review by the circuit courts of adjudicatory administrative decisions, and referred to such actions in the circuit court as “appeals.” In 1993, former Subtitle B was replaced by Rules 7-201 through 7-209 which properly referred to such actions in a circuit court as “actions for judicial review” (Rule 7-201(a)). For discussions of the rules changes, and the nature of these actions, see Kim v. Comptroller, 350 Md. 527, 534-536 , 714 A.2d 176, 179-180 (1998); Driggs Corp. v. Md. Aviation, 348 Md. 389, 398-399 , 704 A.2d 433, 438-439 (1998); Colao v. County Council, 346 Md. 342, 359-363 , 697 A.2d 96, 104-106 (1997); Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, 345 Md. 477, 490-496 , 693 A.2d 757, 764-767 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1053 , 118 S.Ct. 702 , 139 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998). Neither § 2-197(c) nor any other provision of law expressly authorizes an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from a circuit court judgment reviewing a decision by the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission.

II

Beretta U.S.A. Corp. manufactures firearms at a plant in Accokeek, in Prince George’s County, Maryland. Peter Santos had been an employee at the Beretta plant. In December 1991, Santos filed with the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission a complaint against Beretta, alleging employment discrimination by his immediate supervisor based on Santos’s race and origin (Puerto Rican). Thereafter, Santos and Beretta reached a settlement agreement which was approved by the Commission on February 24, 1992.

About two months later, on April 29, 1992, Beretta terminated Santos as an employee. ¹⁷⁰ On the same day his employment was terminated, Santos filed another complaint with the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission, alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for filing the earlier complaint. In response, Beretta claimed that Santos was discharged because of poor job performance and because he disrupted other employees, causing “a lot of downtime.” Following a Commission investigation and an unsuccessful attempt to conciliate the dispute, seven days of hearings were held from October 1994 to February 1996. The first five days of hearings were held before the same three-member panel of commissioners on the following dates: October 5, 1994; December 9, 1994; December 10, 1994; February 6, 1995; and February 7, 1995. Because of “budgetary restraints,” the hearings did not resume until December 1995, when two of the panel members were no longer commissioners, and two new panel members were substituted for them.

The last two days of hearings, before the panel with two new members, took place on December 19, 1995, and February 5, 1996. When the two new panel members were substituted at the December 19, 1995, hearing, Beretta was asked whether it objected to the substitution, and Beretta had no objection at that time. At the hearings Beretta did present a factual defense, and also challenged, on several grounds, the validity of the Prince George’s County Code provision authorizing the Commission to award damages for “humiliation and embarrassment.” The Commission rendered a final decision in October 1996 which rejected Beretta’s arguments, upheld Santos’s charge of retaliation discrimination, found that Santos’s discharge “was a direct retaliation for the claim of discrimination filed by [Santos] in December 1991,” and found that Santos suffered a loss of wages, humiliation and embarrassment. The Commission awarded Santos $37,690.80 for lost wages and $20,000.00 for humiliation and embarrassment.

Beretta, pursuant to § 2—197(c) of the Prince George’s County Code, filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County the present action for judicial review of the Commis ¹⁷¹ sion’s decision. Beretta asserted that the Commission’s finding of retaliation discrimination was not supported by substantial evidence, that Santos had failed to introduce sufficient evidence in support of the award of back pay, that the Commission did not adequately explain its calculation of back pay damages, and that the award of damages for humiliation and embarrassment was unsupported by substantial evidence. Beretta also complained in the Circuit Court that the substitution of two new panel members, who had not heard the evidence adduced during the first five days of hearings, violated the Commission’s rules. Commission Rule 12 requires that the three-member panel which heard the evidence must also render the initial decision.

Finally, Beretta reiterated its arguments that § 2-195.01(a)(3) of the Prince George’s County Code, authorizing “humiliation and embarrassment” damages, was invalid on several grounds. After receiving memoranda from both sides, the Circuit Court rendered an extensive opinion rejecting Beretta’s contentions. The court issued an order affirming the decision of the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission. Beretta took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, raising essentially the same issues which it raised in the Circuit Court.

In addition, at oral argument before the Court of Special Appeals, the court sua sponte raised the question of whether the Circuit Court’s judgment was appealable in light of Maryland Code (1974, 1998 RepLVol.), § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. That provision, inter alia, states that, unless a right to appeal is expressly granted by law, the general appeals statute (§ 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article) does not permit an appeal from a circuit court judgment reviewing the decision of an administrative agency. The Court of Special Appeals, in a reported opinion, held that Beretta was entitled to appeal with regard to certain issues, namely the validity of § 2-195.01(a)(3) of the Prince George’s County Code and whether the Commission violated its own rule by substituting two panel members for two former members, but that the issues concerning the sufficiency of evidence were not cognizable on ¹⁷² appeal. Beretta USA v. Santos, 122 Md.App. 168 , 712 A.2d 69 (1998).

The Court of Special Appeals went on to hold that § 2-195.01(a)(3), authorizing damages for “humiliation and embarrassment,” was invalid on two alternative grounds. The appellate court first held that the Prince George’s County enactment was invalid because it conflicted with Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 11(e), a public general law enacted by the General Assembly. The Court of Special Appeals alternatively held that § 2-195.01(a)(3) was not a “local law” within the meaning of Article XI-A, § 3, of the Maryland Constitution and this Court’s opinions in McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12 , 570 A.2d 834 (1990), and County Council v. Investors Funding, 270 Md. 403 , 312 A.2d 225 (1973); therefore, according to the appellate court, the Prince George’s County Council was not constitutionally authorized to enact the provision. Lastly, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission violated its own rule by substituting panel members, and that, consequently, the award of back pay must be reversed and a new administrative hearing held regarding back pay damages.

The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and ordered that the case be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. Each side filed petitions for a writ of certiorari which this Court granted. Prince George’s County v. Beretta, 351 Md. 285 , 718 A.2d 233 (1998). The questions presented in the petitions and in this Court’s order granting certiorari were as follows: “I. Does the Court of Special Appeals have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the decision of an administrative agency in the absence of statutory authority?

II

Does Prince George’s County Code Section 2-195 conflict with the public general law of the State of Maryland concerning permissible remedies for employment discrimination? ¹⁷³ III. Whether Section 2-195.01(a)(3) of the Prince George’s County Code is a ‘local law1 under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution and the principles set forth in McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12 , 570 A.2d 834 (1990).

IV

Is the provision of the Prince George’s County Code that gives the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission ... unbridled discretion to award up to $100,000 in damages for humiliation and embarrassment an impermissible delegation of judicial power and/or a violation of Beretta’s due process rights?” As previously indicated, we shall hold that the issue reflected in the first question is dispositive and that the Court of Special Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Accordingly we shall not reach, and the Court of Special Appeals should not have reached, the remaining questions.

III

Although at an early period the common law recognized the availability of writs of error under some circumstances, questions of appealability have today become entirely governed by statutes. 1 Recently in Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, supra, 345 Md. at 485 , 693 A.2d at 761 , this Court summarized Maryland law concerning the appealability of judgments as follows: “It is an often stated principle of Maryland law that appellate jurisdiction, except as constitutionally authorized, is determined entirely by statute, and that, therefore, a right of appeal must be legislatively granted. See, e.g., Maryland-Nat’l v. Smith, 333 Md. 3, 7 , 633 A.2d 855, 857 (1993) (‘ “The right to take an appeal is entirely statutory, and no person or agency may prosecute an appeal unless the right is given by statute,” ’ quoting Subsequent Injury Fund v. Pack, 250 Md. 306, 309 , 242 A.2d 506 (1968)); Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 301 Md. 256, 261 , 482 A.2d ¹⁷⁴ 908, 910 (1984); State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 147 , 422 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1980); Estep v. Estep, 285 Md. 416, 422 , 404 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1979); Smith v. Taylor, 285 Md. 143, 146 , 400 A.2d 1130, 1132 (1979); Criminal Inj. Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500 , 331 A.2d 55, 64 (1975).

Consequently, resolution of the [appellate] jurisdictional issue depends upon an examination of the relevant provisions of the Maryland Code and of [the pertinent local] legislative enactments.” Therefore, unless the right to appeal from the Circuit Court to the Court of Special Appeals in this type of case was authorized by state statute or local law, the Court of Special Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain Beretta’s appeal. As earlier discussed, § 2-197(c) of the Prince George’s County Code authorized an “appeal” (or, to use more appropriate terminology, an action for judicial review) from the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. There is no provision of Prince George’s County law, however, authorizing in this type of case an appeal from the Circuit Court to the Court of Special Appeals. Turning to state law, the Maryland General Assembly, from the earliest days to the present, has regularly enacted broad general statutes authorizing appeals. 2 The present general appeals statute is § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, first enacted in 1973 and effective January 1, 1974, which provides as follows: ¹⁷⁵ “ § 12-301.

Right of appeal from final judgments— Generally. “Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiff who has accepted a remittitur may cross-appeal from the final judgment.” Section 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, however, creates an exception to this broad right of appeal as follows: “ § 12-302.

Same—Exceptions. “(a) Unless a right to appeal is expressly granted by law, § 12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the District Court, an administrative agency, or a local legislative body.” Although in a technical or constitutional sense, a circuit court never exercises “appellate jurisdiction” when “reviewing the decision of ... an administrative agency, or a local legislative body,” we have held that the above-quoted language refers to an original circuit court action, authorized by statute, judicially reviewing an adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency or an adjudicatory decision of a local legislative body when it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, supra, 345 Md. at 486-496 , 693 A.2d at 762-767 , and cases there discussed. The Circuit Court in this case, pursuant to a locally enacted statute, was engaged in ordinary judicial review of a final adjudicatory decision by an administrative agency. The court applied the normal criteria applicable under Maryland law for judicial review of adjudicatory administrative decisions and ¹⁷⁶ affirmed the agency’s decision. 3 Since no state or local statute or charter provision expressly granted a right of appeal from the Circuit Court’s judgment, § 12-302(a) would clearly seem to preclude an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

In holding that it had appellate jurisdiction to consider some issues, the Court of Special Appeals reasoned that Beretta could have brought a declaratory judgment action to challenge the validity of § 2—195.01(a)(3) of the Prince George’s County Code. As to the Commission’s alleged failure to follow its own rule, the intermediate appellate court