Kant v. Montgomery County

ELDRIDGE, Judge. This is an action for judicial review of an adjudicatory administrative decision by the Montgomery County Commission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs. The issue before us is whether the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, upholding the administrative decision, was appealable to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals, initially in an unreported opinion and later in a reported opinion, held that the Circuit Court’s judgment was not appealable and dismissed the appeal.

Kant v. Montgomery County, 139 Md.App. 157 , 774 A.2d 1229 (2001). We shall reverse. The petitioners, Chander and Ashima Kant (hereafter referred to as the landlords), owned a single-family residential property in Montgomery County, Maryland, which they rented to the respondent, Barbara Wetherell (hereafter referred ²⁷¹ to as the tenant). Disputes arose between the landlords and the tenant concerning claimed defects in the property.

The landlords then sent the tenant a notice to vacate the premises, allegedly because the tenant made “false or incorrect assertion[s] of defects in the property.” The tenant responded by filing a complaint with the Office of Landlord-Tenant Affairs of the Montgomery County Department of Housing and Community Development, contending that the landlords’ termination of her lease was in retaliation for her complaints about defects in the premises. The Department, after determining that the dispute could not be conciliated, referred the matter to the Commission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs. At a hearing on May 12, 1998, the Commission heard testimony from the tenant Wetherell, from a neighbor, from a former tenant of the premises, and from three inspectors of the Department of Housing and Community Development. Thereafter, the Commission issued a nineteen page opinion and a final decision in favor of the tenant.

As summarized in the reported opinion by the Court of Special Appeals (Kant v. Montgomery County, supra, 139 Md.App. at 160 , 774 A.2d at 1230 ), “the Commission found that [the landlords] had delivered a defective tenancy to Ms. Wetherell, failed to correct the deficiencies during her tenancy, and retaliated against her when she requested repairs by sending her a notice to quit and vacate; all of which were in violation of Chapter 29, Landlord-Tenant Relations, of the Montgomery County Code. It then concluded that [the landlords’] failure to make the necessary repairs prevented Ms. Wetherell from using the faulty appliances and ‘redue[ed] the value of the leasehold for which [she] was paying rent by 15%.’ It further determined that [the landlords] had breached the lease and that the lease agreement was terminated. It then ordered [the landlords] to refund Ms. Wetherell her entire security deposit, plus interest, and pay her $4,502.00 (representing a 15% refund of the reduced value of her leasehold during the defective tenancy, $1,000.00 in attorney’s fees, and $982.00 in relocation costs). ²⁷² “The Commission also found that [the landlords] had engaged in a pattern of retaliatory practices against their tenants and ordered them to refrain from issuing notices to quit and vacate in response to tenant repair requests, to ‘submit to the Department for review and approval [for two years] ... all lease agreements, notices to vacate and security deposit dispositions for any and all rental facilities they own, operate or manage in Montgomery County,’ and to repair any housing code violations when requested to do so by the Department.” The landlords then filed, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, this action seeking judicial review of the Commission’s decision. Montgomery County filed a motion in the Circuit Court to intervene as a defendant, and the motion was granted.

Following a hearing, the Circuit Court issued an opinion and order affirming the decision of the Commission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs. The landlords appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, raising several issues relating to the decisions by the Circuit Court and the Commission. No party raised in the Court of Special Appeals any issue concerning the appealability, of the Circuit Court’s judgment. The Court of Special Appeals, however, sua sponte addressed the appealability issue, and, in an unreported opinion filed on April 27, 2001, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held that, in light of Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and the provisions of the Montgomery County Code, the Circuit Court’s judgment was not appealable. Montgomery County, an appellee in the Court of Special Appeals, filed a motion for reconsideration, suggesting that the Montgomery County Code did authorize an appeal from the Circuit Court’s judgment. The Court of Special Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration and recalled its prior opinion. Nevertheless, in a reported opinion filed on June 29, 2001, the Court of Special Appeals again held that the Circuit Court’s judgment was hot appealable and dismissed the appeal for lack of ²⁷³ jurisdiction.

Kant v. Montgomery County, supra, 139 Md.App. 157 , 774 A.2d 1229 . The landlords have filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting seven questions for review. The first question is whether the Court of Special Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and the remaining questions relate to the decisions by the Circuit Court and the Commission. While Montgomery County in its answer does not defend the non-appealability holding by the Court of Special Appeals, the County does argue that the remaining questions raised by the landlords do not warrant certiorari review by this Court.

We have granted the petition for a writ of certiorari on the first question only, i.e., whether the Circuit Court’s judgment was appealable. We shall hold that the judgment was appeal-able, shall summarily reverse the decision by the Court of Special Appeals, and shall remand the case to that court with directions to decide the merits of the appeal. This Court has emphasized on numerous occasions “that appellate jurisdiction, except as constitutionally authorized, is determined entirely by statute, and that, therefore, a right of appeal must be legislatively granted.” Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, 345 Md. 477, 485 , 693 A.2d 757, 761 (1997), and cases there cited. See also Prince George’s County v. Beretta, 358 Md. 166, 173-174 , 747 A.2d 647, 651 (2000).

Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code is the general appeals statute, and it broadly authorizes appeals in civil cases from final judgments by a circuit court. Section 12-301 states: “ § 12-301. Right of appeal from final judgments-Generally. Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.

The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a ²⁷⁴ particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiff who has accepted a remittitur may cross-appeal from the final judgment.” Other statutory provisions, however, create exceptions to the right of appeal under § 12-301. Of particular significance in the present case is § 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article which provides in pertinent part as follows: “(a) Unless a right to appeal is expressly granted by law, § 12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of ... an administrative agency, or a local legislative body.” Although § 12-302(a) refers to a circuit court exercising “appellate jurisdiction” in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency or local legislative body, the word “appellate” is a misnomer in this context.

As we have often pointed out, a circuit court action reviewing the adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency or local legislative body is not an “appeal.” Instead, it is an original action for judicial review. The above-quoted language in § 12-302(a), creating an exception to the general appeals statute, “refers to an original circuit court action, authorized by statute, judicially reviewing an adjudicatory decision of an administrative agency or an adjudicatory decision of a local legislative body when it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.” Prince George’s County v. Beretta, supra, 358