Khalifa v. State

BATTAGLIA, J. We granted Afaf N. Khalifa’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review her multiple convictions and sentences of incarceration for violating former Maryland Code, Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 RepLVol.) 1 as well as the current, amended version of that statute, Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2002 Supp.). 2 The ⁴⁰⁸ convictions arose from Khalifa’s role in the abduction and detention of her grandson, Adam Shannon, who was born in the United States and now resides in Egypt, thousands of miles away from his father and lawful custodian, Michael Shannon. Khalifa challenges her convictions and sentences on three grounds: (1) courts in the State of Maryland lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear the prosecution of certain counts against her; (2) her convictions and sentences violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights; and (3) her multiple sentences are “constitutionally defective” because the indictment charged the same offense in multiple counts. I. Background Khalifa (hereinafter “Petitioner”) and her adult daughter, Nermeen Khalifa Shannon (hereinafter “Nermeen”), are citizens of Egypt, where Nermeen was raised and educated. In 1989, upon reaching the age of 21, Nermeen moved to the United States and settled in Maryland.

In July of 1995, while living in Maryland, Nermeen met Michael Shannon, and, on ⁴⁰⁹ March 3, 1996, the two were married and took up residence in Millersville in Anne Arundel County. On February 9, 1997, Nermeen gave birth to their first son, Adam Shannon. Nermeen and Michael separated in January of 2000, and Nermeen moved to an apartment in Baltimore County. As a result of attempts to reconcile several months later, their second child, Jason Shannon, was born on January 10, 2001.

Nermeen and Michael’s reconciliation attempts ended in February of 2001. On February 27, 2001, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County issued a “Consent Order” granting to Michael “legal and primary physical care and custody” of Adam. Under the order, Nermeen was afforded visitation with Adam, including up to three non-consecutive weeks of unsupervised visitation during the months of June, July, and August. The order also granted to Nermeen “legal and primary physical care and custody” of Jason, with whom Michael had “reasonable rights of visitation.” On August 18, 2001, Petitioner arrived in the United States from Egypt and stayed at Nermeen’s Baltimore County apartment.

Petitioner, who allegedly had a copy of the custody order, asked Michael if Nermeen’s week of unsupervised visitation with Adam could correspond with Petitioner’s visit to the United States. Petitioner explained to Michael that she wanted to take Nermeen, Adam, and Jason to New York to visit a relative, Waeil El Bayar, whose wife had recently given birth. Michael agreed, with the specific condition that Adam and Jason return to Maryland on Sunday, August 26. According to Michael, Petitioner promised to return the children to Nermeen’s apartment by 6:00 p.m., Sunday, August 26.

Neimeen’s neighbor and babysitter, Christa Mayo, stated that she last babysat Nermeen’s children on Thursday, August 23, 2001. Nermeen had told Christa that she no longer needed babysitting services because she was moving to Egypt with the financial and logistical support of Petitioner. Nermeen explained to Christa that the move was a secret because “[t]hey had an upcoming court case regarding custody [and] ⁴¹⁰ that she wanted to leave before that and no one was to know that they were going.” About a month earlier, at Nermeen’s request, Christa had taken Adam to have his passport photograph taken. On August 23 and for a short time on August 24, Christa saw a moving truck outside of Nermeen’s apartment, and she observed Petitioner “directing the movers” as they walked in and out of the apartment.

According to Christa, Petitioner seemed “very dominant” and “in control,” and, when she was with her daughter, Petitioner appeared “in charge.” Another of Nermeen’s neighbors, Lynda Leight, who observed Petitioner on August 24, noted that Petitioner “seemed to be very forceful” and “dominant” in the way she interacted with Nermeen. The property manager, Michael Nabors, observed the moving truck outside of Nermeen’s apartment on August 24 and had a similar impression of Petitioner, recalling that she “was telling the [movers] what they should and shouldn’t be doing in the truck.” When Christa encountered Nermeen outside of her apartment on August 24, Nermeen gave Christa her apartment keys to return to the rental office after Christa had taken whatever she wanted of the items left behind in Nermeen’s apartment. Petitioner, Nermeen, Adam, and Jason arrived at El Bayar’s house in New York on Friday, August 24. According to El Bayar, after spending one night at his house, his visitors, on August 25, traveled to the airport in a rented car and, using airline tickets that El Bayar had purchased for them at Nermeen’s request several days earlier, flew to Egypt.

Before leaving Maryland, Nermeen provided Michael with three telephone numbers to reach her and the children while they were in New York. On August 24, Michael called New York and spoke with Petitioner, Nermeen, and Adam. Michael called New York again on August 25 and spoke with Nermeen and Adam. On August 26, however, the day Michael expected the children to return to Maryland, Michael was unable to ⁴¹¹ reach Nermeen and the children at any of the telephone numbers he was provided.

At around 4:00 p.m. that day, Michael drove to Nermeen’s apartment and found that it “had been cleaned out.” He noticed that the “major furniture,” the boys’ clothes, the entertainment center, and the television were missing. Michael immediately called the police, who described him as “extremely distraught” and “nearly hysterical.” On Tuesday, August 28, Michael called Petitioner’s residence in Cairo, Egypt, and Petitioner answered the phone. Petitioner informed Michael that Adam and Jason were with her and that Nermeen was elsewhere in Egypt under a doctor’s care. Petitioner initially did not allow Michael to speak with Adam.

When Michael specifically requested the return of the children, Petitioner refused and stated that they would be back in a couple of weeks. Petitioner, according to Michael, explained that she had not told Michael of the children’s travel to Egypt because, had he known, he would have stopped them or had them arrested. Later that day, Michael again called Petitioner’s number in Egypt and was able to speak to Adam. Although Michael has spoken with Adam by phone consistently, Michael has not seen his oldest son since Adam left the United States.

While Adam and Jason have lived in Egypt, officials from the United States Embassy there have conducted three “welfare and whereabouts” visits of the boys at Petitioner’s residence in Cairo. During the first visit on October 2, 2001, Petitioner, her husband, Nermeen, Adam, and Jason were present. On February 27, 2002, when the embassy officials conducted the second visit, the children were accompanied by Nermeen and her sister. On the third visit, which took place on August 7, 2002, Nermeen was with her children and, this time, joined by her sister and niece.

During all of the visits, the children appeared to the embassy officials to be living at Petitioner’s home in Cairo. In the evening of August 28, 2001, the District Court of Maryland sitting in Anne Arundel County issued a warrant for ⁴¹² the arrest of Petitioner and charged her with child abduction and accessory to child abduction of Adam in violation of Section 9-805 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.). The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, on August 29, 2001, ordered Nermeen to “immediately return” Adam “to the care and custody of Michael Shannon.” On September 11, 2001, the circuit court granted the “sole legal and physical care and custody” of Jason to Michael and ordered Nermeen to “immediately return” him to his father.

Petitioner was arrested in May of 2002, when she returned to the United States with her husband to visit their property in San Diego, California. In August of 2002, the State of Maryland issued a revised criminal indictment, charging Petitioner with fifteen counts — ten counts of violating Maryland Code, Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article and five counts of conspiracy to violate that statute. All of the counts related to Petitioner’s role in the alleged abduction, detention, and harboring of Adam. Because amendments to Section 9-305 and the related penalty provisions of Section 9-307 became effective on October 1, 2001, the State charged Petitioner in separate counts for conduct occurring before and after that date.

In particular, of the ten Counts alleging violations of Section 9-305, Counts 1 through 6 charged Petitioner for conduct occurring between August and September of 2001. Counts 11 through 13, alleging conspiracy, also charged Petitioner for conduct that took place between August and September of 2001. The balance of the charges (Counts 7 though 10 and Counts 14 through 15) alleged that Petitioner committed offenses after October 2001. 3 ⁴¹³ After waiving her right to jury trial, Petitioner was tried in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County before the Honorable Nancy Davis-Loomis. Judge Davis-Loomis presided over the four-day trial and, on January 21, 2003, found Petitioner guilty on ten counts and rendered the following verdicts: Count 3: August 2001 through September 2001, harbor child outside of this State — Guilty Count 4: August 2001 through September 2001, accessory to abduct child outside of this State — Guilty Count 5: August 2001 through September 2001, accessory to detain child outside of this State — Guilty.

Count 8: October 2001 through May 2002, harbor child outside of the United States — Guilty. Count 9: October 2001 through May 2002, accessory to detain child outside of the United States- — Guilty. Count 11: August 2001, conspire to commit child abduction outside of this State — Guilty. Count 12: August 2001 through September 2001, conspire to commit detaining child outside of this State — Guilty. ⁴¹⁴ Count 13: August 2001 through September 2001 conspire to commit harboring child outside of this State — Guilty.

Count 14: October 2001 through May 2002, conspire to commit detaining child outside of the United States— Guilty. Count 15: October 2001 through May 2002, conspire to commit harboring child outside of the United States— Guilty. For purposes of sentencing, Judge Davis-Loomis merged Count 3 into Count 5, Count 8 into Count 9, Count 13 into Count 12, and Count 15 into Count 14. She imposed a $15,000 fine and a total of ten years of imprisonment, divided among the various counts as follows: one year of imprisonment on Count 4 (accessory to child abduction outside this State); one year consecutive on Count 5 (accessory to detain a child outside of this State); three years consecutive on Count 9 (accessory to detain a child outside of the United States); one year consecutive on Count 11 (conspiracy to abduct); one year consecutive on Count 12 (conspiracy to detain outside this State); and three years consecutive on Count 14 (conspiracy to detain outside of the United States).

A three-judge sentence review panel decreased Petitioner’s fine to $5,000 and, by ordering her sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently instead of consecutively, limited the total prison sentence to three years. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, merged all of the conspiracy counts but otherwise affirmed Petitioner’s remaining convictions and sentences. The court held that Anne Arundel County had territorial jurisdiction to prosecute the alleged harboring and detention of Adam because those acts “deprived Michael in Maryland of custody of his son, which was an essential element of the crimes of harboring and detaining a child.” The court further held that Petitioner’s convictions under the “new” Section 9-305 did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Petitioner’s offenses, in the court’s view, were “continuing in nature and ⁴¹⁵ punishable ‘day by day.’” According to the court, if the Petitioner had detained Adam outside of the United States after October 1, 2001, the effective date of the statute, she violated the provisions of that statute, and “the State could prosecute her accordingly.” With respect to Petitioner’s claim that the indictment was multiplicative, the Court of Special Appeals decided against merging her sentences for accessory to abduction, accessory to detain outside of Maryland, and accessory to detain outside the United States.

As the court reasoned, “[ajbduction differs from detention in that it includes the element of taking, and the two detention charges differ from one another in their requisite place of detention.” The court also decided, however, upon the State’s concession, that all of the sentences for conspiracy do merge, recognizing that “only one sentence can be imposed for a single common law conspiracy no matter how many criminal acts the conspirators have agreed to commit.” The court held that, because “the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty merges into the offense carrying the greater penalty,” the one-year sentences under Counts 11 and 12 merged into Count 14, which carried a three-year sentence. 4 As a result of the all of the proceedings below, Petitioner had convictions with concurrent sentences on four counts: one year of imprisonment on Count 4 (accessory to child abduction outside of this State); one year on Count 5 (accessory to detain a child outside of this State); three years on Count 9 (accessory to detain a child outside of the United States); and three years on Count 14 (conspiracy to detain a child outside of the United States). Contesting the constitutionality and lawfulness of these convictions and sentences, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, Khalifa v. State, 880 Md. 230 , 844 A.2d 427 (2004), to address the following three questions: ⁴¹⁶ 1. What is the territorial jurisdiction for a violation of Md.Code Ann. Family Law Art. § 9-805 with respect to the crimes of detaining and/or harboring a child outside of the State of Maryland? 2. What impact does the ex post facto clause have on the legislative changes to Md.Code Ann. Family Law Art. § 9-305 and its increased penalties? 3.

What impact do the doctrines of constitutional double jeopardy, the common law doctrine of merger, and the rule of lenity have on Md.Code Ann. Family Law Art. § 9-305? For reasons discussed below, we hold that the State had territorial jurisdiction to prosecute Petitioner for detaining a child outside of the State of Maryland and that Petitioner’s convictions and sentences do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights. We further hold that, except for Count 5 (accessory to detain a child outside of this State), which merges into Count 9 (accessory to detain a child outside of the United States) for purposes of sentencing, no further modifications to Petitioner’s sentences are necessary because, under the required evidence test, the offenses of accessory to child abduction, accessory to child detention, and conspiracy to commit child detention contain distinct elements.

II

Standard of Review A trial judge is vested with very broad discretion when sentencing a criminal defendant, so long as the sentence is based upon findings consistent with the jury’s verdict. See Triggs v. State, 382 Md. 27, 39 , 852 A.2d 114, 122 (2004) (citing Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 199 , 772 A.2d 273, 277 (2001)); see also Blakely v. Washington, — U.S. —, at —, 124 S.Ct. 2531, at 2538-39 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 , at —, 2004 WL 1402697 , at ⁶ (2004). Ordinarily, we review the judge’s sentencing judgment on three recognized grounds: “(1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by ill will, prejudice or ⁴¹⁷ other impermissible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is within statutory limits.” Triggs, 382 Md. 27, 39 , 852 A.2d 114, 122 (quoting Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 516 , 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996)). In this case, Petitioner claims her multiple sentences are violations of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights as well as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.

As we explained in Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685 , 496 A.2d 1074 (1985): When a claim is based upon a violation of a constitutional right it is our obligation to make an independent constitutional appraisal from the entire record. But this Court is not a finder of facts; we do not judge the credibility of the witnesses nor do we initially weigh the evidence to determine the facts underlying the constitutional claim. It is the function of the trial court to ascertain the circumstances on which the constitutional claim is based. So, in making our independent appraisal, we accept the findings of the trial judge as to what are the underlying facts unless he is clearly in error.

We then re-weigh the facts as accepted in order to determine the ultimate mixed question of law and fact, namely, was there a violation of a constitutional right as claimed. Id. at 697-98 , 496 A.2d at 1080 (internal citations omitted); see also Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 221 , 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (2002) (citing Rowe v. State, 363 Md. 424, 432 , 769 A.2d 879, 883 (2001)); Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526 , 784 A.2d 1102, 1106 (2001). Therefore, with respect to Petitioner’s constitutional claims, although we do not engage in de novo fact-finding, our application of the law to the facts is de novo. See Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282-83 , 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000) (stating that, with regard to a Fourth Amendment question, “this Court makes an independent determination of whether the State has violated an individual’s constitutional rights by applying the law to the facts”). ⁴¹⁸ Territorial jurisdiction is a factual issue for the trier of fact.

State v. Butler, 353 Md. 67, 79-80 , 724 A.2d 657, 663 (1999) (holding that “when evidence exists that the crime may have been committed outside Maryland’s territorial jurisdiction and a defendant disputes the territorial jurisdiction of the Maryland courts to try him or her, the issue of where the crime was committed is fact-dependent and thus for the trier of fact”). When the issue is in dispute, the State has the burden to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the crime was committed within the geographic limits of Maryland. Id. at 83-84 , 724 A.2d at 665 . Consequently, because the issue of territorial jurisdiction is factual and the trial judge acted as the trier of fact in this case, we defer to her determination of territorial jurisdiction unless it is “clearly erroneous.” See Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 104 , 680 A.2d 512, 515 (1996) (stating that, “[t]o evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in a non-jury trial,” “we will not set aside the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous”) (citing Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 535 , 573 A.2d 831, 833-34 (1990)).

III

Discussion A. Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article The State charged Petitioner with committing violations of Section 9-305 before and after its amendments became effective on October 1, 2001. Before October of 2001, Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article prohibited participation in the abduction, detention, or harboring of a child “outside of this State.” The former statute provided: If a child is under the age of 16 years, a relative who knows that another person is the lawful custodian of the child may not: (1) abduct, take, or carry away the child from the lawful custodian to a place outside of this State; (2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain the child outside of this State for more than 48 hours after the lawful custodian demands that the child be returned; ⁴¹⁹ (3) harbor or hide the child outside of this State knowing that possession of the child was obtained by another relative in violation of this section; or (4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this section. Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.).

A violation of this statute carried a maximum penalty of one year of imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. Section 9-307(c) of the Family Law Article (1984,1999 RepLVol.). 5 The amendments effective on October 1, 2001 split Section 9-305 into subsections (a) and (b), which established new territorial elements. Subsection (a) addresses the prohibited conduct (abduction, detention, harboring, and acting as an accessory) resulting in the child entering or being held “in another state.” Subsection (b) prohibits that conduct when the child is taken or kept “outside of the United States.” After the amendments, the statute reads: (a) In general. — If a child is under the age of 16 years, a relative who knows that another person is the lawful custodian of the child may not: (1) abduct, take, or carry away the child from the lawful custodian to a place in another state; (2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain the child in another state for more than 48 hours after the lawful custodian demands that the child be returned; (3) harbor or hide the child in another state knowing that possession of the child was obtained by another relative in violation of this section; or (4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this section. ⁴²⁰ (b) Additional restrictions. — If a child is under the age of 16 years, a relative who knows that another person is the lawful custodian of the child may not: (1) abduct, take, or carry away the child from the lawful custodian to a place that is outside of the United States or a territory of the United States or the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; (2) having acquired lawful possession of the child, detain the child in a place that is outside the United States or a territory of the United States or the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for more than 48 hours after the lawful custodian demands that the child be returned; (3) harbor or hide the child in a place that is outside of the United States or a territory of the United States or the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico knowing that possession of the child was obtained by another relative in violation of this section; or (4) act as an accessory to an act prohibited by this section. Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 RepLVol., 2002 Supp.).

The primary significance of the change to Section 9-305 is revealed in the penalty provisions of Section 9-307, which also changed on October 1, 2001. Although the maximum penalty for violating Section 9-305(a) (“in another state”) remained one year of imprisonment with a $1,000 fine, due to the amendment, the maximum penalty for violating Section 9-305(b) (“outside of the United States”) is three years of imprisonment with a $5,000 fine. Section 9-307(d) of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 RepLVol., 2002 Supp.). 6 ⁴²¹ B. Territorial Jurisdiction We first dispose of Petitioner’s claim that the State lacked territorial jurisdiction to prosecute Counts 8, 9, 14, and 15, all of which alleged that Petitioner violated Section 9-305 after October 1, 2001. Petitioner points out that she was in Egypt, “a sovereign foreign nation,” by October 1, 2001, when she committed the acts that allegedly constituted harboring, detention, and conspiracy.

She argues that she cannot be convicted in Maryland for a crime committed outside the borders of the State. The State responds that it had jurisdiction to prosecute Petitioner because her conduct, which resulted in depriving Michael Shannon of the lawful custody of his son, had its effect in Maryland. The State contends that the result of Petitioner’s conduct “forms an essential ingredient” of the offenses charged and, therefore, without the deprivation of lawful custody in Maryland, “there simply would be no crime.” We have stated that “it is well-settled in Maryland that a court must have territorial jurisdiction over a criminal defendant to exercise its jurisdiction, or power, over that defendant.” State v. Butler, 353 Md. at 78 , 724 A.2d at 662 . The general rule under common law is that a state has territorial jurisdiction over a defendant when the crime is committed within the State’s “territorial limits.” State v. Cain, 360 Md. 205, 212 , 757 A.2d 142, 145 (2000); Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 730 , 521 A.2d 1216, 1217 (1987); see also Wright v. State, 339 Md. 399, 404 , 663 A.2d 590, 592 (1995).

Therefore, ordinarily, “[a] person cannot be convicted here for crimes committed in another state.” West v. State, 369 Md. 150, 158 , 797 A.2d 1278, 1282 (2002) quoting Butler, 353 Md. at 72-73 , 724 A.2d at 660 (quoting Bowen v. State, 206 Md. 368, 375 , 111 A.2d 844, 847 (1955)); Cain, 360 Md. at 214-15 , 757 A.2d at 146-47 . In describing the concept of territorial jurisdiction where different elements of a crime have occurred in different states, we have explained: ⁴²² The common law rule concerning territorial jurisdiction, which is adhered to in Maryland, does not permit prosecution of an offense in every jurisdiction in which any element of the offense takes place. Instead, the common law rule generally focuses on one element, which is deemed “essential” or “key” or “vital” or the “gravamen” of the offense, and the offense may be prosecuted only in a jurisdiction where that essential or key element takes place. West, 369 Md. at 158-59 , 797 A.2d at 1283 ; see Wright, 339 Md. at 404 , 663 A.2d at 592 (stating that the traditional rule of territorial jurisdiction is that “a state will exercise jurisdiction over a crime only if some conduct or effect constituting a part of that crime was committed within the state”).

Thus, we have held that Maryland does not have territorial jurisdiction as to the crimes of first degree rape and first degree sexual offense, unless “the specifically proscribed harmful physical contact” (the key or essential element of those offenses) took place in Maryland. West, 369 Md. at 162 , 797 A.2d at 1285 . Nonetheless, “under certain circumstances, the defendant’s presence is not required in a court’s territorial jurisdiction if ... the intended result or an essential element of his or her crime lies in Maryland.” Butler, 353 Md. at 74 , 724 A.2d at 660 . Regarding the offense of obstruction of justice, for example, territorial jurisdiction lies in this State even when “all of the affirmative acts were committed” outside of Maryland because “[t]he gravamen of the crime [is] the intended result in Maryland.” Pennington, 308 Md. at 733, 735 , 521 A.2d at 1219, 1220 ; see also West, 369 Md. at 161 , 797 A.2d at 1284 .

In Trindle v. State, 326 Md. 25 , 602 A.2d 1232 (1992), we expounded on these principles as they applied to former Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article, the same statute at issue in this case. Trindle’s ex-wife, Alexa Matthai, lived in Kent County with their children. Trindle picked up the children in Wilmington, Delaware for a scheduled period of visitation to be spent in Pennsylvania. Id. at 28 , 602 A.2d at 1233 .

Unbeknownst to Matthai, who was the children’s lawful ⁴²³ custodian, Trindle and his new wife, Sharon Marcus, took the children and traveled to Amman, Jordan, where the children were kept without Matthai’s consent. Id. at 28-29 , 602 A.2d at 1233-34 . When Trindle and Marcus returned to the United States after having been deported from Jordan, they were tried and convicted in the Circuit Court for Kent County for child abduction in violation of former Section 9-305 of the Family Law Article. Id. at 30 , 602 A.2d at 1234 .

Although Trindle’s appeal was rendered moot when he died prior to his case being argued, Marcus argued on appeal that the Circuit Court did not have territorial jurisdiction to hear her prosecution, because none of her conduct took place in Maryland. Id. We disagreed, holding instead that the Maryland court had territorial jurisdiction over the child abduction charge against Marcus. We explained: Marcus’s conduct ... consisted of knowingly secreting and harboring Matthai’s children with the intent to deprive Matthai of the custody, care and control of those children.

It is clear that the intended result of that conduct, i.e. depriving Matthai of custody, forms an essential ingredient of her offense and had its effect in Kent County, Maryland, although the acts which produced that result took place outside of this State. Id. at 32 , 602 A.2d at 1235 . We also reviewed the law of territorial jurisdiction in other states and were persuaded by those courts that embraced the view that “child abduction or custody interference prosecutions can be heard in the state where the parental custody has been deprived by acts or omissions which occurred outside the state.” Id. at 36 , 602 A.2d at 1237 . The case before us does not differ materially from the circumstances in Trindle .

Like the appellant in Trindle , Petitioner intended to deprive a parent of lawful custody in the State of Maryland. Although her involvement in the conspiracy, detention, and harboring may have taken place well beyond the borders of this State, the intended consequences of those acts reached Maryland, where Michael was ⁴²⁴ deprived of the lawful custody of his son. As we recognized in Trindle , the intentional deprivation of lawful custody “forms an essential ingredient” of the crimes prohibited under Section 9-305. Furthermore, the bases for territorial jurisdiction in the present case are more cogent than in Trindle , where the child’s abduction began in Delaware.

Unlike Trindle , Petitioner’s initial criminal acts (the child abduction and conspiracy), which facilitated the detention and harboring of Adam in Egypt, occurred in Maryland. For these reasons, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County had territorial jurisdiction over the prosecution of Petitioner’s charges. C. Ex Post Facto Clause Petitioner maintains that the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Maryland Constitutions bar her prosecution under the amended Section 9-305. The Ex Post Facto Clause, Petitioner argues, prohibits her prosecution under the amended statute inasmuch as her crimes were committed and completed before the effective date of the statutory amendments.

The State contends that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not bar Petitioner’s convictions under the amended “new” Section 9-305. The State claims that Petitioner was prosecuted for conduct occurring after the effective date of the amended statute and, therefore, the increased penalties were properly applied. That is, the State argues, Petitioner’s conduct constituted continuing offenses that were punishable day to day and, when Petitioner failed to return the children after the “new” Section 9-305 became effective, she exposed herself to prosecution under the amended statute. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States provides in part that “[n]o State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law....” Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, in more specific terms, also prohibits the passage of ex post facto laws: “That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of such Laws, and by them ⁴²⁵ only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or required.” The Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights have been viewed generally to have the “same meaning” and are thus to be construed in pari materia.

Evans v. State, 2004 WL 1635610 , *—; Watkins v. Secretary, Dept. of Public Safety, 377 Md. 34, 48 , 831 A.2d 1079, 1087 (2003); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 136-37 , 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994) (citing Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142 , 169 n. 9, 608 A.2d 162 , 175 n. 9, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 988 , 113 S.Ct. 500 , 121 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992)). By enacting the Ex Post Facto Clause, “the Framers sought to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect....” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 , 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 23 (1981). As the Supreme Court has explained recently, “the {Ex Post Facto ] Clause protects liberty by preventing governments from enacting statutes with ‘manifestly unjust and oppressive ’ retroactive effects.” Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 ,—, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 2449 , 156 L.Ed.2d 544 , — (2003) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)). Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull, regarded by the Stogner Court as “an authoritative account on the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause,” enumerated the types of laws that contravene the ex post facto proscription: 1st.

Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every