Lapides v. Lapides

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City by a divorced father of two children questioning whether an attorney’s fee awarded to the children’s counsel pursuant to Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. (1974, 1980 Repl.

Vol.), § 3-604 was excessive. The mother’s cross appeal does not question the amount of the fee but seeks simply to preserve the apportionment of payment in the event we reverse. The father was assessed $7,500.00 of the $10,000.00 fee; the mother was assessed $2,500.00. Her Statement of Facts summarizes that which the record reflects and we will therefore adopt it for our own purpose here.

"The parties, Morton M. Lapides and Saundra D. Lapides, entered into a Separation Agreement on September 12, 1978, agreeing to a joint custody arrangement for their two minor children, Morton M. Lapides, Jr., and Matthew A. Lapides. This provision was subsequently incorporated into a Divorce Decree of the Circuit Court for [sic] Baltimore City on September 19,1978. Thereafter, a two-year period of legal and psychological warfare ensued resulting in the Appellant’s obtaining full ²⁵⁰ custody of the minor children. Since it was evident to all who witnessed or became involved in these proceedings that the minor children had become the obvious pawns in this legal and psychological holocaust, it was necessary for the Court to appoint independent counsel to monitor the legal proceedings on their behalf.

Judge Watts, at the time assigned to this case, appointed attorney J. Barry Meinster, who he recognized as an expert in the field of children’s litigation, to represent the minor children, and Mr. Meinster participated in all aspects of the trial including the attendance at hearings, depositions and conferences, filing pleadings, conducting interviews, and reviewing numerous legal documents, medical reports, and other materials relevant to the case. Mr. Meinster filed his Fee Petition at the end of the case alleging that he spent 251.25 hours in the course of representing the minor children and sought an award based upon a fee of $100.00 per hour for his time. Judge Karwacki ultimately awarded Mr. Meinster $10,000.00 representing less than $40.00 per hour for the services and apportioned the award $7,500.00 to be paid by Appellant, $2,500.00 to be paid by Cross-Appellant. In making the apportionment it was evident that the extensive work involved in this case on the part of Mr. Meinster was largely due to the excessive number of pleadings, depositions, conferences, and phone calls generated as a result of Appellant’s conduct and participation during the two-year battle.

The entire record of the proceedings speaks for itself on that point.” Having used cross appellant’s factual recitation, we will look to appellant for what standard he would have us apply under § 3-604, which is a relatively new statute. "The law governing the case is uncomplicated and well established. In determining the amount for ²⁵¹ reasonable counsel fees under these circumstances, the court should make its determination according to 'the ordinary factors of labor, skill, time, and benefit’ of the counsel as well as the financial resources of the parties. Foster v. Foster, 33 Md. App. 73 , 364 A. 2d 65 (1976); Flanagan v. Flanagan, 17 Md. App. 90 , 299 A.2d 520 (1973); Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638 , 276 A.2d 425 (1971), Waters v. Waters, 191 Md. 436 , 62 A.2d 250 (1948).

The award of counsel fees by the trial court should be reduced if the appellate court finds that the amount awarded was clearly excessive under the circumstances, Kapneck v. Kapneck, 235 Md. 366 , 201 A.2d 798 (1964); Plakatoris v. Bainder, 204 Md. 223 , 103 A.2d 839 (1954); Renner v. Renner, 16 Md. App. 143 , 294 A.2d 671 (1972); Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638 , 276 A.2d 425 (1971), or where the evidentiary record is insufficient to establish the reasonableness of the award, Deckman v. Deckman, 15 Md. App. 553 , 292 A.2d 112 (1972).” Our careful review of the record indicates that the evidence was sufficient to establish the reasonableness of the award, the court was not clearly erroneous in its determination and the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in setting the fee. Appellant’s entire argument would have us view the facts regarding the "ordinary factors” of consideration in fee cases in the light he projects rather than in the objective light used by equity chancellors and, within appellate limitations, by us. In regard to time, labor and skill expended, we do not find that the fee was clearly excessive under the circumstances. The evidence, reflected by more than 700 docket entries, was sufficient to support the reasonableness of the award.

See Zamaludin v. Ishoof, 44 Md. App. 538, 546 (1980); Foster v. Foster, 33 Md. App. 73 , cert. denied, 278 Md. 722 (1976); Flanagan v. Flanagan, 17 Md. App. 90, aff'd, 270 Md. 335 (1973). We find the fee frugal indeed