Medley v. State

HARRELL, J. Following his conviction on 6 February 2003 of one count of possession of marijuana, based on a guilty plea and agreed facts before the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, Joseph W. Medley was sentenced by the trial judge as follows: I hereby sentence you to fourteen days St. Mary’s County Detention Center, give you credit for fourteen days served. In addition to that, you have to pay a fine of a thousand dollars, plus $125 court costs. Fine and costs are due today. And the Court is going to see to it in these fine cases that they are paid, because after all, the jury has to be paid.[ 1 ] On 7 March 2003, Medley filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, to wit, the $1,000 fine.

That motion was denied. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in an unreported opinion We granted certiorari, Medley v. State, 383 Md. 569 , 861 A.2d 60 (2004), to consider whether the trial judge erred in imposing the $1,000 fine “because after all, the jury has to be paid.” Lacking an ability on this record to attribute a connotation to the trial judge’s remark other than its plain meaning ⁶ denotation, 2 we hold that Medley’s fine was an illegal sentence and reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. I. A sentencing judge has wide discretion in achieving the principal objectives of sentencing — punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 199 , 772 A.2d 273, 277 (2001) (citing Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 531 , 671 A.2d, 501, 505 (1996); State v. Dopkomki, 325 Md. 671, 679 , 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992)) (some citations omitted).

We may overturn a sentence, however, if we conclude that either: 1) it violates constitutional standards; 2) the sentencing judge was motivated by ill-will, prejudice or impermissible considerations; or 3) the sentence exceeds statutory limits. Jackson, 364 Md. at 200 , 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 516 , 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996) (some citations omitted)). In the present case, we are confronted with a record where, taken at face value, the judge linked or justified the thousand dollar fine to reimbursement for jury costs. This objective falls outside the sentencing judge’s statutory authority under then §§ 1, 2, & 4(b) of Article 38 of the Maryland Code, 3 § 8-106 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Arti ⁷ ele, 4 and Maryland Rules 2-509 5 and 4-353. 6 In reviewing the sentencing judge’s actions, we are mindful that, absent a misstatement of law or conduct inconsistent with the law, a “ ‘[tjrial [judge is] presumed to know the law and apply it properly.’ ” State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179, 825 A.2d 452, 459 (2003) (quoting Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 206 , 699 A.2d 1170, 1194 (1997)).

In Chaney, we explained that this foundational principle of law is deeply rooted in a strong presumption that judges perform their legal duties properly. Id. at 181 , 825 A.2d at 459 (citing Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64 , 25 U.S. 64, 69-70 , 6 L.Ed. 552 (1827); Sehowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 126 , 213 A.2d 475, 479 (1965); Albrecht v. State, 132 Md. 150, 156 , 103 A. 443, 445 (1918)). Equally important is the companion ⁸ presumption that judges know the law. Id. at 181-82 , 825 A.2d at 459 -60 (quoting Samson v. State, 27 Md.App. 326, 334 , 341 A.2d 817, 823 (1975)); Grumbine v. State, 60 Md. 355, 356 (1883).

Because of these potent presumptions, we are reluctant to find error, opining that the judge misperceives the law, unless persuaded from the record that a judge made a misstatement of the law or acted in a manner inconsistent with the law. Perry v. State, 381 Md. 138 , 154 n. 8, 848 A.2d 631 , 641 n. 8 (2004) (holding that a judge’s comment that he did not have to hold a hearing outside the presence of a jury did not indicate that the judge did not know his legal duty to determine a child’s competency prior to testifying); Chaney, 375 Md. at 184 , 825 A.2d at 461-62 (holding that judge properly knew and applied the law because he did not misstate the law); Davis v. State, 344 Md. 331, 339 , 686 A.2d 1083, 1086 (1996) (holding that absent an express ruling to the contrary, a judge is presumed to know and apply correctly the law); John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md.App. 406, 429 , 601 A.2d 149, 160 (1992) (holding that, “[ujnless it is clear” in the record that a trial judge does not know the law, the presumption remains that the judge knows and applies correctly the law) (citing Lapides v. Lapides, 50 Md.App. 248, 252 , 437 A.2d 251, 254 (1981)). Chaney reviewed whether a sentencing judge interpreted properly a sentencing statute (former § 413 of Article 27 of the Maryland Code) for first degree murder, after its death penalty provisions had been excised in Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175 , 297 A.2d 696 (1972), when the judge did not acknowledge expressly his statutorily-granted discretion to suspend all or a portion of the sentence. 7 Chaney, 375 Md. at ⁹ 178, 825 A.2d at 457-58 . In that case, the judge observed that the only portion of the sentencing statute (§ 413) surviving Bartholomey provided for a life sentence, without mention of the potential of a suspended sentence.

He ordered a life sentence without mention of suspension of any part. On appeal to the intermediate appellate court, Chaney successfully argued that the judge ignored case law interpreting other statutory provisions (§ 641 A) allowing a sentencing judge to exercise his (or her) discretion to order a suspended sentence for first degree murder. Id. at 177, 825 A.2d at 457 . The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the judge rendered an illegal sentence because he impermissibly did not consider a suspended sentence as being within his judicial discretion.

Id. In reversing the Court of Special Appeals and affirming the original sentence, we held that the sentencing judge was presumed to have acted properly because he did not misstate the law. Id. at 184 , 825 A.2d at 461 . Absent an express misstatement of the law, the judge was presumed to know the law that allowed him the discretion (under then- § 641A) to order a suspended sentence — even though § 413 was silent as to that.

We agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that the judge properly interpreted and stated the provisions of § 413 of Article 27. We reversed the intermediate appellate court’s judgment, however, because the judge said nothing on the record that evinced he was not aware of his discretion to suspend the sentence under § 641A. Unlike the Court of Special Appeals, we presumed that he was aware of his discretion under § 641A and chose not to exercise that discretion to suspend all or any part of the life sentence. Id. at 184-85, 825 A.2d at 461-62 .

It is clear, after reviewing the statutory provisions relevant to the present case, that the Circuit Court