State v. Chaney

¹⁷¹ HARRELL, Judge. I. On 19 April 1978, Richard Miles Chaney was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Calvert County of first degree murder. On the same day as the verdict was rendered, Chaney was sentenced by the trial judge to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals.

Chaney v. State, 42 Md.App. 563 , 402 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 286 Md. 745 (1979). The present case arises from the Circuit Court’s 12 September 2000 denial of Chaney’s pro se “Motion for Appropriate Relief (To Grant Post-Conviction Relief, Habeas Corpus Relief, To Correct Illegal Sentence, or to Reconsider Sentence).” Chaney averred that the sentence imposed was illegal or irregular because the sentencing judge did not consider, as an option at sentencing, the suspension of all or some part of his life sentence. The motions judge in the Circuit Court, 1 in denying Chaney’s motion without hearing, treated it as a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Chaney filed with the Court of Special Appeals an Application for Leave to Appeal the denial of his motion.

Thereafter, he retained counsel who filed a Motion to Treat the Application for Leave to Appeal as a Notice of Appeal, on the basis that Chaney’s motion in the trial court actually was a motion to correct illegal sentence. The Court of Special Appeals granted Chaney’s appellate counsel’s motion, and transferred the case to its regular docket. On 6 August 2002, after briefing and oral argument, the Court of Special Appeals filed an unreported decision reversing the decision of the Circuit Court and remanding the case for a new sentencing hearing. The State then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted.

State v. Chaney, 372 Md. 132 , 812 A.2d 288 (2002). ¹⁷² II. On 6 December 1971, ten-year-old Elizabeth Ann Metzler failed to return from school to her home in northern Anne Arundel County. The following day, her dead body was found in the woods several miles from her home. She had been molested sexually and strangled.

Richard Miles Chaney was convicted of the murder. Following return of the verdict, sentencing proceeded immediately: Judge: Gentlemen, lets take this matter up for sentencing. Mr. [State’s Attorney], is there anything else you would like to present? State’s Attorney: No, sir.

Judge: [Defense counsel], is there anything you would like to say? Sentencing, there is not a lot either can say. Defense Counsel: I have discussed the possibility of filing a motion for a new trial with my client and he waives his right to file a motion for a new trial and we submit to sentencing. Judge: You have a perfect right to file a motion for a new trial in this court anytime up to thirty days from today.

Sentence or unsentence has nothing to do with that here. That is an old hangover from Baltimore City days but we don’t operate under that anymore. All right. Richard Miles Chaney, stand up.

Mr. Chaney, is there anything you wish to say to the Court before sentence is determined in this case? If so, the Court affords you an opportunity to say it at this time. Defendant: No, sir. Judge: Well gentlemen, there is only one punishment in this State for the crime of which this man has been convicted.

The law provides a single penalty and no other penalty and so the sentence in the discretion of the Court in this case is limited to the imposition of that penalty. ¹⁷³ Accordingly, Madame Clerk, the sentence of the Court in this case is that the Defendant be committed to the jurisdiction of the Division of Corrections for the remainder of his natural life. Mr. Chaney, the Court informs you that you have the following rights. You may appeal this entire proceeding to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. That right is exercised by filing a written order for appeal with the Clerk of this court.

It must be filed not later than thirty days from today. Secondly, you may apply to a panel of Circuit Trial Judges to review the sentence imposed upon you by this member of the court. That right is exercised by filing a written application for review with the Clerk of this Court on forms which the Clerk will provide to you at your request. It must be filed not later than thirty days from today.

Finally, you have a right to move this member of the court to modify or reduce the sentence imposed upon you. That right is exercised by filing a written motion for reconsideration. It must be filed with the Clerk of this court not later than ninety days from today or not later than ninety days from the date of a mandate of any or of the last Appellate Court which would hear this matter. Now, it is [your attorney’s] responsibility as your counsel under our rules of court to initiate any or all three of these proceedings if you request him to do so.

Once he has done that his obligation to you as your attorney under our rules of practice ends unless, of course, you make other arrangements with him for further representation.

III

The State presents one question for review: Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that Chaney’s sentence was illegal due to the alleged failure of the sentencing court to recognize its discretion to suspend part of Chaney’s life sentence? ¹⁷⁴ Respondent, in his brief, dissects this somewhat generic question into three sub-parts: A. [The sentencing judge] erred in failing to recognize that he had the discretion to suspend a portion of the life sentence imposed in this case. B. The failure to exercise discretion rendered Mr. Chaney’s sentence illegal and/or Mr. Chaney’s sentence was imposed in an irregular manner. C. If the Sentence imposed in this case is not illegal or imposed in an irregular manner, this court can still grant Mr. Chaney a new sentencing hearing pursuant to the Post Conviction Procedure Act. The first two of Chaney’s formulated queries were presented by him, as Appellant there, to the Court of Special Appeals.

The third, (C), is new and not properly before us for two reasons. First, it was not raised in the trial court. See Maryland Rule 8-181(a)(ordinarily the appellate court will not decide an issue not raised in or decided by the trial court); Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253, 262-63 , 658 A.2d 239, 243 (1995). Second, this issue was not raised by way of cross-petition in this Court, nor was it included in our order granting the writ.

See Gonzales v. State, 322 Md. 62, 69 , 585 A.2d 222, 226 (1991)(issue not presented in petition for writ will not be addressed); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 106 , 532 A.2d 1066, 1077 (1987). Additionally, appellate counsel for Chaney, during oral argument before us, affirmatively withdrew any argument that this case involves an illegal sentence; thus we shall not address his question (C). 2 Our reading of the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals reveals that the intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court because it viewed the trial judge as having imposed the sentence in 1978 under the mistaken assumption that he did not have the power to suspend any portion of the life sentence. We therefore limit our review to the question of whether, on ¹⁷⁵ this record, the trial judge failed to recognize that he had the discretion to suspend all or a portion of the life sentence imposed in this case, and if so, does that error require a new sentencing proceeding.

IV

Respondent argues that the trial judge erred when he imposed a life sentence without expressly recognizing that the sentence, or a portion of it, could have been suspended. Chaney relies entirely on the transcript of the sentencing proceeding to prove his point. Specifically, he points to the following language employed by the judge: Well, gentlemen, there is only one punishment in this State for the crime of which this man has been convicted. The law provides a single penalty and no other penalty and so the sentence in the discretion of the Court in this case is limited to the imposition of that penalty.

In Respondent’s view, this statement indicates that the trial judge was under the impression that he had no discretion to suspend all or any portion of the life sentence. To bolster this argument, Respondent alleges an absence of any mention by the trial judge that he was aware of the suspension option. Respondent’s argument, in short, is that because the trial judge failed to mention the possibility of suspension of sentence, and stated instead that his discretion was limited to the imposition of the statutory penalty, the trial judge must not have realized that he had the power to suspend the life sentence or a portion of it. Chaney, therefore, argues that he is entitled to be sentenced anew so that effectively a different sentencing judge may consider the possibility of a suspended sentence on the facts of this case. 3 The Court of Special Appeals agreed with Respondent’s position, finding that the trial judge “failed to recognize that he had the discretion to suspend all or part of appellant’s ¹⁷⁶ sentence.” In reaching its conclusion, the intermediate appellate court relied on Williamson v. State, 284 Md. 212 , 395 A.2d 496 (1979) and Sanders v. State, 105 Md.App. 247 , 659 A.2d 356 (1995).

In Williamson , we were confronted with a situation where the sentencing judge refused to follow an opinion of this Court recognizing that a life sentence could be suspended. In that case, the following transpired in the trial court: [The Court]: As far as the murder conviction is concerned, there’s no choice. She gets life. [Defense Counsel]: No, Your Honor. There is a choice.

You can suspend part of it. I brought the Wooten case with me. 4 [The Court]: I understand that, and I completely disagree . with Judge Raine and the Court of Appeals. I think the Legislature said when a person kills somebody else or causes them to be killed, it’s life. So as far as I am concerned, the sentence on the murder charge is life ... [Defense Counsel]: I was going to comment to the Court on the Wooten case, but I guess I won’t do that either. [The Court]: No. I have very strong feelings about that. 284 Md. at 213-14 , 395 A.2d at 496-97 .

We reversed, observing that “[b]y precluding any consideration of suspending any part of the life sentence, the trial judge denied appellant’s ¹⁷⁷ right to a proper exercise of the discretion vested in him.” 284 Md. at 215 , 395 A.2d at 497 . In Sanders , the Court of Special Appeals was confronted with a situation where a judge on resentencing apparently felt that he was constrained in his analysis by what a prior sentencing judge had done. The intermediate appellate court observed: It is apparent from the record that the resentencing judge felt bound by the nature of the sentence imposed by the original trial judge. Prior to hearing the evidence by Sanders and his counsel, the judge checked with defense counsel to be sure the earlier sentence had been imposed consecutively.

Prior to announcing the sentence, the judge noted Sanders’s accomplishments but then he said that he was “stuck with a handicap” and had to “stand in the [prior judge’s] shoes.” He indicated that it was hard to “second guess what [the prior judge] would or would not do,” and then he imposed virtually the same sentence as [the prior judge] had, simply reducing it to the maximum that was legally allowed. The law requires the judge to conduct his own inquiry and to reach his own sentences based upon the evidence before him. Because it appears that the judge erroneously felt constrained to follow his predecessor’s decision and was therefore motivated by impermissible considerations, Sanders is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. 105 Md.App. at 256-57 , 659 A.2d at 361 . The Court of Special Appeals found the case sub judice analogous to Williamson and Sanders , holding that: [i]n this case the sentencing judge believed that the only option open to him was a sentence of life imprisonment, and he, therefore, did not consider the possibility that a portion of the sentence could be suspended.

Since this was an impermissible consideration, we will remand the case to the circuit court for resentencing. We find the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals unpersuasive, and the cases it relied on distinguishable. We therefore reverse. ¹⁷⁸ This case turns on how we today, some twenty-five years after the event, interpret the sentencing judge’s remark that “[t]he law provides a single penalty and no other penalty and so the sentence in the discretion of the Court in this case is limited to the imposition of that penalty.” The statute in effect, at the date of the crime, and under which Chaney was sentenced, Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 413, provided in relevant part that “[ejvery person convicted of murder in the first degree .... shall suffer death, or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary of the State for a the period of their natural life.” 5 Section 413 did not address the potentiality for suspension of the sentence. The version of Art. 27, § 413 in effect at the time of Elizabeth Ann Metzler’s murder on 6 December 1971 subsequently was found to be unconstitutional, as regards the death penalty, in Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175 , 297 A.2d 696 (1972), based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).

In Bartholomey , after invalidating the death penalty, this Court observed that: The invalidity of Bartholomey’s death sentences does not, of course, affect the legality of either of his underlying murder convictions. The “further proceedings” required to be taken under Furman are limited to those involved in imposing valid sentences upon Bartholomey. The only law ¹⁷⁹ ful sentence that can be imposed for murder in the first degree under the controlling statute (§ 413) is life imprisonment; no discretion is lodged in the sentencing judge and the imposition of any other sentence would plainly be illegal. 267 Md. at 185 , 297 A.2d at 701 (citations omitted)(footnote omitted). 6 The sentencing judge’s statement, therefore, far from being in error, was legally correct in its historical context, and, so understood, reflected an implicit knowledge of the extant, though recent, changes in the case law regarding sentencing in murder cases in Maryland at that time. An important point here is that, temporally, one must pass a sentence before one can suspend it.

As noted, the sentencing judge correctly stated the law. Under Art. 27, § 413, the only sentence available at the time under these circumstances was life imprisonment. The issue before us, therefore, is whether the sentencing judge’s failure expressly and consecutively to acknowledge the existence of a second statute permitting a suspension of that sentence, Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, § 641A, 7 is sufficient to infer that he was unaware of its potential application to the sentence he imposed in the case sub judice.

We conclude that it