Lee v. State

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. The narrow issue presented by this appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the charge of obstruction of justice. We find there was and so we will affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The facts are simple and may be recited briefly.

Milton Blyther was the complaining witness in an assault case which he initiated in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City against Juan Lee, appellant. As he, accompanied by his wife and daughter, was leaving the District Court where he had gone in response to a summons to appear in connection with the assault charge, Blyther encountered appellant, who had failed to appear for the case. After offering the Blythers a ride home, appellant inquired if there had been court that day. When Blyther responded in the affirmative, appellant then asked Blyther why he had initiated charges against him.

After Blyther responded, 1 ⁵⁹⁰ appellant took a gun from the glove box of his car, told Blyther either that he would talk to him with the gun or that he would deal with him like a man, and pointed the gun at him. He returned to his car and drove away when the Blythers mentioned that the police were coming. The Blythers flagged down a police car and reported the incident. Appellant was located a short time later.

Although the car and appellant were searched, no gun was found. A gun identified by Mr. and Mrs. Blyther as the one appellant pointed at them, was found, however, in some bushes, approximately twenty-five feet from where appellant was standing. Appellant was arrested and charged with assault, possession of a handgun and obstruction of justice. Appellant was tried by the court sitting without a jury and testified in his own defense.

While he admitted owning the gun recovered by the police, he denied pointing it at either one of the Blythers. On appeal, appellant acknowledges that Blyther was a witness against him in a criminal case and that the subject confrontation occurred on a day on which a hearing in that case had been scheduled. He nevertheless argues that, rather than showing that appellant was trying to influence, intimidate or impede Blyther in the discharge of his duty as the complaining witness in that case, the testimony showed “at most, a continuation of their mutual disagreement and argument which led to the original assault charge.” He finds significant the fact that none of the words he spoke “indicated that Mr. Blyther would be putting himself in jeopardy by continuing to press the assault charge.” Maryland Code Ann. Art. 27 § 27 provides: If any person by corrupt means or by threats or force endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or court officer of any court of this State in the ⁵⁹¹ discharge of his duty, or by corrupt means or by threats or force obstructs, impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice therein, he is liable to be prosecuted, and on conviction to be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 3 years, or both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offense. It was interpreted in Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588 , 16 A.2d 642 (1940).

There one of the defendants was charged with a violation of this section 2 by endeavoring to influence a prosecution witness in a criminal trial, then pending, to leave and remain out of Baltimore City until after that trial. Responding to the argument that the indictment under which the charge was brought was duplicitous, the Court said: The statute is in aid and definition of a class of those criminal acts which are known to the common law as obstructions of justice. The words of the statute are general and embrace in comprehensive terms various forms of obstruction. Thus the particular acts are not specified but, whatever they may be, if the acts be corrupt, or be threats or force, used in an attempt to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness or officer in any court of the state in the discharge of his duty, there is an obstruction of justice.

Likewise, if by acts of similar quality and nature the due administration of justice in any court shall either be impeded or obstructed or be so attempted, there is an obstruction of justice. ⁵⁹² Furthermore, it is quite clear that the corrupt act, or one of threat or force, employed to influence or intimidate or impede any such juror, witness, or officer in the discharge of his duty in a court, must necessarily be, also, an endeavor to obstruct or impede in such court the due administration of justice. The fact that the act denounced is at once an attempt within the meaning of both clauses of the section of the statute forbidding certain obstructions to justice does not make the forbidden act two offences against the sovereign State. Where in this statute the acts particularly denounced are of necessity wholly within the limits of the acts generally denounced, two offences do not arise from the same act, although it may be dealt with here under alternate provisions as an obstruction to justice. Id. at 592 , 16 A.2d 642 .

Although no particular acts are enumerated in the statute, Romans makes clear that the conduct prohibited includes any attempt to corruptly influence, intimidate, or impede a witness in the discharge of his duty or to corruptly obstruct or impede the due administration of justice. Thus, if the action of appellant was intended to influence, intimidate or impede Blyther from testifying against him, it would be prohibited conduct. Because no direct or express evidence of appellant’s intent to influence, intimidate, or impede Blyther as a witness appears on the record, we must look to the circumstances surrounding the incident and the natural and inevitable consequences of