Linder Crane Service Co. v. Hogan

⁴⁴⁰ BISHOP, Judge. Linder Crane Service Company and the Subsequent Injury Fund appeal from the May 16, 1990 order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Howe, J., presiding) which granted summary judgment to the appellee and thereby affirmed the decision of the Worker’s Compensation Commission. The Worker’s Compensation Commission held that Frances Hogan, appellee, continued to be wholly dependent upon Joseph Hogan, Jr., deceased, and was entitled to continued Worker’s Compensation benefits pursuant to Md. Ann.Code art. 101, § 36(8)(a) (1984). 1 ISSUES Appellants present the following issues on appeal: I. Whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore County erred by failing to find as a matter of law that Frances R. Hogan lost her status as a wholly dependent person under Md.Ann. Code art. 101, § 36(8) by virtue of her thirty-three months of employment after the death of her husband; and II. Whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore County erred by failing to provide Linder Crane Service Company and the Subsequent Injury Fund with a credit for the thirty-three months that Frances R. Hogan was employed after her husband’s death.

FACTS Joseph Hogan, Jr. died February 10, 1985 due to injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred while he was working for his employer, Linder Crane Service Company (Linder Crane). He was survived by his wife, Frances, appellee, and his son, Kelly, age sixteen. During their marriage, Joseph supported the family while Frances maintained the home. About two months after Joseph died, on April 3, 1985, appellee began working as a clerk at the ⁴⁴¹ Linen Locker for a wage of $3.35 per hour.

Appellee worked her way up to manager where she made approximately $260.00 per week. On September 3, 1985, appellee filed her claim for Worker’s Compensation benefits pursuant to § 36(8). 2 The claim was contested by appellants. After a hearing, the Worker’s Compensation Commission (Commission) found appellee to be wholly dependent and awarded her $45,000.00 and further benefit payments as provided under § 36(8)(a), to be paid half by Linder Crane and half by the Subsequent Injury Fund (Fund). Linder Crane paid its share of the $45,000.00 to appellee by check dated December 30, 1987, and the Fund paid its share at approximately the same time.

On January 15, 1988, appellee quit her job at the Linen Locker. After the $45,000.00 was paid, appellants stopped making benefit payments. On April 27, 1988, appellee filed a claim with the Commission to have the benefit payments reinstated. A hearing was held before the Commission and, in an order dated July 7, 1988, the Commission found that “the fact that the claimant-widow [appellee] was forced to seek employment in order to live, by virtue of the dispute about compensability, does not abate her total dependency as of the date of the injury,” and ordered that appellants continue to make benefit payments of $155.50 per week to appellee. 3 The decision of the Commission was appealed to the circuit court.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the court denied all motions on the ground that there was a genuine dispute as to whether appellee terminated her employment because she was medically unable to work. Subsequently, appellee filed answers to interrogatories propounded by the Fund. Appellee responded that she did not stop working because she was physically unable to continue. ⁴⁴² After appellee filed her responses, the parties again filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

At the conclusion of the hearing on these motions, the court stated that whether benefit payments would be reinstated pursuant to § 36(8) turns on whether appellee has become self-supporting and not whether she is capable of being self-supporting. The court then found that it was undisputed that appellee was not working at the time the Commission continued her benefits and that she did not work during her marriage. Based on these findings, the court granted summary judgment for appellee. DISCUSSION I. Pertinent to the issues are the following provisions of § 36(8)(a): If a surviving wife, husband, or child continues to be totally dependent after the total amount of $45,000.00 has been paid, further payments to the surviving wife, husband, or child shall be paid at the same weekly rate during his or her total dependency.

If a surviving, wife, husband, or child except as set forth in paragraph (d)[ 4 ] herein, who is wholly dependent at the time of death becomes thereafter wholly or partially self-supporting, payments shall nevertheless continue until the total sum of $45,000.00 has been paid, and thereafter further benefits shall cease. It is the intention herein that a surviving wife or husband who is wholly dependent at the time of death shall receive at least the total sum of $45,000.00, even though she or he becomes wholly or partially self-supporting before the sum is paid. The Commission has continuing jurisdiction to determine whether the surviving wife, husband, or child has become wholly or partially ⁴⁴³ self-supporting, and to suspend, terminate or reinstate suspended or terminated payments of compensation. Appellants contend that appellee’s temporary employment made her “partially self-supporting” and no longer entitled to benefits after she was paid the $45,000.00 award.

We disagree and explain. The question of whether Frances was totally dependent upon Joseph in April 1988, after she left her employment of thirty-three months, is for the finder of fact unless the facts and the inferences that can be drawn from them are undisputed at which point the question becomes one of law for the court and may be decided on a motion for summary judgment. Md.Rule 2-501; Johnson v. Cole, 245 Md. 515, 521 , 226 A.2d 268 (1967); Syme v. Mark Rentals, Inc., 70 Md.App. 235, 237-9 , 520 A.2d 1110 (1987). The Worker’s Compensation statute should be liberally construed so that any ambiguity, uncertainty or conflict is resolved in favor of the claimant, in order to effect the statute’s benevolent purposes. 5 R & T Construction v. Judge, 82 Md.App. 700, 708 , 573 A.2d 96 , cert. granted, 321 Md. 46, 580 A.2d 1066 (1990); Beth.-Sp.

Pt. Shipy’d v. Hempfield, 206 Md. 589, 594 , 112 A.2d 488 (1955); Beth.-Fair. Shipy’d v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416, 425 , 45 A.2d 79 (1945). In the case sub judice, the pertinent facts are undisputed.

Frances was wholly dependent upon Joseph for the twenty years prior to his death. After his death, Frances then worked for thirty-three months, having no other source of income. She resigned from her employment after she received her Worker’s Compensation benefits, and she was unemployed at the time of the Commission hearing which continued her benefits. ⁴⁴⁴ Generally, the test for dependency is whether the claimant relied upon the earnings of the worker under circumstances which indicate that the worker intended to furnish that support. Meyler v. Mayor and City Council, 179 Md. 211, 217 , 17 A.2d 762 (1941).

That the claimant has the ability to be self-supporting does not preclude her from being wholly dependent. Id. “[T]here is no provision in the statute requiring that a person must be incapable of supporting