Little v. State

MURPHY, Chief Judge. This case concerns the legality of police roadblocks established in furtherance of a state operated sobriety checkpoint program to detect and deter drunk driving. I. As part of an effort to stop drunk driving, the Maryland State Police augmented its conventional enforcement methods by erecting systematic roadblocks on state roads having high alcohol related accident rates. The sobriety checkpoints were established pursuant to a pilot program implemented on a limited basis in Harford County for a three-month period beginning on December 12, 1982.

Checkpoints were erected in the county on seven days during this period; they were in operation between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m. on December 17, 18, 26 and 31, 1982, on January 6 and 21, 1983 and on February 18, 1983. 1 Harford County was selected because it had a relatively high rate of alcohol related traffic fatalities that did not vary seasonally. Additionally, the county was unaffected by the sobriety checkpoints operated in the Washington, D.C. suburbs by the Montgomery and Prince George’s County Police Departments. Extensive statewide publicity accompanied the commencement of the pilot program. Press conferences were held in Harford County and Annapolis; a complete demonstration was staged at a mock checkpoint.

These events received widespread media coverage. There was live television coverage of the first roadblock ⁴⁹⁰ which was operated on December 17, 1982; its exact location was disclosed at that time. Comprehensive regulations governed the operation of the sobriety checkpoint program. They were reviewed and approved by the Superintendent of the Maryland State Police, the Attorney General and the Governor.

As prescribed in the regulations, the roadblock locations were selected on the basis of data on alcohol related accidents supplied by the State Highway Administration. The date, time and location of each checkpoint required the approval of the Chief of the Field Operations Bureau of the State Police. Three sites were selected for each night the checkpoints were in operation. The police team charged with operating the roadblocks was authorized to alternate between these sites, with the decision to move the location being vested in the commissioned officer in charge.

One factor influencing this decision was whether traffic passing through the checkpoint was too light or too heavy. ¡ The safety of motorists and State Police officers was a primary consideration in the selection of checkpoint sites. Accordingly, roadblocks were established only where there were long stretches of straight level road giving drivers sufficient distance to stop their vehicles safely, adequate shoulders at least twelve to eighteen feet wide, and a manageable amount of traffic during the roadblock’s hours of operation. At each of the roadblock sites used during the pilot program, there was a safe place for motorists to make a U-turn before reaching the checkpoint. In instances where traffic became congested at the checkpoint site, the commissioned officer in charge was empowered to suspend the operation temporarily until the congestion was relieved.

The regulations prescribed the arrangement of each checkpoint. A twenty-square-foot sign is placed two-hundred to three-hundred feet in front of each checkpoint. The signs say “Stop Ahead, Sobriety Checkpoint” and contain the State Police seal. The checkpoints are manned by nine uniformed officers wearing reflecting safety vests; at least ⁴⁹¹ one commissioned officer is present to supervise.

Checkpoints are illuminated by flares and marked with additional signs to control traffic. State Police vehicles are parked on each side of the roadblock with their emergency lights activated. Troopers signal traffic to halt by using flashlights; no barricades are placed on the roadway. The regulations detail the duties of each officer attending the roadblock: “All traffic approaching the checkpoint will be stopped as long as traffic congestion does not occur.

The trooper will approach each motorist and state, T am Trooper (John Doe) of the Maryland State Police. You have been stopped at a sobriety checkpoint set up to identify drunk drivers.’ If there is no immediate evidence of intoxication, a traffic safety brochure developed specifically for this enforcement strategy will be given to the motorist. The trooper will suggest to the motorist that he read the brochure at a later time for a more complete explanation of the stop. The motorist will then be assisted to safely proceed.” The brochures also contain a questionnaire for the motorist to return with comments about the program.

Each checkpoint stop lasts between fifteen and thirty seconds. The regulations instruct officers to look for the following articulable signs of intoxication: “an odor of alcoholic beverage about the driver, slurred speech, the general appearance, and/or other behavior normally associated with D.W.I. violators.” If these observations give the officer reason to believe that the driver may be intoxicated, the vehicle may be referred to the shoulder for additional investigation. There, the motorist is asked to produce a driver’s license and vehicle registration and may be asked to perform certain coordination tests. 2 If these tests produce sufficient evidence of intoxication, the motorist is arrested. ⁴⁹² A motorist wishing to avoid a sobriety checkpoint may make a U-turn or turn onto a side road prior to reaching the roadblock. No action is taken against a driver doing so unless the motorist drives erratically.

For example, on several occasions, drivers ran off the road while trying to turn around and they were stopped. Likewise, a driver who stops at the checkpoint but refuses to roll down the car window is allowed to proceed. If other signs of intoxication are observed, the driver may be followed to detect signs of erratic driving. The officers operating the checkpoint do not search the interior of the vehicle or its occupants.

A flashlight is used to illuminate the driver only; the officers do not inspect the area around the driver or the remainder of the passenger compartment. Appellant Odom was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint on Route 24 in Harford County at 2:55 a.m. on January 1, 1983. State Trooper Meeks detected a strong odor of alcohol and observed that Odom’s face was flushed red and that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Odom “kept sticking his head inside the vehicle” to prevent Meeks from smelling his breath.

Meeks asked Odom to pull his vehicle to the side of the road and to perform several field sobriety tests. He was arrested after performing poorly on the tests. Appellant Little was stopped at 1:50 a.m. by State Trooper Adams at the same checkpoint. Little brought his vehicle to a “jerking stop” and rolled down the window about three inches.

Adams detected a very strong odor of alcohol and observed that Little’s eyes were bloodshot and “bugged out” and that his face was red. Little was asked to pull onto the shoulder and perform several field sobriety tests. He stumbled while getting out of his car, bumping into the door. After performing poorly on the tests, he was arrested.

Both appellants were charged with driving while intoxicated. Each filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the roadblock stops, claiming violation of their constitutional rights. The Circuit Court for Har ⁴⁹³ ford County (Cameron, J.) denied the motions and subsequently found Odom guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol and Little guilty of driving while intoxicated. Each appealed.

We granted certiorari prior to consideration of the appeals by the intermediate appellate court primarily to determine whether the challenged roadblocks violated appellants’ constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 3 II. It is well recognized that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-558 , 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082-3083 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). The Fourth Amendment, however, does not prohibit all seizures but only those which are unreasonable.

Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 407 , 474 A.2d 191 (1984); Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 494-495 , 124 A.2d 764 (1956). In other words, as the Supreme Court made clear both in Prouse and MartinezFuerte, such seizures are not per se violative of the Fourth Amendment simply because the stop was not based on either probable cause to believe or reasonable suspicion that ⁴⁹⁴ the motorist was engaged in conduct in violation of the criminal law. As Prouse states, 440 U.S. at 653-654 , 99 S.Ct. at 1395-1396 , the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental officers in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. Hence, “the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. at 654 , 99 S.Ct. at 1396 .

And, as Prouse further makes plain, “the reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against ‘an objective standard,’ whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test.” 4 Id. The application of these constitutional principles to the stopping of motorists is well illustrated by the cases. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), Border Patrol officers pursued and stopped a car carrying several illegal immigrants. Their only reason for choosing that particular vehicle was the apparent Mexican ancestry of the passengers.

The Court held that the stop constituted a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 878 , 95 S.Ct. at 2578 . Balancing the public interest against the interference with individual liberty, the Court found that the roving stops were unreasonable when not based on individualized suspicion. Id. at 883 , 95 S.Ct. at 2581 .

The Court recognized the strong public interest in stemming the tide of illegal aliens. It held, however, that the degree of interfer ⁴⁹⁵ ence with lawful traffic was not justified. The Court concluded: “[Ojfficers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.” Id. at 884 , 95 S.Ct. at 2582 (footnote omitted). In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 , 96 S.Ct. 3074 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), the Court held that stops made without individualized suspicion at fixed roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The defendants had been stopped at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint. All traffic passing through the checkpoint was screened and most vehicles were allowed to proceed without further interruption. If an officer found a particular vehicle to be suspicious, it was detained at a secondary inspection area while the occupants were questioned about their citizenship. The Court found that the need for the checkpoints was great because the flow of illegal aliens could not be otherwise controlled effectively at a 2000-mile border.

Therefore, the Court reasoned, checkpoints located on major highways were needed to deny illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the interior. A requirement that stops be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical, the Court said, because “such a requirement would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.” Id. at 557 , 96 S.Ct. at 3083 . Balanced against this strong government interest, the Court found that the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests occasioned by routine checkpoint stops “is quite limited.” Id. It said: “This objective intrusion—the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection—also existed in roving-patrol stops.

But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion—the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers—is ⁴⁹⁶ appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In [United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 , 95 S.Ct. 2585 [2587-2588], 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975) ], we noted: ‘[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.’ ” Id. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083 .

Compared with the roving-patrol stops involved in Brignoni-Ponce, supra, the Court said that “[r]outine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public.” Id. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3083 . It continued by noting: “First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity.

The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops.

Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unrea ⁴⁹⁷ sonable is subject to post-stop judicial review.” Id. at 559 , 96 S.Ct. at 3083-3084 (footnote omitted). The Court concluded that the checkpoint stops made without individualized suspicion were constitutional. Id. at 562 , 96 S.Ct. at 3085 . It also said that the intrusions caused by directing motorists to a secondary inspection area were minimal; that referrals could be made on criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop; and that individualized suspicion was not required.

Id. at 563 , 96 S.Ct. at 3085 . In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), the Court struck down the use of random driver’s license and vehicle registration checks not based on probable cause or articulable suspicion. The Court found these random stops as intrusive as the stops made by the roving patrols in Brignoni-Ponce, supra. It said: “Both of these stops generally entail law enforcement officers signaling a moving automobile to pull over to the side of the roadway, by means of a possibly unsettling show of authority.

Both interfere with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and consume time. Both may create substantial anxiety. For Fourth Amendment purposes, we also see insufficient resemblance between sporadic and random stops of individual vehicles making their way through city traffic and those stops occasioned by roadblocks where all vehicles are brought to a halt or to a near halt, and all are subjected to a show of the police power of the community.” Id. at 657, 99 S.Ct. at 1398 . The Court found that the state’s interest in enforcing the license and registration laws could be served by more effective alternatives and concluded that the state’s interest was outweighed by the intrusiveness of the stops.

Id. at 661 , 99 S.Ct. at 1400 . Although the Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of temporary roadblocks set up to enforce traffic ⁴⁹⁸ laws, it has suggested that this method would be permissible. In Prouse , it said: “[Our] holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.” 440 U.S. at 663 , 99 S.Ct. at 1401 (footnote omitted).

The Court noted in Brown v. Texas, supra, 443 U.S. at 51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640 , that as an alternative to a stop based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion, a seizure may “be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.” Commenting on Prouse , the Court in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 , —, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 2579 , 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983) said that “alternative methods, such as spot checks that involve less intrusion, or questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops, would just as readily accomplish the State’s objectives in furthering compliance with auto registration and safety laws. * 4s * * * “... Random stops without any articulable suspicion of vehicles away from the border are not permissible under the Fourth Amendment [citations omitted] but stops at fixed checkpoints or at roadblocks are.” 103 S.Ct. at 2582 . In applying the rules enunciated by the Supreme Court, some courts have found roadblocks to be unconstitutional where the authorities did not provide adequate procedures for limiting the discretion of field officers. In State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980), two police officers decided to stop all vehicles entering a city park during the evening.

Their purpose was to identify potential suspects if any vandalism occurred during those hours. They established their roadblock without the knowledge or authoriza ⁴⁹⁹ tion of their superiors. Because there were only two officers, they could not stop all vehicles entering the park. The court held that the stops made by the officers violated the Fourth Amendment.

It noted that the checkpoint was “haphazardly located by officers in the field”; that there were no signs warning drivers of the roadblock; that it was not adequately illuminated; that vehicles were not stopped systematically; and that no provision was made for maintaining the roadblock for a significant period. Id. at 318-19 . The court indicated that the use of roadblocks would be valid where there existed: “(1) a checkpoint or roadblock location selected for its safety and visibility to oncoming motorists; (2) adequate advance warning signs, illuminated at night, timely informing approaching motorists of the nature of the impending intrusion; (3) uniformed officers and official vehicles in sufficient quantity and visibility to ‘show ... the police power of the community;’ and (4) a predetermination by policymaking administrative officers of the roadblock location, time, and procedures to be employed, pursuant to carefully formulated standards and neutral criteria.” Id. at 318 . Similarly, in Com. v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137 , 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983), the court declared unconstitutional a sobriety checkpoint.

The court found that the checkpoint was poorly illuminated and unsafe; that field officers determined the procedures governing the operation of the roadblock and decided which vehicles would be stopped; that the roadblock caused traffic to back up for at least two-thirds of a mile; and that inadequate warning was given to approaching motorists. 449 N.E.2d at 353 . The court said: “For a roadblock to be permissible, it appears that the selection of motor vehicles to be stopped must not be arbitrary, safety must be assured, motorists’ inconvenience must be minimized, and assurance must be given that the procedure is being conducted pursuant to a plan devised by law enforcement supervisory personnel. While we do not suggest that advance notice is a constitu ⁵⁰⁰ tional necessity, advance publication of the date of an intended roadblock, even without announcing its precise ' location, would have the virtue of reducing surprise, fear, and inconvenience.” Id. In State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D.1976), the court declared unconstitutional the operation of a sobriety checkpoint for two reasons.

First, the court said, no warning was given to oncoming drivers. Second, supervisory law enforcement officials did not establish any' guidelines governing the location and operation of the checkpoints. Id. at 394-95 . The court concluded that the stops made at the roadblock were indistinguishable from those made by the roving patrols in Brignoni-Ponee, supra.

Olgaard, supra, 248 N.W.2d at 395 . The same result was reached in State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct. of State, 136 Ariz. 1 , 663 P.2d 992 (1983). In that case, the court found: “The roadblocks were set up at the discretion of a local highway patrolman and were operated without specific directions or guidelines.

Officers were uncertain whether they should simply question the occupants of motor vehicles or whether they should seize the opportunity to cursorily search the vehicles for evidence of a violation. Motorists were taken by surprise, not having had prior notice of the location and purpose of the checkpoints.” 663 P.2d at 996 . The court moreover noted the absence of any statistics concerning the effectiveness of the roadblocks. It concluded that upon the record made in the case the intrusiveness of the roadblocks outweighed the state’s law enforcement interest.

Id. See also the pre-Prouse cases of United States v. Maxwell, 565 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.1977) (stop at checkpoint set up to detect illegal aliens unlawful because the roadblock was temporary); and United States v. Sandoval-Ruano, 436 F.Supp. 734 (S.D.Cal.1977) (border checkpoint held unconstitutional because its location was determined by a field officer and because insufficient advance ⁵⁰¹ notice was given to drivers). See also State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla.Crim.App.1984) (temporary sobriety checkpoint unconstitutional because it is more likely to cause fear and surprise than a permanent facility); Koonce v. State, 651 S.W.2d 46 (Tex.App.1983) (driver’s license checkpoint held unconstitutional because there was no evidence that it was operated pursuant to objective, nondiscretionary, departmental procedures). A majority of courts, however, have sustained the use of roadblocks as a proper law enforcement tool.

As a general rule, the constitutionality of traffic checkpoints has been upheld where: (1) the discretion of the officers in the field is carefully circumscribed by clear objective regulations established by high level administrative officials; (2) approaching drivers are given adequate warning that there is a roadblock ahead; (3) the likelihood of apprehension, fear or surprise is reduced by a display of legitimate police authority at the roadblock; and (4) vehicles are stopped on a systematic, nonrandom basis that shows drivers they are not being singled out for arbitrary reasons. Illustrative is State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529 , 673 P.2d 1174 (1983). There, the court sustained the validity of a sobriety checkpoint established to deter and apprehend drunk drivers. In balancing the government’s interest against the intrusion on individual liberty, the court indicated that the following factors should be considered: “(1) The degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in the field; (2) the location designated for the roadblock; (3) the time and duration of the roadblock; (4) standards set by superior officers; (5) advance notice to the public at large; (6) advance warning to the individual approaching motorist; (7) maintenance of safety conditions; (8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation; (9) average length of time each motorist is detained; (10) physical factors surrounding the location, type and method of operation; (11) the availability of less intrusive methods for combating the problem; (12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and (13) any ⁵⁰² other relevant circumstances which might bear upon the test.” 673 P.2d at 1185 .

The court found that the location of the roadblock was selected by supervisory personnel and not by officers in the field; that participating officers were briefed in advance about the procedures to be followed; that the site was well lighted, the officers were in uniform and the emergency lights on the patrol cars were activated; that vehicles traveling in either direction were stopped and therefore officers in the field had no discretion to decide which motorists to detain; and that the time of the initial detention was limited unless the inspecting officer detected reasonable grounds for further investigation. On balance, the court concluded that the intrusion caused by the roadblock stops was reasonable under the applicable Fourth Amendment standard. Consideration of the factors discussed in Deskins has led other courts to uphold the validity of roadblocks in varying circumstances. See United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 , 102 S.Ct. 130 , 70 L.Ed.2d 110 (1981) (constitutionality of license and registration checkpoint at which all passenger cars were stopped upheld on basis of dicta from Prouse, supra); United States v. Miller, 608 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926 , 100 S.Ct. 3020 , 65 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1980) (stating in dicta that temporary roadblocks are permissible under Prouse); United States v. Millar, 543 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir.1976) (constitutionality of license and registration checkpoint upheld); United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir.1970) (same); United States v. Obregon, 573 F.Supp. 876 (D.N.M.1983) (same); State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535 , 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974) (sustaining validity of license and registration checkpoint set up outside a rock music concert); State v. Roberson, 165 Ga.App. 727 , 302 S.E.2d 591 (1983) (upholding constitutionality of stop made at roadblock established to check drivers’ licenses); People v. Meitz, 95 Ill.

App.3d 1033 , 51 Ill.Dec. 561 , 420 N.E.2d 1119 (1981) (finding no constitutional violation where police stopped all cars of ⁵⁰³ certain make and model exiting a parking lot from which vehicles of that type had recently been stolen); People v. Estrada, 68 Ill.App.3d 272 , 24 Ill.Dec. 924 , 386 N.E.2d 128 (1979) , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 968 , 100 S.Ct. 459 , 62 L.Ed.2d 382 (1979) (vehicle safety equipment inspections conducted in a systematic, nondiscretionary manner at roadblocks are valid under Fourth Amendment); Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 1004 (Miss.1979) (constitutionality of driver’s license checkpoint upheld); People v. John BB., 56 N.Y.2d 482 , 438 N.E.2d 864 , 453 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1982) (sustaining validity of roadblock erected on rural road to stop all traffic as part of an investigation into off-season burglaries of vacation homes); State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845 , 618 P.2d 423 (1980) , cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981) (roadblock established to check hunting licenses and compliance with game laws found constitutional); State v. Schroeder, 66 Or.App. 754 , 675 P.2d 1111 (1984), petition for review denied, 296 Or. 648 , 678 P.2d 1227 (1984) (upholding constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints in reliance on Tourtillott, supra)', State v. Shankle, 58 Or.App. 134 , 647 P.2d 959 (1982) (license, registration and vehicle safety equipment checkpoint found valid under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D.1979) (roadblock erected to enforce game laws held constitutional). In decisions made prior to the Supreme Court Border Patrol checkpoint cases, courts uniformly upheld the validity of roadblocks set up to check drivers’ licenses and vehicle registration. See City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 (Fla.1959); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky.1962); Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481 , 150 So.2d 512 (1963); State v. Kabayama, 98 N.J.Super. 85 , 236 A.2d 164 (1967), aff'd, 52 N.J. 507 , 246 A.2d 714 (1968); 7A Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 101 at 273 (1980); 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 157 at 807-08 (1969). Accepting the applicability of the foregoing principles, appellants argue that the intrusiveness of the checkpoint stops far outweighs the State’s interest in stopping drunk driving.

They suggest that the illumination of the driver ⁵⁰⁴ with a flashlight is a “startling invasion of privacy [that] may be physically insufferable to a pair of eyes that have become accustomed to the night’s darkness.” Appellants contend that unanticipated roadblocks are likely to surprise and annoy drivers; that too much discretion is given to the police in deciding which drivers to detain for interrogation and when to suspend or move the checkpoint; and that the checkpoints are ineffective and unnecessary in that conventional enforcement methods provide a less intrusive but more effective alternative. Thus, appellants conclude that the checkpoint program is unreasonable because the State’s law enforcement interest is only marginally advanced while the exercise of personal liberty is substantially impaired. We find that no Fourth Amendment or Article 26 violation occurred when appellants were stopped at the sobriety checkpoint involved in the present case. Clearly the State has a compelling interest in controlling drunk driving.

Indeed, as the record discloses, about sixty percent of the drivers killed in automobile accidents have elevated levels of alcohol in their blood; nationally, fifty-five percent of all traffic fatalities are alcohol related. The magnitude of the problem created by intoxicated motorists cannot be exaggerated. As the Supreme Court said recently in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 920 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983): “The situation underlying this case—that of the drunk driver—occurs with tragic frequency on our Nation’s highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here.

This Court, although not having the daily contact with the problem that the state courts have, has repeatedly lamented the tragedy. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 , 77 S.Ct. 408, 412 , 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957) (‘The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield’); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 , 91 S.Ct. 668, 672 , 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971) (BLACK-MUN, J., concurring) (deploring ‘traffic irresponsibility ⁵⁰⁵ and the frightful carnage it spews upon our highways’); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 , 657 and 672, 91 S.Ct. 1704 , 1715 and 1722, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (‘The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars’); Mackey v. Montrym, 443