Livingston v. Naylor

MEREDITH, J. George M. Livingston, IV, appeals an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County that denied his motion to dismiss a writ of garnishment of his wages. The garnishment had been issued in an effort to collect monies owed by Livingston to Thomas Naylor, appellee. Naylor had obtained a money judgment against Livingston in North Carolina and then enrolled that judgment in Maryland pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”), Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), §§ 11-801 et seq. Livingston is a resident of North Carolina.

He argues that the Maryland court did not have an adequate basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, and was, therefore, without power to (a) enroll the judgment from another state, and (b) order the garnishment of wages he earned as an employee of Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”). We hold that there were sufficient contacts between Livingston and this State for Maryland to enroll a judgment from another state pursuant to the UEFJA. We further hold that the Maryland courts may garnish Livingston’s property in ⁴⁹¹ Maryland, including compensation he earned from Marriott for services Livingston rendered in Maryland. But we also hold that due process does not permit the garnishment in Maryland of compensation Livingston earned for services rendered wholly outside the State of Maryland when such garnishment order is based solely upon the fact that Livingston’s employer, Marriott, does business in this State that subjects Marriott to the jurisdiction of the Maryland courts.

We vacate the circuit court’s judgment that denied Livingston’s motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment and remand for further proceedings. Facts and Procedural Background In June 1995, in North Carolina, Livingston broke into the home of Thomas Naylor, who was then asleep. Livingston battered Naylor and inflicted serious bodily injuries. Livingston was subsequently convicted in North Carolina of assault with a deadly weapon and second degree burglary.

Seeking money damages, Naylor filed suit against Livingston in state court in North Carolina, and Livingston was properly served. Livingston failed to answer the complaint, and an “Entry of Default” was entered against him. After the Entry of Default, Livingston failed to appear for a hearing, and, as a consequence, a default judgment was entered against Livingston in favor of Naylor in the amount of $50,000. Naylor contends that Livingston was afforded all appropriate substantive and procedural rights under the laws of North Carolina, and Livingston does not dispute that contention.

The judgment has not been satisfied. Livingston is a North Carolina resident who has been employed by Marriott since 1996 at various locations in North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland. After the default judgment was entered, Livingston moved from North Carolina to Virginia, where Naylor successfully instituted garnishment proceedings against Marriott. Livingston next moved back to North Carolina, and Naylor initiated garnishment proceedings there as well.

Naylor’s ⁴⁹² attempt to garnish Livingston’s wages in North Carolina failed, however, because wages are apparently exempt from garnishment in that state. See Harris v. Hinson, 87 N.C.App. 148, 151 , 360 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1987) (citing General Statutes of North Carolina, § 1-362, as exempting from attachment “the earnings of the debtor for his personal services, at any time within 60 days next preceding the order,” and also noting that “the courts of North Carolina have held that wages for personal services to be earned constitute neither property nor debt”). See also Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N.C. 261 , 59 S.E. 58 (1907). In 2004, Livingston was assigned to work temporarily in Maryland, where he served as a “bench manager,” i.e., a manager who works in a relief role for short periods of time at various Marriott hotels.

Livingston concedes that he stayed in Maryland and worked as a bench manager for approximately one month to one-and-a-half months. But Livingston contends he never changed his residence from North Carolina. He proffered that even when he worked at Marriott locations in Maryland, his pay was processed by a Marriott payroll facility in Kentucky, and his compensation, reduced by with-holdings for North Carolina income tax, was directly deposited via electronic transfer into his North Carolina bank account. Pursuant-to the UEFJA, the North Carolina judgment was enrolled in the judgment records of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, on September 20, 2004.

On October 13, 2004, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued a. Writ of Garnishment of Wages that was served upon Marriott in Bethesda, Maryland. Both Livingston and Marriott filed motions to dismiss the writ of garnishment on jurisdictional grounds. On March 3, 2005, the circuit court entered an order denying both of the motions to dismiss.

Livingston timely appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment. Livingston raises the following two issues: 1. Whether the trial court was without proper personal jurisdiction over [Livingston] to enter a judgment in this ⁴⁹³ matter as required by the U.S. Supreme Court decision of International Shoe v. Washington [, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)]. 2. Whether the trial court was without proper personal jurisdiction over [Livingston] to entertain a garnishment of [Livingston’s] wages in this matter as required by the U.S. Supreme Court decision of International Shoe v. Washington as applied to garnishment or execution proceedings in Shaffer v. Heitner [ 433 U.S. 186 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)].

Both questions attack the personal jurisdiction of the circuit court. Our standard of review for such questions is de novo. See Bond v. Messerman, 391 Md. 706, 718 , 895 A.2d 990 (2006) (“The defense of lack of personal jurisdiction ordinarily is collateral to the merits and raises questions of law.”). Analysis 1.

Enrollment of judgment from another state The circuit court followed the procedure required by the UEFJA when it enrolled the judgment that had been previously rendered in North Carolina. But Livingston contends that, under the due process requirement set forth in International Shoe , the Maryland court could not enroll the North Carolina judgment unless the State of Maryland had sufficient minimum contacts with Livingston in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Livingston has cited no case that has held that a judgment from another state may not be enrolled pursuant to the UEFJA unless the receiving state has sufficient contact with the judgment debtor to assert personal jurisdiction in accordance with the requirements of International Shoe . Nevertheless, he posits the following syllogism.

Before the UEFJA was adopted, a judgment creditor who wished to enroll a judgment that had been rendered in another state was required to file a new action in the receiving state, and such a suit could not be prosecuted unless the receiving state could obtain personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. See ⁴⁹⁴ Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 356 Md. 542, 552 , 741 A.2d 462 (1999) (“Historically, the party seeking to enforce a judgment in a sister state had to bring a separate court action in that state.”). 1 When the UEFJA was adopted, it purported to make no substantive changes in the law, but merely provide for a streamlined procedure. Id. at 555 , 741 A.2d 462 (“[Bjecause the UEFJA is intended ‘merely to streamline the procedure’ of filing a new suit, and not to alter substantive rights, whatever rights or defenses a party may have had with respect to an independent action in the enforcement state, that party also has with respect to the judgment filed under UEFJA.”); Weiner v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 674, 677 (D.Md. 1990) (“the [UEFJA] ... does not purport to alter any substantive rights or defenses that otherwise would be available either to the judgment creditor or the judgment debtor if suit were filed to enforce that foreign judgment.”), affd, 925 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 816 , 112 S.Ct. 69 , 116 L.Ed.2d 43 (1991). Therefore, Livingston argues, because the receiving state needed personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor before the enactment of UEFJA, and the uniform act made no substantive changes in the law, then the receiving state must have the same basis for exercising personal juris ⁴⁹⁵ diction now, even though that is not one of the express requirements of UEFJA.

We need not decide the constitutional question raised by Livingston in order to conclude that Naylor’s North Carolina judgment was properly enrolled in Maryland pursuant to the UEFJA. See Burch v. United Cable Television of Baltimore Ltd. P’ship, 391 Md. 687, 695 , 895 A.2d 980 (2006) (“Even when a constitutional issue is properly raised at trial and on appeal, ... this Court will not reach the constitutional issue unless it is necessary to do so.”). Even if we assume without deciding that Livingston is correct in his assertion that the receiving state must have sufficient minimum contacts to take action against the judgment debtor, we conclude that there were sufficient contacts with Livingston for the Maryland court to enroll a judgment against him. Livingston concedes the validity of the underlying North Carolina judgment, stating in his reply brief: To be clear[,] the Defendant in this matter[, Livingston,] contests neither the validity of the North Carolina judgment, nor the power of that court to enter the judgment in the first instance.

Rather[,] the Defendant argues that the International Shoe Mandate of sufficient minimum contacts precludes the courts of Maryland [from enforcing] that foreign judgment in this state, absent such minimum contacts. Accordingly, the judgment entered against Livingston by the North Carolina courts is valid, and is, therefore, entitled to full faith and credit in Maryland. Cf. Legum v. Broum, 395 Md. 135,147 , 909 A.2d 672 (2006)(the burden is on a person resisting enforcement of a foreign judgment to produce “competent evidence” that the court that entered the judgment did not have personal jurisdiction over him).

Because Livingston concedes the validity of the North Carolina judgment, Maryland and all other states are constitutionally mandated to give that judgment full faith and credit. As the Supreme Court stated in Underwriters Assur. Co. v. N.C. ⁴⁹⁶ Guaranty Assn., 455 U.S. 691, 704 , 102 S.Ct. 1357 , 71 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982): [T]he Framers provided that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1. This Court has consistently recognized that, in order to fulfill this constitutional mandate, “the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced.” Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234, 235 , 4 L.Ed. 378 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.); Riley v. New York Trust Co., supra, 315 U.S. 343, at 353 , 62 S.Ct., at 614 , 86 L.Ed. 885 [(1942)].

See also Superior Court v. Ricketts, 153 Md.App. 281, 326 , 836 A.2d 707 (2003) (“ ‘[a] final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land’ ”) (quoting Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 , 118 S.Ct. 657 , 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)). With respect to the question of whether the State of Maryland had a sufficient basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over Livingston at the time Naylor sought to enroll the North Carolina judgment in this State, assuming arguendo that such a jurisdictional basis is required, we note that the Court of Appeals summarized the standard for determining the issue in Mackey v. Compass Marketing, Inc., 391 Md. 117,129-30 , 892 A.2d 479 (2006): Determination of personal jurisdiction is a two-step process. First, the requirements under the long-arm statute must be satisfied, and second, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process. Maryland has construed our long-arm statute to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the Due Process Clause.

See, e.g., Beyond v. Realtime, 388 Md. 1, 15 , 878 A.2d 567, 576 (2005); Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 224 , 352 A.2d 818, 821 (1976). Thus, the evaluation becomes one of determining whether the defendant’s actions satisfy the minimum ⁴⁹⁷ contacts required by due process so that “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. at 154 . The Court must be assured that defendant’s contacts with Maryland “are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559, 567 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Accord MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 166 Md.App. 481, 498 , 890 A.2d 818 (2006).

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals described the test for a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state party in a case in which the plaintiff sought to enforce in Maryland a Russian arbitration award against a Russian company that had shipped a quantity of aluminum to Maryland. In Base Metal Trading, Limited v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum, Factory, ” 283 F.3d 208 , 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 822 , 123 S.Ct. 101 , 154 L.Ed.2d 30 (2002), the court stated: Due process requires only that a defendant “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). For these minimum contacts to exist, there must “be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). The court rejected the contention that jurisdiction to enforce the foreign arbitration award in Maryland could be founded upon the Russian company’s single shipment of aluminum to Maryland (even if that transaction had the corresponding effect of creating a debt “in Maryland” owed by the ⁴⁹⁸ Maryland purchaser to the Russian company).

The court noted that the presence of the defendant’s property alone was not a sufficient connection to support the exercise of jurisdiction. It stated, id.: This basic analysis is not altered when the defendant’s property is found in the forum state. The Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), eliminated all doubt that the minimum contacts standard in International Shoe governs in rem and quasi in rem actions as well as in personam actions. Shaffer; 433 U.S. at 207-12 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 .

The Court held that “in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.” Id. at 207 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (internal quotations omitted). And “[t] he standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe . ” Id. Of course, the presence of property in a state may have an impact on the personal jurisdiction inquiry. Indeed, “when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.” Id.

Yet, when the property which serves as the basis for jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action, the presence of property alone will not support jurisdiction. Id. at 209, 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 . While, “the presence of the defendant’s property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation,” when those “other ties” do not exist, jurisdiction is not reasonable. Id.

Although Livingston argues that his contact with Maryland does not rise to the level prescribed in Miserandino v. Resort Properties, Inc., 345 Md. 43, 50 , 691 A.2d 208 (“regular or systematic conduct will be required to sustain jurisdiction”), ⁴⁹⁹ cert. denied, 522 U.S. 953 , 118 S.Ct. 376 , 139 L.Ed.2d 292 (1997), Livingston concedes that he resided and worked in Maryland for at least four to six weeks prior to the date Naylor sought to enroll the North Carolina judgment. We need not decide whether such contact would have been sufficient to support personal jurisdiction over Livingston for all manner of litigation. But it certainly is sufficient contact for a Maryland court to enroll a final judgment from another state without, in the words of International Shoe , “offend[ing] ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 . Livingston’s period of resident employment in Maryland was not “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contact with this State.

See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Nor was it so brief or fleeting that Livingston could not “reasonably anticipate being haled into court [ ]here.” See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Accordingly, it was not a violation of Livingston’s due process rights for the circuit court to enroll Naylor’s North Carolina judgment pursuant to the UEFJA. Although we have assumed arguendo that another state’s judgment could only be enrolled if the receiving state had sufficient contacts with the judgment debtor to exercise personal jurisdiction, as we noted above, Livingston has directed us to no case that has so held.

There are a number of cases that support the contrary position. See, e.g., Shaffer, supra, 433 U.S. at 210 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , stating: “[W]e know of nothing to justify the assumption that a debtor can avoid paying his obligations by removing his property to a State in which his creditor cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, after all, makes the valid in personam judgment of one State enforceable in other sister States.” (Footnotes omitted. This comment and Shaffer footnote 36 are examined more fully in the next section of this opinion.) Cf.

Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Electric, Inc., 281 A.D.2d 42, 47 , 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (2001) (concluding that “a party seeking recognition in New York of a foreign money judgment ⁵⁰⁰ (whether of a sister state or a foreign country) need not establish a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor by the New York courts”)(citing Shaffer, supra, 433 U.S. at 210 n. 36, 97 S.Ct. 2569 ). One commentator, citing Shaffer footnote 36, states: “[A] state may enforce a sister state judgment even if the enforcing state does not have personal jurisdiction over the debtor.” Aristides Diaz-Pedrosa, Shaffer’s Footnote 36, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 17, 31 (2006). Courts in several states have held that their state need not have personal jurisdiction over the person or property of an obligor under a foreign support order prior to registering such order pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act; see, e.g., Lagerwey v. Lagerwey, 681 P.2d 309, 311 (Alaska 1984); Gingold v. Gingold, 161 Cal.App.3d 1177, 1185 , 208 CaLRptr. 123, 127 (1984); Wilson v. Ransom, 233 Neb. 427, 434 , 446 N.W.2d 6, 10-11 (1989); Pinner v. Pinner, 33 N.CApp. 204, 207, 234 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1977); Davanis v. Davanis, 132 Wis.2d 318, 327 , 392 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Wis.App. 1986).

But cf. Williamson v. Williamson, 2A1 Ga. 260, 275 S.E.2d 42 (1981)(although acknowledging “we are bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize the validity of the Arizona [divorce] decree in this State,” 247 Ga. at 262 , 275 S.E.2d at 44 , the court nevertheless dismissed wife’s suit to enforce the decree in Georgia, concluding, “the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the defendant has property in this State, [and therefore] there is no res, and personal service would be required to domesticate the decree,” 247 Ga. at 264 , 275 S.E.2d at 46 ). 2. Garnishment of wages of non-resident Our conclusion that there were sufficient contacts with Livingston for Maryland to recognize the North Carolina judgment, however, does not necessarily dispose of Livingston’s second contention that the judgment should not be enforced by means of garnishing his wages. The Court of Appeals recognized in Smith Pontiac, supra, 356 Md. at 562 , 741 A.2d 462 , that there is a “distinction between recognition and enforcement” of a foreign judgment. “While this Court ⁵⁰¹ must recognize this judgment [domesticated in Maryland pursuant to the UEFJA] as a valid Maryland judgment, this Court also may inquire into post-judgment defenses in order to determine the extent to which it is enforceable.” Id. See also Baker v. General Motors Corp., supra, 522 U.S. at 235 , 118 S.Ct. 657 , where the Court stated: Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments.

Enforcement measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law. See McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325 , 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839) (judgment may be enforced only as “laws [of enforcing forum] may permit”); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 99 (1969) (“The local law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another state is enforced.”). Livingston contends that the principles articulated in Shaffer v. Heitner require that the judgment creditor establish that Livingston has sufficient contacts with Maryland to support the garnishment of wages owed to Livingston by an employer that does business in Maryland.

Livingston argues that even though his employer, Marriott, is a Maryland corporation that has its corporate headquarters in Maryland, Livingston has at all times relevant been a resident and domiciliary of the state of North Carolina. Accordingly, Livingston argues that his relatively brief temporary presence in Maryland while on assignment for his employer should not support the garnishment of wages that are normally paid to him in North Carolina. He further argues that his own ability to sue Marriott in any state in which Marriott does business in not a circumstance that, standing alone, makes it fair for his third party creditors to pursue garnishment of his wages in all states in which Marriott does business. Citing Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 , 25 S.Ct. 625 , 49 L.Ed. 1023 (1905), the circuit court rejected Livingston’s argument that the court needed to meet the International Shoe stan ⁵⁰² dard with respect to the judgment debtor in addition to the garnishee.

Because it is clear that there is a sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Marriott in Maryland, the circuit court was of the view that any indebtedness owing from Marriott to Livingston, including wages, is subject to garnishment by the Maryland courts, regardless of the source of that obligation, ie., regardless of whether the indebtedness is attributable to wages earned by Livingston for services performed outside the State of Maryland. The circuit court quoted the following passage from Harris, supra, 198 U.S. at 222 , 25 S.Ct. 625 : If there be a law of the State providing for the attachment of the debt, then if the garnishee be found in that State, and process be personally served upon him therein, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him, and can garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff and condemn it, provided the garnishee himself could be sued by his creditor in that State. The Supreme Court summarized its ruling in Harris: “Power over the person of the garnishee confers jurisdiction on the courts of the State where the writ issues.” Id. The circuit court relied upon this principle in denying Livingston’s motion to dismiss.

Early Maryland cases held that “[a]ll property ... within the limits of the State, whether belonging to residents or nonresidents, is subject to its laws, and the State has the right to prescribe how and in what manner such property shall be subjected to the claims of creditors.” Coward v. Dillinger, 56 Md. 59, 60-61 (1881). Upon the theory that a debt is property (i.e., an asset of the party that is owed that indebtedness) that is “located” where the debtor may be sued, Maryland cases have historically focused upon the garnishment court’s jurisdiction over the garnishee rather than the judgment debtor. For example, in Cole v. Randall Park Holding Co., 201 Md. 616, 627 , 95 A.2d 273 (1953), the Court of Appeals referred to a text wherein “the learned author says that a foreign corporation doing business in the State may be summoned as a ⁵⁰³ garnishee whether the principal defendant is a resident or nonresident, by service of process such as would give jurisdiction over it if it were the principal defendant.” The Court in Cole further observed, id. at 628 , 95 A.2d 273 , that garnishments focus upon the property, or “the res” to be seized: Another reason which supports the Maryland holdings is that garnishment proceedings commence as proceedings in rem or quasi in rem. Subsequently, they may result in judgments in personam against the garnishee or real defendant, or both, in various situations.

Nevertheless, since fundamentally they seek to compel the appearance of the defendant by seizure of the res, the Court issuing the attachment must have jurisdiction of the res. Coward v. Dillinger [, 56 Md. 59 (1881),] and U.S. Express Co. v. Hurlock, [ 120 Md. 107 , 87 A. 834 (1913),] both supra. If it is an intangible, such as a debt owed by the garnishee, the debt must either be payable expressly in this State or jurisdiction must be had over the debtor. See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company v. Ruby, 312 Md. 413, 422-24 , 540 A.2d 482 (1988) (focusing on the sufficiency of contacts between the garnishee and the State of Maryland).

Livingston contends the circuit court erred in relying on the above quoted passage from Harris and its debt-follows-the-debtor analysis. Livingston argues that the due process requirements for a state to exercise in rem jurisdiction have changed, and that the current controlling principles are set forth in Shaffer, supra, and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 , 100 S.Ct. 571 , 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980). Livingston cites no case that specifically holds that unless the garnishing state has sufficient minimum contacts with the judgment debtor Shaffer and Rush preclude the post-judgment attachment of wages earned by an out-of-state judgment debtor. But Livingston argues that such result is compelled by Shaffer and Rush .

In Shaffer , the Supreme Court held that, for a pre-judgment attachment of property, even though the proceeding is quasi in rem, the state court issuing the attachment needed to have some basis for exercising in personam jurisdiction over the ⁵⁰⁴ out-of-state owner of the property. Abandoning the Harris standard that permitted in rem jurisdiction to be exercised based upon the presence of property alone, the Court in Shaffer stated that “the time is ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice set forth in International Shoe should be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam. ” 433 U.S. at 206 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 . And the Court expressly held that the International Shoe standard governs actions in rem. Id. at 212, 97 S.Ct. 2569 .

The Court noted that even though in rem cases had traditionally been analyzed as involving only property, such cases nevertheless involve and affect the owners’ rights in such property. The Court quoted Justice Holmes’s statement that “[a]ll proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons,” id. at 207 n. 22, 97 S.Ct. 2569 , and stated, id. at 207 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 (footnotes omitted): The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of “fair play and substantial justice” as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam is simple and straightforward. It is premised on recognition that “(t)he phrase, ‘judicial jurisdiction over a thing,’ is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 56, Introductory Note (1971) (hereafter Restatement). This recognition leads to the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising “jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.” The standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe .

After noting that application of the International Shoe standard might have little impact upon some in rem cases, such as litigation involving “claims to the property itself,” the Court acknowledged that the new standard might have a significant impact upon quasi in rem cases, stating, id. at 208-09, 97 S.Ct. 2569 : ⁵⁰⁵ For the type of quasi in rem action typified by Harris v. Balk and the present case, however, accepting the proposed analysis would result in significant change. These are cases where the property which now serves as the basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiffs cause of action. Thus, although the presence of the defendant’s property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State’s jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is now thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum.

Recognizing that its holding would be at odds with a “long history of jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property in a State,” id. at 211 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , the Court nevertheless held that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.” Id. at 212, 97 S.Ct. 2569 . More fully, the Court stated, id. at 211-12 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 (footnotes omitted): We are left, then, to consider the significance of the long history of jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property in a State. Although the theory that territorial power is both essential to and sufficient for jurisdiction has been undermined, we have never held that the presence of property in a State does not automatically confer jurisdiction over the owner’s interest in that property. This history must be considered as supporting the proposition that jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property satisfies the demands of due process, cf. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 , 41 S.Ct. 433, 438 , 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921), but it is not decisive. “[TJraditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.

Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S., at 340, 89 S.Ct., at 1822; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 , 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361 , 93 L.Ed. ⁵⁰⁶ 1782 (1949). The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.

We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny- (Emphasis added.) Leaving no doubt that Shaffer was intended to supercede prior cases addressing in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, the Court stated, id. at 212 n. 39, 97 S.Ct. 2569 : It would not be fruitful for us to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the rationales of Pennoyer [v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877),] and Harris to determine whether jurisdiction might have been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled. Livingston argues that the above statements in Shaffer clearly required that the Maryland court satisfy the International Shoe standard of having sufficient minimum contacts with him — and not just the garnishee — before garnishing his wages. He supplements his argument by referring to Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 , 100 S.Ct. 571 , 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980), another case involving a prejudgment attachment in which the Court emphasized that jurisdiction must satisfy the International Shoe standard.

In Rush, 444 U.S. at 327 , 100 S.Ct. 571 , the Court recapped its Shaffer holding as follows: In Shaffer v. Heitner we held that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.” 433 U.S.,