Motor Vehicle Admin v. Geppert

Motor Vehicle Administration, et al. v. Karl Geppert No. 61, September Term 2019 Appeals – Administrative Procedure Act – Transfers Between Appellate Courts – Cases Arising Under Maryland Vehicle Law. An appeal of a circuit court decision in an action brought under the State Administrative Procedure Act ordinarily is an appeal of right to the Court of Special Appeals. However, if the case arose under Title 16 of the Maryland Vehicle Law, the appeal is by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. If a litigant incorrectly files a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, that court should transfer the case to the Court of Appeals under Maryland Rule 8-132 to be treated as a petition for a writ of certiorari.

Maryland Code, State Government Article, §10-223; Transportation Article, §16-101 et seq.; Maryland Rule 8-132. Administrative Procedure Act – Judicial Enforcement Action – Final Administrative Decision. A party who has prevailed at an administrative hearing under the State Administrative Procedure Act may bring an action in a circuit court pursuant to State Government Article, §10-222.1 and request a writ of mandamus to enforce that decision. The circuit court is bound by any fact findings made as part of the administrative decision that were not reversed in any prior judicial review of the administrative decision.

However, to obtain a writ of mandamus, a plaintiff must still show a “clear legal right” to the relief sought. An erroneous legal holding by the administrative decision maker is not binding on the circuit court. Maryland Code, State Government Article, §10-222.1. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Circuit Court for Baltimore County OF MARYLAND Case No. 03-C-15-003363 Argument: March 9, 2020 No. 61 September Term, 2019 MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.

V. KARL GEPPERT _____________________________________ Barbera, C.J., McDonald Hotten Getty Booth Biran Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by McDonald, J. ______________________________________ Filed: July 27, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-07-27 14:17-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This appeal poses the question whether a court must enforce a final administrative decision of an executive branch agency when the losing party previously failed to seek judicial review of that decision, even if the relief granted by that decision violates a statute that specifically prohibits the agency from taking the action required by the administrative decision. A State statute requires, as a condition for obtaining a Maryland driver’s license, that an applicant provide the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) with the applicant’s social security number, or proof that the applicant is ineligible for a social security number.

A second statute explicitly bars the MVA from issuing a license to an applicant who fails to satisfy that requirement. This case began when Respondent Karl Geppert, who does not have a social security number but is eligible for one, applied for a learner’s permit (an initial step toward a driver’s license). Petitioner MVA denied Mr. Geppert’s application because he failed to satisfy the statutory requirement related to providing a social security number. However, the MVA’s computer application form, which reflected an earlier, repealed regulation that preceded the applicable statutes, effectively inquired only whether an applicant had a social security number, but not whether the applicant was eligible for one.

Mr. Geppert had accurately responded only that he did not have a social security number, without certifying anything as to his eligibility for obtaining one. Mr. Geppert requested a hearing to contest the MVA’s denial of his application. The MVA has delegated the conduct of hearings and the authority to render a final administrative decision on its behalf to administrative law judges (“ALJ”s) in the Office of Administrative Hearings. At the hearing in Mr. Geppert’s case, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Geppert had not complied with the statutory requirement to provide a social security number.

However, the ALJ ordered that a learner’s permit be issued to him, apparently based on the ALJ’s belief that the repealed regulation, on which the computer application was based, was still in effect and trumped the statutes. The MVA did not seek judicial review of the ALJ’s final administrative decision. Mr. Geppert brought a judicial enforcement action under the State Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and requested a writ of mandamus to enforce the ALJ’s ruling. The Circuit Court concluded that the ALJ’s decision was based on an incorrect legal premise and held that Mr. Geppert did not have a “clear legal right” to the relief he requested.

On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the Circuit Court was barred from considering the legal soundness of the ALJ’s decision. In our view, a circuit court asked to enforce an administrative order based on a final administrative decision under the APA is not precluded from considering whether the relief ordered would violate the law on which the administrative decision is based. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals. I Legal Background A. Obtaining a Driver’s License in Maryland The Maryland Vehicle Law The Maryland Vehicle Law is part of the Transportation Article (“TR”) of the Maryland Code and is administered by the MVA.1 Pertinent to this case, the General 1 The Maryland Vehicle Law consists of titles 11 through 27 of the Transportation Article.

TR §11-206. 2 Assembly has directed the MVA, in administering that law, to “examine and determine the legality of each application made to it under the Maryland Vehicle Law” and to reject an application, if not satisfied as to its legality. TR §12-106. The MVA is authorized to adopt regulations and create necessary forms to carry out that law. TR §§12-104(b), 12-105.

The regulations that the agency has adopted for implementing the Maryland Vehicle Law are codified in Subtitles 11 through 23 of Title 11 of the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR). Regulating Drivers The authority to operate a motor vehicle on a public road in Maryland is governed by Title 16 of the Maryland Vehicle Law. To do so legally, an individual must either (1) have a Maryland driver’s license issued pursuant to Title 16; (2) be expressly exempted in Title 16 from the licensing requirement;2 or (3) be otherwise specifically authorized by Title 16 to drive a specific class of vehicle.3 TR §16-101(a). This case concerns one of the requirements for satisfying the first of these alternatives under Title 16 – obtaining a Maryland driver’s license.

An individual can begin the process for obtaining a Maryland driver’s license, upon reaching the age of 15 years and nine months, by applying for a learner’s instructional 2 The exemptions from the licensing requirement are set forth in TR §16-102. An example is an out-of-state resident who is licensed to drive by the state of residence and who meets certain criteria. TR §16-102(a)(9). 3 An example of an individual specifically authorized by Title 16 to drive a specific class of vehicle without a Maryland driver’s license is a driver of a commercial motor vehicle who holds a commercial driver’s license from another state and meets certain criteria. TR §16-809. 3 permit as a precursor to a driver’s license.4 TR §§16-103(c)(1), 16-105.

To do so, the applicant must complete an application for a driver’s license provided by the MVA that asks for information required by the relevant provisions of Title 16, pass a vision test, and pay the requisite fee. TR §§16-105(a), 16-106, 16-110. As a prerequisite to obtaining a learner’s permit, the applicant must also take an exam administered at an MVA office. TR §16-110; COMAR 11.17.05.09.

Upon reaching the age of 16 years and six months and meeting certain criteria, a holder of a learner’s permit may obtain a provisional license. TR §§16-103(c)(2), 16-111. Applications for Licenses and the SSN Requirement The information that an applicant must provide in an application for a driver’s license – and for a learner’s permit en route to a license – is specified in TR §16-106 and related regulations. For example, the applicant must provide the applicant’s full name and address, certain demographic information (race, sex, height, weight, general physical condition, date of birth), proof of age and identity, and information about prior licenses held or applied for.

Pertinent to this case, an applicant must also provide: (1) Satisfactory documentary evidence that the applicant has a valid Social Security number by presenting the applicant’s Social Security Administration account card or, if the Social Security Administration account card is not available [any of several specified documents bearing the Social Security number]; or (2) Satisfactory documentary evidence that the applicant is not eligible for a Social Security number. 4 A learner’s permit falls within the general rubric of a license under the Maryland Vehicle Law. TR §11-128(a)(2)(ii). 4 TR §16-106(c). We shall refer to this condition for obtaining a license as the “SSN requirement.”5 In addition to requiring an applicant to take certain affirmative steps – such as satisfying the SSN requirement – to obtain a driver’s license, the Maryland Vehicle Law expressly prohibits the MVA from issuing a driver’s license, or a learner’s permit en route to a license, if the applicant fails to qualify for the license for a number of enumerated 5 An applicant for a Maryland driver’s license has been required to provide the applicant’s social security number as part of the application for several decades, although the precise requirement has changed over the years in response to two federal laws. In 1988, the MVA first adopted a regulation requiring disclosure of an applicant’s social security number or a certification that the applicant did not have a social security number. 15: 5 Md. Reg. 622 (Feb. 26, 1988) (Final Action adopting COMAR 11.17.02.02).

In 2003, to ensure that the State continued to qualify for funding under a federal law that required states to collect social security numbers in connection with licensing for the purpose of enforcing child support obligations, the General Assembly incorporated that requirement in statute. Chapter 452, Laws of Maryland 2003; see also 42 U.S.C. §666 (a)(13); TR §16-203 (providing for suspension of a driver’s license of one who is delinquent on child support obligations). Two years later, the federal REAL ID Act of 2005 was enacted, requiring a state to collect information concerning an applicant’s social security number in order for a driver’s license to be adequate identification to enter a federal building or to board an airplane. Pub.L. 109-13, title II, §202(c), 119 Stat. 312 -13.

To allow Maryland licenses to comply with the REAL ID Act, the General Assembly amended Maryland law to require a license applicant to provide a valid social security number or proof that the applicant was ineligible for a social security number – what we refer to in this opinion as the SSN requirement. Chapter 390, §2, Laws of Maryland 2009. As explained later in the text of this opinion, the MVA immediately adopted a regulation to reflect the SSN requirement based on the REAL ID Act, but did not repeal the prior regulation for a couple of years. The SSN requirement is essentially unchanged since 2009.

Maryland law allows for the issuance of driver’s licenses that are not compliant with the REAL ID Act and SSN requirement, but only for applicants who cannot prove lawful status in the United States. TR §16-122(a). This second tier driver’s license does not pertain to this case as there is no dispute that Mr. Geppert is a United States citizen. 5 reasons. TR §16-103.1.

Among those reasons is an applicant’s failure to satisfy the SSN requirement. TR §16-103.1(11). That provision states that the MVA “may not issue a driver’s license to an individual … who does not [satisfy the SSN requirement],” in language essentially identical to that of TR §16-106(c) quoted above. In the Maryland Code, the verb phrase “may not” is defined to have “a mandatory negative effect and establishes a prohibition.” Maryland Code, General Provisions Article, §1-203.

TR §16- 103.1(11) thus bars the agency from issuing a license to one who fails to satisfy the SSN requirement. B. Administrative Hearings under the Maryland Vehicle Law Title 16 of the Maryland Vehicle Law provides for an administrative hearing in certain circumstances where the MVA refuses to issue or renew a driver’s license, suspends a license, or revokes a license. TR §16-206. The MVA is to provide such a hearing pursuant to the hearing provisions of the Maryland Vehicle Law.

See TR §12-201 et seq.6 That statute generally requires the MVA to provide notice and a prompt hearing following a request for one. TR §12-203. The hearings are to be conducted in accordance with the contested case procedures set forth in the APA, Maryland Code, State Government Article (“SG”), §10-201 et seq. With respect to hearings concerning driver’s licenses, the MVA is to render a decision within 30 days of the hearing.

TR §12-203(b)(3). 6 In some instances, the Maryland Vehicle Law limits the issues that can be raised during the hearing. See, e.g., TR §16-205.1(f)(7)(i), §16-206(d)(3). 6 As permitted by statute, the MVA has, by regulation, delegated to the Office of Administrative Hearings the authority to conduct hearings on the MVA’s behalf under the Maryland Vehicle Law, including hearings concerning driver’s licenses. See TR §12- 104(e); COMAR 11.11.02.07. That delegation authorizes the ALJ who conducts the hearing to issue a final decision and order on behalf of the MVA.

COMAR 11.11.02.07A. Once an ALJ has issued a final decision on behalf of the MVA, judicial review of that decision is available in a circuit court pursuant to the judicial review provision of the APA and the Maryland Rules. TR §12-209(b); SG §10-222; Maryland Rule 7-201 et seq. A party may also seek enforcement of an administrative order under the APA by filing an action in the circuit court in which the party requests declaratory or injunctive relief, or a writ of mandamus.

SG §10-222.1. For most actions brought under the APA, an appeal from a circuit court decision ordinarily takes the usual route to the Court of Special Appeals. SG §10-223. However, there is an exception for cases arising under Title 16 of the Maryland Vehicle Law.

SG §10-223(a)(1). In cases subject to that exception, any further review is not in the Court of Special Appeals, but rather by a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), §12-305. As we shall see, the route of appeal from a circuit court decision in an enforcement action brought under SG §10- 222.1 that arises under Title 16 of the Maryland Vehicle Law is a matter of debate in this case. 7 II Facts and Proceedings The basic facts and procedural path of this case are undisputed.7 A. Mr. Geppert Applies for a Learner’s Permit During 2012, Mr. Geppert reached the age of 15 years and nine months and, like most teenagers his age, sought to obtain a learner’s permit as a prerequisite to obtaining a driver’s license.

He apparently made multiple attempts to obtain a learner’s permit from the MVA beginning in March 2012. However, those efforts proved unsuccessful as Mr. Geppert did not have a social security number.8 This case is based on an attempt Mr. Geppert made on November 6, 2013, when he went to the MVA office in Glen Burnie to complete the license application and to take the required exam. To complete the application, Mr. Geppert responded to a computer form that asked him, among other things, to certify “that I do not have or I am not eligible for a social security number.” As is evident from the discussion in the previous section of this 7 In presenting the relevant materials to us, the parties have distributed them over four separate appendices and a copy of the record extract that was filed in the intermediate appellate court. This suggests that there may have been a lack of cooperation between counsel.

We will not attempt to assign blame for this situation and, in any event, we have reviewed the original record for purposes of this opinion. We simply note that future litigants will earn the undying appreciation of an appellate court if they can successfully consolidate relevant materials from the record in an agreed-upon record extract, as encouraged by Maryland Rule 8-501. 8 It appears from the record that Mr. Geppert has never applied for a social security number; nor did his parents apply for a social security number for him. It appears to be a matter of principle for the Gepperts. In an email to one of his son’s former counsel that appears in the record, Mr. Geppert’s father stated that “We have planned and been in this fight for 17 yrs.

We are not giving up the fight.” 8 opinion, that question was inconsistent with the SSN requirement in TR §16-103(c) and TR §16-103.1(11), as it did not require an applicant who lacked a social security number to certify that he or she was ineligible to have one. To be consistent with the governing statutes, the application should have asked an applicant to certify “that I do not have and I am not eligible for a [social security number].”9 In any event, Mr. Geppert checked the box next to the existing question on the computer form, which effectively certified only that he did not have a social security number, but was ambiguous as to his eligibility for one. The MVA promptly denied Mr. Geppert’s application at the time he made it in the Glen Burnie office. The agency immediately provided him with a form letter stating that it could not process his application because he had failed to satisfy the SSN requirement.

The form letter recited that he had the right to request a hearing within 15 days.10 9 The MVA later corrected this part of the computer application form to substitute the conjunction “and” for the conjunction “or.” See footnote 19 below. 10 We note in passing that it is not entirely clear on what basis Mr. Geppert was entitled to a hearing. The provision cited in the denial letter – TR §12-203 – does not itself grant a right to hearing, but rather governs the notice and timing of hearings when “the Maryland Vehicle Law or a rule or regulation of the [MVA] provides that an applicant or licensee may request a hearing on refusal, suspension, or revocation of a license or privilege.” (emphasis added). Various sections in the Maryland Vehicle Law provide for a hearing when a license is suspended, revoked, or refused. An applicant who is refused a license has a right to a hearing in six circumstances enumerated in TR §16-206(a)(1).

TR §16-206(d)(1) (right to a hearing if applicant is refused a license for reasons set forth in TR §16-206(a)(1)). None of those provisions pertains to Mr. Geppert’s situation. In this case, the statute on which the denial was based, TR §16-103.1(11), simply states that the MVA may not issue a driver’s license to an individual “[w]ho does not provide . . . a valid Social Security number . . . or [s]atisfactory documentary evidence that the applicant is not eligible for a Social Security number.” No provision is made for an administrative hearing in that statute if an applicant is refused a license for failure to 9 B. The Administrative Hearing Mr. Geppert’s father made a timely request through counsel11 for a hearing on the denial of Mr. Geppert’s November 2013 application. The hearing was held on April 1, 2014.12 At the hearing, the ALJ reviewed documents submitted by the MVA, which did not otherwise appear at the hearing.

Mr. Geppert appeared at the hearing with his father.13 comply with that requirement. This Court has previously held that a license applicant is not entitled to an administrative hearing when the MVA denies the application pursuant to another subsection of TR §16-103.1 that bars the MVA from issuing a license to one whose license to drive is revoked, suspended, refused, or cancelled in another state. Headen v. MVA, 418 Md. 559 (2011). In that case, the Court observed that TR §16-103.1 itself does not grant the right to a hearing, nor did any other provision of the Maryland Vehicle Law or regulations. 418 Md. at 580-83 .

We are not aware of any statute or regulation that provides a right to a hearing for an applicant who fails to satisfy the SSN requirement. It is notable that the transmittal to the Office of Administrative Hearings for the hearing listed the case type as “cancellation” and some of the citations related to circumstances in which a license is refused because the applicant made a false statement in the application – a circumstance, though not applicable to Mr. Geppert, that would entitle the applicant to a hearing in some circumstances under TR §16-206(a)(1)(vi) and which caused the ALJ some initial confusion as to the nature of the hearing she was supposed to conduct. In the end, the fact that the MVA may have provided Mr. Geppert with more process than he was due is not a reason for disregarding the ALJ’s decision – and the MVA appropriately has not made such an argument. 11 Counsel was discharged before the hearing and Mr. Geppert appeared at the hearing pro se with his father. 12 In the interim between the denial on November 6, 2013, and the hearing, Mr. Geppert made at least one additional attempt to procure a learner’s permit at the Westminster MVA office, but was unsuccessful. 13 At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Geppert’s father stated that he would be representing his son at the hearing. Consistent with SG §9-1607.1 and §10-206.1, the ALJ advised Mr. Geppert’s father that, because he was not an attorney, he could not represent his son at the hearing.

However, she swore in both father and son as witnesses and, in the 10 Included among the documents provided by the MVA was a letter that Mr. Geppert had submitted to the MVA from the Social Security Administration stating that the federal agency had no record that a social security number had been assigned to Mr. Geppert. The ALJ asked why Mr. Geppert lacked a social security number. His father replied that federal law did not require him to obtain one. The ALJ then reviewed the Maryland Vehicle Law and observed that, under that law, one of the prerequisites for obtaining a Maryland driver’s license was compliance with the SSN requirement.

She opined that, because Mr. Geppert failed to satisfy the SSN requirement, the MVA was precluded from issuing him a license and that she had no discretion to order it to do otherwise. Mr. Geppert’s father then provided the ALJ with a copy of an MVA regulation that he had found in COMAR that described the SSN requirement differently from the statute, but consistently with the computer application form. The copy of the regulation provided by Mr. Geppert’s father – denominated COMAR 11.17.12.02 – simply required that the applicant provide the applicant’s social security number or certify that the applicant does not have a social security number.14 As noted above, the use of the disjunctive “or” in that relatively informal context of the administrative hearing, interacted primarily with the father. 14 That regulation read: A. The Administration shall request the social security number of each applicant for an original, renewed, duplicate, or corrected driver’s license or identification document. B. An applicant for a driver’s license shall disclose the applicant’s social security number as required by 42 U.S.C. §666 .

If the 11 regulation appeared to indicate that a certification that an applicant simply does not have a social security number was a permissible alternative to providing the social security number on the application. This, of course, would be contrary to TR §16-103.1(11) and §16-106(c), in which the only alternative that an applicant has to providing a social security number is to demonstrate that the applicant is not eligible for one. The ALJ immediately recognized the discrepancy between the statutes and the regulation provided by Mr. Geppert’s father. The ALJ noted that “the language of the statute is stricter” than that of the regulation and stated that she was confronted with “two competing pieces of black letter law.” After Mr. Geppert himself affirmed that the certification he had made on the computer at the MVA office was consistent with the regulation his father had presented, the ALJ opined that “if that’s good enough for them … that’s up to them.” Observing that the regulation – and the computer certification – was “more liberal” than the statute, the ALJ said that she would follow the regulation and that it would be up to the MVA to ensure that its regulations and computer certifications were consistent with the Maryland Vehicle Law. applicant does not have a social security number, the applicant shall certify in the application that the applicant does not have a social security number.

C. The administration shall deny the issuance of a driver’s license for failure to disclose the required social security number or to certify that the applicant does not have a social security number. D. The disclosure of the social security number is voluntary for applicants for an identification document. (emphasis added). 12 Apparently unbeknownst to the ALJ or Mr. Geppert’s father, the MVA had repealed the regulation under discussion some years before Mr. Geppert’s application.15 See 38: 3 Md. Reg. 200 (Jan. 28, 2011) (Notice of Proposed Action of MVA to repeal COMAR 11.17.12.02); 38: 9 Md. Reg. 553 (Apr. 22, 2011) (Notice of Final Action of MVA repealing COMAR 11.17.12.02). The explanation of that action indicated that it was done “to reflect the current statute” following the periodic Regulatory Review and Evaluation Report of the relevant regulations.16 A different regulation, codified at COMAR 11.17.09.04A(5), had accurately reflected the SSN requirement, consistently with the statute, since 2009.17 That regulation stated, as it does today, that “an applicant for a Maryland license … shall provide … [a social security number] or proof of ineligibility for [a social security number].” However, that regulation was not brought to the ALJ’s attention. 15 It is difficult to fault the ALJ or Mr. Geppert’s father for their ignorance of that repeal.

According to the Internet archive known as the Wayback Machine (https://archive.org/web/), the extant compilation of Maryland regulations published by the Division of State Documents, a unit of the Office of the Secretary of State, in COMAR still reflected the repealed regulation for some years after the MVA rescinded it. Moreover, reconstructing the historical text of COMAR regulations is a tedious and difficult exercise, as any Maryland law librarian will attest. Even if the MVA itself was aware of the discrepancy, the ALJ did not have the benefit of a live MVA representative at the hearing. Indeed, the MVA did not point out that this regulation had been repealed in 2011 until the case reached this Court. 16 The Regulatory Review and Evaluation Act requires the periodic systematic review of agency regulations to ensure, among other things, that they “continue to be supported by statutory authority and judicial opinions.” SG §10-132(1)(i)2. 17 See 36: 14 Md. Reg. 995 (July 6, 2009) (Proposed Action to adopt COMAR 11.17.09); 36: 22 Md. Reg. 1724 (Oct. 23, 2009) (Final Action to adopt COMAR 11.17.09). 13 In any event, for reasons that are not evident in the record, the Division of State Documents, the State agency responsible for publishing COMAR, had apparently continued to include the rescinded regulation in its print and online compilation of COMAR.18 Likewise, the MVA’s computer application form that was in effect at the time that Mr. Geppert applied for a learner’s permit also apparently continued to reflect the rescinded regulation.19 Having decided that the regulation presented to her superseded the statute, the ALJ ruled in Mr. Geppert’s favor and ordered the MVA to issue a learner’s permit to him.

The ALJ advised both Gepperts that the MVA might seek judicial review of her decision in a circuit court. Immediately after the ALJ issued her decision, Mr. Geppert sought to implement the ALJ’s order later that day at an MVA office, but the MVA declined to issue a learner’s permit or allow him to take the learner’s permit exam because of his failure to satisfy the SSN requirement. Apart from the reliance on a rescinded regulation contrary to an existing statute, there was another problem with the ALJ’s order on its face. Even if one were to give the rescinded regulation precedence over the statute, surmounting the SSN requirement hurdle 18 This appears to have continued until the MVA repealed, in early 2018, the entire chapter in which this regulation appeared. 45: 1 Md. Reg. 37 (Jan. 5, 2018) (Proposed Action to repeal COMAR 11.17.12); 45: 5 Md. Reg. 286 (Mar. 2, 2018) (Final Action to repeal COMAR 11.17.12). 19 The computer application form was subsequently corrected to be consistent with the statute.

A screen shot of the revised form submitted by the MVA in the Circuit Court in 2017 demonstrated that the form had been revised to require an applicant to certify “that I do not have and I am not eligible for a social security number.” (emphasis added). 14 only entitled Mr. Geppert to take the learner’s permit exam and take additional steps required for a learner’s permit. It would not itself entitle him to a learner’s permit, as the ALJ had ordered.20 See COMAR 11.17.05.09. Mr. Geppert apparently made no further effort to try to implement the ALJ’s decision for nearly a year.21 For reasons that are not evident in the record, the MVA did not pursue judicial review of the ALJ’s decision in the meantime. C. The Judicial Enforcement Proceeding On March 27, 2015, almost a year after the ALJ’s decision, Mr. Geppert filed a pro se enforcement action under the APA in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against the MVA and various MVA officials asking that the court issue a writ of mandamus to compel the MVA to allow him to take the learner’s permit exam “and issue him a learner’s permit or driver’s license (whichever is appropriate).” The MVA answered the complaint, contending that Mr. Geppert did not have a clear legal right to the relief that he sought and that, in any event, issuance of a learner’s permit to him would violate State law. 22 20 Mr. Geppert has conceded that he needs to pass the exam before he would be entitled to a learner’s permit. 21 Mr. Geppert applied to the MVA in March 2015 to take the learner’s permit exam, but was rebuffed again. 22 This case was captioned in the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals listing one of the MVA officials as the lead defendant, although that individual had long since departed that post and the defendants’ counsel had filed an appropriate substitution of defendant under Maryland Rule 2-241(a)(5).

Before us, the parties have listed the agency as the lead defendant in the caption and we have done the same, as all of the defendant officials were named only in their official capacities. 15 The Circuit Court held a brief hearing in October 2015 at which the MVA and Mr. Geppert, now represented by new counsel, jointly asked to set a briefing schedule to be followed by oral argument. The Circuit Court acceded to the request. After some delay and a temporary dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute,23 the parties filed their respective memoranda during the second half of 2017 and the Circuit Court heard argument on December 17, 2017. In a memorandum opinion dated April 5, 2018, the Circuit Court reasoned that, to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Mr. Geppert was required to show a clear legal right to the relief he sought.

The court found that TR §16.103.1(11) was “clear and unambiguous” in prohibiting the issuance of a license or learner’s permit to an applicant who did not satisfy the SSN requirement. The court concluded that, as Mr. Geppert had not established that he had satisfied that requirement, he failed to meet the threshold for mandamus relief. It held that the ALJ’s order that the MVA issue a learner’s permit was contrary to the statute and denied the request for mandamus relief. Mr. Geppert subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the court also denied.

D. The Appeal Mr. Geppert appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Shortly after the appeal was filed, the MVA asked the intermediate appellate court to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, to transfer it to this Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132 on the ground that 23 The complaint was dismissed for lack of prosecution at the end of 2016 pursuant Maryland Rule 2-507(c). The Circuit Court later struck that dismissal. Mr. Geppert thereafter obtained new counsel and the litigation proceeded. 16 the Court of Special Appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction over this type of case.

On July 6, 2018, the Court of Special Appeals denied the motion without explanation in a brief order and the appeal proceeded in that court. In the brief it subsequently filed, the MVA reiterated its request that the appeal be transferred to this Court under Rule 8-132. In an unreported decision, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court. Geppert v. Chaffee, 2019 WL 4233845 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. Sept. 6, 2019). The intermediate appellate court concluded that, regardless of the legal merits of the MVA’s position, the ALJ’s decision was a final administrative order that was binding on the MVA because the agency had not sought judicial review of the order. Id. at ⁵-6. Citing its prior decision in Karabetis v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 72 Md. App. 407 (1987), the Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the ALJ’s order should be treated as an “enrolled judgment” for purposes of res judicata.

Geppert, supra, at ⁷. The Court of Special Appeals, nevertheless, revised the relief provided by the ALJ’s order and devoted the largest part of its opinion to explaining that revision. Geppert, 2019 WL 4233845 at ¹⁴-21. While the ALJ had ordered the MVA to issue a learner’s permit, the intermediate appellate court held that Mr. Geppert was entitled only to take the exam for a learner’s permit.

The court noted that the ALJ may have been confused by the MVA’s documentation and that Mr. Geppert himself was not trying to circumvent the exam requirement. Despite the literal language of the ALJ’s order, the MVA would be required to issue Mr. Geppert a learner’s permit under the Maryland Vehicle Law only if he passed the exam. The intermediate appellate court declined to say whether Mr. Geppert would be 17 entitled to either a provisional or full driver’s license, should he apply for one in the future. Id. at ¹ n.1.

Lastly, the Court of Special Appeals explained its decision not to dismiss the appeal. The court concluded that the relevant statutes provided a route of appeal to the intermediate appellate court from a circuit court decision in an action under the APA to enforce an administrative order concerning a driver’s license. The court distinguished actions to review an administrative order under the APA concerning a driver’s license, which it agreed were not appealable to the Court of Special Appeals, from an enforcement action such as Mr. Geppert had brought. While the court did not explicitly address the MVA’s request that it transfer the appeal to this Court under Rule 8-132, its reasoning implicitly supported a denial of that request.

The MVA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. III Route of Appeal We begin where the Court of Special Appeals ended – whether this appeal should have been dismissed or directed to this Court in the first instance. As noted above, the MVA argues that Mr. Geppert should have sought a writ of certiorari from this Court rather than pursue an appeal of right in the Court of Special Appeals and that, accordingly, the intermediate appellate court should have either dismissed the appeal or transferred the case to us rather than decide the appeal itself. In our view, dismissal of the appeal was not appropriate, but the case should have been transferred to this Court to be treated as a petition for a writ of certiorari. 18 Nevertheless, the detour through the Court of Special Appeals is of no consequence.

The case is now in this Court, as we have found the substantive issue worthy of a grant of certiorari and, given that the decision of the intermediate appellate court is not entitled to deference in this context, it does not skew our assessment of the merits.24 We discuss the question of the route of appeal for future guidance. As outlined above, this appeal concerns a ruling in a contested case