Fludd v. Kirkwood

Anthony Fludd v. Donielle Kirkwood No. 1297, Sept. Term, 2020 Opinion by Leahy, J. Family Law > Child Support > Equitable Defenses > Laches When determining the appropriateness of applying laches to a child support action, courts must consider the best interest of the child and the parents’ continuing duty to “support” and “care” for the child. Maryland Code (2014, 2019 Repl. Vol.), General Provisions Article , § 1-401 Family Law > Child Support > Equitable Defenses > Laches We agree with the Payne Court that “[a]n infant who cannot legally bring suit . . . can scarcely be accused of lack of diligence.” Payne v. Prince George’s Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 67 Md. App. 327, 338 (1986). We stop short of holding that laches may never be applied to a child support claim, and determine, instead, that the defense is generally not applicable. Our holding is in accord with Maryland precedent and the law of a majority of other jurisdictions. Family Law > Child Support > Equitable Defenses > Laches Parents who raise the laches defense—regardless of how long the delay—to bar prospective child support obligations may liken their prospects to a camel passing through the eye of a needle.

Ultimately, child support is awarded by the court for the benefit of the child[ren]. See Guidash v. Tome, 211 Md. App. 725, 739 (2013) (holding that “parents may not waive or bargain away a child’s right to receive support.”). As we have explained, “the guiding principle in family law cases that involve children is the children’s ‘indefeasible right’ to have their best interests fully considered, and the boundaries of a court’s often broad discretion are tethered to the best interests of the child standard[.]” Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. 358, 387-88 (2020) (citations omitted). The parents of a minor child are “jointly and severally responsible for the child’s support, care, nurture, welfare, and education.” Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl.

Vol.), Family Law Article, § 5-203(b)(1). Family Law > Child Support > Equitable Defenses > Laches > Application Any delay in bringing and adjudicating the underlying child support action could not have relieved Mr. Fludd of his continuing statutory duty to support his minor children until they reach the age of majority (or another qualifying event occurs) under Maryland Code (2014, 2019 Rep. Vol.), General Provisions Article , § 1-401. Family Law > Child Support > Continuing Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents > Application We conclude that Mr. Fludd’s “obligation to pay child support . . . arose under the laws of this State,” Maryland Code (1973, 2020 Repl.

Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 6-103.1(2), and that he was given “reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.” Glading v. Furman, 282 Md. 200, 209 (1978). Accordingly, on December 15, 2020, the circuit court had continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Fludd in the child support case. Family Law > Child Support > Maryland’s Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) > Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents When evaluating whether “a Maryland court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non- resident defendant” under the UIFSA, a court must consider: “(1) whether [the] long-arm statute has been satisfied; and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.” Friedetzky v. Hsia, 223 Md. App. 723, 732 (2015) (citing Bond v. Messerman, 391 Md. 706, 721 (2006)). The UIFSA long-arm statute articulates seven potential bases on which a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant regarding a child support or paternity claim.

Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article, § 10-304. The long-arm statute was written to be “as broad as constitutionally permissible.” Friedetzky, 223 Md. App. at 743 (citing Unif. Interstate Family Support § 201 cmt., 9 U.L.A. Part IB, at 185).

Family Law > Child Support > Maryland’s Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) > Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents > Application We hold that a trial court need only find one basis among the seven listed under the UIFSA long-arm statute in order to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Family Law > Child Support > Maryland’s Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) > Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents > Application We hold that Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”), § 10- 304(a)(2) was satisfied when Mr. Fludd filed a responsive pleading, entered a general appearance, and affirmatively requested relief from the court. Once Mr. Fludd submitted to the court’s jurisdiction under FL § 10-304(a)(2), he could not “un-ring [the jurisdictional] bell.” Friedetzky v. Hsia, 223 Md. App. 723, 747 (2015).

Accordingly, the circuit court correctly determined that it was able to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Fludd under the UIFSA long-arm statute. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 100281-FL REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1297 September Term, 2020 ______________________________________ ANTHONY FLUDD v. DONIELLE KIRKWOOD ______________________________________ Arthur, Leahy, Eyler, Deborah S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Leahy, J. ______________________________________ Filed: December 16, 2021 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2022-06-15 13:41-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk For nearly a decade, the parents of the two children at the center of this case have been fighting over custody and child support, flooding the docket in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County with over 500 entries. The litigation began in January 2012, when Donielle Kirkwood, appellee, filed a complaint for custody against Anthony Fludd, appellant.

At the time, Ms. Kirkwood was fleeing her relationship with Mr. Fludd, which, she claimed, had turned abusive. The parties contested custody and visitation fiercely, cycling through various temporary arrangements. In December 2015, behind torrents of motions, the circuit court entered a final custody order awarding Ms. Kirkwood sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ two children who, at the time, were both under five years old. To help manage the financial burden of raising the children, Ms. Kirkwood filed a motion for child support and other financial relief.

Mr. Fludd responded. For unknown reasons, the circuit court did not rule on Ms. Kirkwood’s motion for child support for several years. Meanwhile, issuance of a final custody and visitation order did not decelerate Mr. Fludd’s filings in the circuit court. To the contrary, in the months following entry of the final custody order, Mr. Fludd continued what the court had characterized as “abusive filing.” Then the litigation storm quieted for a little over two years until Mr. Fludd filed a motion to modify child custody and visitation in September 2019.

At a hearing on the motion to modify, the circuit court appointed a child privilege attorney and counseled Mr. Fludd to resume therapy in the hopes of furthering the reunification process outlined in the 2015 child custody order. After the hearing, however, the circuit court was informed that Ms. Kirkwood and the children fled to Texas some months earlier. Mr. Fludd had already notified the court, several years earlier, that he moved to Washington, D.C. Accordingly, on September 1, 2020, the court held a hearing on the issue of the court’s continuing jurisdiction over the case. Although the parties and the court agreed that the circuit court no longer had jurisdiction over the child custody issues, Ms. Kirkwood argued that the court retained jurisdiction over child support.

On November 17, 2020, the court issued an order in which it found that Ms. Kirkwood had presented grounds establishing continued personal jurisdiction over Mr. Fludd on the matter of child support and related attorney’s fees and costs under the long arm provisions of Maryland’s Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), codified at Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”), §§ 10-301-71. Following this determination, the court held a hearing over two days in early December on the merits of Ms. Kirkwood’s 2016 motion for child support. Ms. Kirkwood testified to her financial burdens as well as the abuse that Mr. Fludd inflicted on her.

She professed that she was “scared to ask” for child support. The court issued a written order requiring that Mr. Fludd: (1) pay $2,101 per month in child support; (2) pay one calendar year of arrears, totaling $25,212.00; and (3) pay Ms. Kirkwood $8,000 in attorney’s fees. Mr. Fludd noted a timely appeal and presents two questions for our review, which 2 we have rephrased non-substantively for clarity:1 I. Does the doctrine of laches bar a trial court from considering a motion for child support filed four years earlier?

II

Does a trial court have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent to award child support? We affirm the judgment of the circuit court. First, we hold that the doctrine of laches is generally inapplicable to child support claims. Second, we hold that in child support or paternity actions, the trial court need only find one basis among the seven listed under the UIFSA long-arm statute to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

BACKGROUND Mr. Fludd and Ms. Kirkwood are the natural parents of two minor children. In January 2012, Ms. Kirkwood filed a bill of complaint for custody of the parties’ then-only child in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Weeks earlier, Ms. Kirkwood also filed for a temporary protective order in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County. On May 23, 2012, Mr. Fludd filed an answer to the custody complaint along with a counter- complaint for custody.

The parties initially entered into a consent order in the circuit court under which they shared legal custody and Ms. Kirkwood had primary physical custody. Just three days 1 Mr. Fludd presented the questions in his brief as follows: “1. Whether the doctrine of laches barred a trial court from considering a motion for child support that had not been considered for over four years, and there is inexcusable delay and prejudice as a result of that delay? 2. Whether the trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent to award child support?” 3 after the consent order was entered on June 19, 2012, Mr. Fludd filed a motion to modify— the first in a long series of filings.

Following numerous motions and hearings, in December 2015, the circuit court entered a final custody order awarding Ms. Kirkwood sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ two children.2 The custody order specified that Mr. Fludd was to have no contact with Ms. Kirkwood or the children3 and instructed that, “due to the abusive filing” by Mr. Fludd, he was “prohibited from filing any charges against [Ms. Kirkwood] with any commissioner anywhere in the State of Maryland.” Instead, Mr. Fludd was “limited to filing charges directly with the police or the State’s Attorney’s Office.”4 Still, the order articulated a reunification process which outlined, among other things, the steps that Mr. Fludd must take before he is eligible for visitation and custody. In September 2016, Ms. Kirkwood filed a “Motion For Child Support and Other Financial Relief and Request for Hearing.” (Capitalization omitted). Later the same month, Mr. Fludd filed a response arguing that the portion of his disability payments 2 The record reveals that after Ms. Kirkwood had filed her initial complaint for custody, she conceived a second child by Mr. Fludd. The second child was born on June 28, 2013. 3 Ms. Kirkwood had already obtained a final protective order against Mr. Fludd on December 19, 2014 in District Court Case No. 0602SP050122014.

That order noted the “long history of violence/abuse between [the] parties” and ordered, among other things, that Mr. Fludd not abuse, threaten or harass Ms. Kirkwood and the children and to stay away from Ms. Kirkwood and the children, as well as the children’s childcare providers. 4 Ms. Kirkwood alleges in her brief that Mr. Fludd’s abuse of her “extended beyond physical abuse, to include, cyberstalking, abuse of process and false imprisonment.” By January 2015, Ms. Kirkwood was living with her children in a domestic violence shelter. 4 directed to Ms. Kirkwood constituted child support.5 Further, Mr. Fludd asked the court to enter a judgment in his favor awarding “fees incurred in this matter” and “[s]uch other relief this [c]ourt deems appropriate.” However, as discussed below, the issue of child support was not ultimately decided until December 15, 2020. Four years after the motion for child support was filed, Mr. Fludd wrote to Ms. Kirkwood’s counsel requesting that the reunification process, as outlined in the 2015 custody award, proceed. In his letter, Mr. Fludd asked for an update as to the children’s “court ordered activities,” as the completion of these activities, he claimed, had been a “barrier for the reunification process.” Mr. Fludd also noted that he hoped to “prevent unnecessary pleadings, legal fees, or court fees” by having the “opportunity to discuss the status of [the] case” and “speak frankly about mutually resolving [the] matter.” In response, Ms. Kirkwood’s counsel advised that the children were “still in need of further therapy” and that if Mr. Fludd wished to progress in the reunification process, he should “request a modification through the court.” On September 26, 2019, Mr. Fludd filed a motion to modify custody and visitation. He asserted that he had “not seen or spoken with the minor children since January 16, 5 Neither Ms. Kirkwood’s initial motion for child support nor Mr. Fludd’s response were included in the record extract.

While we have reviewed the original record for the purposes of this opinion, we encourage future litigants to follow Maryland Rule 8-501(c)’s instruction to provide “all parts of the record that are reasonably necessary for the determination of the questions presented by the appeal or cross-appeal.” See also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Geppert, 470 Md. 28 , 39 n.7 (2020) (“We [] note that future litigants will earn the undying appreciation of an appellate court if they can successfully consolidate relevant materials from the record in an agreed-upon record extract, as encouraged by Maryland Rule 8-501.”). 5 2015”; that all protective orders had expired; that no cases were pending between Mr. Fludd and Ms. Kirkwood or the children; and that the children had “completed all court ordered activities.” The circuit court held a hearing on Mr. Fludd’s motion on January 17, 2020.6 Ms. Kirkwood was represented by counsel and was not present at the hearing. The purpose of the hearing was to establish a framework by which the reunification process could continue. The court counseled both parties to continue therapy and appointed a child privilege attorney to work through waiver of the children’s patient-therapist privilege. On August 5, 2020, Ms. Kirkwood filed a motion requesting a hearing on the still- pending motion for child support and attorney’s fees.

In the motion, Ms. Kirkwood alleged that Mr. Fludd was currently employed, and that she “has not received child support from [Mr. Fludd], if ever,” since prior to the filing of her motion for child support in 2016. Ms. Kirkwood requested the court order Mr. Fludd to provide her with, among other things: a copy of his tax returns for the prior three years; child support arrearages dating back to 2016; and attorney’s fees incurred over the prior four years. A. Jurisdiction Over Child Custody Issues Although the record before us does not convey when exactly Ms. Kirkwood and the 6 Although Mr. Fludd captioned his filing as a motion to modify, given that Mr. Fludd was arguing that he had completed the steps necessary to proceed with the reunification process as set out in the child custody order, the circuit court recaptioned the filing as a motion to enforce the order. 6 children relocated to Texas or when that fact was revealed to the court, 7 on August 19, 2020, the circuit court entered an order requesting counsel to submit briefs outlining their arguments on whether the Circuit Court for Montgomery County retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over matters concerning custody of the children. The court held a hearing on the issue on September 1, 2020.

The parties and the judge agreed that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County was divested of exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the child custody issues in the case under the Maryland Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”), §§ 9.5-101-318. This ruling was memorialized in a written order on September 9, 2020. Ms. Kirkwood’s counsel raised the issue of her client’s pending motion for child support, asserting that the circuit court retained jurisdiction over these matters.

The court deferred ruling on the issue and requested additional briefing from the parties. B. Jurisdiction Over Child Support Issues As requested, in October 2020, Mr. Fludd and Ms. Kirkwood filed legal memoranda regarding the court’s continuing jurisdiction over child support. Invoking Maryland Code (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), § 6-103.1, Mr. Fludd argued that the circuit court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because the “case was filed as a [c]omplaint for custody,” and that complaint was dismissed by the court on September 9th.

Correspondingly, he claimed that the circuit court lacked 7 At the hearing on September 1, 2020, Mr. Fludd stated that he found out months earlier, in February 2020, that Ms. Kirkwood had moved with the children to Texas. 7 jurisdiction to issue an initial support determination under UIFSA sections 10-304 and 10- 307. Additionally, Mr. Fludd argued that Texas had become the more convenient forum to litigate the dispute. Ms. Kirkwood responded that the circuit court did retain personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the pending child support issues under the long-arm provision of the UIFSA. She contended that Mr. Fludd had: (1) submitted to the circuit court’s jurisdiction under FL § 10-304(a)(2) by filing a responsive pleading to her motion for child support; (2) triggered FL § 10-304(a)(6) by engaging in sexual intercourse with Ms. Kirkwood in Maryland; and (3) met the requirements for personal jurisdiction under a minimum contacts analysis by “‘purposefully avail[ing] himself to the jurisdiction of [the] court by making the choice to seek relief, including relief related to child support and financial matters, by and through his various and multiple filings requesting such relief.” Ms. Kirkwood also posited that, if the circuit court were to determine it had jurisdiction over the child support matters, it also had jurisdiction over the award of attorney’s fees under FL § 12-103(a).8 8 FL § 12-103(a) states: The court may award to either party the costs and counsel fees that are just and proper under all the circumstances in any case in which a person: (1) applies for a decree or modification of a decree concerning the custody, support, or visitation of a child of the parties; or (2) files any form of proceeding: (i) to recover arrearages of child support; (ii) to enforce a decree of child support; or (iii) to enforce a decree of custody or visitation. 8 In further support of her argument, Ms. Kirkwood offered that the UCCJEA—the statute that divested the court of jurisdiction over custody matters—specifies in its definition section that it “does not include an order relating to child support[.]” FL § 9.5- 101(d)(3).

Even if the court was not convinced of these grounds, Ms. Kirkwood noted that, in her view, Mr. Fludd had waived any right to challenge personal jurisdiction when he failed to raise the issue in his 2016 response to her motion for child support. Finally, Ms. Kirkwood posited that the court had subject matter jurisdiction as she was a resident of Montgomery County at the time she filed her initial child support motion and that the circuit court was “the highest common-law and equity court[] of record exercising original jurisdiction.” During oral argument, Mr. Fludd repeated the arguments contained in his memorandum. He also represented that the Texas child support case had been scheduled for a hearing, and, since the custody matters had been transferred to Texas, it was the proper forum to litigate the child support case as well. Counsel for Ms. Kirkwood charged Mr. Fludd with having filed the duplicate action “for the purposes of confusing the issues here.” She urged the court to retain jurisdiction over the matter because it had been four years since she first requested child support and a Texas court would not be able to assess the accrued arrears and attorney’s fees.

Mr. Fludd also challenged Ms. Kirkwood’s argument that under FL § 10-304(a)(6) Maryland retained jurisdiction over him because he did not agree that the children were conceived in Maryland. Ms. Kirkwood testified in response that Mr. Fludd was the father 9 of the two children for which she was seeking support and that both children were conceived in Montgomery County, Maryland. On November 17, 2020, the judge issued a written order finding several bases for the Circuit Court for Montgomery County’s continuing exercise of jurisdiction over the child support case under the UIFSA long-arm statute, FL § 10-304(a). The court found that Mr. Fludd submitted to jurisdiction by “ma[king] a general appearance defending against the motion for Child Support, Attorney Fees, and Costs.” Additionally, the court found that Mr. Fludd had submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by “filing a responsive pleading” to Ms. Kirkwood’s initial child support motion.

Finally, the judge credited Ms. Kirkwood’s testimony that the children were conceived when she had sexual intercourse with Mr. Fludd in Maryland. The court then set the matter in for a merits hearing on December 2, 2020. At the hearing, Ms. Kirkwood testified that she had not received any monetary support or health insurance assistance for the children since she first requested child support in September 2016. She also testified that she was “scared to ask” for child support.

She related, for example, that Mr. Fludd had disabled her car after she initially requested child support. More fearsome, she said, was Mr. Fludd’s threat to kill her or kill their children if she ever pursued child support. The court admitted several documents offered through Ms. Kirkwood’s testimony relating to the parties’ incomes and Ms. Kirkwood’s medical and childcare expenses. Additionally, the court received documents offered to establish Ms. Kirkwood’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $22,180.60. 10 Mr. Fludd testified on his own behalf.

He noted that he had an ongoing medical condition that would greatly affect his income potential. He also related that he tried to keep the matter out of court by offering support for the children but that those offers were all rejected by Ms. Kirkwood. Mr. Fludd described his financial burdens, including his obligation to pay private school tuition for a child not in common with Ms. Kirkwood. The court heard closing arguments in the matter on December 3, 2020.

The next day, the judge dictated an oral ruling. Finding no reason to deviate from the Guidelines,9 the court ordered Mr. Fludd to pay $2,101 per month in child support, effective January 1, 2021. The court further ordered Mr. Fludd to pay arrears for calendar year 2020 totaling $25,212.00. While acknowledging that “in many ways” the ruling was a “windfall for Mr. Fludd” because it did not require that he pay arrears dating back to 2016, the judge explained that, given Mr. Fludd’s financial hardships, he wanted to ensure that Mr. Fludd was “able to make these payments” and that “these kids receive it.” Finally, the court ordered that Mr. Fludd pay $8,000 in attorney’s fees.

The court issued a written order memorializing these terms on December 15, 2020. Mr. Fludd noted a timely appeal on January 13, 2021. 9 “The calculation of a child support award is governed by FL § 12-204. The statute includes a schedule for the calculation of child support, commonly referred to as the ‘Guidelines,’ when the parties’ combined adjusted actual income ranges from $15,000 to $180,000.” Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md. App. 358, 386 (2020). 11 DISCUSSION I. Laches A. An Afterthought Although the defense of laches was not raised before the circuit court, Mr. Fludd now contends that that court was barred from considering the motion for child support under the equitable doctrine of laches. He claims that laches was established, first, by the court’s four-year “inexcusable delay” in considering Ms. Kirkwood’s motion; and second, by the “obvious prejudice” inflicted upon him by the order to pay child support arrears, which was “further exacerbated by the trial court’s award of [attorney’s] fees.” Ms. Kirkwood counters that she “did not delay in exercising her rights” and that Mr. Fludd “was not prejudiced by the trial court’s delay.” She submits that she “promptly asserted her children’s rights to establish child support” by filing her motion on September 16, 2016.

Moreover, Ms. Kirkwood refutes both the contention that the delay was sufficient to constitute laches and the assertion that Mr. Fludd suffered prejudice by pointing out that Mr. Fludd has an ongoing statutory duty to provide support for his minor children until they reach the age of majority. Ms. Kirkwood avers that Mr. Fludd “has neither provided any evidence demonstrating that he changed his position, relying on the belief that [Ms. Kirkwood] would not pursue a child support award, nor asserted that he lost evidence that would support his position that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue a child support award.” 12 We note, with some degree of irony, that although the basis of Mr. Fludd’s laches defense is the court’s delay in hearing the motion for child support, he failed to raise the doctrine of laches until this appeal. Nevertheless, equitable defenses allow a court to decline relief “for a stale claim after the facts are fully developed[.]” Balt. Cnty. v. Glendale Corp., 219 Md. 465, 468 (1959).

Therefore, even if not pled or argued, the defense of laches can “be invoked by a court on its own initiative” when “equity demands.” State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 584-85 (2014) (citation omitted). Here, we choose to evaluate Mr. Fludd’s laches argument not because we think it has merit, but rather, because we think that it has none. We explain. B. Analysis The question of whether laches bars an action presents a mixed question of law and fact.

Anderson v. Great Bay Solar I, LLC, 243 Md. App. 557, 611 (2019), cert. denied sub nom. Bd. of Comm’rs of Somerset Cnty. v. Anderson, 468 Md. 224 (2020) (citation omitted). Whether “the elements of laches have been established” is a question of fact. Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 245 (2007).

However, “the question of whether in view of the established facts, laches should be invoked, is a question of law.” Id. at 246 . Our Court of Appeals has observed that laches is “an ancient defense in equity against stale claims,” Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Montgomery Cnty., 446 Md. 490, 509 (2016), and “is based upon grounds of sound public policy by discouraging fusty demands for the peace of society,” Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 668 (2005) (quoting Parker v. Bd. of Election Supervisors, 230 Md. 126, 130 (1962)). See also Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 645 (2001) (“[T]he word [‘laches’], itself, derives from the old 13 French word for laxness or negligence.”). This defense “applies when there is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one’s rights and that delay results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Liddy, 398 Md. at 244 (quoting Frederick Rd.

Ltd. P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 117 (2000)). When evaluating whether a delay was reasonable, we look to whether the party bringing the claim exercised “reasonable diligence” in asserting their rights. State Ctr., LLC, 438 Md. at 610 (quoting Hall v. Clagett, 48 Md. 223, 243-44 (1878)). What constitutes prejudice in this context “depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but it is generally held to be anything that places [a defendant] in a less favorable position.” Parker, 230 Md. at 130-31 .

In the instant case, the complaint for custody was filed in 2012, the initial motion for child support was filed in 2016, and the hearing on the motion for child support occurred in 2020. Mr. Fludd focuses his laches claim not on the four years between the filing of the custody complaint and the initial claim for child support, but rather, on the four years that elapsed between the date the initial child support claim was filed and the court’s hearing on the claim. Mr. Fludd’s argument misses the mark because laches bars “the right to assert a claim after the passage of time[.]” Parker, 230 Md. at 130 (emphasis added). Here, Mr. Fludd challenges a delay that occurred after Ms. Kirkwood asserted her child support claim.

Moreover, as we next explain, the doctrine of laches is generally inapplicable to child support claims. The nature and purpose of some claims dictate that laches will rarely, if ever, apply. For example, the Court of Appeals has, for decades, “expressed doubt about the applicability of the laches defense in attorney grievance proceedings.” Att’y Grievance 14 Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 356 (1993). This reservation emanates from the underlying purpose of attorney grievance proceedings, which is to “protect the public.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 684 (1981).

Given that the claim is designed to protect the public, “dismissal of [a] disciplinary petition for the sole reason that the Attorney Grievance Commission failed to proceed with the proper dispatch [would be] manifestly unwarranted.” Id. The Court of Appeals recently clarified that “with the possible exception of cases involving both extraordinary circumstances of delay and actual prejudice resulting in a clear due process violation, applying the