Lloyd v. General Motors Corp.

BELL, C.J. The major issue in this case is whether the cost to repair defective seatbacks, which allegedly have a tendency to collapse in rear-impact collisions, causing, in some cases, serious bodily injury or death to drivers and/or passengers in the class vehicles, constitutes a cognizable injury, in the form of economic loss for claims sounding in tort, contract, and consumer protection. Inconsistent with the conclusion reached by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and the Court of Special Appeals, we shall hold that the petitioners, Timothy and Bernadette Lloyd, have sufficiently alleged an injury that is cognizable under each of the petitioners’ claims. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals dismissing the petitioners’ claims. I. The petitioners are Timothy and Bernadette Lloyd and seven other Maryland residents, who own “class vehicles,” automobiles manufactured between 1990 and 1999 by the respondents, General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Daimler Chrysler Corporation and Saturn Corporation.

The petitioners brought this class action to recover from the respondents the cost of repairing and/or replacing the front seats in each class vehicle. They allege that the seats are ¹¹⁸ unsafe because they collapse rearward in moderate and severe rear-impact collisions. None of the petitioners or any putative class members allege that he or she has experienced personal injury as a result of the mechanical failure that caused the alleged defect. Indeed, persons with such experiences were expressly excluded from this class. 1 The Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) contains seven counts.

Count one alleges negligence in the design and manufacture of the seats. Count two, sounding in strict liability, alleges that the seats were in a defective condition, rendering them “inherently dangerous and creating an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death to users” when they left the control of the defendants. Count three alleges breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Count four alleges negligent failure to disclose, failure to warn, concealment and misrepresentation.

Count five alleges fraudulent concealment and intentional failure to warn. Count six alleges unfair or deceptive trade practices under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Count seven alleges civil conspiracy. Significant to the case sub judice, the TAC sets forth the following allegations of fact: “27.

Each year more than a thousand people die and many thousands more are injured in rear-impact motor vehicle collisions in the U.S. Some of these people are Maryland residents. “29. The Defect has resulted in significant numbers of serious injuries including paraplegia, quadriplegia and death to occupants of Class Vehicles struck in rear-impact collisions. “31. All Seats have the Defect. ¹¹⁹ “32. It is highly predictable that a certain percentage of occupants of Class Vehicles will be killed or seriously injured in rear-impact motor vehicle collisions each year in the U.S., and that some of those killed or injured will be Class Members. “33.

The automobile seat is the single most important lifesaving device in an automobile in the event of a crash. “36. The inclusion of properly designed dual recliner mechanisms greatly increases the resistance to rearward collapse of the backrest, and minimizes injury to the oceupants.[ ] “40. The Seats are unreasonably unsafe in moderate and severe rear-impact collisions because they are so weak they deform and/or collapse rearward, allowing the occupant to slide or ramp up the seatback and suffer hyper extension of the spine over the top of the Seat, or to be hurled into the rear seat area. The latter event can result in injuries not only to the occupant who is hurled back, but also to those already seated in the rear of the vehicle, including children in safety seats positioned as recommended by the manufacturer.

Additional hazards caused by Seat collapses include: 1) the loss of vehicle control when the driver is unable to reach pedals or hand controls, and 2) delayed escape from the vehicle in the event of fire.” The petitioners filed this suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Before the petitioners filed pleadings seeking certification of a class, the respondents moved, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322(b), 2 to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ¹²⁰ The trial court granted the motion, holding that “the economic loss doctrine would not support the cause of action being sought by the plaintiffs in this case, and there is insufficient basis to allow a fraud claim to continue against these defendants.” The petitioners noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion, that court affirmed the dismissal of the action. It reasoned that, for each claim, the petitioners failed to plead sufficiently the required allegation of injury or actual harm to withstand a motion to dismiss.

The intermediate appellate court also held that the petitioners failed to plead the fraud and conspiracy claims sufficiently, characterizing the allegations as “vague, confused, and extremely ambiguous” and, as well, as supported by insufficient facts. The petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted. Lloyd v. GM, 369 Md. 179 , 798 A.2d 551 (2002). The petitioners urge this Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which, they argue, is erroneous for failing to conclude that the cost to class members to fix the defective seatbacks, a proven cause of serious bodily injury or death in rear-collision accidents, constituted a cognizable injury.

More particularly, the petitioners aver that such required remedial expenditures constitute economic loss, which this Court has permitted to be recovered when the product defect factor creates an unreasonable risk of death or serious injury. That economic loss, the petitioners submit, is recoverable under each of the substantive legal counts alleged in the Third Amended Complaint, including those alleging violation of the Consumer Protection Act, breach of warranty, fraud, and conspiracy. The respondents do not agree. They argue that the Circuit Court and the intermediate appellate court ruled correctly.

They submit that the petitioners have not stated a cognizable injury, which they must do in order to recover under the claims asserted in the Third Amended Complaint. Specifically, the respondents deny that the petitioners have suffered ¹²¹ actual harm to person or property or experienced product malfunction as a result of the product defect, and thus, they contend, the damages sought by the petitioners are simply speculative. The respondents also argue that the petitioners failed to argue in their Petition for Certiorari that the Court of Special Appeals erred in dismissing the fraud and civil conspiracy claims and, therefore, have waived the right to raise the issue before this Court. In any event, the respondents assert, in accordance with the holding of the Court of Special Appeals, that the petitioners did not plead the fraud and conspiracy claims with sufficient particularity to state a cognizable claim.

II

Upon review of a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must “assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint, as well as all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from them,” Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 531 , 667 A.2d 624, 630 (1995), and order dismissal only if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action. A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse, 333 Md. 245, 249 , 634 A.2d 1330, 1332 (1994). See also Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 306 Md. 754, 768 , 511 A.2d 492, 499-500 (1986), in which we stated the rule as follows: “[I]n considering the legal sufficiency of [a] complaint to allege a cause of action for tortious interference, we must assume the truth of all relevant and material facts that are well pleaded and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from those pleadings.” Mere conclusory charges that are not factual allegations may not be considered.

Morris, supra, 340 Md. at 531 , 667 A.2d at 631 , Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 443 , 620 A.2d 327, 331 (1993). Moreover, in determining whether a petitioner has alleged claims upon which relief can be granted, “[t]here is ... a big difference between that which is necessary to prove the [commission of a tort] and that which is necessary merely to allege [its commission],” ¹²² Sharrow supra, 306 Md. at 770 , 511 A.2d at 500 , and, when that is the issue, the court’s decision does not pass on the merits of the claims; it merely determines the plaintiffs right to bring the action. Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 647 , 584 A.2d 69, 72 (1991). Furthermore, the court must view all well-pleaded facts and the inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Board of Education v. Browning, 333 Md. 281, 286 , 635 A.2d 373, 376 (1994).

III

Traditionally, damages in products liability cases have been categorized as “(1) personal injuries, (2) physical harm to tangible things, and (3) intangible economic loss resulting from the inferior quality or unfitness of the product to serve adequately the purpose for which it was purchased.” A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse, 333 Md. 245, 249-50 , 634 A.2d 1330, 1332 (1994) (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser And Keeton On The Law of Torts § 101 at 707-08 (5th ed.1984)). The latter of these damages, and the one with which we are concerned in the instant matter, is economic loss. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 156 , 647 A.2d 405, 410 (1994). Such loss occurs when a purchaser suffers loss of value or use of the product, and has absorbed, or will absorb, the cost to repair or replace the product, or has lost or will lose profits resulting from the loss of use of the product.

Id., citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § § 101, at 665 (4th ed.1971); Comment, Manufacturer’s Liability to Remote Purchasers for “Economic Loss” Damages—Tort or Contract?, 114 U. Pa. L.Rev. 539 (1966). Ordinarily, such damages are not allowed in tort actions. Id.

The petitioners in the matter sub judice aver that they were damaged because they incurred a loss in the form of the cost of replacing the faulty seatbacks. We shall examine the propriety of the intermediate appellate court’s affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s claims. ¹²³ A. Tort Claims Ordinarily, as noted, supra, damages for economic loss are not available in a tort action and are recoverable, if at all, in contract causes of action and, in the case of fraud, in actions for deceit. Gypsum, 336 Md. at 156 , 647 A.2d at 410 . We have explained the rationale for this general rule: “The distinction between tort recovery for physical injury and warranty recovery for economic loss derives from policy considerations which allocate the risks related to a defective product between seller and the purchaser.

A manufacturer may be held liable for physical injuries, including harm to property, caused by defects in its products because it is charged with the responsibility to ensure that its products meet a standard of safety creating no unreasonable risk of harm. However, where the loss is purely economic, the manufacturer cannot be charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the product meet [sic] the particular expectations of the consumer unless it is aware of those expectations and has agreed that the product will meet them. Thus, generally, the only recovery for a purely economic loss would be under a contract theory.” Decoster, supra, 333 Md. at 250-51, 634 A.2d at 1333 (citing Keeton et al., supra § 101 at 708 (5th ed.1984) and Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 Colum.L.Rev. 917 (1966)). There is an exception to the general rule, however: “Even when a recovery, based on a defective product, is considered to be for purely economic loss, a plaintiff may still recover in tort if this defect creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury.” Gypsum, 336 Md. at 156-57 , 647 A.2d at 410 .

This Court adopted this exception, an increasingly popular view, in Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 25 , 517 A.2d 336, 345 . (1986). There, we recognized that, in limited circumstances, those in which a product defect presents a substantial, clear and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury, it is inappropriate to draw a distinction ¹²⁴ “between mere ‘economic loss’ and personal injury.... When one is personally injured from a defect, he recovers mainly for his economic loss.

Similarly, if a wife loses a husband because of injury from a defect in construction, the measure of damages is totally economic loss. We fail to see any rational reason for such a distinction.” Id., at 25 , 517 A.2d at 345 . (1986) (quoting Barnes v. Mac Brown and Company, 264 Ind. 227 , 342 N.E.2d, 619, 621 (1976)). See also, Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So.2d 515 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) rev. denied 417 So.2d 328 (Fla.1982), Barnes v. Mac Brown and Co., 264 Ind. 227 , 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Kristek v. Catron, 7 Kan.App.2d 495 , 644 P.2d 480 (1982); Juliano v. Gaston, 187 N.J.Super. 491 , 455 A.2d 523 (1982) cert. denied, 93 N.J. 318 , 460 A.2d 709 (1983); Quail Hollow East Condominium Assoc. v. Donald J. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.App. 518 , 268 S.E.2d 12 review denied, 301 N.C. 527 , 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395 , 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis.2d 479 , 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974).

Thus, in order to assert a cognizable products liability theory of recovery, an action sounding in tort, but one premised on economic loss alone, the plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate that the product at issue creates a dangerous condition, one that gives rise to a clear danger of death or personal injury. Whiting-Turner 308 at 27, 517 A.2d at 345 . In Whiting-Turner, the appellants, residents and the Council of Unit Owners of the Atlantis Condominium, a twenty-one story condominium budding, brought an action, in tort, alleging that the appellees, the general contractor, developer and architects involved in the planning, inspection and construction of the budding, faded to construct “ten vertical utility shafts with materials having a fire resistance rating of two hours,” as the applicable budding code required. Id. at 22 , 517 A.2d at 338 .

As a result of the defect, the appellants claimed that there was “a threat to the safety and welfare of the owners and occupants of the [condominium] and to the personal and ¹²⁵ real property of the owners and occupants.” Id. The appellees demurred, arguing, inter alia, that, because the appellants failed to allege actual personal injury or property damage, they could not “ ‘be liable in tort to [appellants] for purely economic loss.’ ” Id. at 24 , 517 A.2d at 339 . The Circuit Court for Worcester County sustained the appellees’ demurrer and granted the appellees’ subsequently filed motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the appellants had no cause of action in tort against the appellees due to lack of privity between the parties 3 and because the appellees owed no duty to the appellants when the latter claimed only economic loss.

Id. at 24 , 517 A.2d at 339 . This Court reversed. We concluded that the issue of whether a duty will be imposed in tort depends upon the “risk generated by the negligent conduct.” Id. at 35 , 517 A.2d at 345 . The Court explained that a plaintiff should not “have to wait for a personal tragedy to occur in order to recover damages to remedy or repair defects[.] In the final analysis, the cost to the developer for a resulting tragedy could be far greater than the cost of remedying the condition.” Id. at 35 , 517 A.2d at 345 .

If, therefore, the conduct complained of creates a risk of death or personal injury, this Court continued, “the action will lie for recovery of the reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous condition in a tort action seeking purely economic loss.” Id. at 35 , 517 A.2d at 345 . The Court explained: “it is the serious nature of the risk that persuades us to recognize the cause of action in the absence of actual injury. ¹²⁶ Accordingly, conditions that present a risk to general health, wealth, or comfort but fall short of presenting a clear danger of death or personal injury will not suffice. A claim that defective design or construction has produced a drafty condition that may lead to a cold or pneumonia would not be sufficient.” Id. at 35 n. 5, 517 A.2d at 345 n. 5. Accordingly, given the serious risk of death or serious bodily injury that resulted from the appellee’s failure to construct sufficiently fire-worthy utility shafts, this Court held that the appellants had asserted a cognizable negligence claim against the appellees.

Id. at 40-41 , 517 A.2d at 348 . U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor and, City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 157-58 , 647 A.2d 405, 411 (1994), is to like effect. There, the City of Baltimore filed a claim, seeking, inter alia, recovery in tort for the cost of “discovering, managing, rectifying the effects of, and removing ... asbestos-containing building material.” Id. at 156 , 647 A.2d at 410 . Relying on the exception to the general bar to recovery for economic loss in tort “ ‘where the risk is of death or personal injury,’ ” id.

(quoting Whiting-Turner, 308 Md. at 35 , 517 A.2d at 345 ), this Court agreed that the City’s allegations met the threshold set forth in Whiting-Turner. It held, therefore, that Gypsum should be responsible for the cost to the City of removing the hazard. Id. at 157-158 , 647 A.2d at 411 . In so holding, we noted the great likelihood that those exposed to the asbestos-containing material in the City building would suffer serious injury in the event that it was not abated.

This Court further explicated the application of the exception to the economic loss rule in Morris v. Osmose, 340 Md. 519 , 667 A.2d 624 (1995). In Morris , the appellants sought to recover purely economic loss associated with the alleged deterioration of flame retardant treated (FRT) plywood used in the construction of the roofs of their townhouses. Id. at 526-27 , 667 A.2d at 628-29 . The appellants argued, in particular, that a chemical reaction, which occurred when FRT plywood was exposed to moderately high temperatures, weakened the wood and the bonding between the planks.

Id. As a result, ¹²⁷ the appellants asserted that “ ‘the roofs are unsafe and dangerous’ and ‘at risk of premature failure’ ” Id. at 527 , 667 A.2d at 629 . They further [asserted] that “ ‘there is an immediate threat of injury from walking on the roofs, and also the threat of the roofs collapsing and injuring the occupants within,’ and that the roofs cannot support ‘any weight, even a heavy snowfall.’ ” Id. The appellants did not allege, it is to be noted, that any person had ever been injured as a result of the allegedly defective FRT firewood.

Id. at 536 , 667 A.2d at 633 . Inter alia, the appellants asserted claims sounding in negligence and strict liability, 4 believing that the threat of serious injury or death presented by the faulty roofs was serious enough, under Whiting-Turner, to warrant recovery for the economic loss associated with replacing the roofing. Id. 340 Md. at 528 , 667 A.2d at 629 . The trial court dismissed the complaint.

With regard to the allegations in the tort claims, it reasoned that the appellants had not alleged “a clear danger of physical injury or death” as is required to make cognizable a claim for recovery of purely economic damages in tort. The trial court explained that “at the time of the sale by defendants to the developers, the FRT plywood was not so defective as to present a clear and imminent danger of death or personal injury to the ultimate purchaser of the home.” Id. 340 Md. at 529 , 667 A.2d at 630 . The Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal with regard to the implied warranty claim, but affirmed the dismissal of all the other counts, including the tort claims. Regarding those latter claims, the intermediate appellate court held that the risk of serious injury or death, as alleged by the appellants, amounted to “[m]ere possibilities ... [that did not] meet the threshold of establishing a clear danger of death or personal injury.” Id. 340 Md. at 531 , 667 A.2d at 630 . ¹²⁸ On certiorari to this Court, the appellants reiterated their argument that, under the exception to the economic loss rule in tort enunciated in Whiting-Turner, the risk of serious injury or death from FRT treated plywood was sufficient to assert a claim for the recovery of monies spent to repair the roofs.

Id. 340 Md. at 533 , 667 A.2d at 631 . The appellees argued that the risk of serious injury or death was not sufficiently clear as to invoke the exception. Id. We agreed with the appellees and the Court of Special Appeals.

Id. at 37, 517 A.2d 336 . Affirming the dismissal of the appellant’s tort claim, 5 we explained that, in order to determine whether a valid tort claim exists under the exception to the economic loss rule, the court must “examine both the nature of the damage threatened and the probability of damage occurring to determine whether the two, viewed together, exhibit a clear, serious, and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury.” Id. 340 Md. at 533 , 667 A.2d at 631-32 . Furthermore, we expounded on the logic of this two-part approach, vis-a-vis the general rule barring recovery in tort for economic losses: “This two part approach recognizes the negative effects that could occur if the economic loss rule was abandoned. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 870-71 , 106 S.Ct. 2295 [, 2301,] 90 L.Ed.2d 865 [, 876] (1986), (stating that an approach rejecting the economic loss rule ‘fails to account for the need to keep products liability and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages’).

It balances these considerations, however, against the public policy of encouraging people to correct dangerous conditions before tragedy results. Accordingly, we do not ordinarily allow tort claims for purely economic loss. But when those losses are coupled with serious risk of death or personal injury resulting ¹²⁹ from a dangerous condition, we allow recovery in tort to encourage correction of the dangerous condition.” Morris, 340 Md. at 534-35 , 667 A.2d 624, 632 . We also explained that, when analyzing the two elements, the critical test is not whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that meet an articulable threshold for both elements, but, rather, whether that plaintiff has met the threshold to satisfy either of the elements so long as, under the facts alleged, both elements are, at a minimum, present.

Id. at 533-34 , 667 A.2d at 631-32 . “Thus, if the possible injury is extraordinarily severe, i.e., multiple deaths, we do not require the probability of the injury occurring to be as high as we would require if the injury threatened were less severe, i.e. a broken leg or damage to property. Likewise, if the probability of the injury occurring is extraordinarily high, we do not require the injury to be as severe as we would if the probability of the injury were lower.” Id. 340 Md. at 533 , 667 A.2d at 632 . To illustrate, we referred to Whiting-Turner, which primarily concerned the potential severity of the injuries that would be incurred as a result of the appellees’ failure to construct the condominium with the requisite fire-worthy support shafts. Id. at 533-34 , 667 A.2d at 632 .

This Court pointed out that, even though, in Whiting-Turner, “no fire had actually occurred and the probability that the defect would cause the fire was not extraordinarily high, we allowed the plaintiffs to maintain a tort action because the nature of the possible damage was very serious—multiple deaths and personal injuries.” Id. See also U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 156-57 , 647 A.2d 405, 410-11 (1994), in which the Court recognized a tort claim against companies involved in the manufacture, distribution and installation of asbestos in Baltimore City buildings because the “possible injury—inhalation of asbestos fibers causing serious diseases—was coupled with a high probability that personal injuries thereby would result because ¹³⁰ everyone who used the building could have been exposed to asbestos fibers in the air.” Turning to the facts of the case before it, this Court held that the factors that persons who walk on the roofs may potentially suffer injury in the event that the roofs collapsed, or that the roofs might collapse under any significant pressure, such as a heavy snowfall, failed to meet the threshold for either element of the exception to the economic loss analysis enunciated in Whiting-Turner and its progeny. Id., 340 Md. at 536 , 667 A.2d at 633 (1995). We reasoned that the appellants made “no allegation that any injury has ever occurred since the roofs were installed on the plaintiffs townhouses ... or that any of the roofs have collapsed because of weather conditions or because of the alleged degradation associated with their construction.

As noted by the Court of Special Appeals, mere possibilities are legally insufficient to allege the existence of a clear danger of death or serious personal injury.” Id. Applying the thresholds established in Whiting-Turner, Gypsum, and Morris , we disagree with the intermediate appellate court, that the appellants in the case sub judiee asserted insufficient facts to meet the pleading threshold with regard to the risk of serious bodily injury. On the contrary, we believe that the appellants have alleged facts adequate to satisfy both elements of the analysis, the nature of the damage and the probability of damage prongs, for determining when an exception will lie to the general economic loss bar to recovery. With regard to the first prong, the nature of the damage, the appellants aver that individuals have suffered extremely serious injuries, including paraplegia, quadriplegia and/or death as a result of rear impact collisions in the class vehicles containing the allegedly defective seatbacks.

Certainly, as in Gypsum, such injuries rise to the level of “serious injury” within the meaning enunciated in Whiting-Turner and Morris . Under this Court’s instruction in Morris , that a plaintiff need only allege facts that satisfy one of the prongs of ¹³¹ the analysis to an acceptable degree, the fact that the severity of the potential injury is so grave, in this case, is sufficient to meet the threshold for the petitioners’ recovery of economic losses, even if the probability that the injuries would occur is not as high. This Court, however, also concludes that the petitioners have alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the second prong of the Morris economic loss analysis, as well, the probability that a serious injury, or death, would occur as a result of the allegedly defective seatbacks. In its TAC, the petitioners alleged that thousands of individuals have been injured or killed as a result of the collapse of the class vehicle seatbacks in rear-end collisions.

Indeed, the petitioners’ exhibit D includes specific records of complaints made to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), in which the drivers of class cars experienced the collapse of seatbacks in rear-end collisions resulting in no less than 38 reported injuries and 3 fatalities. The number of these incidents, as alleged, is certainly greater than those alleged in Morris , where the appellants alleged no actual record of past injury, a fact to which this Court accorded great weight when holding that the appellants, in that case, did not meet the threshold for economic loss under the Whiting-Turner exception. Although we acknowledge the important goal of the general bar to recovery for purely economic losses, to “keep products liability and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages,” East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 870-71 , 106 S.Ct. 2295, 2302 , 90 L.Ed.2d 865, 876-77 (1986), it is exactly the risk of serious bodily injury involved in this case that the exception to the economic loss rule was intended to remedy, to “encourag[e] people to correct dangerous conditions before tragedy results.” Morris, 340 Md. at 534-35 , 667 A.2d 624, 632 . i. Negligence A complaint alleging negligence must contain the following elements: “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant ¹³² breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of the duty.” Valentine v. On Target, 353 Md. 544, 549 , 727 A.2d 947, 949 (1999); BG & E v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 43 , 656 A.2d 307, 311 (1995), citing Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 76 , 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994).

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claim solely on the basis that, quoting Morris, supra, 340 Md. at 536 , 667 A.2d at 633 , the petitioners failed to articulate an injury in the form of economic losses sufficient to “ ‘meet the required legal threshold of pleading the existence of a clear and extreme danger of death or serious personal injury, as required by Whiting-Turner and its progeny.’ ” We reiterate that the standard for whether an allegation states a claim upon which relief can be granted does not require the petitioner to assert facts sufficient to prove the claim, but rather those necessary to allege a claim. As we have seen, the petitioners have met that burden, and thus, viewing all facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the petitioners, we reverse the dismissal of the negligence count. 6 ii. Strict Liability The theory of strict liability is set out in the Restatement (Second) op Torts § 402A (1965): “Special Liability of Seller or Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer “(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if ¹³³ “(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and “(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. “(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although “(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and “(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with either.” See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 341 , 363 A.2d 955, 957 (1976). Strict liability “advances the policy of requiring those who make and sell defective products to bear the costs of the injuries that result therefrom.” Id. at 342-43 , 363 A.2d at 958 .

See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963) (holding that the cost of injuries caused by defective products should be “borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”). Official Comment c to § 402A states that a “seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect ... [and] public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption to be placed upon those who market them and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.” Official Comment i to § 402 A also instructs that a product placed on the market reaches the threshold of being unreasonably dangerous to trigger strict liability when “[t]he article sold [is] dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be ¹³⁴ contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” To recover for injury under strict liability, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the possession or control of the seller; (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; (3) that the defect was a cause of the injuries, and (4) that the product was expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in its condition. Phipps, 278 Md. at 344 , 363 A.2d at 958 . In its analysis and holding, the Court of Special Appeals made no specific mention of the petitioner’s strict liability claim, but rather relied upon the same reasoning it used to resolve the negligence claim; namely that the petitioners failed adequately to “[plead] the existence of a clear and extreme danger of serious personal injury, as required by Whiting-Turner and its progeny.” Neither the Circuit Court nor the intermediate appellate court found any other element of a strict liability claim lacking in the petitioner’s TAC.

As we have discussed, pursuant to Whiting-Turner and its progeny, a plaintiff may overcome the ordinary rule that bars recovery for economic loss in tort claims so long as he or she asserts that there is a strong likelihood that the threatened damage is of a serious nature and that it is reasonably probable that the damage will occur. In other words, when the risk of serious injury or death and the likelihood of the damage are great enough to reach the threshold enumerated in Whiting-Turner and Morris , the cost to remedy the product defect stands in the place of actual physical injury. We have already determined that the risk of serious injury is so great, and the potential injury in this case so severe that it reaches the threshold enumerated in Whiting-Turner. The respondent in this case has not presented a persuasive argument as to why a petitioner should be barred from recovery of economic losses under a strict liability theory ¹³⁵ when the product at issue creates a significant risk of death or serious injury.

To be sure, the caveat enunciated in Whiting-Turner, that a consumer should not have to wait until injury or death has occurred to assert a claim when the likelihood of injury or death is great, is equally applicable in the case of a strict liability claim, where a party has marketed an item that is unreasonably dangerous. The Official Comment to § 402 A notes, and we stated in Pkvpps and the Supreme Court of California stated in Green-man, that it is the manufacturer that is in the best position to absorb the cost of injuries that result from a product defect. Under the reasoning of Whiting-Turner and Morris , it is also the manufacturer who should absorb the cost when a product defect creates a serious risk of severe bodily injury or death, even though actual injury has not yet occurred. The alternative would be to require plaintiffs aware of the risk to run the risk and perhaps suffer serious bodily injury, debilitation, or even death, thus incurring damages far in excess, in both human and economic terms, of the costs of remedying the defect.

This is needless risk, and even counterintuitive, considering the frequency of serious injuries and death that have been alleged to occur when the class of cars in the case sub judice are involved in rear collisions. iii. Negligent Failure to Disclose, Failure to Warn, Concealment and Misrepresentation 7 The petitioners aver that, in addition to the respondents’ negligent conduct in manufacturing automobiles with defective seatbacks, the respondents also negligently misrepresented the existence of the defect in the class automobile seatbacks to the general public. The following elements are required to assert a claim for negligent misrepresentation: ¹³⁶ “(1) the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently asserts a false statement; “(2) the defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the plaintiff; “(3) the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury; “(4) the plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement; and “(5) the plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.” Virginia Dare Stores v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287, 291-92 , 1 A.2d 897, 899 (1938); Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 336-37 , 439 A.2d 534, 539 (1982); Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 256 , 630 A.2d 1156, 1161 (1993). See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 522 (1977). 8 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation count on the same grounds that it dismissed the negligence and strict liability counts, 9 because ¹³⁷ there had been no actual injury and no allegation of such injury.

Our cases make it clear that a plaintiff is not required to suffer personal physical injury to recover under a theory of negligent misrepresentation. Martens, supra, 292 Md. at 335-36 , 439 A.2d at 538-39 (1982) (holding that “pecuniary loss is compensable under an action for negligent misrepresentation,” citing Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 548 , 187 A.2d 880 (1963)). To that end, the Court in Village of Cross Keys v. Gypsum, 315 Md. at 754, 556 A.2d at 1132 stated: “Although Whiting-Turner concerned negligent conduct, similar principles apply when negligent misrepresentation is involved. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 comment a (1965), noting that the rule pertaining to negligent misrepresentation involving the risk of physical harm represents a somewhat broader liability than the rule relating to liability for pecuniary loss resulting from negligent misrepresentation.” Under this reasoning, therefore, economic losses qualify as a cognizable injury under negligent misrepresentation. 10 ¹³⁸ iv.

Fraudulent Concealment and Intentional Failure to Warn The essential elements for a claim of fraudulent concealment include: “(1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to disclose a material fact; (2) the defendant failed to disclose that fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud or deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff took action in justifiable reliance on the concealment; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant’s concealment.” Green v. H & R Block, 355 Md. 488, 525 , 735 A.2d 1039, 1059 (1999). Fraudulent Concealment “is any statement or other conduct which prevents another from acquiring knowledge of a fact, such as diverting the attention of a prospective buyer from a defect which otherwise, he would have observed.” 11 ¹³⁹ A fraudulent concealment claim is caused, in part, by the intentional failure to warn. As this Court explained in Frederick Road Limited Partnership v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, n. 14 , 756 A.2d 963, 976, n. 14 , citing Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 323-24 , 389 A.2d 887, 904 (1978): “Absent a fiduciary relationship, this Court has held that a plaintiff seeking to establish fraudulent concealment must prove that the defendant took affirmative action to conceal the cause of action and that the plaintiff could not have discovered the cause of action despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, see, Walsh v. Edwards, 233 Md. 552, 557 , 197 A.2d 424, 426-27 (1964); Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 476 , 147 A.2d 223, 225-26 (1958), and that, in such cases, the affirmative act on the part of the defendant must be more than mere silence; there must be some act intended to exclude suspicion and prevent injury, or there must be a duty on the part of the defendant to disclose such facts, if known. Impala, supra, 283 Md. at 323-24 , 389 A.2d at 904 .” With regard to the fraudulent concealment claim, the Court of Special Appeals specifically stated that, because “no injury has occurred, appellants are unable to assert that they have suffered damages as a result of any concealment of the alleged defect.” The court further held that, “[ejven assuming arguendo that a ‘pre-injury’ lawsuit is recognized in Maryland, [the trial court] correctly dismissed appellant’s tort-based claims ... by concluding that ‘the economic loss doctrine would not support the cause of action being sought by the plaintiff in this case.’ ” Id.

(slip op. at 16-17). This court is aware of no reason, nor has one been presented to it, that, so long as sufficient allegations of a serious risk of bodily harm or death has been made, under the Whiting-Turner analysis, why the petitioners should be barred from ¹⁴⁰ asserting a claim for economic loss resulting from fraudulent concealment. The Court of Special Appeals’ decision to affirm summary judgment regarding the fraudulent concealment claims, therefore, is reversed. v. Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices under Maryland Consumer Protection Act The Court of Special Appeals determined, and the respondents argue in this Court, that the petitioners have failed to articulate any actual injury or loss to sustain a Consumer Protection Act claim. 12 As we will elucidate, actual physical injury to a person or property or actual product malfunction is not required to state a cognizable injury under the Consumer Protection Act and, thus, the dismissal of the petitioners’ Consumer Protection Act claim must also be reversed. The Consumer Protection Act, codified at Maryland Code (1975, 2005 Replacement Volume) §§ 13-101 et seq. of the Commercial Law Article was “intended to provide minimum standards for the protection of consumers in the State.” § 13-101.

As this Court explained in Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, supra: “The General Assembly enacted the Consumer Protection Act ... in response to ‘mounting concern over the increase of deceptive trade practices in connection with sales of merchandise, real property, and services and the extension of credit.’ ... The Legislature was concerned that these deceptive practices were undermining public confidence in merchants.... It found existing federal and State laws to be ‘inadequate, poorly coordinated and not widely known or adequately enforced,’ and found ‘that improved enforcement ¹⁴¹ procedures [were] necessary to help alleviate the growing problem of deceptive consumer practices.’ ... With the Act, therefore, the General Assembly intended ‘to set certain minimum statewide standards for the protection of consumers across the State’ and to ‘take strong protective and preventative steps to investigate unlawful consumer practices, to assist the public in obtaining relief from these practices, and to prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland.’ ” 340 Md. at 536-37 , 667 A.2d at 633 (citations omitted).

The Act inter alia, prohibits unfair and deceptive trade practices “in the sale, lease, rental, loan, or bailment of any consumer goods, consumer realty, consumer services ...” § 13-303(1). Deceptive trade practices include, as relevant: “(1) False, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement, visual description, or other representation of any kind which has the capacity, tendency or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers;[ 13 ] Representation that: “(i) Consumer goods ... have a sponsorship, approval, accessory, characteristic, ingredient, use, benefit, or quantity which they do not have; “(iv) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services are a particular standard, quality, grade, style or model which the are not; ¹⁴² “(3) Failure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends to deceive; s}: s¡« # ${: “(9) Deception, fraud, false pretense, false premise, misrepresentation, or knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with the intent that the consumer rely on the same in connection with: (i) the promotion or sale of any consumer goods ...” § 13-301. A party alleging unfair or deceptive trade practices may file a complaint with the Attorney General’s office, § 13-401, 14 or bring a private cause of action. § 13-408. 15 While “any person may bring an action to recover for injury or loss sustained by him as the result of a practice prohibited by this title,” § 13-408, a party who files a complaint with the Attorney General, who then brings the action, is not required to allege that actual injury has occurred. § 13-302. 16 ¹⁴³ This Court has held, however, that a private party suing under the Consumer Protection Act must establish “actual injury or loss.” Citaramanis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 153-54 , 613 A.2d 964, 969 (1992); Morris v. Osmose, 340 Md. 519 , 538 n. 10, 667 A.2d 624 , 635 n. 10 (1995); McGraw v. Loyola Ford, Inc., 124 Md.App. 560, 581 , 723 A.2d 502, 512 (1999), cert. denied, 353 Md. 473 , 727 A.2d 382 (1999). See Maryland Code, (1975, 2005 Replacement Vol.) § 13-408 of the Commercial Law Article (“any person may bring an action to recover for injury or loss sustained by him as the result of a practice prohibited by this title”).

We have, in earlier cases, established that, in order to articulate a cognizable injury under the Consumer Protection Act, the injury must be objectively identifiable. In other words, the consumer must have suffered an identifiable loss, measured by the amount the consumer spent or lost as a result of his or her reliance on the sellers’ misrepresentation. Golt v. Phillips, 308 Md. 1, 11-14 , 517 A.2d 328, 333-335 (1986); Citaramanis, 328 Md. at 151-53 , 613 A.2d at 968-70 (1992); Morris v. Osmose, 340 Md. at 538 n. 10, 667 A.2d at 635 n. 10 (1995); McGraw v. Loyola Ford, 124 Md.App. 560, 581 , 723 A.2d 502, 512 (1999), cert. denied 353 Md. 473 , 727 A.2d 382 , (1999). In Golt , the petitioner entered into a rental agreement to lease the respondent landlord’s apartment. 308 Md. 1, 5 , 517 A.2d 328, 330 .

The petitioner agreed to move into the premises only upon the landlord’s promise that, prior to the move in date, certain cleaning and repairs would be done. When the petitioner took possession of the property, however, the respondent had not completed the requested repairs. The petitioner paid rent and occupied the apartment for three months, during which time the respondent made no attempt to remedy the condition of the apartment. The petitioner, therefore, contacted the Baltimore City Department of Housing and ¹⁴⁴ Community Development, which conducted an inspection of the dwelling.

Id. Upon inspection, the Department of Housing discovered numerous housing code violations, which included, inter alia, lack of toilet facilities, defective door locks, and the lack of fire exits and fire door. Id. at 6 , 517 A.2d at 330. Additionally, the housing inspector learned that the respondents did not possess the appropriate license to lease the building as a multiple-family dwelling unit.

The respondent was ordered to make the requisite repairs and obtain the proper license. Id. Rather than obtain a license and make the repairs, the respondent chose to evict the petitioner, forcing the petitioner to move to a new, more expensive apartment. Furthermore, the respondent refused to refund all of the petitioner’s security deposit, withholding a portion of it for one month’s rent and for utility charges.

The petitioner filed suit in District Court for violation of the Consumer Protection Act and seeking recovery of, inter alia, his security deposit. Id. The District Court found that the petitioner was entitled to the return of the total amount of his November rent because “the dwelling was unlicensed, and, therefore illegal to rent,” id. at 6, 517 A.2d at 330, and that the respondent had improperly withheld the security deposit. The District Court held, however, denied the petitioner relief under the Consumer Protection Act, holding that he had viewed the premises prior to moving in and, thus, was fully aware of their condition.

Id. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and this court granted certiorari. Id. at 7, 517 A.2d at 331. We reversed, holding that the failure of the respondents to disclose the material fact that it did not hold a license to rent the premises as a multi-family unit amounted to a violation of the Consumer Protection Act.

Id. at 9, 517 A.2d at 332. Particularly, we stated: “Implicit in any advertisement and rental of an apartment is the representation that the leasing of the apartment is lawful. Baltimore City Code, Art. 13, § 1101 (1983 Repl. ¹⁴⁵ Vol.) expressly prohibits the operation of any multiple family dwelling without a license or temporary certificate. As [the respondent] had neither a license nor a temporary certificate, it violated the City Code.

Consequently, [the respondent’s] advertisement and rental of the apartment was a ‘misleading ... statement ... or other representation of any kind which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers.’ Maryland Code (1983 RepLVol.), § 13-301(J) of the Commercial Law Article.” Id. Recognizing that the purpose of a licensing scheme served the important purpose of ensuring that landlords do not rent apartments that are “hazardous to the safety or welfare of the people,” id. at 13, 517 A.2d at 334, we noted that licensing “is an integral part of the City’s effort to maintain safe residential conditions for its citizens.” To that end, we explained: “Dwellings that are not licensed provide no opportunity for the City to ensure minimum living conditions. Furthermore, an annual license fee for a multiple dwelling unit is only $20.00 per dwelling unit ... It is evident that the license fee is charged to support the cost of inspections, and not to raise revenue.

Therefore, [the respondents] may not retain any benefits from the unlicenced lease and [the Petitioner] may recover his full damages.” Id. at 13-14, 517 A.2d at 334. With regard to the petitioner’s loss, this Court determined that he was entitled to restitution of the total amount he paid in rent, as well as consequential damages, including the cost of moving to a new apartment and the “difference in cost between reasonable substitute housing and the rental charged for the remainder of the legal term of his lease with the [respondents].” Id. at 13-14, 517 A.2d at 334. In Citaramanis , this Court further clarified when an injury is deemed sufficiently pled to state a consumer protection claim. In that case, the petitioner rented a house from the respondent homeowners for a period of one year.

During that time, the petitioners did not complain regarding the condition of the home and, despite the fact that the respondent in ¹⁴⁶ creased the rent, extended their tenancy beyond the first year, Citaramanis, 328 Md. at 144-45 , 613 A.2d at 965 . During the tenancy, only minor repairs were made on the home. After the petitioners informed the respondents that they planned to move, they learned that the respondents, when they rented the house, did not have a license to do so. Id.

Armed with that information, the petitioners filed, in the Circuit Court for Howard County, a complaint alleging that the respondents had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices prohibited by the Maryland Consumer Protection Act and praying the return of all of the rent they paid to the respondent during their tenancy. Id. The respondents did not dispute that they failed to obtain a license before renting their home to the petitioners, nor did they dispute that they failed to obtain the license at any time during the petitioners’ tenancy. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court granted the petitioners’ motion, relying primarily on this Court’s reasoning in Golt , and awarded the petitioners the full amount of the rent they paid to the respondents during their tenancy.

Id. at 146 , 613 A.2d at 966 . The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that “because the [petitioners] had not demonstrated that any condition of the premises during their tenancy constituted a ‘substantial housing code violation’ ... or the lack of licensure had caused a diminution in value of the property” they had not incurred actual damages, a prerequisite to recovery in a private action under the Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 147 , 613 A.2d at 966 quoting Hallowell v. Citaramanis, 88 Md.App. 160 , 594 A.2d 591 (1991). Before this Court, the petitioners argued that the condition of the house in that case was irrelevant.

They relied on the following language in Golt : “It is evident that the [multiple family dwelling] licensing fee is charged to support the cost of inspections, and not to raise revenue. Therefore, Phillips Brothers may not retain ¹⁴⁷ any benefits from the unlicenced lease, and Golt may recover his full damages.” Id. at 150 , 613 A.2d at 967 . Recognizing that, with regard to the Golt decision, “Pajecause of the obvious actual loss and damage suffered by the tenant [in that case], who paid rent for what proved to be an uninhabitable apartment, we realize now ... that we spoke much too broadly in making the statement just quoted,” id. at 150 , 613 A.2d at 967 , we distinguished the situation in Golt from the one at bar. We noted that, in Golt , as a result of the landlord’s failure to obtain a license and abide by the requirements of the Baltimore City Code, the tenant was forced to live in conditions violative of basic health and safety, including “no toilet in [the tenant’s] apartment, no fire doors, defective door locks, and no fire exits.” 328 Md. at 148 , 613 A.2d at 966 .

Furthermore, this Court clarified, the tenant in Golt was evicted when the landlord decided not to obtain a license as required by the City, which required the tenant to incur moving expenses and an increase in rent when he had to lease a new apartment. Id. at 147-48 , 613 A.2d at 966 . By contrast, the CitaraManises alleged neither uninhabitable conditions nor monetary loss as a result of their landlord’s failure to obtain a license. This Court explained: “the CitaraManises do not allege that the house they rented was unclean, unsafe, unhabitable or unsuitable in any regard.

To the contrary, during argument before the trial judge, the [petitioner]’s counsel explicitly argued that the condition of the property was irrelevant because the basis of their cause of action is misrepresentation regarding the failure to license, not the condition of the property. Indeed, the [petitioners] elected to extend their tenancy and remain on the premises for another six months after the termination of the original lease at a higher rent.” Id. at 149 , 613 A.2d at 967 . We further elucidated that, under the Consumer Protection Act a party may pursue a public remedy, by filing a claim with the Attorney General, a private remedy, by filing a private ¹⁴⁸ cause of action, or both. We noted, however, that there is a difference between the two options with regard to the necessity of pleading injury or harm: “Notwithstanding the availability of both public and private remedies to consumers, the Legislature has established a clear distinction between the elements necessary to maintain a public enforcement proceeding versus a private enforcement proceeding, In a public enforcement proceeding any practice prohibited by this title is a violation ... whether or not any consumer in fact has been misled, deceived, or damaged as a result of that practice.” § 13-302.

In contrast, a private enforcement proceeding pursuant to § 13-408(a) expressly only permits a consumer “to recover for injury or loss sustained by him as the result of a practice prohibited by this title.” § 13-408(a). Section 13-408(a), therefore, requires and aggrieved consumer to establish the nature of the actual injury or loss that he or she has allegedly sustained as a result of the prohibited practice. This statutory construction creates a bright line distinction between the public enforcement remedies available under the CPA and the private remedy available under § 13-408(a). Id. at 151, 613 A.2d at 968 .

The requirement that parties plead actual injury or harm in a private cause of action under the Consumer Protection Act: “is said to prevent aggressive consumers who were not personally harmed by the prohibited conduct, or even involved in a transaction with the offending businessman, from instituting suit ‘as self-constituted private attorneys general’ over relatively minor statutory violations. Another fear is that the powerful weapon given to consumers in the form of the private remedy ‘was capable of being used improperly for harassment and improper coercive tactics.’ ” Id. (quoting 1 H. Alperin & R. Chase, Consumer Law: Sales Practices And Credit Regulation § 136 at 193). We acknowledged the differing interests sought to be promoted by the public and private enforcement proceedings. ¹⁴⁹ “[T]he CPA’s public enforcement mechanisms are set up to prevent potentially unfair or deceptive trade practices from occurring, even before any consumer is injured, whereas § 13-408(a) requires that actual ‘injury or loss’ be sustained by a consumer before recovery of damages is permitted in a private cause of action.

A construction of the CPA that would establish § 13-302 as a benchmark to determine whether a consumer has sustained ‘injury or loss’ within the meaning of § 13~408(a) is both strained and illogical.” Id. at 153, 613 A.2d at 969 quoting Comment, Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act: A Private Cause of Action for Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices, 38 Md. Law Rev. 733, 739 n. 50 (1979). With those rules in mind, the Court held that, unlike the petitioner in Golt , the Citaramanis petitioners neither claimed that they received less than the full benefit of their agreement nor incurred any costs as a result of the respondents’ failure to obtain a license; they alleged no injury or loss under the Consumer Protection Act. In the case sub judice, it is clear that the petitioners have alleged facts constituting a loss. Particularly, the petitioners allege that, as a result of the respondents’ misrepresentation or omission, they suffered a loss, measured by the amount it will cost them to repair the defective seatbacks. 17 ¹⁵⁰ In Golt , the amount of the loss was quantified, in part, by the amount the petitioner had to pay to remedy his situation; namely, the difference between the amount he had to pay to rent another apartment and the rent he was