Lloyd v. State

LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Retired, Specially Assigned), J. The appellant, Bobby Rydell Lloyd, II (Lloyd), appeals his conviction in the Circuit Court for Garrett County for second degree assault. We are presented with one issue on appeal: “Was [Lloyd] denied his federal and state constitutional right to [a] speedy trial?” For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm. Our analysis includes consideration of the effect on constitutional speedy trial analysis of a prayer for jury trial removal of a prosecution within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the District Court of Maryland. Factual Background On June 27, 2011, Lloyd was convicted of second degree assault on a not guilty statement of facts.

He was sentenced on the same day to ten years of incarceration, all but three suspended, and five years of probation. Lloyd was arrested on October 12, 2010, the day of the assault. 1 He was additionally charged with assault in the first degree and malicious destruction of property. ³²⁶ The total period from Lloyd’s arrest to his trial in the circuit court is eight months and fifteen days. The relevant proceedings during that period are enumerated below: October 13, 2010: Bail set by a District Court Commissioner in the instant case at $10,000. October 15, 2010: On bail review in this case by the District Court, bail set at $100,000 (100% acceptable).

October 18, 2010: Defense counsel enters his appearance in the District Court. October 22, 2010: The State moves to consolidate the subject case with another, based on common facts. October 27, 2010 Lloyd requests subpoenae for witnesses for preliminary hearing set for December 7, 2010. December 7, 2010: Preliminary hearing postponed.

State enters nolle prosequi to first degree assault charge. At this point, the subject case came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the District Court. See Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 4-301(b)(5) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, together with Maryland Code (2002), §§ 3-203 and 6-301 of the Criminal Law Article. Case assigned trial date of January 10, 2011.

January 10, 2011: Lloyd prays jury trial. January 10, 2011: District Court record received in circuit court. January 12, 2011: Lloyd files omnibus motion, including pro forma request for speedy trial. January 20, 2011: Bail review hearing held.

Bail unchanged. No demand for speedy trial. March 1, 2011: Case assigned jury trial date of May 18, 2011. April 18, 2011: Bail review hearing held.

Bail unchanged. No demand for speedy trial. ³²⁷ May 18, 2011: Case postponed for good cause. The single Circuit Court for Garrett County jury courtroom to be in use for trial of older case. May 24, 2011: Case assigned jury trial date of June 28, 2011.

June 27, 2011: Defense counsel argues motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The motion was written by Lloyd. Motion denied. June 27, 2011: Case tried on not guilty statement of facts.

Nolle prosequi entered as to malicious destruction of property count in the subject case and to all counts in a companion case charging threat of arson. State calls violation of probation case against Lloyd. We shall present more facts in the discussion as necessary. Discussion The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees defendants in criminal prosecutions the right to a speedy trial.

It is a fundamental right “ ‘imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States.’ ” State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 395 , 572 A.2d 544, 545 (1990) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2184 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 108 (1972)). Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights serves the same purpose in Maryland. To determine if an individual’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, the Court utilizes a balancing test “in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” Bailey, 319 Md. at 396 , 572 A.2d at 546 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 117 ). “ ‘A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.’ ” Id. Four factors have been identified by the Supreme Court and consistently utilized in Maryland to make this constitutional determination: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.

Id. at 409, 572 A.2d at 552 . See also State v. Kanneh, 403 Md. 678, 688 , 944 A.2d 516, 521 (2008); Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 222 , 792 A.2d ³²⁸ 1160, 1167 (2002); Wilson v. State, 281 Md. 640, 644 , 382 A.2d 1053, 1056 , cert. denied., 439 U.S. 839 , 99 S.Ct. 126 , 58 L.Ed.2d 136 (1978). Length of Delay The length of delay is measured from the date of arrest. Kanneh, 403 Md. at 688 , 944 A.2d at 521 ; Bailey, 319 Md. at 410 , 572 A.2d at 552 .

There is “no specific duration of delay that constitutes a per se delay of constitutional dimension.” Glover, 368 Md. at 223 , 792 A.2d at 1167 . The Court of Appeals has consistently held, however, that a delay of more than one year and fourteen days is “presumptively prejudicial” and requires balancing the remaining factors. Id. (fourteen month delay triggered constitutional analysis); Kanneh, 403 Md. at 688 , 944 A.2d at 522 (thirty-five month delay triggered constitutional analysis); Bailey, 319 Md. at 411 , 572 A.2d at 553 (two year delay triggered constitutional analysis).

Cases have held that a delay of less than this time did not trigger the balancing test. See State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 579 , 471 A.2d 712, 719 (1984) (less than six months elapsing between arrest and trial was not “inordinate delay,” and, because the delay was “not presumptively prejudicial, there [was] no necessity for inquiry into the other factors which go into the balance”); Collins v. State, 192 Md.App. 192, 213-14 , 993 A.2d 1175, 1187-88 (2010) (five month delay did not trigger balancing analysis); Smart v. State, 58 Md.App. 127, 132 , 472 A.2d 501, 503 (1984) (one day less than six months delay did not trigger balancing analysis); Isaacs v. State, 31 Md.App. 604, 614 , 358 A.2d 273, 279 (1976) (delay of five months and six days did not trigger constitutional analysis). But see Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 686 , 414 A.2d 1266, 1272 (1980) (“The State concedes that the eight month and twenty day delay ‘might be construed to be of constitutional dimension so as to trigger the prescribed balancing test.’ ”). The nature of the charges levied also affects the permissible delay: the more complex and serious the crime, the longer a delay might be tolerated because “society also has an interest in ensuring that” longer sentences “are rendered ³²⁹ upon the most exact verdicts possible.” Glover, 368 Md. at 224 , 792 A.2d at 1168 ; Bailey, 319 Md. at 411 , 572 A.2d at 553 (“ ‘the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than a serious, complex conspiracy charge’ ” (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 117 )).

Finally, “the length of delay in and of itself is not a weighty factor.” Id. at 225, 792 A.2d at 1168 . “[T]he duration of the delay is closely correlated to the other factors, such as the reasonableness of the State’s explanation for the delay, the likelihood that the delay may cause the defendant to more pronouncedly assert his speedy trial right, and the presumption that a longer delay may cause the defendant greater harm.” Id. Here, a total of eight months and fifteen days elapsed between Lloyd’s arrest and his trial. This delay is below the presumptively prejudicial one year and fourteen day mark. It is, however, two months more than the several cases holding that a six-month delay was not presumptively prejudicial.

As in Battle, this delay “might” be construed as presumptively prejudicial and of constitutional dimension. We shall therefore address the remaining three factors. Reason for Delay As the Court of Appeals stated in Glover, 368 Md. at 225 , 792 A.2d at 1168 : “ ‘Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. ... [Different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government.

A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should [be] considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.’ ³³⁰ “Bailey, 319 Md. at 412 , 572 A.2d at 553 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 117 ).” October 12, 2010 to January 10, 2011 This is a period of two months and twenty-nine days measured from Lloyd’s arrest to the day on which he could have been tried in the District Court, but instead prayed a jury trial. The reason for the delay is neutral, and should not be charged to either party. See Howell v. State, 87 Md.App. 57, 82 , 589 A.2d 90, 102 , cert. denied, 324 Md. 324 , 597 A.2d 421 (1991) (“The span of time from charging to the first scheduled trial date is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, and is accorded neutral status.”); Marks v. State, 84 Md.App. 269, 282 , 578 A.2d 828, 835 (1990), cert. denied, 321 Md. 502 , 583 A.2d 275 (1991) (same); Brown v. State, 153 Md.App. 544, 558 , 837 A.2d 956, 964 (2003), cert. denied, 380 Md. 618 , 846 A.2d 401 (2004) (holding that an eight and a half month period from the date of mandate to the first scheduled trial date “was necessary for the orderly administration of justice and constituted a reasonable amount of time to allow the State and the Defendant to prepare for trial”).

January 10, 2011 to May