Looc, Inc. v. Kohli

ELDRIDGE, Judge. This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County requiring the petitioners, LOOC, Inc. and Domino’s Pizza, Inc., immediately to comply with a decision and order of the Maryland Commission on Human Relations. 1 Because the circuit court, under the circumstances, erred in ordering compliance with the Commission’s decision and order at this stage in the proceedings, we shall reverse. I. The controversy began in December 1987, when Prabhjot Kohli applied for a job with Domino as a manager in training. Domino denied his application under a company-wide no-beard policy because Mr. Kohli refused to shave his beard, which he wears for religious reasons.

In January 1988, Mr. Kohli filed a complaint with the Maryland Human Relations Commission, asserting that rejection of his employment application under these circumstances constituted religious discrimination. After lengthy administrative and judicial review proceedings, and after the case was remanded back to the Commission ²⁶² by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, 2 the Commission’s Appeal Board on January 17, 1996, issued a final administrative decision and order pursuant to Maryland Code (1957,1994 RepLVol., 1997 Supp.), Art. 49B, §§ 3(d), 11,15(f), and 16, and the Administrative Procedure Act, Code (1984, 1995 Repl. Vol.), § 10-221 of the State Government Article. The Commission found that Domino had engaged in unlawful religious discrimination in its employment practices in violation of Art. 49B, § 16, and ordered Domino to revise its no-beard policy, to pay Mr. Kohli back pay, and to offer him the next available position as a manager in training. 3 ²⁶³ On February 13,1996, in accordance with the judicial review section of the Administrative Procedure Act, § 10-222 of the State Government Article, Domino filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s decision and order.

At the same time, Domino filed a motion to “stay” the decision and order pursuant to Maryland Rule 7-205 and § 10-222(e) of the State Government Article, and Domino requested a hearing. 4 The circuit court on March 18, 1996, without a hearing, denied the motion to stay. Domino then filed a motion for reconsideration and another request for a hearing. The circuit court denied this motion in an order dated May 14, 1996. The court’s May 14th order, however, went beyond a simple denial of the motion to reconsider.

The circuit court also ordered “that [Domino] shall immediately comply with the Decision and Order of the Maryland Commission on Human Relations pending this Court’s consideration of [Domino’s] appeal.” 5 On May 17, 1996, the Commission sent a letter to Domino demanding that Domino take certain action in accordance with the final decision and order of the Commission, and stating: ²⁶⁴ “If, Domino fails to immediately act in accord with the orders of the Commission and circuit court, on Thursday, May 23, 1996, the Commission will file a Petition for Contempt.” Domino, on May 20, 1996, filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from the circuit court’s order of May 14, 1996. At the same time, Domino filed in the Court of Special Appeals a motion to stay the circuit court’s order pending appeal. The Court of Special Appeals denied the motion for a stay. Shortly thereafter, and prior to the filing of briefs in the Court of Special Appeals, Domino filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari and a motion to stay the circuit court’s order.

This Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari and ordered that the circuit court’s May 14th order be stayed pending the decision by this Court. LOOC, Inc. v. Kohli 342 Md. 582 , 678 A.2d 1047 (1996). Domino argues that the circuit court’s compliance order of May 14, 1996, constituted a preliminary or interlocutory injunction which violated the Maryland Rules regarding injunctions, presently codified as Maryland Rules 15-501 through 15-505. Alternatively, Domino contends that the order was unauthorized under the statutory provisions governing the Human Relations Commission and the enforcement of the Commission’s orders, Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol., Supp.1997), Art. 49B.

The Commission, on the other hand, asserts that the circuit court’s order of May 14, 1996, went no further than its earlier order of March 18, 1996, which had simply denied Domino’s motion for a stay. The Commission contends that any court order denying a stay of an administrative “cease and desist” or similar administrative order is “injunctive in effect as are all orders denying requests for stay of injunctive agency orders” (Commission’s brief at 14), and that the earlier March 18th order denying a stay “required and commanded [Domino] ... to do exactly what the Commission’s final decision and Order required and commanded” (id. at 15). Because, in the Commission’s view, the earlier March 18th circuit ²⁶⁵ court order had the same “injunctive effect” (id. at 14) as the later May 14th circuit court order, the Commission contends that Domino’s notice of appeal should have been filed within 30 days of March 18th. Since the notice of appeal was filed on May 20, 1996, more than 30 days from March 18th, the Commission maintains that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely. 6 The Commission further argues that, even if Domino’s appeal were timely, there was neither a violation of the Maryland Rules concerning injunctions nor of Art. 49B.

Again, the Commission views the May 14th order as going no farther than the March 18th order denying a stay. While stating that a court order denying a stay of an administrative cease and desist order has “injunctive effect,” the Commission asserts that such a court order is not subject to the Maryland Rules regulating injunctions. Finally, the Commission contends that the circuit court’s order was authorized by Art. 49B.

II

We agree with Domino’s argument that the circuit court’s May 14, 1996, compliance order both violated the Maryland Rules regulating injunctions and was unauthorized by Art. 49B. We flatly reject the Commission’s theory that the May 14th and earlier March 18th orders were identical in effect and that Domino’s appeal was untimely. A. The circuit court’s order of March 18, 1996, simply denying a motion to stay the administrative decision and order, was in no sense an “injunction” as contended by the Commission. It was not a court “order mandating or prohibit ²⁶⁶ ing a specified act,” and thus did not amount to an “injunction” as defined by Maryland law. 7 Although the March 18th denial of the motion for a stay left the earlier administrative decision operative, to the same extent as it was operative when rendered by the Commission, nothing in the court’s order of March 18th required or prohibited any party from doing anything.

To whatever extent, if any, immediate action was then required, such requirement resulted entirely from the Commission’s order and not the court’s order. No party could have been held in contempt for violating the March 18th court order. Moreover, we have held “that a trial court’s decision on a motion for a ... stay is ordinarily not appealable” as a grant or denial of an injunction, County Comm’rs v. Schrodel, 320 Md. 202, 213 , 577 A.2d 39, 45 (1990). See, e.g., Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary District, 295 Md. 410, 416-417 , 456 A.2d 371, 374 (1983) (stay or refusal to stay proceedings in the same matter ordinarily does not constitute the grant or denial of an injunction), and cases there cited; Waters v. Smith, 277 Md. 189, 195-197 , 352 A.2d 793, 796-798 (1976).

Under our cases, the March 18th order denying a stay was not an order granting or denying an injunction, and Domino could not have filed an appeal from that order pursuant to Code (1974,1995 RepLVol., Supp.1997), § 12-303(3)(i) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The May 14, 1996, order, however, did constitute the granting of the injunction. The circuit court on May 14th ²⁶⁷ ordered that Domino “shall immediately comply with the Decision and Order of the Maryland Commission on Human Relations____” This was a court order “mandating ... a specified act;” it therefore fell within the definition of “injunction” set forth in Rule 15-501(a). If this Court had not stayed the May 14th order, and if Domino had not complied with it, Domino could have been subject to contempt proceedings.

Furthermore, because the May 14th order did not contain an expiration date “not later than ten days after issuance,” it was not a valid temporary restraining order. 8 In substance, the order was a preliminary injunction. Nevertheless, it was erroneously issued without giving Domino an opportunity for a hearing. Rule 15-505(a) states, without exceptions, as follows: ²⁶⁸ “Rule 15-505. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION “(a) Notice.—A court may not issue a preliminary injunction without notice to all parties and an opportunity for a full adversary hearing on the propriety of its issuance.” Since the injunctive portion of the May 14th order was not issued in accordance with the rules, it must be reversed.

B. Alternatively, even if the injunctive portion of the May 14th order had been issued in compliance with Rules 15-501 through 15-505, reversal would be required under the provisions of Art. 49B. The statutory provisions applicable to the Human Relations Commission do not authorize such an order at the time and under the circumstances. In contending that it was authorized to seek the compliance portion of the May 14th order, and that the circuit court was authorized to grant its request, the Commission relies upon Art. 49B, § 12(a). That subsection provides as follows: “§ 12.

Enforcement of Commission’s orders; * * * “(a) If any respondent refuses to comply with an order of the Commission made within the scope of any of these subtitles, the Commission may, represented by its general counsel, institute litigation in the appropriate equity court of the county or in Baltimore City where the alleged discrimination took place to enforce compliance with any of the provisions of this article. “The court, in hearing said case, shall be governed by the judicial review standards as set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland.” The Commission’s reliance on § 12(a) is misplaced for two reasons. First, the Commission filed no pleading which could reasonably be construed as the institution of an enforcement action under § 12(a). The mere submission of a proposed order to be signed by a judge, in response to the other side’s motion to reconsider the denial of a stay, can hardly be viewed as the “institution of] litigation ... to enforce compliance with any ²⁶⁹ of the provisions of this article.” The Legislature did not provide in Art. 49B, § 12(a), that whenever “any respondent” institutes an action for judicial review of the Commission’s decision, there is automatically an enforcement action before the court, and that the court