Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary District

Davidson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ⁴¹² This case involves questions concerning the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts. However, we shall not consider these questions. Rather we shall, on our own motion, vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals because the appeal to that Court was taken from a nonappealable interlocutory order, and not from a final judgment. Before 1 October 1978, the petitioner, Highfield Water Company (HWC), had supplied water to Highfield, Maryland, an area located in Washington County. 1 On 29 September 1978, the respondent, Washington County Sanitary District (WCSD), filed suit in the Circuit Court for Washington County (Circuit Court) against HWC (injunction suit).

The bill of complaint alleged that HWC’s operation provided inadequate and unsatisfactory service and constituted a serious menace to the health, safety, and comfort of the public. Additionally, the bill of complaint requested an ex parte injunction authorizing WCSD to begin operating the water system, and preventing HWC from interfering with WCSD’s operation. On that same day, the Circuit Court issued such an injunction and on 1 October 1978, WCSD began to operate the water system. That injunction was extended to 31 January 1979. 2 On 28 September 1979, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, HWC filed suit against, among others, WCSD (federal court case).

The complaint filed in the federal court contained 12 counts. Count V, Deprivation of ⁴¹³ Civil Rights ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ), alleged that, under color of State law, WCSD deprived HWC of its civil rights secured by the United States Constitution through misuse of administrative powers and judicial proceedings that resulted in an unlawful seizure of HWC’s property without just compensation. This count sought a declaratory judgment as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Count VIII, Violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 24 (formerly 23), alleged that the misuse of administrative powers and judicial proceedings which resulted in an unlawful seizure of HWC’s property was tortious and in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

This count also sought a declaratory judgment as well as compensatory and punitive damages. See Highfield Water Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 488 F. Supp. 1176 (D.Md. 1980); see also Public Service Comm’n v. Highfield Water Co., 293 Md. 1 , 441 A.2d 1031 (1982) (certified question from United States District Court for the District of Maryland). On 7 January 1981, WCSD filed a Condemnation Petition in the Circuit Court for Washington County (condemnation case). The HWC responded by filing a Motion Raising Preliminary Objection and Plea in Abatement (motion raising preliminary objection) requesting that the trial court dismiss or stay the condemnation case pending the conclusion of the federal court case.

More particularly, HWC claimed, among other things, that "|w]hen the Federal District Courts and the State Courts have in rem, or quasi in rem, concurrent jurisdiction, the right to maintain exclusive jurisdiction attaches to the tribunal which first exercises it.” The HWC concluded that, in the instant case, jurisdiction over the res was initially exercised by the federal court in the federal court case, and, therefore, that the Circuit Court was deprived of jurisdiction in the condemnation case. The trial court denied the motion and ordered HWC to respond on the merits. Instead of responding on the merits, HWC immediately appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The WCSD filed a ⁴¹⁴ motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not taken from a final judgment.

The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied. In an unreported opinion, Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary District, (No. 323, September Term, 1981, filed 23 November 1981), the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of HWC’s motion raising preliminary objection and the trial court’s refusal to dismiss or stay the condemnation case. The HWC filed a petition for a writ of certiorari that we granted. Here, WCSD did not seek to have the appeal dismissed on the ground that there was no final judgment.

Nevertheless, because we find that the appeal to the Court of Special Appeals was taken from a nonappealable interlocutory order, and that, therefore, the Court of Special Appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction, we shall on our own motion vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. The jurisdiction of this Court, and the Court of Special Appeals, is determined by constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and rules. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. Where appellate jurisdiction is lacking, the appellate court will dismiss the appeal on its own motion.

More particularly, where the Court of Special Appeals has entertained an appeal without having jurisdiction to do so, and the case is timely brought to our attention by a petition for a writ of certiorari dealing with the merits of the appeal, we will issue a writ of certiorari and on our own motion consider the jurisdiction of the Court of Special Appeals. Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 293 , 402 A.2d 71, 73 (1979); Eastgate Associates v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 700-01 , 350 A.2d 661, 663 (1976); Md. Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.) § 12-301 of the Cts. & Jud.Proc.Art.; Md. Rule 835 a; see Institutional Management Corp. v. Cutler Computer Concepts, Inc., 294 Md. 626, 629 , 451 A.2d 1224, 1226 (1982). Unless an appeal from an interlocutory judgment is expressly provided, an appeal ordinarily must be taken from a final judgment. King v. State Roads Comm’n, 294 Md. 236, 240 , 449 A.2d 390, 393 (1982); § 12-301 of the Cts. & ⁴¹⁵ Jud.Proc.Art.; cf. § 12-303 of the Cts. & Jud.Proc.Art. Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.) § 12-101 (f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: " 'Final judgment’ means a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court, including an orphans’ court, from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.” The statutory definition of "final judgment” in § 12-101 (f) has been explicated by case law.

This Court has consistently stated that a judgment or order of a court is final when it determines or concludes the rights of parties or when it denies the parties means of further prosecuting or defending their rights and interests in the