Louis Fireison & Associates, P.A. v. Alkire

GRAEFF, J. This appeal arises from a dispute between Louis Fireison & Associates, P.A. (“Fireison”), appellant, and Anita M. Alkire (“Ms. Alkire”), appellee, over legal fees due pursuant to a contingency fee contract. The issues on appeal involve the proper forum to resolve the dispute. In May 2007, Fireison filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

It sought a declaratory judgment awarding Fireison the legal fees it believed were owed by Ms. Alkire. In June 2007, Ms. Alkire petitioned the District of Columbia Attorney/Client Arbitration Board (the “Arbitration Board”) to resolve the dispute. The circuit court granted Ms. Alkire’s motion to stay the circuit court proceedings and to compel arbitration, and it ultimately ordered Fireison to comply with the Arbitration Board’s decision and award. ⁴⁶⁴ Fireison appealed, and it presents two questions for our review, which we quote: 1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by compelling [appellant] to submit to arbitration when there was no agreement to arbitrate entered into by the parties? 2.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying [appellant’s] Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and Lift Stay and granting Defendant’s Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 20, 2000, Ms. Alkire was injured while being rescued from a broken elevator at the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel in Washington, D.C. 1 On May 15, 2003, Ms. Alkire, a California resident, entered into a contract for legal services (the “contract”) with Fireison to represent her in her personal injury lawsuit against Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”) and others. The contract provided that Fireison was entitled to legal fees as follows: One-third of gross sum of whatever may be recovered from said claim of settlement without the necessity of filing court proceedings; 40% of gross sum of whatever may be recovered from said claim as a result of judgment or settlement after filing of court proceedings, 50% of gross sum of whatever may be recovered from said claim in the event of an appeal or second trial.

The parties did not include specific language in the contract regarding dispute resolution. 2 ⁴⁶⁵ On Ms. Alkire’s behalf, Fireison filed a claim against Marriott in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. On March 16, 2006, the court entered a judgment in Ms. Alkire’s favor in the amount of $1,040,000, plus costs and interest. On March 31, 2007, the court denied Marriott’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial, or in the Alternative, to Alter or Amend the Judgment. On April 24, 2007, Michael MacWilliams, Marriott’s attorney, contacted Mr. Fireison to initiate settlement discussions.

Mr. Fireison stated that the earliest dates he had available to discuss the case were May 8 or 9, 2007. On April 30, 2007, Marriott filed a notice of appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a) (“In a civil case ... the notice of appeal ... must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.”). On May 8, 2007, settlement negotiations began.

Mr. MacWilliams stated in an affidavit filed in the circuit court that the negotiations lasted approximately 45 minutes. Ms. Alkire states that she directed Mr. Fireison to accept the settlement the next day. On May 16, 2007, Ms. Alkire wrote to Mr. Fireison regarding a dispute about the firm’s legal fee. The primary dispute involved whether the firm was entitled to 40% of Ms. Alkire’s total award from Marriott, or whether it was entitled to 50% of the award because they had prevailed on appeal. 3 Ms. Alkire demanded that Fireison “submit the 10% issue to ⁴⁶⁶ mandatory fee dispute arbitration.” She requested that Firei-son accept 40% of the award from Marriott as payment, put 10% in escrow pending the resolution of their dispute, “and out of the 50% remaining ... pay approved ‘deductions’ and submit the remainder to me.” 4 On May 23, 2007, Fireison filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County seeking a declaratory judgment awarding Fireison 50% of Ms. Alkire’s total award.

It alleged that Mr. Fireison resolved the appeal in Ms. Alkire’s favor, and Ms. Alkire violated the terms of the contingency fee agreement by refusing to pay Fireison 50% of her total award. On May 25, 2007, Mr. Fireison entered his appearance on Ms. Alkire’s behalf in the appellate proceedings. On June 8, 2007, Ms. Alkire and Marriott filed a joint request to dismiss the case. On June 11, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered the order granting the joint request to dismiss the appeal.

On June 6, 2007, Ms. Alkire filed a request to arbitrate the alleged fee dispute with the Arbitration Board. On June 14, 2007, a representative of the Arbitration Board informed Fireison that Ms. Alkire had initiated a fee dispute proceeding. On July 5, 2007, however, the Arbitration Board advised Ms. Alkire that it would be unable to resolve the fee dispute unless the circuit court either dismissed or stayed Fireison’s proceeding regarding its legal fees. 5 On July 27, 2007, Fireison filed in the circuit court a Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Hearing. On August 1, 2007, Ms. Alkire filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings and to Compel Arbitration.

On August 14, 2007, Ms. Alkire filed an opposition to Fireison’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and ⁴⁶⁷ she filed her own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, requesting the court to direct Fireison to remit to Ms. Alkire 50% of the total award, less the amount in disputed deductions and $5,000 in attorney’s fees that Fireison asked Ms. Alkire to put into escrow. 6 On September 10, 2007, the court issued an order granting Ms. Alkire’s Motion to Stay Proceedings and to Compel Arbitration. That same day, it issued another order that denied Fireison’s Motion for Summary Judgment and stayed Ms. Alkire’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This latter order included language that judgment be entered in favor of Fireison on the complaint. On October 5, 2007, the court issued an amended order deleting this language and reiterating its order denying Fireison’s motion for summary judgment and staying Ms. Alkire’s motion for partial summary judgment.

On January 28, 2008, the Arbitration Board, which was in receipt of only the September orders, refused Ms. Alkire’s request to re-open the fee dispute resolution proceedings. Specifically, the Arbitration Board asserted: After reviewing the Orders as well as the Complaint that was filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the [Arbitration Board] declines to re-open this case. It appears that this is a dispute over the interpretation of the contract entered into between the parties. The Order filed on September 12, 2007, grants judgment to the Plaintiff (the respondent in the fee dispute before the [Arbitration Board]) as to Count 1 of the Complaint.

The [Arbitration Board] does not have jurisdiction to overturn the Order [directing that judgment be entered in favor of Fireison] issued on September 10, 2007. Given that the court has already issued substantive rulings in this matter it appears that this matter should be handled and resolved by the Circuit Court in Montgomery County, where it was initially filed. ⁴⁶⁸ On February 5, 2008, Fireison filed a Motion to Lift Stay in the circuit court, stating that the Arbitration Board had declined to re-open the fee dispute matter. On February 8, 2008, Ms. Alkire wrote a letter to the Arbitration Board, with a copy to Fireison, to explain the error in the September order, to clarify that the circuit court had not entered judgment on Fireison’s behalf, and to inform the Arbitration Board that the circuit court had issued an order compelling the parties to arbitrate the fee dispute. On February 13, 2008, Fireison wrote a letter to the Arbitration Board, with a copy to Ms. Alkire’s counsel, to clarify Fireison’s interpretation of the Board’s January 28, 2008, letter.

Fireison stated its understanding that the Arbitration Board had determined that the dispute involved the interpretation of a contract, a “matter [] more appropriately addressed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County rather than a fee dispute forum.” Fireison expressed its intent “to proceed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to bring this case to a final resolution.” On February 19, 2008, Ms. Alkire filed in the circuit court an Opposition to [Fireison’s] Motion to Lift Stay and Motion for Sanctions, alleging that the Arbitration Board had erroneously determined that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the fee dispute based on the September order, that Fireison had failed to take any steps to advise the Arbitration Board of the errors in the September order, and that Fireison intentionally exploited the Arbitration Board’s erroneous interpretation of the circuit court’s September order. On April 18, 2008, the court issued an order denying Fireison’s Motion to Lift Stay. On May 7, 2008, the Arbitration Board wrote to the parties, stating: This matter was pending in two different forums; before the [Arbitration Board] and before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. Because the fee dispute could not continue in two parallel forums, and because the [Arbitration Board] does not have superior jurisdiction over ⁴⁶⁹ the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, the [Arbitration Board] closed the case.

It appears that substantive rulings have already been made in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The [Arbitration Board] does not have jurisdiction to overturn these court orders. Therefore, the [Arbitration Board] will not re-open this case unless instructed to do so by Order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. On June 16, 2008, the circuit court issued another order, which denied Fireison’s Motion to Lift Stay, compelled Firei-son to submit the claims raised in the circuit court to the Arbitration Board, and stayed all counts in the Complaint pending the Arbitration Board’s resolution of the dispute.

On March 3, 2009, the Arbitration Board met to resolve the dispute between Ms. Alkire and Fireison. Ms. Alkire sought the following relief: “total sums deposited to escrow account, including $110,524.20 (10% of award), plus $5,000 (attorney’s fees), plus accumulated interest less three hours of attorney’s time at $350/hr.” The Arbitration Board issued the following decision: “Respondent Fireison to remit all sums currently held in Escrow including, but not limited to, 10% of the award ($110,524.20), attorney’s fees ($5,000), and current accumulated interest less $5,500 to be retained by respondent Fireison.” On March 31, 2009, Fireison filed in the circuit court a Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and to Lift Stay, alleging: “The [Arbitration Board] [ ] essentially ‘rewrote’ the contract entered into by and between the parties which is the subject of the Complaint and counsel has been unable to determine the basis of such award. Further, the award is wholly inconsistent with the plain language of the contract entered into by and between the parties. There is no dispute as to the validity of the contract, nor as to legal services.

Fireison argued that the court should vacate the arbitration award because the arbitrators exceeded their powers, asserting that there was never an agreement to arbitrate and “the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction to address the matter.” ⁴⁷⁰ Ms. Alkire disagreed, arguing that Mr. Fireison, as a member of the District of Columbia bar, agreed to arbitrate all fee disputes pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XIII(a), and the Arbitration Board did not exceed its authority or its jurisdiction in resolving the dispute. In addition to opposing Fireison’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, Ms. Alkire filed a Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and a Motion for Sanctions. The court held a hearing on June 1, 2009. 7 On July 14, 2009, the circuit court issued an order denying Fireison’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, granting Ms. Alkire’s Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award, denying Ms. Alkire’s Motion for Sanctions, and ordering Fireison to comply with the Arbitration Board’s March 3, 2009 decision. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION Fireison contends that the trial court erred in compelling it to submit to arbitration, arguing that there was no agreement to arbitrate between the parties. Noting that the contract lacked express language requiring the parties to arbitrate disputes, Fireison argues that it ■“ ‘cannot be compelled to arbitrate that which it never agreed to arbitrate.’ ” (Citation omitted). Fireison further contends that, after the Arbitration Board rendered its decision, the circuit court erred in denying its Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and in granting Ms. Alkire’s Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award. Although couched in various ways, Fireison’s argument boils down to its assertion that the arbitration award was improper because there was no agreement to arbitrate the dispute at issue here. 8 ⁴⁷¹ Ms. Alkire contends that there was an agreement to arbitrate between the parties.

She points to D.C. Bar R. XIII, which provides that, in certain circumstances, “[a]n attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court shall be deemed to have agreed to arbitrate disputes over fees for legal services.” She argues that, because Mr. Fireison represented her in a court proceeding in the District of Columbia and was a member of the District of Columbia Bar when he represented her, Mr. Fireison was subject to the rule. Ms. Alkire asserts that “[t]he D.C. Rules, which were in effect at the time the Contract was entered into and performed, were incorporated into and became a part of the agreement between the parties.” As such, and because the dispute between the parties was a fee dispute, Ms. Alkire argues that the circuit court was correct in compelling Fireison to resolve the fee