MacBride v. Pishvaian

GREENE, J. This matter arises from a civil action filed in the Circuit Court for Frederick County by appellant, Linda MacBride, against appellee, Michael M. Pishvaian, for damages stemming from the poor living conditions of the apartment she rented from appellee, and his allegedly inadequate response to ameliorating those conditions. Appellant filed suit, and at the conclusion of a three day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant on her claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices, awarding her damages in the amount of $100,000. The Circuit Court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) on the grounds that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and directed entry of judgment for the appellee. The principal issue currently before this Court is whether the Circuit Court erred when it granted a JNOV on the basis of limitations, and failed to apply either the “continuation of events” 1 theory, or the “continuing harm” 2 rule. ⁵⁷⁶ We shall hold that the issue of when appellant knew or should have known of appellee’s unfair and deceptive trade practices was an issue of fact properly reserved for determination by the jury.

Given that the jury found that appellant knew or should have known of the unfair and deceptive trade practices more than six years before she filed her complaint, the Circuit Court properly entered a JNOV on the basis of limitations. Furthermore, we shall hold that, in the case at bar, the continuation of events theory does not toll the statute of limitations, because there was no fiduciary relationship between the parties, and even if there were, appellant knew or should have known of her claim. Finally, w e shall hold that, the continuing harm theory does not apply because the relevant claim in this case is one of unfair and deceptive trade practices, about which appellant knew or should have known, more than six years before filing her complaint. As a result, the deteriorating condition of appellant’s apartment is immaterial to our analysis in this case.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Appellant began leasing an apartment on October 28, 1998, at the Little Brook Apartments in Frederick, Maryland, a complex owned by appellee or corporate entities under his control. Appellant renewed the lease periodically, and continued to live on the premises until November, 2004. At the time appellant signed the original lease, the premises looked “nice and clean,” although appellant noticed water spots on the ceiling and a suspicious odor. Subsequently, during conditions of heavy rain, water would soak the ceiling, walls, and carpet of the apartment.

Appellant noticed that there were squirrels running between the walls and over the ceiling. Despite appellant’s complaints to management, the problems were not corrected to appellant’s satisfaction. Eventually, a mold problem developed on the premises, and appellant moved out in November, 2004. ⁵⁷⁷ In November, 2004, appellant’s relatives contacted the City of Frederick. A City inspector found mold, a squirrel’s nest in the wall, and both the front door and a refrigerator in need of repair.

Testing and analysis confirmed the presence of various molds in the apartment. Appellant filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick County on December 10, 2004, and an amended complaint on November 15, 2005. In her amended complaint, appellant advanced claims of unfair and deceptive trade practices, 3 fraud, negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. 4 Appellee raised the issue of limitations in a motion for partial summary judgment, in preliminary statements at trial, in a motion for judgment, and at a renewed motion for judgment. The Court denied the motion for judgment, but reserved on the limitations issue.

After a three day trial, the jury returned a verdict, finding in favor of appellee on appellant’s claims of fraud, negligence, and breach of contract. The jury, however, found that appellee had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices, and awarded appellant $100,000 in damages. The jury also found, by special verdict, that appellant “knew or should have known” of the unfair and deceptive trade practices on October 28, 1998, more than six years before appellant filed suit. After a hearing on October 31, 2006, the Circuit Court entered a JNOV on the grounds of limitations, noting that the “continuing conduct” rule did not apply.

The court stated, in relevant part: ⁵⁷⁸ The difficulty in this case is the jury did not find breach of contract or negligence in this action. They found violation of a Consumer Protection statute. In looking at the Consumer Protection statute ... the time of the alleged violation, at the time of the inception of the lease, which is what the jury found and set the date for ... October 28th ... 1998 ... there is no exception that the Court can find to extend that three year limitation period of time, and in fact suit was not filed until more than three years after that.

I don’t see that I have any choice, but to grant the judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the limitations grounds due to the jury’s finding that Ms. MacBride knew or should have known [] of that violation on that date. Appellant noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on November 15, 2006, and appellee noted a cross-appeal on November 20, 2006, which was withdrawn on April 2, 2007. 5 Prior to proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, we issued a writ of certiorari, on our own initiative. 6 MacBride v. Pishvaian, 400 Md. 646 , 929 A.2d 889 (2007). ⁵⁷⁹ DISCUSSION Parties’ Arguments Appellant argues that, by returning a verdict in her favor on the unfair and deceptive trade practices claim and awarding her damages for that claim, the jury implicitly decided that the claim was not barred by limitations. Alternatively, appellant maintains that even though she knew or should have known about the unfair and deceptive trade practices on October 28, 1998, the statute of limitations should be tolled because either the “continuation of events” rule, or the “continuing harm” rule applies to the instant case. Appellee asserts that the question of when appellant knew or should have known of the unfair and deceptive trade practices was a question of fact, which was properly left to the jury.

According to appellee, the Circuit Court judge properly applied the three year statute of limitations to the factual findings of the jury. Appellee contends that the “continuation of events” rule does not apply to this case, because the relationship at issue is a contractual relationship, and not a fiduciary relationship. In the alternative, appellee argues that even if the relationship in this case were fiduciary, the continuation of events theory does not toll the statute of limitations where an aggrieved party knew or should have known of the wrongdoing. The Jury Findings The jury in this case returned both a general verdict in favor of appellant, and a special verdict, finding that appellant knew or should have known of the unfair and deceptive trade practices on October 28, 1998.

Appellant argues that the jury must have determined that the statute of limitations did not apply, because it returned a verdict in her favor on that claim, and awarded her damages. We do not find this argument persuasive. The jury was neither instructed on the statute of limitations, nor the legal ramifications of its finding that appellant knew or should have known of the unfair and ⁵⁸⁰ deceptive trade practices on a particular date. Instead, the jury was told that “[a] cause of action accrues when a Plaintiff knows, or by reasonable, diligent investigation should have known, of the injury or damage.” The jury was also given general instructions on the definition of unfair trade practices.

Nowhere in the instructions was the jury told about the statute of limitations or the legal effect of finding that appellant knew or should have known of the unfair and deceptive trade practices on October 28, 1998. Furthermore, “it is counsel’s responsibility to assure that all critical issues are submitted to the jury.” Edwards v. Gramling Eng’g Corp., 322 Md. 535, 549 , 588 A.2d 793, 800 (1991). Appellant may not, on appeal, “bemoan the imprecise language of the special verdict,” when she did not object to the questions submitted to the jury. Id. at 550 , 588 A.2d at 800 .

Moreover, the trial court reserved on the issue of statute of limitations, which suggests that the Court would later apply the law to the facts, as found by the jury. Appellant argues that the jury’s award of damages, coupled with its finding that appellant knew or should have known of the cause of action more than six years before she filed her complaint, indicates that the jury determined that the statute of limitations did not apply. We do n ot find this argument persuasive either. The jury’s award of damages and its finding that appellant knew or should have known of her potential claim on October 28, 1998 are not inconsistent, because the jury was asked to render a verdict on the merits of the claim, and asked separately to determine the accrual date of the claim, but was not asked to apply the statute of limitations.

This Court will reconcile the jury’s response to a special verdict under the assumption that the jury acted rationally and consistently. Edwards, 322 Md. at 547 , 588 A.2d at 799 . Even assuming, arguendo, that there is any inconsistency between the jury’s determination that appellant’s claim accrued on October 28, 1998, and its verdict in favor of appellant, the apparent inconsistency may be recon- ⁵⁸¹ died. Without instructions on the legal ramifications of determining that appellant’s claim accrued on October 28, 1998, the jury would have no reason to apply the statute of limitations to appellant’s claim.

We, therefore, interpret the jury’s decision under the assumption that it acted rationally, and attribute its award of damages to its inability to apply a law on which it was never instructed. We have said that the question of when an action accrues, is one that is left to judicial determination. Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95 , 756 A.2d 963, 973 (2000).

In order to determine when an action accrues, this Court has adopted the discovery rule, which tolls the accrual date of the action until such time as the potential plaintiff either discovers his or her injury, or should have discovered it through the exercise of due diligence. Id. at 95-96 , 756 A.2d at 973 . The determination as to whether the plaintiffs failure to discover his cause of action was due to failure on his part to use due diligence, or to the fact that defendant so concealed the wrong that plaintiff was unable to discover it by the exercise of due diligence, is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 96 , 756 A.2d at 974 (quoting O’Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 294-95 , 503 A.2d 1313, 1320 (1986)).

In this case, the jury properly determined that appellant knew or should have known of the cause of action on October 28, 1998. The trial judge then applied the statute of limitations to the jury’s factual findings, and determined that the claim was barred. Matters of Law Having determined that the jury properly found that appellant knew or should have known of her injury on October 28, 1998, we now turn to the Court’s application of the law to that factual finding. Maryland law provides that “[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.” Md.Code (1973, 2006 RepLVoL), § 5-101 of the Courts and ⁵⁸² Judicial Proceedings Article.

This statute of limitations is meant to promote the interests of fairness and judicial economy by allowing “adequate time for a person of ordinary diligence to bring an action,” while providing potential defendants with a degree of repose. Frederick Rd., 360 Md. at 94 , 756 A.2d at 973 . This Court has adopted the discovery rule as a means of determining when the claim begins to accrue for purposes of the