Maggin v. Stevens

Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a maze of procedural maneuvering so complex as to require our setting it out in considerable detail. The appellees, Mr. and Mrs. Eddie L. Stevens, instituted this action against the appellant, Irving Maggin, claiming damages for breach of contract relating to their purchase from Maggin of a lot upon which a house was to be built. This suit was filed in July 1970 and the summons, which was promptly served, directed the appellant to answer by 18 August of that year.

It also warned: “If you fail to assert a defense within the time named, the plaintiff (s) may obtain judgment by default against you, which may be extended to final judgment upon proper proof of damages.” Maggin ignored this admonition until 4 September 1970 when he requested by motion a time extension in which to file his initial pleading. Even though appellees did not object to a reasonable delay, Maggin failed to pursue this matter further by obtaining a court order granting the extension. The court record discloses no additional activity in the case until late November when the Stevenses filed a motion seeking a default judgment against the appellant. This was granted on 10 December 1970 by Chief Judge Shook.

The case then remained dormant until 2 April 1971 when Mr. and Mrs. Stevens asked that a hearing be scheduled so they could present ex parte proof concerning damages. On 29 April 1971 Maggin finally awoke from his slumber and 254 days after his initial pleading was due, some 140 days after the default judgment had ¹⁶ been entered, he filed a motion to vacate the judgment. Chief Judge Shook reversed course and granted this motion on 14 May 1971, giving appellant leave to file “pleas or other defense.” One week later appellees requested a reconsideration of the order vacating the judgment. This matter was reviewed by Judge Moore on 21 September 1971, at which time he reinstated the judgment by default. 1 He concluded that since thirty days had passed from 10 December 1970, the date the default judgment was entered, it had become enrolled and therefore under Maryland Rule 625, Chief Judge Shook could not subsequently vacate that judgment on 14 May 1971 as there was no showing that its entry was based on fraud, mistake or irregularity.

Rule 625 provides: “For a period of thirty days after the entry of a judgment, or thereafter pursuant to motion filed within such period, the court shall have revisory power and control over such judgment. After the expiration of such period the court shall have revisory power and control over such judgment, only in case of fraud, mistake or irregularity.” This rule is applicable to all final judgments including judgments by default for want of a plea. Berwyn Fuel & Feed Co. v. Kolb, 249 Md. 475, 477 , 240 A. 2d 239 (1968) ; Armour Fert. Works v. Brown, 185 Md. 273, 277 , 44 A. 2d 753 (1945).

The Stevenses argue here that a default judgment is interlocutory and therefore not subject to appeal until extended. However, in Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197, 206 , 254 A. 2d 181 (1969), where a default judgment had similarly not been extended, Judge Finan, speaking for the Court, unequivocally answered any possible question on this point by concluding that such a judgment was appealable when entered and need not have been extended prior to taking an appeal. He stated: ¹⁷ “[The] extension of the judgment was never intended to affect the finality of a judgment by default as to the question of the liability of the party against whom it is obtained. A reading of both Berwyn Fuel Co., supra, and Tasea Investment Corp., supra, leaves no doubt in the Court’s mind but that a judgment by default is a final determination as to liability.

See also Abrams v. Gay Investment Co., 253 Md. 121 , 251 A. 2d 876 , Sheehi v. Saia, 250 Md. 198 , 242 A. 2d 174 (1968).” 2 See also Associated Transport v. Bonoumo, 191 Md. 442, 446 , 62 A. 2d 281 (1948) ; Eddy v. Summers, 183 Md. 683 , 39 A. 2d 812 (1944). In Himes with a procedural question similar to the one