Maranto v. Maranto

Markell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by the husband from a decree granting the wife a divorce a vinculo and awarding her custody of their nine-year-old daughter and allowances for the support of herself and the child. In this court no ques ²¹⁷ tion is raised as to custody of the child or the amount of the allowances. The only question is whether there is sufficient corroboration of the wife’s testimony to support the decree of divorce.

The principal object of the statutory requirement of corroboration, Code, Art. 35, sec. 4, is to prevent collusion, and when the possibility of collusion is precluded, the corroboration need be but slight. “The corroboration required varies with the circumstances of particular cases, and as the danger of collusion * * * increases or diminishes, in the same ratio the rule prescribed by the statute is applied with greater or less strictness * * *, but under no circumstances may it be dispensed with altogether.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, 170 Md. 405, 409 , 185 A. 109, 111 . It is applied most strictly in uncontested cases. Bowersox v. Bowersox, 157 Md. 476 , 146 A. 266 , 65 A. L. R. 165; Jones v. Jones, 186 Md. 312, 313 , 46 A. 2d 617 . In genuinely contested cases the corroboration required may be slight and may be found in evidence of admissions by the other spouse.

Schriver v. Schriver, 185 Md. 227, 241, 242 , 44 A. 2d 479 . Apart from statute, to sustain the burden of proof, testimony of one spouse, flatly contradicted by the other, needs corroboration, but the inherent strength or weakness of opposing testimony may furnish corroboration. In the instant case defendant urges that strict corroboration should be required because a psychiatrist testifies that plaintiff is a paranoiac and it is usual for a paranoiac to exaggerate. The psychiatrist says that in 1945 at defendant’s request he examined plaintiff by interviewing her.

He “concluded that she was a mild paranoiac, suffiering from delusions probably directed against her husband.” “I cannot recall any details, I haven’t any note, nothing to refresh my memory to what her direct answers were. She apparently thought that he was doing harmful things and exaggerated either the truth or the importance of them”. He cannot remember what the delusions were about, “in other words, it is more of a general impression I have.” He cannot recall that he ²¹⁸ noticed any sex delusions. “In my mind it was general ill treatment, but specifically I would' not swear to it”. From her testimony that he heard he believes “she is still a paranoiac.

I think she has exaggerated to a great extent. I believe if you go over the testimony you will find many contradictions as to time. He does not know anything about contradictions as to fact; “I am talking about contradictions as to time”. “She mentioned a number of times that certain events occurred, and then her own testimony and the testimony of others rather contradicts that.” He thinks defendant “is possibly mildly paranoiac, also, to a less degree than” plaintiff. He cannot recall that he did or did not suggest to plaintiff, after he made the examination, that she should leave her husband.

The treatment of plaintiff by defendant, as described in her testimony, would certainly increase her condition. This court has long held that an expert witness cannot usurp the function of the courts to determine the legal sufficiency of evidence of mental incapacity. Berry v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 96 Md. 45 , 53 A. 720 . If a psychiatrist is to take over the function of courts and juries to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, he must furnish some basis for so doing more substantial than a general impression from forgotten facts.

In the instant case a psychiatrist is not needed to determine that plaintiff and defendant both have exaggerated and testimony of at least one of them is untrue. Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1937. They have a child, nine years old when the bill was filed in February, 1948. Another child, born in 1940, died three months after birth.

Plaintiff and defendant and the child were still living under the same roof (in a house owned by the entireties) at the time of the trial. In August, 1946 plaintiff ceased, and has not resumed marital relations with defendant. In 1945 she had ceased such relations, but after a conference between plaintiff and defendant and their respective counsel a “reconciliation” had been effected and relations had been resumed. ²¹⁹ The bill alleges that defendant, with the intention of breaking their marital relations, for a long time prior to August 3, 1946 so conducted himself towards plaintiff that she, through fear of bodily harm and physical violence on defendant’s part, “was forced to