Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp.

CHASANOW, Judge. In this appeal, we are asked to settle a dispute as to the identity of the payment source upon which a surviving spouse, in a workers’ compensation death benefits case, must continue ³⁹³ to be dependent in order to receive additional benefits after the initial maximum award of $45,000 has been paid out. Specifically, we are called upon to determine whether the phrase “continues to be wholly dependent,” as found in Maryland Code (1991 Repl.Vol.), Labor and Employment Article, § 9-681 (d), 1 refers to an ongoing dependency on the deceased worker’s wages or the generally lesser amount of workers’ compensation benefits. Patricia Martin (Petitioner) contends that in ongoing dependency determinations, “continues to be wholly dependent” refers to the standard of living the claimant experienced while the deceased spouse was alive; thus, she has a continued dependency on her husband’s income at the time of his death.

Beverage Capital Corporation (Beverage Capital), Sun Dun, Inc. (Sun Dun), and Great Distribution and Warehousing, Inc. (Great Distribution) (Respondents) 2 argue, in accordance with the Court of Special Appeals, that this phrase refers to the surviving spouse’s continued dependency on the workers’ compensation death benefits initially granted. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the- Court of Special Appeals and affirm the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s (Commission) finding that Petitioner continued to be wholly dependent on her deceased husband within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In accordance with the Commission’s interpretation of the statute and its findings of total dependency on the part of Petitioner, we hold that “continues to be wholly dependent” as found in § 9—681(d) refers to the surviving spouse remaining wholly dependent on the deceased spouse’s income at the time of his or her death, and not the generally lesser amount of workers’ compensation benefits. Thus, in ³⁹⁴ making ongoing dependency determinations, the amount earned by the deceased worker at the time of death must be compared with the amount the claimant earns after the initial $45,000 has been received.

In this case, Mr. Martin, the deceased spouse, earned an average of $200,000 per year prior to his accident. In stark contrast is the average salary of Mrs. Martin, the surviving spouse, of approximately $15,000 per year. After Mrs. Martin received the initial $45,000, she was still earning approximately $15,000 per year; therefore, she “continues to be wholly dependent” if her circumstances have not changed since the initial dependency ■ determination was made. In the instant case, we need not attempt to define the exact point at which a claimant becomes either wholly or partially self-supporting after the initial $45,000 has been paid out.

We leave to the legislature and future cases the task of determining the percentage or amount of the deceased spouse’s average weekly income the claimant must earn in order to be found either wholly or partially self-supporting. With this holding we are adopting the Commission’s interpretation and administration of the Act, which directs that Petitioner’s workers’ compensation death benefits will not suddenly cease when some specific point in time is reached, but will instead continue so long as her dependency remains; that is, until she remarries, dies, or the Commission decides that she has become wholly or partially self-supporting. I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are undisputed. On January 15,1992, Chester Martin was operating a helicopter in the course of his employment with Beverage Capital, Sun Dun, and Great Distribution when it malfunctioned and he was tragically killed. 3 ³⁹⁵ At the time of his death, Mr. Martin held various executive positions with Beverage Capital, Sun Dun, and Great Distribution.

He was President and a shareholder of Beverage Capital, the sole owner of Sun Dun, and President of Great Distribution. Mr. Martin was survived by Mrs. Martin. The Martins were married on July 2, 1976, and no children were born of the marriage. At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Martin was employed with Giant Food, earning approximately $18,000 per year.

In June 1987, Mrs. Martin resigned her job with Giant Food because Mr. Martin wanted her to stay home and not work anymore. So that she would not have to work outside the home, the Martins agreed that Mr. Martin would pay Mrs. Martin a salary from Sun Dun, but that she would not have to actually do any work for the company. In 1991, Mrs. Martin began a sideline business selling business forms. Most of her customers were either businesses owned by her husband or accounts that he helped her obtain.

Mrs. Martin received a salary from Sun Dun until January 15, 1992, the date of Mr. Martin’s death. After this date, the salary payments stopped. For the two years prior to Mr. Martin’s death, the Martins’ finances were as follows: 1990 — Chester Martin Income $151,504 Patricia Martin Income 38,895 (Sun Dun) Total Family Income 190,399 4 1991 — Chester Martin Income $187,240 Patricia Martin Income 38,852 (Sun Dun) 4,246 (Her job selling forms) Total Family Income 230,338 A few months after Mr. Martin was killed, Mrs. Martin filed a dependency claim with the Commission stating that she was “wholly dependent” on her husband at the time of his death. A hearing was held on January 21, 1994, and on February 1, 1994, the Commission found Mrs. Martin to be “wholly depen ³⁹⁶ dent” on her deceased husband.

Pursuant to Md.Code (1991 RepLVoL, 1998 Supp.), Labor and Employment Art., § 9-602 (“Average weekly wage”) and Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 14.09.01.07, the Commission determined that Mr. Martin’s average weekly wage was $2,850 per week ($148,200 per year). In accordance with the established formula, the Commission awarded Mrs. Martin $475 for 94.736 weeks as the weekly death benefit, retroactive to January 15, 1992. 5 Respondents filed an appeal of the Commission’s order to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, challenging the finding of Mrs. Martin’s total dependency. The appeal was decided through cross motions for summary judgment, and on February 3, 1995, the court granted Mrs. Martin’s summary judgment motion finding that she was “wholly dependent” on her husband at the time of his death. Respondents did not appeal this ruling.

In accordance with the Commission’s award, by the end of January 1994, Respondents had made total payments to Mrs. Martin of $45,000, the maximum initial award of compensation under § 9-681(c)(2). They then discontinued the benefits. At this point, the issue became whether Mrs. Martin continued to be wholly dependent after she received the initial maximum benefits under § 9-681(d). Since 1993, Mrs. Martin has been working as an independent contractor, brokering products for Canada Dry Corporation to Giant Food.

Her job is low paying with sporadic, non-established hours. Mrs. Martin has earned the following since Mr. Martin’s death in January 1992: 1993—$11,249.50; 1994—9,651.00; and 1995— $15,879.00. 6 Mrs. Martin filed issues with the Commission, ³⁹⁷ claiming that she continued to be “wholly dependent” and seeking resumption of the weekly death benefit payments. On March 7,1995, there was a hearing before the Commission and on August 22, 1995, it ruled that Mrs. Martin continued “to be wholly dependent on her deceased husband,” and Respondents were ordered to continue paying the weekly benefits. On the same day as the ruling, the Respondents filed another appeal to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, which was also decided through cross motions for summary judgment.

On November 26, 1996, the circuit court granted Mrs. Martin’s motion for summary judgment, affirming the Commission’s order and mandating the continuation of benefits. Respondents appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and on February 25,1998, the court reversed the Commission’s order. The Court of Special Appeals held that Mrs. Martin was “partially self-supporting and not ‘wholly dependent’ upon Workers’ Compensation benefits within the meaning of LE § 9-681(d).” Beverage Capital v. Martin, 119 Md.App. 662, 683 , 705 A.2d 1175, 1186 (1998)(emphasis added). The court stated that when analyzing whether a dependent is entitled to continue to receive workers’ compensation death benefits following the initial award of $45,000, a determination must be made as to whether there is an ongoing dependency on the benefits, as opposed to an ongoing dependency on the deceased worker’s salary at the time of his or her death.

Martin, 119 Md.App. at 672-75 , 705 A.2d at 1181-82 . The court went on to hold that because Mrs. Martin’s employment was not temporary, occasional, or minor, and that her salary constituted approximately fifty percent of the workers’ compensation death benefits, she was no longer “wholly dependent.” Martin, 119 Md.App. at 682-83 , 705 A.2d at 1185-86 . ³⁹⁸ Mrs. Martin filed a petition for certiorari in April, 1998, appealing the Court of Special Appeals’ ruling on the issue of whether she remains wholly dependent. We granted certiorari. Specifically, we are asked to determine whether “continues to be wholly dependent” in § 9—681(d), as it pertains to a surviving spouse who has already received the maximum initial workers’ compensation death benefits of $45,000, refers to a continued dependency on the standard of living, in the form of the deceased worker’s salary, at the time of the fatal injury or on the generally lesser workers’ compensation death benefits.

As the Court of Special Appeals acknowledged, “[t]he statute does not explicitly say upon what the surviving spouse must continue to be dependent.” Martin, 119 Md.App. at 671 , 705 A.2d at 1180 . We reverse the Court of Special Appeals and hold that a spouse “continues to be wholly dependent,” and therefore eligible for continuing workers’ compensation death benefits, when he or she has an ongoing dependency on the deceased worker’s salary at the time of death.

II

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS A. Statutory Interpretation Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), which has been in existence for over eighty years, is intended to protect workers and their families from the various hardships that result from employment-related injuries. Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343 , 412 A.2d 733, 734 (1980). Specifically, “it is designed to provide workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury, disease or death arising out of and in the course of employment, to provide vocational rehabilitation, and to provide adequate medical services.” Id. Moreover, as we stated in Beth.-Fair.

Shipyard v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416 , 45 A.2d 79 (1945): “The Workmen’s Compensation Act is essentially social legislation and the provisions thereof are to be liberally construed. It must be interpreted to effectuate its general purpose and not strictly construed. Where there is a ³⁹⁹ conflict in the Workmen’s Compensation law, questions of construction should be resolved in favor of the claimant.” (Citations omitted). 185 Md. at 425 , 45 A.2d at 83 . When we interpret a statute in order to effectuate its goal, our primary concern is to ascertain the intent of the legislature.

Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Regarding this task, we have previously stated: “The search for legislative intent begins, and ordinarily ends, with the words of the statute under review.” Schuman, Kane v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119 , 668 A.2d 929, 931 (1995). A statute may contain ambiguous language, requiring us to look beyond its plain language to discern intent. Where the statutory language is unambiguous and expresses a plain and definite meaning, however, we need not look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent.

Marriott Employees v. MVA 346 Md. 437, 445 , 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997). In determining legislative intent, we must never lose sight of the overriding purpose and goal of the statute. As we observed in Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987), the search for legislative intent is most accurately characterized “as an effort to ‘seek to discern some general purpose, aim, or policy reflected in the statute.’ ” 309 Md. at 513 , 525 A.2d at 632 (quoting Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposal for a Change in Maryland’s Statutes Quo, 43 Md. Law Rev. 647, 653 (1984)). In addition, when interpreting a statute and determining legislative intent, “the entire statutory scheme [must be examined], as opposed to scrutinizing parts of a statute in isolation.” Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 15-16 , 616 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1992).

Once we determine that the statutory language at issue is in accordance with the legislature’s intended purpose in enacting the statute, our task of interpretation is complete. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435 , 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994)(“If the language of the statute is plain and clear and expresses a meaning consistent with the statute’s apparent ⁴⁰⁰ purpose, no further analysis is ordinarily required.”); Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171-72 , 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991)(“When the language is clearly consistent with the apparent purpose of the statute and the result is not absurd, no further research is required.”). Thus, in interpreting and determining legislative intent, we must look to the plain language of the enactment, while keeping in mind its overall purpose and aim. Only when both of these tasks are done concurrently do we obtain an accurate interpretation of the statute.

In light of these guiding principles of statutory interpretation, we now proceed to a discussion of the Maryland law that is pertinent to our analysis of § 9—681(d). As we do so, we must be keenly aware that “[t]he Workers’ Compensation statute should be liberally construed so that any ambiguity, uncertainty or conflict is resolved in favor of the claimant, in order to effect the statute’s benevolent purposes.” Linder Crane Service Co. v. Hogan, 86 Md.App. 438, 443 , 586 A.2d 1290, 1292 (1991)(footnote omitted). B. Maryland Workers’ Compensation Law . 1. Background In Maryland, there is a two-step process for determining the initial receipt and continuation of workers’ compensation death benefits.

The first step is to determine whether the surviving spouse is entitled to receive benefits up to the $45,000 maximum. Step one is undertaken pursuant to § 9-679, “Determination of dependency,” which provides in part: “Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the Commission shall determine all questions of partial or total dependency in accordance with the facts of each case that existed: (1) at the time of the occurrence of the accidental personal injury that caused the death of the covered employee.” See also § 9-681(a), (b), and (c). The second step comes into play after the initial $45,000 has been paid out. If the claimant petitions for further benefits, step two requires the ⁴⁰¹ surviving spouse to prove that he or she “continues to be wholly dependent” under § 9-681(d).

In general, § 9-681, “Wholly dependent individuals,” governs the payment of benefits to dependents following the death of a worker in the course of his or her employment. In particular, § 9-681(d) states: “If a surviving spouse who was wholly dependent at the time of death continues to be wholly dependent after $45,-000 has been paid, the employer or its insurer shall continue to make payments to the surviving spouse at the same weekly rate during the total dependency of the surviving spouse.” The instant case concerns step two; specifically, whether the phrase “continues to be wholly dependent” refers to an ongoing dependency on the salary of the deceased worker at the time of his or her fatal injury (in essence, the standard of living experienced by the surviving spouse while the deceased employee was alive) or on the generally lesser workers’ compensation death benefits. Most of this State’s case law regarding this two-step process concerns step one, the determination of initial dependency. Only two reported Maryland appellate cases have looked at this second step of determining whether a claimant “continues to be wholly dependent.” See Martin, supra, and Linder Crane, supra.

While the “step one” cases are not directly on point with the particular issue in this appeal, they provide important guidance as to whether “continues to be wholly dependent” in § 9-681(d), step two, refers to an ongoing dependency on the deceased spouse’s salary or on the benefits. The standard of review for workers’ compensation proceedings is found in § 9-745, “Conduct of appeal proceedings.” It provides in pertinent part: “(b) Presumption and burden of proof.—In each court proceeding under this title: (1) the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct; and ⁴⁰² (2) the party challenging the decision has the burden of proof. (c) Determination by court.—The court shall determine whether the Commission: (1) justly considered all of the facts about the accidental personal injury ...; (2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or (3) misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided. (e) Disposition.—(1) If the court determines that the Commission acted within its powers and correctly construed the law and facts, the court shall confirm the decision of the Commission.

(2) If the court determines that the Commission did not act within its powers or did not correctly construe the law and facts, the court shall reverse or modify the decision or remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings.” (Emphasis added). Beyond the statutory language, further guidance of the standard of review may be found in Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655 , 399 A.2d 250 (1979), in which we stated: “In reviewing this ruling we, as was the circuit court, are to be guided by the general statutory command that ‘the decision[s] of the Commission [are] entitled to prima facie correctness.’ A court, therefore, may reverse a commission ruling only upon a finding that its action was based upon an erroneous construction of the law or facts.... ” (Citations omitted). 284 Md. at 658 , 399 A.2d at 252 (quoting in part Md. Bureau of Mines v. Powers, 258 Md. 379, 382 , 265 A.2d 860, 862 (1970)). 2. “Step One” Cases Unfortunately, the Act does not define “total dependency” or “wholly dependent.” Until June 1, 1947, when Chapter 895 ⁴⁰³ of the Acts of 1947 took effect, the law presumed that a wife was wholly dependent on her husband. Meyler v. Mayor and City Council, 179 Md. 211, 215 , 17 A.2d 762, 764 (1941). The 1947 amendments removed the presumptions of dependency and placed all matters of dependency within the discretion of the Commission. § 9-679.

We have often stated, in accordance with § 9-679, that “the question of dependency is one primarily of fact to be decided in every case upon the facts of that case.” Rosenthal, 185 Md. at 420 , 45 A.2d at 81 . In 1941, this Court stated that the test of dependency is “not whether a claimant was capable of supporting himself without the earnings of the workman, but whether he did in fact rely upon such earnings for his livelihood, in whole or in part, under circumstances indicating an intent on the part of the workman to furnish such support.” Meyler, 179 Md. at 217 , 17 A.2d at 765 . In 1958, we defined a “dependent” within the meaning of the Act as “one who relies wholly or in part upon a workman for the reasonable necessities of life at the time of his accidental injury. A legal or moral obligation to support some one does not create dependency in the absence of actual support.” Mario Anello v. Dunn, 217 Md. 177, 180 , 141 A.2d 731, 733 (1958)(emphasis added).

Meyler, supra, was one of our early cases in which we examined the issue of dependency in the workers’ compensation death benefits context. In Meyler , the claimant, who was the stepdaughter of the deceased, and her stepfather agreed that she would stay home and take care of her invalid mother and the home. 179 Md. at 213 , 17 A.2d at 763 . Even though the claimant had previously held a factory job and was capable of supporting herself, we held that “there is no provision in the statute requiring that a person must be incapable of supporting himself before he can be dependent, and there is no reason to hold that dependency should be so restricted in its meaning.” Meyler, 179 Md. at 217 , 17 A.2d at 765 . We further stated that the “mere ability to earn a livelihood does not necessarily preclude a person from being a dependent.” Id.

See also Superior Builders, Inc. v. Brawn, 208 Md. 539, 543, 119 A.2d 376, 378 (1956)(“[I]n construing the Act, the ⁴⁰⁴ courts do not demand that a claimant must show destitution to obtain an award as a total dependent.”). We held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the claimant was either totally or partially dependent on the deceased and ordered a new trial. Meyler, 179 Md. at 219 , 17 A.2d at 766 . In the 1944 case of Larkin v. Smith, we examined the words “wholly dependent” as delineated in the Act. 183 Md. 274 , 37 A.2d 340 (1944).

In this case, the claimant alleged that she was dependent on her son for financial support, even though she sometimes sold eggs from her hens, ate occasional free meals at the restaurant where she previously worked, and intermittently received clothing from her former employer. Larkin, 183 Md. at 276-77 , 37 A.2d at 341 . The employer/insurer (appellants) maintained that the jury should be instructed that “if they should believe from the evidence ‘that the claimant received any support from any source other than from [her son] at the time of his injury ’ ” then the claimant could not be found wholly dependent on her deceased son. Larkin, 183 Md. at 278 , 37 A.2d at 342 (emphasis added).

In finding the claimant to be “wholly dependent” on her deceased son, we noted that while these words were not precisely defined under the Act, other jurisdictions had adopted what appeared to be the following universal rule as to their meaning: “‘Total dependency exists where the dependent subsists entirely on the earnings of the workman; but in applying this rule courts have not deprived claimants of the rights of total dependents, when otherwise entitled thereto, on account of temporary gratuitous services rendered them by others, or on account of occasional financial assistance received from other sources, or on account of other minor considerations or benefits which do not substantially modify or change the general rule as above stated.’ ” (Emphasis added). Larkin, 183 Md. at 280 , 37 A.2d at 343 (quoting Bloomington-Bedford Stone Company v. Phillips, 65 Ind.App. 189 , 116 N.E. 850, 852 (1917)). See also Johnson v. Cole, 245 Md. 515 , 520- ⁴⁰⁵ 21, 226 A.2d 268, 271 (1967)(stating that aid or benefits from other sources will not negate a finding of total dependency so long as they “do not substantially affect or modify [the dependent’s] status toward the deceased employee”). In adopting the above rule, we stated that we “did not think that the legislature intended such an illiberal construction of the word Vholly’ as contended ... by the appellants” and concluded that the Act “must be interpreted to effectuate its general purpose, and not by strict rules of construction.” Larkin, 183 Md. at 282 , 37 A.2d at 344 .

Similarly, in Rosenthal, supra, we also found that the claimant was totally dependent on her deceased husband, even though she was employed at the time of her husband’s death. In examining the particular facts of the case, as we are required to do pursuant to § 9-679, we found that the claimant was working outside the home “because her boy was in the Navy and she was worried and wanted to occupy her mind ... until her son came home____” Rosenthal, 185 Md. at 423 , 45 A.2d at 82. Therefore, we held that “the claimant’s work was only temporary or occasional, and that her intention was to depend solely on her husband’s income in the future as she had in the past. So finding, the jury could decide that there was total dependency within the meaning of the Act.” Rosenthal, 185 Md. at 426 , 45 A.2d at 84 (emphasis added).

See also Harvey v. Roche & Son, 148 Md. 363 , 129 A. 359 (1925) (recognizing that claimant, who though separated from her spouse at the time of his death but received monthly support money from him, could be found a total dependent even though she collected weekly rent from a boarder). Thus, as the above cases illustrate, a claimant can be found totally dependent even though he or she has received occasional financial aid or benefits from sources other than the deceased employee. Later cases somewhat restricted the above holdings, however, with the development of the “consequential contribution” test, under which total dependency status may be denied to dependents who make a “consequential contribution” to their own support. Specifically, this test states that while a wholly dependent claimant “may receive ⁴⁰⁶ temporary gratuitous services, occasional financial assistance or other minor benefits from sources other than the deceased workman ... he must not have had a consequential source or means of maintenance in addition to what is received out of the earnings of the deceased.” Mullan Construction Co. v. Day, 218 Md. 581, 586 , 147 A.2d 756, 759 (1959)(emphasis added). 7 Mario Anello, supra, was the first case to apply the consequential contribution test.

In Mario Anello, Mrs. Dunn, the claimant, had pooled her significant earnings with that of her husband’s for several years and used them to support the family. 217 Md. at 180 , 141 A.2d at 733 . In finding Mrs. Dunn to be partially dependent, we held that we were “unable to say that a jury could properly find, or infer, that her earnings were not a consequential part of her maintenance; therefore she was not wholly dependent upon her husband.” 217 Md. at 183 , 141 A.2d at 734 . Mullan Construction, supra, following on the heels of Mario Anello, supra, also involved a wife pooling her earnings with her deceased husband. As in Mario Anello, we found that Mrs. Day was partially, not totally, dependent on her deceased husband, as she made almost fifty percent of her husband’s salary.

Mullan Construction, 218 Md. at 588, 590 , 147 A.2d at 760, 761 . We held that: “[W]here the earnings of [Mrs. Day] were substantial, where she did not subsist solely out of the earnings of her husband, and where she either could not or would not account for more than half of her net earnings, she cannot establish the status of a total dependent by merely claiming she did not pool her earnings with those of her husband.” Mullan Construction, 218 Md. at 589 , 147 A.2d at 760 . In yet another pooled income case, Toadvine v. Luffman examined whether the deceased employee’s two minor chil ⁴⁰⁷ dren were totally dependent on him at the time of his death. 14 Md.App. 333 , 286 A.2d 790 (1972). The court applied the consequential contribution test and found that because the “mother’s contributions were a substantial source, about 40%, of the total funds,” the children were not totally dependent on their deceased father.

Toadvine, 14 Md.App. at 346-47 , 286 A.2d at 797 . The court stated that “[t]he mother’s contributions were regular as distinguished from occasional, permanent as distinguished from temporary, substantial as distinguished from minor.” Toadvine, 14 Md.App. at 346 , 286 A.2d at 797 (emphasis added). See also Simmons v. B & E Landscaping Co., 256 Md. 13, 15 , 259 A.2d 314, 316 (1969)(up-holding the trial judge’s conclusion that “ ‘the mother’s contribution to this family [cannot] be deemed either occasional or inconsequential. She ... was and is the bulk of the support of her children.’ ”).

Thus, as these “step one” cases demonstrate, a claimant can be found a total dependent even though he or she has received occasional financial aid or benefits from sources other than the deceased worker. However, if these additional benefits constitute a consequential contribution to the claimant’s own support, then a finding of total dependency -will be defeated. 3. “Step Two” Cases As mentioned, only two reported appellate cases have examined the issue of whether a claimant “continues to be wholly dependent” after the sum of $45,000 has been paid. See Martin, supra, and Linder Crane, supra. Linder Crane does not fully address the specific issue posed in the instant case, and we need not determine whether we would adopt all aspects of its holding.

Linder Crane, however, does lend support to our, and the Commission’s, interpretation of § 9-681(d), which is that “continues to be wholly dependent” refers to the claimant continuing to be dependent on the salary of the deceased worker at the time of death. ⁴⁰⁸ In Linder Crane the claimant was the surviving spouse of the deceased employee, who was killed in an automobile accident during the course of his employment. 86 Md.App. at 440 , 586 A.2d at 1291 . During their twenty-year marriage, Mr. Hogan supported the family and Mrs. Hogan was a homemaker. Id. Mrs. Hogan began a paying job two months after her husband’s death, due to financial necessity brought on by a dispute as to death benefit compensability.

Linder Crane, 86 Md.App. at 440-41 , 586 A.2d at 1291 . Eventually, Mrs. Hogan was determined to be wholly dependent on her husband and was awarded the maximum initial workers’ compensation death benefits. Linder Crane, 86 Md.App. at 441 , 586 A.2d at 1291 . She quit her job approximately two weeks after receiving the $45,000.

Id. The benefit payments were stopped after the $45,000 had been paid, so Mrs. Hogan filed a claim to have the benefits reinstated. Id. The Commission reinstated her benefits and the circuit court affirmed, holding: “[I]t was undisputed that appellee was not working at the time the Commission continued her benefits and that she did not work during her marriage.” Linder Crane, 86 Md.App. at 442 , 586 A.2d at 1292 .

Appeal was then made to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s holding that Mrs. Hogan’s workers’ compensation death benefits should be reinstated. Linder Crane, 86 Md.App. at 447 , 586 A.2d at 1294 . After finding that Mrs. Hogan was wholly dependent on Mr. Hogan for the twenty years prior to his fatal accident, and that she only worked after his death for thirty-three months due to financial necessity, the court held that Mrs. Hogan remained wholly dependent on Mr. Hogan.

Linder Crane, 86 Md.App. at 448-45 , 586 A.2d at 1292-94 . In examining the issue of Mrs. Hogan’s ability to earn money outside of the home, the court referenced Meyler for the proposition that simply because a “claimant has the ability to be self-supporting does not preclude her from being wholly dependent.” Linder Crane, 86 Md.App. at 444 , 586 A.2d at 1293 . In support of its finding of Mrs. Hogan’s total dependency, the