Maryland Coal Co. v. Cumberland & Pennsylvania Railroad

Grason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Assuming, for the purposes of this case, that the covenant, entered into by the appellee and the George’s Creek ³⁵¹ Coal and Iron Company, is such an one as would, if unrestricted, run with the land and pass therewith to the grantees of the covenantee, (a question we deem if unnecessary to decide in this case,) we think the contract itself very clearly confines the benefit of the covenant to the George’s Creek Coal and Iron Company and its lessees only. The covenant is in the words follorving: “And the said Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company further covenants and agrees to and with the said George’s Creek Coal and Iron Company, that the coals and other products of the mines on the lands now held by the George’s Creek Coal and Iron Company, and all other matters tendered by the last named Company, or its lessees, or any of them, to whom the said lands, or any part thereof shall or may be demised, for transportation over the railroad, now owned by the Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, or over the railroad now contracted to be sold to the said company, or over any part or parts thereof, shall, at all times hereafter, be carried and transported upon terms as favorable, with respect to prices for tolls and for transportation thereof, and all othér facilities, as like articles are carried and transported, for, or on account of, the most favored customer of the Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, it being the true intent of this indenture and of the parties hereto, that, in reference to transportation over said railroad, and every of them, the George’s Creek Coal and Iron Company, and the lessees of said company and every of them, shall stand, •in every respect, on the footing of the most favored customer of the Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company ; and further, that for tolls and transportation over the railroad now agreed to be sold by the George’s Creek Coal and Iron Company to the Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, or any part thereof, the former company, or its lessees, shall not be charged at higher rates than the said George’s Creek Coal and Iron Com ³⁵² pany, can or could charge for like transportation over said railroad, or such parts thereof by its charter,” &c. In tile interpretation of written contracts it is the duty of Courts to ascertain, if possible, the intention of the parties, as manifested by the terms of the instrument.

If the intention of the parties is plainly manifest upon the face of the instrument there is no room for interpretation, and there is nothing left for the Courts but to carry into effect the intention of the parties so ascertained, unless prevented from doing so by public policy or some established principle of law. The rule is well settled that, in ascertaining the meaning of words in a deed or other written instrument, technical words must be given their technical meaning and signification. Mitchell vs. Mitchell, 2 Gill, 238 . Applying these rules, first, that the intent is to govern ; and secondly, that technical words must be given their technical meaning, we think that all difficulty is removed from this case.

The benefit of having coal and other products of the lands transported at cheap rates of tolls by the Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company; is, in plain and unmistakable terms, restricted to the George’s Creek Coal and Iron Company and its lessees, and to them alone. In three