Maryland Reception, Diagnostic & Classification Center v. Watson

WILLIAM W. WENNER, Judge, Specially Assigned. On 29 January 1999, appellee, Richard Watson, was employed as a Correctional Officer by appellant, Maryland Reception, Diagnostic and Classification Center (MRDCC), a maximum security correctional facility operated by the Division of Correction (DOC) of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the Department). In the early morning hours of 29 January 1999, Watson was involved in an incident on Interstate 95 in Howard County. On that same date, a Notice of Termination was prepared and signed by MRDCC Warden William O. Filbert (Warden ⁶⁸⁷ Filbert), and on 12 February 1999, the Notice of Termination was approved by the Department’s Secretary.

By an “appeal” to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) dated 20 February 1999, Watson contested his termination. On 6 April 1999, DBM referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), and a two-day evidentiary hearing was conducted by the- OAH on 7 and 13 March 2000 before Neile Friedman, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). During the course of these proceedings, Watson interposed the following defenses to his termination: (1) as appointing authority, the Warden had not adequately investigated Watson’s alleged misconduct, and (2) the evidence presented was insufficient to support the charged misconduct. By a decision and order issued on 21 April 2000, the ALJ rejected Watson’s defenses, determined that the charged misconduct had been adequately investigated, that the evidence presented was sufficient to support most of the allegations of misconduct with which Watson had been charged, and affirmed Watson’s termination.

Watson then sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. At the conclusion of an 18 October 2000 hearing, the circuit court ruled that Warden Filbert had not adequately investigated Watson’s alleged misconduct or considered mitigating circumstances, and that Watson’s termination had not been given prior approval by the head of the principal unit. By written Order dated 30 October 2000, the ALJ’s decision was reversed by the circuit court and the case was remanded “for an administrative determination beginning with administrative review by Warden Filbert and the Commissioner of Corrections, with the subsequent process and administrative hearing as set forth in the State Personnel and Pensions Article and applicable Code of Maryland Regulations.” Watson’s Motion to Revise Judgment was denied by an Order dated 16 January 2001. MRDCC then noted an appeal, and Watson noted a cross-appeal.

We are now confronted with the following questions: ⁶⁸⁸ 1. Did the ALJ correctly conclude that Watson’s alleged misconduct, consisting of criminal conduct investigated by the Maryland State Police, was investigated as required by Md. State Pers. & Pens.Code Ann. Section' 11—106(a)(1)? 2. Did the circuit court incorrectly conclude that mitigating circumstances were not considered as required by Md. State Per. & Pens.Code Ann. Section 11—106(a)(3)? 3. Did the ALJ correctly conclude that Watson’s disciplinary termination, which was given prior approval by the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, was given prior approval by the head of the principal unit as required by Md. State Pers. & Pens.Code Ann. Section 11-104(7)?

On cross-appeal, Watson poses the following question: Whether the proper remedy for the Department’s violations of Mr. Watson’s rights is to rescind the termination and return him is [sic] full duty status, complete with back pay and benefits? We shall answer MRDCC’s first and third questions in the affirmative, and its second question in the negative, and reverse the judgment of the circuit court. Consequently, we need not answer the question posed by Watson on his cross-appeal. Factual Background During the evening of 27 January 1999, Watson was engaged in the game of chess and drinking while visiting at a friend’s house in Prince George’s County.

During the course of his visit, Watson claims to have consumed about 18 ounces of sherry. Shortly after midnight, Watson left his friend’s house to return to Baltimore. At about 12:40 a.m. Watson was driving north on Interstate 95, and was “clocked” by Trooper First Class Kevin Watkins (Watkins) as driving at 86 m.p.h., in a 65 m.p.h. zone.

On that morning, Watkins was assigned to stationary radar along with Troopers Stanley Slide (Slide), and Amy Coleman (Coleman). ⁶⁸⁹ When Watkins radioed Coleman of Watson’s speed, Coleman activated her emergency lights, pulled out onto the interstate, and followed Watson. She noticed that the automobile operated by Watson was weaving, and eventually pulled over onto the left shoulder of Interstate 95. Trooper Coleman pulled in behind Watson’s car, and approached it. After introducing herself as a State Trooper, Coleman explained to Watson why he had been stopped, and asked him for his driver’s license and registration card.

Trooper Coleman then detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Watson’s breath. Watson handed Trooper Coleman his driver’s license and Division of Correction I.D. cards, and the trooper asked Watson if he had been drinking. Watson replied, “no”. When she again asked him if he had been drinking, Watson asked for “officer courtesy.” Trooper Coleman then asked Watson to step out of his car and performed standard field sobriety tests.

Watson exhibited poor balance when getting out of his car, and the trooper proceeded with the field sobriety tests. After Watson failed the three field sobriety tests administered, Trooper Coleman informed Watson that he was being placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated, and asked him to turn and place his hands behind his back. As she attempted to handcuff Watson, he turned, pushed Trooper Coleman, and ran to the driver’s side of his car, knelt down and reached under the driver’s seat. In fear for her life, Trooper Coleman struggled with Watson on the shoulder of the interstate highway for about 30 seconds, demanding that he “stop, you are under arrest, stop, put it down.” The trooper finally gained control of Watson, removed him from his car, and restrained him against a guardrail.

Troopers Watkins and Slide, who were administering field sobriety tests to another driver some 200 yards away, rushed to Trooper Coleman’s assistance. Watson was finally restrained by the troopers. A search of the trunk of Watson’s car yielded a fully loaded .38 caliber revolver. While being transported to the state police barrack, Watson said to Trooper Coleman, “God wasn’t ready for you.” On his ⁶⁹⁰ way into the barrack, Watson said, “you’re lucky it wasn’t one on one out there,” and “One on one it would have been a different story.” Watson was charged with speeding, driving while intoxicated and under the influence of alcohol, negligent driving, reckless driving, failure to obey designated lane direction, willfully disobeying the lawful order and direction of a police officer, attempting to elude a uniformed police officer by fleeing on foot, resisting lawful arrest, first degree assault, second degree assault, and transportation of a loaded handgun while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Later in the day of 29 January 1999, the State Police Commander spoke with Warden Filbert, to whom one or more police reports concerning the incident had been faxed. After considering Watson’s explanation of the incident, Warden Filbert found no mitigation of its seriousness. Consequently, on that date, a Notice of Termination was prepared and signed by Warden Filbert, and was approved on 12 February 1999 by Stuart O. Simms, the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services. Discussion The principles governing judicial review of the decision of an administrative agency are well established.

Our function in reviewing an administrative agency’s decision is precisely the same as that of the circuit court. Carriage Hill Cabin John, Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Comm’n, 125 Md.App. 183, 211 , 724 A.2d 745 (1999). In other words, we “must review the administrative decision itself.” White v. North, 121 Md.App. 196, 219 , 708 A.2d 1093 (1998). “Courts, at all levels, are enjoined not to substitute their judgment for that of the coordinate branch of government to whom such judgment has been, in our scheme of dividend government, primarily entrusted.” People’s Counsel for Baltimore County v. Beachwood I Limited Partnership, 107 Md.App. 627, 637 , 670 A.2d 484 (1995). Courts must “review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency, since decisions of administrative agencies are prima ⁶⁹¹ fade correct and carry with them the presumption of validity.” Baltimore Lutheran High School Ass’n, Inc. v. Employment Security Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662-63 , 490 A.2d 701 (1985).

A reviewing court “should not substitute its judgement for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken,” Board of Education v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 35 , 491 A.2d 1186 (1985), and must not engage in judicial fact-finding. Anderson v. Dep’t Public Safety & Correctional Services, 330 Md. 187, 212 , 623 A.2d 198 (1993). The test to be used here is reasonableness. Snowden v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 224 Md. 443, 448 , 168 A.2d 390 (1961).

In our view, the ALJ correctly concluded that the misconduct with which Watson had been charged had been investigated as required by Md. State Pers. & Pens.Code Ann. Section ll-106(a)(l), and that Warden Filbert, the chief executive officer of the correctional facility at which