Maryland State Board of Elections v. Libertarian Party

GREENE, J. The Libertarian Party and the Green Party (collectively, Appellees) are political organizations within the State of Maryland. The Maryland State Board of Elections (Appellant) is an agency of the State of Maryland located in Anne Arundel County. Pursuant to Md.Code (2002, 2010 RepLVol.), § 4-102 of the Election Law Article, 1 Appellees qualified as new political parties and gained ballot access privileges by filing peti ⁴⁹¹ tions with Appellant and by adopting interim constitutions and bylaws in accordance with the statute. Appellees, as political parties, enjoyed ballot access privileges from January 2007 until December 2010 when they were unable to show that their respective memberships consisted of at least 1% of registered Maryland voters or that their nominees for Governor of Maryland received at least 1% of the total vote. 2 In accordance with § 4-102, Appellees then undertook to obtain the required 10,000 petition signatures necessary to regain their ballot access privileges. 3 Upon review of the submitted petitions, and the signatures contained therein, Appellant determined that Appellees did not satisfy the statutory requirements.

Specifically, Appellant determined that many of the submitted petition signatures were invalid under Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6-203 of the Election Law Article, as interpreted by this Court in Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass’n v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463 , 15 A.3d 798 (2011) [hereinafter Fire-Rescue ]. As a result, Appellees filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellant incorrectly applied the law regarding validation of petition signatures and that the applicable law was whether there was “sufficient cumulative information,” a phrase appearing in Fire-Rescue, from which Appellant could identify a signatory on a petition as a registered voter.

Appellees subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with a Stipulation of Facts Not in Dispute signed by counsel for all parties. Appellant then filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial judge granted Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, reasoning that the overriding consideration for Appellant to use in validating a petition signature is whether the identity of the signer can be verified. In his Order, the trial judge adopted Appellees’ suggested ⁴⁹² “sufficient cumulative information” standard and declared that: the sufficient cumulative information standard forbids invalidating a petition entry merely because a signer omits an unused first or middle name; the sufficient cumulative information standard forbids invalidating a petition entry for name-related defects if, through other information contained in the entry, the signer’s identity can be corroborated; and no signature should be considered a duplicate unless a signature from the same voter has been previously validated.

Appellant noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and Appellees noted a cross-appeal; prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider both the appeal and the cross-appeal. Md. Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party, 422 Md. 353 , 30 A.3d 193 (2011). The following questions are posed by Appellant: 1. Do [the Maryland State Board of Elections’s] current standards for reviewing and validating petition signatures, as revised to reflect this Court’s recent ruling in Fire-Rescue, appropriately implement the requirements of Section 6-203 of the Election Law Article (“EL”) of the Annotated Code of Maryland as interpreted in Fire-Rescue? 2.

Does the signature validation standard articulated in Fire-Rescue apply uniformly to validation of petition signatures both in the referendum context, and in other contexts including new party petitions? 3. Does the [Maryland State Board of Elections] appropriately refuse to validate duplicate or multiple signatures of persons who already have signed a petition? Appellees present the following additional question for this Court to address: Did the Circuit Court err in holding that the “sufficient cumulative information” standard permits the invalidation of a signature on a ballot access petition by a person the [Maryland] State Board [of Elections] has identified as a registered voter, merely because the signer uses a nickname? ⁴⁹³ We shall hold that this Court’s interpretation in Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697 , 962 A.2d 342 (2008), of the mandatory signature requirements of § 6-203(a) was affirmed in Fire-Rescue.

The trial court and Appellees misconstrue the reasoning of Fire-Rescue in concluding that the “sufficient cumulative information” language established a new standard to utilize in petition signature validation; rather, this Court has consistently held that the requirements for petition signatures under § 6-203(a) are mandatory. We, therefore, reject any arguments made by Appellees in reliance on a supposed “sufficient cumulative information” standard. Furthermore, we hold that the petition signature validation requirements provided in § 6-203 of the Election Law Article apply to petitions in both the referendum context and in the context of new party petitions. To the extent that Appellees raise constitutional claims related to this issue, we decline to address those claims for reasons discussed more fully below.

Lastly, we hold that, in accordance with the plain and unambiguous language of § 6-203(b), Appellant appropriately refused to validate and count duplicate signatures of individuals who previously signed the same petition. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 4-102 of the Election Law Article provides that any group of registered voters may form a new political party by filing a petition with the State Board of Elections and adopting and filing an interim constitution and bylaws. In accordance with Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 4-103 of the Election Law Article, “a new political party shall retain its status as a political party until December 31 in the year of the second statewide general election following the party’s qualification under § 4-102,” unless the political party status is extended by fulfilling either of two conditions. The first condition is nominating a candidate for the highest office on a ballot in a statewide general election and obtaining at least 1% of the total vote for that office in favor of the nominated candidate.

See Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 4-103(a)(2)(i) of the Election Law ⁴⁹⁴ Article. The second condition is affiliation of at least 1 % of the State’s registered voters with the political party. See Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 4-103(a)(2)(ii) of the Election Law Article. If a political party is unable to satisfy either of those conditions, it may re-apply for status as a new political party by once again filing with the State Board of Elections a petition, satisfying the necessary statutory requirements, as well as an interim constitution and bylaws.

See Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 4-103(c) of the Election Law Article. Section 4-102(b) lists the requirements for the petition: (1) The petition shall state: (i) the partisan organization’s intent to organize a State political party; (ii) the name of the partisan organization; (iii) the name and signature of the State chairman of the partisan organization; and (iv) the names and addresses of 25 registered voters, including the State chairman, who shall be designated as constituting the initial governing body of the partisan organization. (2) (i) Appended to the petition shall be papers bearing the signatures of at least 10,000 registered voters who are eligible to vote in the State as of the first day of the month in which the petition is submitted. (ii) Signatures on the petition must have been affixed to the petition not more than 2 years before the filing date of the last qualifying signature.

Appellees fulfilled the requirements to become new political parties from January 2007 until December 2010; after December 2010, however, they no longer satisfied the conditions under § 4-103(a)(2)(i) or (ii) to retain their statuses as political parties, as explained herein. Appellees then sought to regain their political party statuses by each collecting 10,000 petition signatures of registered voters in the State of Maryland, as required under § 4-102(b)(2)(i). On March 7, 2011, Appellees submitted, and Appellant accepted, a petition on behalf of the ⁴⁹⁵ Libertarian Party that purported to contain 13,787 signatures, as well as a petition on behalf of the Green Party that purported to contain 14,842 signatures. On March 16, 2011, Appellees submitted, and Appellant accepted, additional petition pages on behalf of the Libertarian Party that purported to contain an additional 1,068 signatures.

Title 6 of the Election Law Article provides a two-step process, involving validation and verification, for counting signatures on a petition. The signature validation procedure is outlined in Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6-203(a) of the Election Law Article: (a) In general. — To sign a petition, an individual shall: (1) sign the individual’s name as it appears on the statewide voter registration list or the individual’s surname of registration and at least one full given name and the initials of any other names; and (2) include the following information, printed or typed, in the spaces provided: (i) the signer’s name as it was signed; (ii) the signer’s address; (iii) the date of signing; and (iv) other information required by regulations adopted by the State Board. (b) Validation and counting. — The signature of an individual shall be validated and counted if: (1) the requirements of subsection (a) of this section have been satisfied; (2) the individual is a registered voter assigned to the county specified on the signature page and, if applicable, in a particular geographic area of the county; (3) the individual has not previously signed the same petition; (4) the signature is attested by an affidavit appearing on the page on which the signature appears; (5) the date accompanying the signature is not later than the date of the affidavit on the page; and ⁴⁹⁶ (6) if applicable, the signature was affixed within the requisite period of time, as specified by law. The signature verification procedure is outlined in Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6-207 of the Election Law Article: (a) In general. — (1) Upon the filing of a petition, and unless it has been declared deficient under § 6-206 of this subtitle, the staff of the election authority shall proceed to verify the signatures and count the validated signatures contained in the petition.

(2) The purpose of signature verification under paragraph (1) of this subsection is to ensure that the name of the individual who signed the petition is listed as a registered voter. (b) State Board to establish process. — The State Board, by regulation, shall establish the process to be followed by all election authorities for verifying and counting signatures on petitions. Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6-103(a) of the Election Law Article provides: (1) The State Board shall adopt regulations, consistent with this title, to carry out the provisions of this title. (2) The regulations shall: (i) prescribe the form and content of petitions; (ii) specify procedures for the circulation of petitions for signatures; (iii) specify procedures for the verification and counting of signatures; and (iv) provide any other procedural or technical requirements that the State Board considers appropriate.

Accordingly, Appellant devised guidelines to determine whether the signatures on the respective petitions submitted by Appellees should be validated and verified. 4 After concluding ⁴⁹⁷ the processes of validation and verification, Appellant made the determination that the petitions contained an insufficient number of signatures, and it notified Appellees that they did not qualify to regain their statuses as political parties. On April 11, 2011, Appellees filed a Complaint against Appellant in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, 5 pursuant to Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6-209 of the Election Law Article. In the Complaint, Appellees contended that Appellant improperly determined that the petitions submitted by Appellees were insufficient to satisfy the 10,000 signature requirement. Appellees claimed that, pursuant to this Court’s opinion in Fire-Rescue, the correct standard for Appellant to apply when validating signatures on a petition is the “sufficient cumulative information” standard.

According to Appellees, under that standard, a signature should be validated if there is sufficient cumulative information to identify the signer. Appellees characterized Appellant’s review of the petitions as a “ ‘single elimination’ review, aimed not at evaluating the totality of each petition signature but at invalidating a signature as soon as even a single flaw [was] discovered.” Appellees cited several examples of instances where they claimed Appellant had erroneously invalidated petition signatures. Of particular relevance to the issues before this Court, Appellees claimed that Appellant erroneously invalidated petition entries “where a signature and a printed name both omitted an initial or an unused first or middle name[.]” ⁴⁹⁸ In addition, Appellees asserted that Appellant erred when it invalidated entries in which a signer used a nickname rather than a given name. Lastly, Appellees maintained that Appellant acted improperly when it “instructed the local boards to reject (and code as “DUP”[ 6 ]) any signature by a voter whose signature had already been examined once — even if the first signature was invalidated.” In their Complaint, Appellees sought declaratory and injunctive relief: 41.

As to Count One, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that (a) the defendants incorrectly applied the applicable law in validating the plaintiffs’ petition signatures; and (b) that the plaintiffs were and are entitled to have their petitions validated under the “sufficient cumulative information” standard articulated by the Court of Appeals in Fire-Rescue Association. 42. As to Count One, the plaintiffs further seek a declaratory judgment (a) that the “sufficient cumulative information” standard forbids the invalidation of petition entries for defects found in printed names if the missing elements are supplied by the corresponding signed names, or vice versa; (b) that the “sufficient cumulative information” standard forbids the invalidation of petition entries merely because the signer omits an used first or middle name, or uses a nickname, when writing his or her full name or signature; (c) that the “sufficient cumulative information” standard forbids the invalidation of petition entries for name-related defects if the entry contains address or birthdate information from which the signer’s identity can be corroborated; (d) that no signature should be considered a “duplicate” unless a signature from the same voter has previously been validated; (e) that state law does not require a petition circulator’s printed name to match his or her signed name; (f) that state law does not require a petition circulator to adhere to any prescribed form or level of completeness in ⁴⁹⁹ the way his or her name is printed or signed; and (g) that no page of a new party petition using a state-approved form, even if that form has been superseded, should be considered invalid unless there is some reason to believe the use of the superseded form could actually cause voter confusion. 43. As to Count One, the plaintiffs request that this Court order the defendants to review plaintiffs’ petitions under the proper legal standard, and (a) to enlarge the number of validated signatures credited to each plaintiffs petition to whatever extent can be agreed upon by the parties or proven by the evidence in court; and (b) to determine, in the event that either plaintiff reaches 10,000 properly validated signatures, that the petition has succeeded and that plaintiff is entitled to be re-recognized as a ballot-eligible political party in Maryland. Appellees subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment, and Appellant filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and for a Declaratory Ruling in Favor of Defendants.

Appellant and Appellees also filed a Stipulation of Facts Not in Dispute, which contained the following relevant facts: 1. Plaintiff Libertarian Party of Maryland (“Libertarian Party”) is a political organization with whom 9,282 registered voters in Maryland have chosen to affiliate (as of February 28, 2011). 2. Plaintiff Maryland Green Party (“Green Party”) is a political organization with whom 8,457 registered voters in Maryland have chosen to affiliate (as of February 28, 2011). 3. Defendant Maryland State Board of Elections is an agency of the State of Maryland.

Defendant is charged with, among other things, verifying and validating signatures on petitions submitted by organizations seeking to qualify as new political parties (or renew their status as “recognized” or ballot-eligible political parties). The Maryland State Board of Elections is located in Anne Arundel County. ⁵⁰⁰ 5. The Libertarian Party and the Green Party each enjoyed ballot access privileges during the last four years, having most recently renewed their party status with the state in January 2007. However, during the 2010 Gubernatorial General Election, neither plaintiffs nominee for Governor of Maryland received more than the approximately 18, 579 votes (1% of the total votes cast for governor) necessary to retain the party’s status as a political party. 6.

On March 7, 2011, the State Board accepted a petition on behalf of the Libertarian Party that purported to contain 13,787 signatures, as well as a petition on behalf of the Green Party that purported to contain 14,842 signatures. On March 16, 2011, the State Board accepted additional petition pages on behalf of the Libertarian party that purported to contain an additional 1,068 signatures. 7. On or about March 9, 2011, the defendants promulgated the “State of Maryland Petition Acceptance and Verification Procedures[.]” At that time, the State Board anticipated that an opinion by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Montgomery County Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass’n v. Montgomery County Bd. of Elections [ 418 Md. 463 , 15 A.3d 798 ], 2011 WL 977590 (Md., March 22, 2011) (“Fire-Rescue”) might require some modification of the State Board’s petition signature verification guidelines or other processes. Accordingly, the defendants’ revised guidelines included a new code (“Signature Standard — SS”) for use by elections officials in marking certain petition signatures that the State Board thought might be affected by the Fire-Rescue opinion. 8.

On March 22, 2011, while the signatures submitted by the plaintiffs were being validated by state and local election officials using the March 9, 2011 SBE Guidelines, the Maryland Court of Appeals released its opinion in Fire-Rescue. In light of the additional guidance provided by the Fire-Rescue opinion, the State Board began a further revision of its petition acceptance and verification procedures, which were not completed and finalized until on or about May 5, 2011.... However, because processing of the petitions had ⁵⁰¹ already begun using the March 9, 2011 SBE Guidelines and because elections officials are required by statute to complete the verification and counting of petitions within 20 days, the State Board made its determination as to the sufficiency of the petitions using the March 9, 2011 SBE Guidelines. 9. On March 31, 2011, the defendants determined that the majority of the signatures submitted by the Libertarian Party in support of its petition were invalid and could not be counted toward the 10,000 signature minimum set by state law.

The Libertarian Party was credited with 3,815 signatures (25.44%) that were considered valid under the State Board’s pre-Fire-Rescue understanding of the applicable standards, plus 2,417 signatures that had been coded “SS” and were considered valid under Fire-Rescue. The remaining 8,762 signatures — nearly 60% of the signatures processed — were invalidated. 10. Also on March 31, 2011, the defendants determined that the majority of the signatures submitted by the Green Party in support of its petition were invalid and could not be counted toward the 10,000 signature minimum set by state law. The Green Party was credited with 3,928 signatures (26.39%) that were considered valid under the State Board’s pre-Fire-Rescue understanding of the applicable standards, plus 1,977 signatures that had been coded “SS” and were considered valid under Fire-Rescue.

The remaining 8,981 signatures — over 60% of the signatures processed — were invalidated. 11. In the weeks since March 31, [2011,] thanks to constructive discussions between the parties, the State Board has credited each party with additional signatures, mainly falling into the categories described in paragraph^] 30 and 31 of the complaint.[ 7 ] Specifically, the defendants have re ⁵⁰² processed approximately 1,040 signatures originally rejected for the reasons described in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the complaint, and have found approximately 358 to be valid. As a result of these discussions, as of May 5, [2011,] the total signatures credited to each party had risen to 6,583 for the Libertarian Party and 5,919 for the Green Party. 12. During both the original validation process and the reprocessing that has occurred since March 31, [2011,] state and local election officials searched the state’s “MDVO-TERS” database for every person who could be identified from the information appearing on the face of the Libertarian Party and Green Party petitions.

Many signatures could not be matched to a registered voter in the state’s database. However, Exhibits C and D to this stipulation list all the voters who could be identified as having signed in support of the Libertarian Party’s petition (Exhibit C) and the Green Party’s petition (Exhibit D). Exhibits C and D are com ⁵⁰³ píete and accurate printouts of the information the State Board exported from its MDYOTERS database on or about May 11, 2011. 13. Exhibit C contains approximately 12,203 lines of voter names.

Subtracting duplicates, Exhibit C contains the names of over 12,000 unique registered voters. 14. Exhibit D contains approximately 13,454 lines of voter names. Subtracting duplicates, Exhibit D contains the names of over 12,950 unique registered voters. 15. As of May 3, 2011, the State Board considered approximately 5,131 signatures on the Libertarian Party petition and approximately 6,583 signatures on the Green Party petition to be invalid because of defects in the printed name that the State Board had coded “RS” (a code that indicates the signature is invalid and does not count toward the required 10,000 signatures).

The State Board agrees with the plaintiffs that some of the remaining “RS” signatures (those described in paragraph 42(a) of the complaint[ 8 ]) should be considered valid under Fire-Rescue, but these have not yet been re-processed. The plaintiffs estimate that the Libertarian Party could expect to gain between 820 and 925 signatures from re-processing these “42(a)” signatures, and the Green Party could expect to gain between 1,050 and 1,183 [signatures]. The State Board has no official estimate of how many valid signatures each party is likely to gain from the validation of signatures described in paragraph 42(a), but agrees with the plaintiffs that it appears highly unlikely that either party could meet the 10,000 signature requirement with those signatures alone. 16. According to Exhibits C and D, approximately 95 signatures on the Libertarian Party petition and approximately 413 signatures on the Green Party petition are currently considered invalid because they were considered ⁵⁰⁴ to be duplicate signatures.

The defendants instructed the local boards to reject (and code as “DUP”) any signature by a voter whose signature had already been examined once— even if the first signature was invalidated. 17. The plaintiffs are permitted to submit additional signatures in support of their petitions at any time subject to the requirements of COMAR § 33.06.04.05.[ 9 ] However, under current procedures, the prohibition on “duplicate” signatures applies to all additional signature pages which are part of the same petition, so that once an individual has had a signature entry processed, whether that entry was accepted or rejected, any other effort to sign that petition is rejected as a “duplicate” entry. Following a hearing on June 21, 2011, the trial judge granted Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that the invalidations made by Appellant were improper. The trial judge indicated that “the overriding consideration is whether the signer can be identified as the registered voter.” The trial judge’s Order stated, in relevant part, that it was: ORDERED and Declared, that the “sufficient cumulative information” standard forbids the invalidation of petition entries merely because the signer omits an unused first or middle name, when writing his or her full name or signature; and it is further ⁵⁰⁵ ORDERED and Declared, that the “sufficient cumulative information” standard forbids the invalidation of petition entries for name-related defects if the entry contains address or birthdate information from which the signer’s identity can be corroborated; and it is further ORDERED and [D]eclared, that no signature should be considered a “duplicate” unless a signature from the same voter has previously been validated.

STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court has discussed review of a trial judge’s grant of summary judgment in the following relevant way: Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501, we have stated that “[a] trial court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City Council of Balt City, 413 Md. 309, 329 , 992 A.2d 459, 471 (2010) (internal quotation omitted). A determination of “[wjhether a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment is proper in a particular case is a question of law, subject to a non-deferential review on appeal.” Tyler v. City of College Park, 415 Md. 475, 498 , 3 A.3d 421, 434 (2010); Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 243 , 932 A.2d 571, 584 (2007); Charles Cnty. Comm’rs v. Johnson, 393 Md. 248, 263 , 900 A.2d 753, 762 (2006). Thus, “[t]he standard of review of a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment on the law is de novo, that is, whether the trial court’s legal conclusions were legally correct.” Messing v. Bank of Am., N.A., 373 Md. 672, 684 , 821 A.2d 22, 28 (2003) (citations omitted).

On review of an order granting summary judgment, our analysis “begins with the determination [of] whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists; only in the absence of such a dispute will we review questions of law.” Appiah v. Hall, 416 Md. 533, 546 , 7 A.3d 536, 544 (2010) (citing O’Connor v. Balt. Cnty., 382 Md. 102, 110 , 854 A.2d 1191, 1196 (2004)). Our review of the record is independent “to ⁵⁰⁶ determine whether the parties properly generated a dispute of material fact----” Charles Cnty. Comm’rs, 393 Md. at 263 , 900 A.2d at 762 .

The record is reviewed “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and [we] construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the wellpled facts against the moving party.” Muskin v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 422 Md. 544, 554-55 , 30 A.3d 962, 968 (2011); Conaway, 401 Md. at 243 , 932 A.2d at 585 ; O’Connor, 382 Md. at 111 , 854 A.2d at 1196 ; Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695 , 785 A.2d 726, 728 (2001). With regard to whether a fact is material, this Court has stated, “[A] dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment.” O’Connor, 382 Md. at 111 , 854 A.2d at 1196 (quoting Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227 , 783 A.2d 206, 209 (2001)). In other words, a material fact is a fact “necessary to resolve the controversy as a matter of law[.]” Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8 , 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974). If it is determined that no genuine dispute of material fact exists, “we review the trial court’s ruling on the law, considering the same material from the record and deciding the same legal issues as the circuit court.” Messing, 373 Md. at 684 , 821 A.2d at 28 (citation omitted); Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condo., 404 Md. 560, 571 , 948 A.2d 11, 18 (2008) (holding that “[i]f no material facts are placed in dispute, this Court must determine whether the Circuit Court correctly entered summary judgment as a matter of law” (citations omitted)).

In conducting our review of a grant of a motion for summary judgment, we consider “only the grounds upon which the trial court relied in granting summary judgment.” River Walk Apartments, LLC v. Twigg, 396 Md. 527, 541-42 , 914 A.2d 770, 779 (2007) (quoting Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Berrett, 395 Md. 439, 451 , 910 A.2d 1072, 1079 (2006)). D’Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549, 574-75 , 36 A.3d 941, 955-56 (2012). ⁵⁰⁷ Based upon the extensive factual stipulations presented to the trial judge with the cross-motions for summary judgment, we conclude that there were no material facts in dispute. Therefore, we evaluate whether the trial judge correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees as a matter of law.

As discussed in further detail below, the trial judge incorrectly interpreted the applicable law in this case. Therefore, the entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellees was improper and should be vacated. DISCUSSION I. Requirements of § 6-203 In granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial judge concluded that the appropriate standard for Appellant to use when validating and counting petition signatures is the “sufficient cumulative information” standard, which the judge determined was announced in Montgomery Cnty. Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass’n v. Montgomery Cnty.

Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463 , 15 A.3d 798 (2011). The trial court and Appellees misconstrue this Court’s analysis in Fire-Rescue by asserting that there is a “sufficient cumulative information” standard applicable to validation of petition signatures under § 6-2Q3(a). Rather, only in the context of discussing legibility of petition signatures, we stated that “§ 6 — 203(b)(1) directs the election authority to validate a petition signer’s entry if there is sufficient cumulative information on the face of the petition, e.g., a signature, a printed name, address, date of signing, and other information required by regulation, evidencing compliance with § 6-208(a), to determine the identity of the signer.” Fire-Rescue, 418 Md. at 473-74 , 15 A.3d at 804 (emphasis added). Our interpretation in Fire-Rescue of the provisions of § 6-203 is consistent with our prior analysis of the statute in Doe v. Montgomery Cnty.

Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697 , 962 A.2d 342 (2008), wherein we indicated that the requirements of § 6-203(a) are mandatory. Thus, we hold that Appellant correctly implemented the mandates of § 6-203(a), as interpreted in Doe and affirmed in Fire-Rescue, and ⁵⁰⁸ the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. In Doe , this Court addressed the issue of “whether the Montgomery County Board of Elections (‘County Board’) properly certified a petition for referendum proffered by the Maryland Citizens for Responsible Government (‘Citizens Group’) who sought to use the referendum process to overturn Bill No. 23-07, enacted by the Montgomery County Council and signed by the County Executive, which would add ‘gender identity’ as a protected characteristic under the County’s anti-discrimination laws.” Doe, 406 Md. at 702 , 962 A.2d at 344-45 (footnotes omitted). After the petition had been certified for the election ballot, several citizens in Montgomery County filed a Complaint, challenging the validity of the petition and seeking a declaratory judgment.

Doe, 406 Md. at 702-03 , 962 A.2d at 345 . After considering the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial judge granted the County Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had failed to file timely their Complaint and that the provisions of § 6-203 were merely suggestive as opposed to mandatory. Doe, 406 Md. at 708-09 , 962 A.2d at 348-49 . Of particular relevance to the issues in the instant case, on review in Doe , we interpreted the statutory requirements of § 6-203(a).

The statute provides, in relevant part: (a) In general. — To sign a petition, an individual shall: (1) sign the individual’s name as it appears on the statewide voter registration list or the individual’s surname of registration and at least one full given name and the initials of any other names; and (2) include the following information, printed or typed, in the spaces provided: (i) the signer’s name as it was signed; (ii) the signer’s address; (iii) the date of signing; and ⁵⁰⁹ (iv) other information required by regulations adopted by the State Board. (b) Validation and counting. — The signature of an individual shall be validated and counted if: (1) the requirements of subsection (a) of this section have been satisfied; (2) the individual is a registered voter assigned to the county specified on the signature page and, if applicable, in a particular geographic area of the county; (3) the individual has not previously signed the same petition; (4) the signature is attested by an affidavit appearing on the page on which the signature appears;