Massey v. Galley

ELDRIDGE, Judge. This is an action under the Maryland Public Information Act, Maryland Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Yol.), §§ 10-611 through 10-628 of the State Government Article, by an inmate of a Maryland correctional institution who seeks access to certain public records. The sole issue before us is whether the Prisoner Litigation Act, Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.

Vol.), §§ 5-1001 through 5-1007 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, precludes this action on the ground that the plaintiff has not “fully exhausted all administrative remedies for resolving [his] complaint or grievance.” See § 5-1003(a)(1) and (c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. We shall hold that the exhaustion of administrative remedies provision of the Prisoner Litigation Act has no application to, and thus does not preclude, the statutory cause of action under the Public Information Act. I. The case was decided in the Circuit Court by a grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint. Consequently, for purposes of these appellate proceedings, the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and constitute the basic facts of the case.

Benson v. State, 389 Md. 615, 626 , 887 A.2d 525, 531 (2005); Debbas v. Nelson, 389 Md. 364, 372 , 885 A.2d 802, 807 (2005); Doe v. Pharmacia, 388 Md. 407, 416 , 879 A.2d 1088, 1093 (2005); Horridge v. St. Mary’s County Dept. of Social Services, 382 Md. 170, 175-176 , ⁶³⁷ 854 A.2d 1232, 1234 (2004); Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, 359 Md. 238, 246 , 753 A.2d 501, 505 (2000). Richard L. Massey, Jr., an inmate at the Western Correctional Institution in Cumberland, Maryland, on July 16, 2002, filed in the Circuit Court for Allegany County a complaint under the Maryland Public Information Act, Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Yol.), § 10-623 of the State Government Article, against Jon P. Galley, the Warden of the Western Correctional Institution. The complaint alleged that Galley is the custodian of records at the Western Correctional Institution (WCI), and that on May 28, 2002, Massey mailed to Galley a request that Massey be allowed to inspect the following public records in Galley’s custody: “a.

The contract between the State of Maryland and Prison Health services, Inc. (PHS) which is currently effective and applies to provisions of medical care at WCI. b. Any and all records of lawful authorization for the WCI commissary to charge inmates any amount beyond costs of items sold, including specifleation(s) of any percentage/amount allowable. c. Any and all records, including contracts, pertaining to the use of photocopier machines for/by inmates housed at WCI and currently effective. d. Any and all financial records, such as monthly reports, pertaining to the photocopier cards sold by the WCI commissary to inmates, including the amount(s) and destination(s) of funds obtained by said sales during the current fiscal year.” The complaint alleged that Massey, not having received any response to his request, on June 30, 2002, again mailed to Galley a request to inspect the documents.

The complaint further alleged that Massey had still not received any response to his request, that Galley had not asked for an extension of time to respond as provided by § 10—614(b)(4) of the State Government Article, and that Galley had not “temporarily denied” Massey’s request pursuant to § 10-619 of the State Government Article. ⁶³⁸ The complaint went on to state that Massey, being a “person” within the meaning of the Public Information Act, has a right to inspect public records which are not exempt from inspection, that Galley “has not made a good faith effort to comply with the Act,” and that Galley’s “knowing and willful denial of disclosure renders his action/inaction arbitrary and capricious.” Massey sought an “order[] that [the] records requested be produced for inspection,” as well as other relief pursuant to § 10-628 of the State Government Article. 1 ⁶³⁹ Massey’s complaint in the Circuit Court did not allege, or even intimate, that he had any type of complaint or grievance concerning his confinement, or the defendant, or any other officers or personnel connected with the institution or the Maryland Division of Correction. Massey alleged that he simply wanted access to the records as a “person” who has a statutory right to such access. 2 The defendant Galley filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Circuit Court “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims, as Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to initiating this lawsuit.” The defendant asserted that Massey had an administrative remedy before the Inmate Grievance Office pursuant to Code (1999), §§ 10-201 through 10-210 of the Correctional Services Article. The motion to dismiss went on to state that the Prisoner Litigation Act, § 5-1003(a)(l) and (c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, precluded this action under the Public Information Act because of Massey’s failure to exhaust his Inmate Grievance Office administrative remedy. 3 ⁶⁴⁰ The Circuit Court granted the defendant Galley’s motion to dismiss. Upon Massey’s appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.

Massey v. Galley, 154 Md.App. 437 , 840 A.2d 183 (2003). Thereafter, this Court granted Massey’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Massey v. Galley, 381 Md. 324 , 849 A.2d 473 (2004).

II

This case involves three separate state statutes, and a dispute concerning the relationship among them. Thus, we shall first briefly review each of the statutes as well as the parties’ arguments based upon them. A. The statute creating the Inmate Grievance Office (formerly named the Inmate Grievance Commission), and providing for an adjudicatory administrative remedy and judicial review for inmate “grievances,” was enacted by Ch. 210 of the Acts of 1971, and is presently codified as §§ 10-201 through 10-210 of the Correctional Seivices Article. For discussions of the statute, see, e.g., Watkins v. Department of Public Safety, 377 Md. 34, 45-47 , 831 A.2d 1079, 1086-1087 (2003); Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, supra, 359 Md. at 250-257 , 753 A.2d at 507-511 ; McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 604-610 , 552 A.2d 881, 882-885 (1989), and cases there cited.

The administrative remedy under that statute is applicable only when an inmate, in the custody of a state correctional institution or the Commissioner of Correction, “has a grievance against an official or employee of the Division of Correction or the Patuxent Institution,” § 10-206(a) of the Correctional Services Article. The Inmate Grievance Office statute also provides that “[a] court may not consider an individual’s grievance that is within the jurisdiction of the Office ... ⁶⁴¹ unless the individual has exhausted the remedies provided in this subtitle.” B. The Maryland Public Information Act was initially enacted by Ch. 698 of the Acts of 1970, and has been substantially revised on several occasions since that time. The Act was extensively revised by Ch. 1006 of the Acts of 1978 which provided, inter alia, that, in the case of denials of the right to inspect records by agencies subject to the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, the person seeking inspection may pursue an administrative remedy under that Act, but that such administrative “remedy need not be exhausted prior to filing suit in the circuit court pursuant to this article.” IV Laws of Maryland, 1978, at 2894-2895. The provision is presently codified in § 10-622(c) of the State Government Article.

Another revision of the Public Information Act, by Ch. 481 of the Acts of 1982, required the custodian of a public record, upon a written request for access to a record, to “grant the request and produce the record immediately or within a reasonable period, not to exceed 80 days, as may be required to retrieve the information,” or to deny the request within 30 days. TV Laws of Maryland 1982, at 2957. See § 10-614(b)(1) of the State Government Article (“The custodian shall grant or deny the application promptly, but not to exceed 30 days after receiving the application”). Underscoring the General Assembly’s concern for expedition with regard to requests under the Public Information Act, is the provision in § 10-623(c)(l) of the State Government Article that a judicial action by a person denied inspection of a public record “shall: (i) take precedence on the docket; (ii) be heard at the earliest practicable date; and (iii) be expedited in every way.” Furthermore, the “defendant: (i) has the burden of sustaining a decision to deny inspection of a public record .... ” § 10—623(b)(2)(i) of the State Government Article.

See Governor v. Washington Post, 360 Md. 520, 545 , 759 A.2d 249, 263 (2000); Fioretti v. Maryland, Board, of Dental Examiners, 351 Md. 66, 78 , 716 A.2d 258, 264 (1998). ⁶⁴² In applying the provisions of the Public Information Act, this Court on numerous occasions has pointed out that “[t]he presumption of the statute is in favor of disclosure.” Stromberg v. University of Maryland, 382 Md. 151, 160 , 854 A.2d 1220, 1226 (2004). See, e.g., University System v. Baltimore Sun, 381 Md. 79, 87-88, 95 , 847 A.2d 427, 429 (2004) (The Public Information Act’s provisions “ ‘reflect the legislative intent that the citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded unde ranging access to public information concerning the operation of their government.’ ” The Act “is to be construed in favor of permitting inspection of public records”); Hammen v. Baltimore County Police Dept., 373 Md. 440, 456 , 818 A.2d 1125, 1135 (2003) (“[T]he Act is to be construed in favor -of disclosure. * * * The affording of broad access to public records ... is the very purpose of the [Act]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 370 Md. 272, 305-306 , 805 A.2d 268 (2002) (“[T]he provisions of the statute must be liberally construed ... in order to effectuate the [Public Information Act’s] broad remedial purpose”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Governor v. Washington Post, supra, 360 Md. at 544 , 759 A.2d at 262 (The “ ‘Maryland Public Information Act establishes a public policy and a general presumption in favor of disclosure of government or public documents,’ ” quoting Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 80-81 , 721 A.2d 196, 199 (1998)); Office of Attorney General v. Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 343 , 753 A.2d 1036, 1037 (2000) (“In order to carry out this right of access, the Act is to be construed in favor of disclosure”); Fioretti v. Maryland Board of Dental Examiners, supra, 351 Md. at 73 , 716 A.2d at 262 (“ ‘[T]he provisions of the Public Information Act reflect the legislative intent’” favoring “ ‘wide-ranging access to public information,’ ” quoting A.S. Abell Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32 , 464 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1983)). Moreover, the Maryland Public Information Act contains no limitations as to those persons entitled to inspect public records. Section 10-612(a) of the State Government Article provides that “[a]ll persons are entitled to have [such] access.... ” Thus, an inmate in a correctional institution has a ⁶⁴³ right to inspect public records.

Attorney General v. Galla gher; supra, 359 Md. at 343, 753 A.2d at 1037. C. The Prisoner Litigation Act was enacted by Ch. 495 of the Acts of 1997. According to the first words of the Title to Ch. 495, the purpose of the Act was to impose certain requirements upon “a prisoner who files a civil action relating to the conditions of confinement.'” (Emphasis added). The Department of Legislative Reference’s file on House Bill 926 of the 1997 legislative session, which became Ch. 95, indicates that the bill as originally introduced was patterned after federal legislation concerning prisoner actions in the federal courts.

Nonetheless, the bill was substantially amended in the course of its progress through the General Assembly. For a detailed review of the Prisoner Litigation Act, including its history and purpose, see Judge Harrell’s opinion for the Court in Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, supra, 359 Md. 238 , 753 A.2d 501 . The Department of Fiscal Services’ Fiscal Note and Analysis of House Bill 926 of the 1997 legislative session states that “[t]he bill is intended to reduce the number of civil suits filed by inmates relating to the conditions of confinement, especially the number of frivolous suits.” (Emphasis added). The Department of Legislative Reference’s file on House Bill 926 contains a list of “Examples of Frivolous State Court Inmate Litigation” at which the Bill was aimed.

The entire list is as follows: “1. Earl Wilkins v. Secretary, Public Safety and Correctional Services, Circuit Court for Washington County, Case No. 19682—Action to recover money for stale cigars caused by confiscation of individual humidors as contraband from cigars mailed into prison. 2. James Hogston v. Secretary, Public Safety and Correctional Services, Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Case No. C-94-11445.AA—Action relating to missing a ⁶⁴⁴ single meal. (Feedup occurred while inmate was in visiting room.) 3.

Robert Moore v. Secretary, Public Safety and Correctional Services, Circuit Court for Somerset County, Case No. 95-CA-04693—Complaint that roll served with breakfast and cereal portion were too small. 4. Gregory Marshall v. William Smith, Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Case No. C-96-0122.AA—Complaint that fourth of July activities for inmates in the yard precluded inmate from taking accustomed nap. 5. Steven Jones v. Bishop Robinson, Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Case No. C-95-24019.OT—Officer’s 15-minute delay in taking inmate to dentist precluded inmate from seeing dentist until one hour lunch break had ended.” For a further discussion of the type of claims which prompted the Prisoner Litigation Act, see Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, supra, 359 Md. at 264-265, 753 A.2d at 515 . The first section of the Prisoner Litigation Act, setting forth the Act’s “definitions,” largely delineates the scope of the Act.

Section 5—1001(b) defines “administrative remedy” as “any procedure for review of a prisoner’s complaint or grievance,” and specifically includes proceedings under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act and the Inmate Grievance Office Act. 4 Section 5—1001(c)(1) defines a “civil action” as a legal action seeking various types of relief “that relates to or ⁶⁴⁵ involves a prisoner’s conditions of confinement.” 5 The Act in § 5-1001(d) defines “conditions of confinement” as follows: “(d) Conditions of confinement.—‘Conditions of confinement’ means any circumstance, situation or event that involves a prisoner’s custody, transportation, incarceration, or supervision.” The Prisoner Litigation Act goes on to set forth requirements concerning filing fees for civil actions brought by prisoners (§ 5-1002), certain grounds for dismissal of prisoner civil actions (§ 5-1004), sanctions for filing “frivolous actions” (§ 5-1005), and regulations with respect to compensatory and punitive damages (§ 5-1006). As earlier indicated, the Prisoner Litigation Act’s requirement which is involved in the present case is found in § 5-1003(a)(1), which provides that a “prisoner may not maintain a civil action until the prisoner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies for resolving” the prisoner’s grievance. 6 D. In arguing that he need not attempt to exhaust any administrative remedies, including a possible remedy before ⁶⁴⁶ the Inmate Grievance Office, the petitioner Massey relies on the nature of the Public Information Act, including the nature of a legal action pursuant to that Act. Massey contends that an action under the Public Information Act does not meet the definition of “civil action” set forth in the Prisoner Litigation Act. Therefore, according to Massey, the prohibition of a “civil action” without exhausting administrative remedies is entirely inapplicable to a lawsuit authorized by the Public Information Act.

The respondent Galley broadly argues that the Prisoner Litigation Act’s “exhaustion requirements apply to virtually