Maulsby v. Scarborough

SLOAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. One of the appellees, Curtis Kroh, filed a bill of inter-pleader against Miller Scarborough and J. Harvey Scarborough, and Florence Young Maulsby, Elizabeth C. Smithers and Margaret Smithers, to which the Scar-boroughs answered and the others demurred. Scott v. Maréen, 153 Md. 14 , 137 A. 523 . The demurrer was overruled and the demurrants ordered to answer without prejudice to raise the same questions in their answer as in their demurrer.

They answered and demurred, repeating the reasons assigned in the original demurrer. The plaintiff, Kroh, demurred to the answer of the appellants, and his demurrer was sustained. Thereupon a decree of interpleader was passed, whereby the defendants were ordered to interplead, with the Scarboroughs as plaintiffs and the others as defendants, and further proceedings against the plaintiff, Kroh, stayed pending the outcome of the controversy between the two groups of defendants. The decree ought to be amended so as ⁷⁰ to require the plaintiff,- Kroh, pending the final determination of the suit between the defendants, to .each month pay his rent to the clerk of the Circuit Court.

The defendants Florence Young Maulsby and Elizabeth C. Smithers appealed from the decree which overruled their demurrer, sustained the plaintiff’s demurrer, and ordered them to interplead. The plaintiff, Kroh, in his bill says that, by a written lease executed on or about December 29th, 1933, John S. Young leased to him a “store house situated in the town of Bel Air, Harford County, Maryland, at corner of Main Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, and the ground said store building is on” for the term of one month beginning January 1st, 1934, at §40 a month, payable in advance, (later increased by oral agreement to §50) to continue from term to term, with the right to either party to terminate it any time on ten days’ notice in writing, and that the plaintiff has occupied the premises ever since the execution of the lease and has paid his rent to April 1st, 1940; that John S. Young, the lessor, died February 17th, 1939; that on or about March 9th, 1939, the defendants Miller Scarborough and J. Harvey Scarborough, through their attorney, Robert H. Archer, made written demand on the plaintiff for all rent thereafter accruing, claiming that at the time of the execution of the lease John S. Young was a cotenant, holding a life estate in an undivided interest in the property “and that in leasing the said premises * * * he was acting for his then co-owner of said property as well as on behalf 'of himself, and, in collecting the rents reserved under the said lease, he was at all times acting for and on behalf of all co-owners of said property, including the said defendants, Miller Scarborough and J. Harvey Scarborough, who, previous to the death of the said John S. Young, had acquired title to the said demised premises, by devise and inheritance subject to the life estate of the said John S. Young * * * and that upon the death of the said John S. Young, the said defendants, Miller Scarborough and. J. Harvey Scarborough, became the sole ⁷¹ owners of said property, and as such entitled to all of the rental money thereafter accruing under said lease.” That, on or about April 7th, 1939, the defendants, Florence Young, Elizabeth C. Smithers and Minnie Margaret Smithers, made written demand on the plaintiff, by Eldridge Hood Young, their attorney, for the whole rent thereafter to accrue. In the letter of April 7th, 1939, Mr. Young, in addition to saying his clients would protect the plaintiff in his “possession of the property and the payment of any rents against the illegal claims of the Scarboroughs through Robert H. Archer, Esq., or any other attorney representing them,” wrote, “Mr. John S. Young was during his lifetime the sole owner of the property in fee simple and it has now descended to his devisees under his will and you should pay the rent to them or their representative, Mr. Harry L. Young.” The plaintiff further alleged that he was separately warned by each of the two groups of defendants not to pay rent to the other, leaving him no alternative, aside from vacating the premises in which he had done business for seven years, but to get all the claimants into court, where their claims and pretensions could be adjudicated.

Hence the bill for an interpleader. The Scar-boroughs, in their answer, set out in detail their title, but we are not at liberty at this stage in the case to consider it. The appellants contend that the plaintiff is estopped to deny his landlord’s title. No one disputes this statement of the law, but it is not without its limitations.

While John S. Young lived, the plaintiff could not have questioned his right to execute a lease of the property, and the lessee would have been bound to pay the rent. The rule, however, does not extend beyond the expiration of the lease or the death of a lessor holding a life estate. Presstman v. Silljacks, 52 Md. 647, 656; Johnson v. Riddle, 240 U. S. 467, 480 , 36 S. Ct. 393 , 60 L. Ed. 752, 758 ; Lamson v. Clarkson, 113 Mass. 348 ; 35 C. J. 1243, sec. 595. The appellants in their brief quote from Wilmer ⁷² v. Philadelphia, & R. Coal & Iron Co., 124 Md. 599, 6 .10, 93 A. 157, 161 , as follows: “The well recognized exception to the rule that a tenant cannot maintain a suit for interpleader against his landlord is where there is privity between his landlord and the opposing claimant; that is, where the title of the other claimant is derived from that of the lessor, or where both defendants claim under the lessor by different titles.

In such cases the tenant does not dispute his landlord’s title. 3