Mayor of Baltimore v. Davis

Coestable, <T., delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question involved in this appeal is, whether Chapter 503 of the Acts of 1912, which was-approved April 8th, 1912, is repealed by Chapter 847 of the Acts of 1912, which was approved April 15th, 1912. The prior. Act directs the Police Commissioners of Baltimore City to pay sergeants, assigned by them to do clerical work at police headquarters, not exceeding eight, the sum of thirty dollars a week, instead of twenty-two dollars per week, the pay of sergeants provided for in section 745 of Article 4 of' the Code of Public Local Laws.

The latter Act repeals, and re-enacts with amendments, section 745 of Article 4 of the Code of Public Local Laws. J ts provisions cover the whole police force of the city; providing for the appointment of the members, their numbers and salaries. The provisions in regard to sergeants are as follows: “Said police force shall consist * * * of such number of sergeants as the Board of Police Commissioners in their judgment may deem necessary. * * * The members of the police force shall receive the following salaries, payable eveiy two weeks * * * each sergeant twenty-two dollars per week.” ⁴⁰⁵ This Act does not expressly repeal Chapter 503, hut by the second section thereof provides, “that all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, otherwise to remain in full force and effect.” The appellee, a sergeant assigned to do clerical work at headquarters, brought suit to recover from the city a balance he claimed was due him on account of salary. He claims that he was entitled to a weekly salary of thirty dollars, under Chapter 503, and that the City had paid him only twenty-two dollars under Chapter 847.

The appellant asked the Court below to rule as a matter of law that Chapter 503 was repealed by Chapter 847. This the Court refused, and the judgment being against the City it brought this appeal. The appellant’s contention is that the two Acts are inconsistent, and that the latter repeals the former. It is not open to question that courts will hold a law to be repealed by a subsequent law, without any express clause of repeal, where the two provisions are so repugnant that they can not stand togethex*.

If, however, they can stand together, there is no x*epeal by implication — Webb v. Ridgely, 38 Md. 364 . And in State v. Yewell, 63 Md. 121 , this Court quoted with approval fx*om United States v. Tynen, 11 Wallace, 92: “When there are two Acts on the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both, if possible; but if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter Act, without any repealing claxxse, operates, to the extent of the repugnancy, as a repeal of the first.” It is equally well settled that repeal of a former by a sxxbseqxxent statute is xxot favox’ed by the courts, and if by a reasonable construction the two Acts can be made to stand together they will be harmonized. It is only when two Acts are repugnant and plainly inconsistent, that the later x’epeals the earlier. Yunger v. State 78 Md. 575 ; Mining Co. v. C. and P. R. R. 81 Md. 35 ; Prince George’s Co. v. Laurel, 51 Md. 457 ; School