Mayor of Hyattsville v. Washington, Westminster & Gettysburg Railroad

Boyd, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County that the property described in the proceedings in this case and the interest and estate of all the parties to said cause be condemned. The petition was filed by the appellee against the Mayor and Common Council of Hyattsville and others, under the Act of 1912, Chapter 117, and none of the defendants answered excepting the appellant. A number of objections to the condemnation were made, which will be considered in the order presented in the appellant’s brief : First.

It is alleged that the petition is bad in substance ■and insufficient in law to form the basis of a judgment of ■condemnation. We do not deem it necessary to discuss this ■objection at length, as section 2 of Article 33a of the Code, as enacted by the Act of 1912, provides what shall be set forth in the petition, and there can be no doubt that this one sufficiently complies with those requirements. Second. The next objection is that the appellee is not a duly, legally and validly incorporated company under the laws of this State, and is not, therefore, entitled to exercise the right of eminent domain.

This objection is the most important one before us, and we must admit that it has not been entirely free from difficulty. The appellee was incorporated under the General Eail Eoad Law of the State in 1897. As the Code of 1888 was the one then in use we will refer to the numbers of the sections of Article 23 therein given, and will for convenience insert in brackets the numbers of the corresponding sections in the Code of 1912. Arti ¹³¹ cle 23, section 159 (261), provides that certificates of incorporation of railroad companies shall specify “first, the name assumed by such company and by which it shall be known;, second, the name of the places of the termini of said road, and the county or counties, city or cities, through which such road shall pass; third, the amount of capital stock necessary to construct such road.” The certificate of this corporation includes the following: “1.

The name of said railroad company is the Washington, Westminster and Gettysburg Bail-road Company. 2. The termini of said railroad are Washington, D. C., and Gettysburg, Pa., and its main line is to run through the counties of Montgomery, Howard, Frederick and Carroll, Maryland, also with a branch line from a point in the vicinity of Sand Spring, or Laytonsville, in a westerly direction to Frederick, in Frederick county, Maryland. 3. The capital stock of said company shall be one hundred, thousand dollars, divided into two thousand shares of the par value of fifty dollars each.” In December, 1910, section 2 of that charter was amended so as to include Prince George’s county, it being in other respects the same as that section in the original certificate. It will be observed that the termini given in the certificate are “Washington, D.'C., and Gettysburg, Pa.” It is contended on the part of the appellee that the statute does not provide that the termini shall be in this State and hence it is not so required, but there can be no doubt that the Legislature did not attempt to authorize the construction of railroads between points outside of the State, for in the first place it had no power to do so, and as it was passing a General Eailroad Law for Maryland, when it required the certificate to specify what it stated in the second clause, it must have meant the places of the termini in Maryland, just as it did the county or counties, city or cities in Maryland. ' - Section 161 (263) strongly indicates that the Legislature intended that the termini in this State should be in some way fixed in the certificate.

That section confers powers which are essential to a railroad company and it says: “Such cor ¹³² porations shall be authorized to construct and maintain a railroad with a single or double track, with such side tracks, turnouts, offices and depots, as they may deem necessary, between the points named in the certificate, commencing at or within and extending to or into any town, city or village named as the place of termini of such road,” etc. It is perfectly certain that the Legislature of Maryland could not authorize the construction and maintenance of a railroad outside of the State, and when it did so authorize the construction of a railroad and other improvements mentioned “between the points named in the certificate,” it must have intended that those points should be in this State. It is true it was said in Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., 105 Md. 18 , that that section “does not relate to the requisites of the certificate, but to the exercise of the powers thereby conferred, in constructing the -projected railroad ‘between the points named in the certificate/ ” but it does reflect upon the question we now have before us. That expression was used in connection with the point involved in that case — whether it was necessary that the termini should begin at or in a town, city or village, and it was held that it was not, but the Court in the same paragraph referred to the case of Piedmont & Cumberland Ry. Co. v. Speelman, 67 Md. 260 , and quoted from page 271 that “The law of this State requires the termini to be fixed in this State, with reasonable certainty, and the cities (if any) through or near which the road is to pass.” The learned judge below was in error when he said in his opinion t-hat one of the termini mentioned in the charter of the railroad involved in the Speelman case was in West Virginia.

As shown on page 27l of 67 Md. one of them was at a point in Allegany county, Maryland, opposite a place in West Virginia, and the other was at Cumberland, as construed by the Court. The principal questions in that case were: (1st), whether a railroad chartered under the General Laws of the State could between its termini cross into another State and then re-cross into Maryland; and ¹³³ (2nd), whether under that particular charter the company was authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain at the place in controversy. The Court said: “Of course the State of Maryland has nothing to do with the road in West Virginia, hut she can permit by either general or special law the road to run beyond her limits and return. 3STo possible reason can exist why, under the general law, a railroad lying on the border of a State may not be built partly in one State and partly in another. The conformation of the country may make it a necessity to do so, or the public interest, which, as Mr. Wood says, is the interest of the stockholders, may make it desirable to do so.

For these reasons we think that a road lying near the border line between two States may lie partly in one and partly in the other. The law of this State requires the termini to be fixed in this State, with reasonable certainty, and the cities (if any) through or near which the road is to pass. We think the termini have been fixed in this charter, good faith has been observed, and the towns have been named.” The Court went on to say that “a Maryland law could not compel a corporation to go out of the State, all it could do is to give it permission to do so.” That opinion stated in so many words that “the law of this State requires the termini to be fixed in this State, with reasonable certainty,” and that was repeated in Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co. It can not therefore be correctly said that this Court has never said that the termini should be fixed in this State. It is true that the termini named in the charter in the Speelman case were both in this State, but the validity of the charter was assailed and the expression was used in connection with the discussion as to whether a railroad so situated could cross into another State and then re-cross into this State.

The statement as to the termini was probably made to avoid any misunderstanding, owing to what had been said as to the right to go out of the State, but however that may be it indicates what the views of this Court at that time were, and as late as 1907 it was quoted without qualification. It therefore seems clear to us that under a ¹³⁴ proper construction of the statute and under those decisions, the termini must in some way be fixed in this State with reasonable certainty. The next question then is whether we can treat the dividing line between the District of Columbia and-Maryland and that between Pennsylvania and Maryland as the real termini in this State and whether those points are sufficiently definite to be a compliance with the statute. Inasmuch as it is settled by the two cases above cited that it is not necessary to name a city, town or village as a terminus, if the points at which this road was to cross the State lines are fixed with sufficient certainty that would be a substantial compliance with the statute, notwithstanding what we have said above.

As it was said in the Speelman case that “The law of this State requires the termini to be fixed in this State with reasonable certainty,” and inasmuch as we have said that the Statute requires the termini to be in this State, if the route of the railroad is fixed with sufficient certainty at the State lines, the mere fact that there are references to points outside of the State, but close to it, would not necessarily make" the description invalid. If the lines of Washington are coextensive with those of the District, that would be sufficiently for the southerly terminus, for if, for example, one terminus of a railroad was Baltimore City, it would not be necessary to name the particular street or part of the city to or from which it ran. Whether or not those lines are co-extensive is not shown in the record, and as the attorneys for the respective parties differed at the argument as to that, we are not at liberty to determine that question under this record. But if we assume that the lines of the City of Washington are not co-extensive with those of the District, and that the limits of Washington are still what they were before the changes were made in the government of the District, apparently, and so far as we can tell from the map, a line from Washington to Gettysburg, passing through the counties named in the charter and going by Westminster, would cross the District line into Prince George’s county and there would ¹³⁵ not be a very great distance along the division line within which it could cross.

The route named in the charter indicates that it is to be at or near Sandy Spring or Laytonsville, and the name of the company indicates that it is to go to or by Westminster. C. & P. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St. 325. The City of Washington, as built up, is at most only a few miles from the District line, and Gettysburg is not far from the dividing line between Maryland and Pennsylvania.

If then a road be built from Washington to Gettysburg, through Prince George’s and the other counties named and by Westminster, the point at which it would cross the Pennsylvania line could apparently be fixed with reasonable certainty. It is not necessary that the precise point shall be named. In Union R. Co. v. Canton R. Co., supra, the Court, after referring to the requirements of the general law said, on page 17: “The language of the provisions in question may be somewhat lacking in clearness, but the question here is not one of philological accuracy in the expressions employed therein, but of legislative intent upon a view of the whole statute and of the object of it. This Court has said that the statute in question is of remedial character and to be liberally construed.

Piedmont & Cumb. Ry. Co. v. Speelman, 67 Md. 260 . Its object is to promote and facilitate the organization of corporations for the building of railroads and supplying means of transportation as the necessities and convenience of any community in the State and its industrial and commercial development may require.

Where doubt may be suggested as to the construction of the law it ought to be resolved with a view of bringing the practical operation of the law into harmony with its purposes.” Again it was said on pages 17-18: “In requiring that the termini shall be specified in its act of incorporation, it would seem that the only reasonable intent to be imputed to the law is that the railroad shall have such termini definitely ascertained and fixed so as to indicate its general direction and location. This would be sufficient in a special charter conferred directly by the Act of the Legislature. Wky should ¹³⁶ if; be otherwise in a charter authorized to be