McDermott v. Dougherty

CATHELL, J. This appeal arises as an outgrowth of the lengthy and unfortunately acrimonious dispute over custody of Patrick Michael McDermott (hereinafter “Patrick” or “the child”), the minor son of petitioner Charles David McDermott (hereinafter ³²⁴ “Mr. McDermott”), between Mr. McDermott and respondents, Hugh and Marjorie Dougherty, the child’s maternal grandparents, (hereinafter “the Doughertys,” or “maternal grandparents”). 1 The Doughertys, along with Patrick’s paternal grandparents, who do not appear as parties to the instant appeal and do not now appear to support the Doughertys, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Harford County against their adult children, Mr. McDermott and Ms. Dougherty, for Third-Party Custody of Patrick on February 12, 2002. Trial on the matter of custody subsequently took place on July 1 and 2, 2003. The circuit court issued its decision on September 8, 2003, awarding the maternal grandparents sole legal and physical custody of the child based upon that court’s finding that Ms. Dougherty was “unfit,” and, although not finding Mr. McDermott an “unfit” parent, the court found that his employment in the merchant marine, requiring him to spend months-long intervals at sea, constituted “exceptional circumstances” as that term was defined in Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 191 , 372 A.2d 582, 593 (1977) (“Hoffman”), and the “best interest of the child” and need for a stable living situation thus warranted that custody be placed with the Doughertys. Mr. McDermott appealed this decision to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision in an unreported April 5, 2004, opinion.

The intermediate appellate court subsequently denied Mr. McDermott’s Motion for Reconsideration on May 21, 2004, and thereafter he petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which we granted on August 25, 2004. McDermott v. Dougherty, 382 Md. 688 , 856 A.2d 724 (2004). 2 Petitioner’s appeal centers on the following questions: ³²⁵ “1. Is concern that the parent might not obtain employment and remain in the state of Maryland a high enough concern to meet the ‘only to prevent harm or potential harm to the child’ standard required by the U.S. Supreme Court case of Troxel v. Granville and/or the high standards referenced in the previous cases cited therein, 530 U.S. 57 [, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 ] (2000)? 2. Do the facts involved in this case constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’ as described in Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639 [, 814 A.2d 543 ] (2003)? 3.

Does the Order in this case violate the holding of the Maryland case of Schaefer v. Cusack, 124 Md.App. 288 [, 722 A.2d 73 ] (1998), which is that custody must be decided based on the circumstances as they are now and not based on a future plan or conjecture or based on past behavior that has ceased?” [Alterations added.] We hold that in disputed custody cases where private third parties are attempting to gain custody of children from their natural parents, the trial court must first find that both natural parents are unfit to have custody of their children or that extraordinary circumstances exist which are significantly detrimental to the child remaining in the custody of the parent or parents, before a trial court should consider the “best interests of the child” standard as a means of deciding the dispute. We further hold that under circumstances in which there is no finding of parental unfitness, the requirements of a parent’s employment, such that he is required to be away at sea, or otherwise appropriately absent from the State for a period of time, and for which time he or she made appropriate arrange ³²⁶ ments for the care of the child, do not constitute “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” to support the awarding of custody to a third party. Accordingly, we shall reverse and direct the lower courts to grant custody of Patrick to petitioner. Although we find the declaration, announced by the plurality opinion in Troxel, 3 affirming “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,” 530 U.S. 57, 66 , 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), to be instructive, our determination also rests upon the potential for absurd results that might result from a holding that denies custody to a fit and willing parent on the basis that the means by which he or she supports himself or herself and his or her family calls for his or her periodic absence from the State although having arranged suitable and safe alternative care for the child, or based upon the fact that the child, in a particular case, might be “better raised” by grandparents.

With our holding we need not reach the issue of whether the circuit court’s order in the case sub judice improperly examined past behavior or future plans in deciding custody. I. Facts By the time of the current dispute there had been a lengthy series of events in the dispute over the custody of Patrick Michael McDermott, born April 30, 1995, to Charles David McDermott and Laura A. Dougherty, who were married on November 26, 1994, in Baltimore County and subsequently took up residence in Abingdon, Maryland. Their relationship having deteriorated, the spouses separated shortly after Patrick’s birth. Suffice it to say, between the time this custody disagreement was launched by Mr. McDermott’s September 29, 1995 filing, in the Circuit Court for Harford County, of his Complaint for Limited Divorce, Child Custody and Child Support from Ms. Dougherty, and the grandparents’ February ³²⁷ 2002 complaint for third-party custody, i.e., the action to which the instant appeal can be most directly traced, the various parties, whether represented by counsel or proceeding pro se, utilized the full measure of the court’s resources in their filings of petitions and motions in regard to support and custody of Patrick.

Ms. Dougherty, who had some history of alcohol-related trouble, was convicted of her fourth drinking and driving offense in November 2001, which ultimately would result in a period of incarceration. On January 3, 2002, apparently just prior to her incarceration, Ms. Dougherty, who then had primary residential custody of Patrick, signed a power of attorney giving her parents, the Doughertys, authority to care for Patrick and make all decisions on his behalf. Apparently unaware of Ms. Dougherty’s incarceration, Mr. McDermott filed a motion on January 8, 2002, seeking a temporary modification of a November 8, 2001, custody order and stated in his reasons for the petition, the following: “The mother has left town, given power of attorney to parents and quit her job. Ms. Dougherty is scheduled for sentencing on 3/15/02 for up to 24 months.

I am unemployed currently.” He requested that custody be shared by himself and the maternal grandparents. Sometime prior to January 10, 2002, and possibly as early as early December 2001, petitioner signed on to work a six-month seaman’s contract at sea. Mr. McDermott executed a notarized letter on January 9, 2002, stating his desire that Patrick remain in the care and custody of the Doughertys at their home in Joppa, Maryland, through the end of the 2001-2002 academic year. In addition, Mr. McDermott wrote a letter, which appears to be dated January 10, 2002, to Patrick’s court-appointed attorney and indicated that Mr. Dougherty, Patrick’s grandfather, had responded that he and his wife did not know Ms. Dougherty’s whereabouts when queried by Mr. McDermott. 4 ³²⁸ Apparently, after Mr. McDermott went to sea, the court signed an order to show cause in response to his Temporary Motion/Petition to Modify Custody and scheduled the matter for a show-cause hearing on January 14, 2002, requiring that the child’s mother as well as the Doughertys be present.

Mr. McDermott departed on his ship in the first half of January 2002. While it is not manifest that any subterfuge occurred, it seems that petitioner went to sea believing that Ms. Dougherty still had legal custody of the child and not knowing of her incarceration or of the scheduled hearing on his petition. At some point in time, what formerly had been a cooperative relationship between Mr. McDermott and the Doughertys deteriorated. The Doughertys’ counsel apparently spoke with Mr. McDermott by telephone on January 14, 2002, while the latter was aboard ship, and informed him that Ms. Dougherty had begun a jail sentence on or about January 4, 2002.

In affirming this conversation as well as Mr. McDermott’s apparent consent that both sets of grandparents share joint legal custody of Patrick, the Doughertys’ counsel prepared and filed in the Circuit Court for Harford County on February 12, 2002, a Complaint for Third-Party Custody and Motion for an Ex-parte Order, naming the Doughertys, as well as the McDermotts, Patrick’s paternal grandparents, as plaintiffs. 5 The paternal grandparents later noted, however, that they “never signed a document to be plaintiffs in this case, and have had a strained relationship with the Dougherty’s [sic] during the period January to July 2002” when Mr. McDermott was at sea. On February 13, 2002, the court signed an order providing that the grandparents, the Doughertys and the McDermotts, would share “temporary joint legal custody” and the Doughertys would have residential custody of Patrick. Visitation by the parents — one of whom was in jail, and the other at sea at ³²⁹ the time — was ordered to “take place at the mutual convenience and approval of plaintiffs,” ie., the Doughertys. 6 Mr. McDermott returned from sea in early July 2002 and the Doughertys, without any modification of the court’s custody order, apparently returned Patrick to Mr. McDermott shortly thereafter to mollify the child’s sustained entreaties and crying that he wanted to be with his father. Patrick remained with his father for the duration of 2002.

On July 25, 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint for Modification of Custody seeking to be granted permanent primary residential and legal custody of Patrick. The Doughertys, labeling Patrick’s living with his father at the time as “de facto” custody, sought to dismiss the complaint stating that they were “unsure as to Mr. McDermott’s ability to care for the child on a daily basis and believe that it is in the best interest of the child that custody not be changed .... ” Petitioner’s parents, who at the time shared legal custody with the Doughertys, agreed with petitioner’s request for a change of legal custody to him. At a pre-trial conference in November 2002, the matter was set down for trial in May 2003 but trial was later delayed until July 2003. The circuit court advised Mr. McDermott to hire an attorney to represent him in his petition for custody, and accordingly, Mr. McDermott hired his present attorney in December 2002 and went to sea in early 2003 in order to “make the money to pay for [a custody] attorney” (alteration added).

Apparently, Patrick lived with the Doughertys during his father’s time at sea in the early months of 2003. Mr. McDermott returned to Maryland in March 2003 during his two-week break between ship assignments. Ms. Dougherty, petitioner’s former wife, filed a Motion to Modify Custody on May 23, 2003, seeking to remove Patrick from her parents’ custody, 7 citing that they withheld visitation, ³³⁰ were “verbally and psychologically abusive to the child” and “[b]oth of the child’s natural parents are able and willing to take care of Patrick.” On June 18, 2003, Mr. McDermott responded in opposition to his former wife’s motion. He filed an answer, an amended complaint for custody and also apparently sought back child support from Ms. Dougherty as well as trial costs and an estimated $18,000 in legal fees that he expected to incur at the scheduled trial.

The circuit court did not immediately rule on these and other outstanding motions. Trial in the matter of Mr. McDermott’s request for permanent custody took place on July 1 and 2, 2003. The parties presented both lay and expert testimony regarding Ms. Dougherty’s and Mr. McDermott’s respective fitness as parents. Mr. McDermott indicated that he went to sea in January 2003 in order to bolster his finances in his effort to obtain sole custody of Patrick and he intended to establish permanent residence in Maryland if granted full custody.

He noted that he and Patrick were then residing with a family in Port Deposit, an atypical, though presently workable and harmonious, living situation. The maternal grandparents stated that they had decided to contest custody because they believed that Patrick needed stability in his life and over the past four years they had been the only consistently stable presence for the child. Upon the trial’s conclusion, the circuit court held the matter sub curia, and stated that the current order, i.e., that of February 13, 2002, remained in effect. The parties continued to jostle for custody while the ruling remained pending in the circuit court.

The circuit court issued a memorandum opinion and order on September 8, 2003, granting sole legal and physical custody of Patrick to the Doughertys. The court expressed its doubt at the veracity of Mr. McDermott’s stated intentions to remain in Maryland and stated in its finding: “Based on the analysis of the above [Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 191 , 372 A.2d at 593 ] factors, the court concludes that Ms. Dougherty is unfit to have custody at this time, and that exceptional circumstances exist that overcome the pre ³³¹ sumption that Patrick’s best interest is served by custody in Mr. McDermott. In particular, because the court is unable to rely upon Mr. McDermott’s representations that he intends to obtain employment and remain in Maryland, it would appear, to Patrick’s detriment, that stability in his living arrangements would be jeopardized.” [Alteration added.] On September 16, 2003, Mr. McDermott, through his counsel, filed simultaneously a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment contending that the circuit court’s opinion was contrary to existing federal and state ease law and a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The circuit court denied petitioner’s motion.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on April 5, 2004, with an unreported decision that incorporated the circuit court’s detailed recitation of the considerable procedural history of this case. Petitioner sought reconsideration from the intermediate appellate court, but was denied on May 21, 2004.

II

Discussion A. Fundamental Constitutional Parental Right to Raise One’s Children One of the earlier United States Supreme Court cases 8 in respect to parental rights, and one that has been described in subsequent cases as seminal, is the case of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S.Ct. 625 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), albeit it does not concern the rights of third parties. It is important primarily for its language, which stressed the importance of family in our society. Nebraska, apparently as a reaction to World War I war, enacted a statute that forbade the teaching of the German language to children who had not yet reached the eighth grade. ³³² In the process of holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court said: “The problem for our determination is whether the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment: ‘No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.’ “While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. “For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which should provide: ‘That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent....

The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.’ “In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius their ideas ³³³ touching the relation between individual and state were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-402 , 43 S.Ct. at 626-28 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). One of the early cases citing to Meyer, supra, was Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 530 , 45 S.Ct. 571, 572-73 , 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), involving the Oregon Compulsory Education Act. The Court opined: “After setting out the above facts, the Society’s bill alleges that the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training, the right of the child to influence the parents’ choice of a school ... and is accordingly repugnant to the Constitution and void. “Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control ....

The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” [Citation omitted.] In a case not exactly on point in a dispute between natural parents that involved competing state jurisdictions, i.e., whether one state had the power to modify the custody determination of another state, the Court in New York v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 613 , 67 S.Ct. 903, 905 , 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947), opined: “Under Florida law the ‘welfare of the child’ is the ‘chief consideration’ in [cases between natural parents] shaping the custody decree or in subsequently modifying or chang ³³⁴ ing it. But ‘the inherent rights of parents to enjoy the society and association of their offspring, with reasonable opportunity to impress upon them a father’s or a mother’s love and affection in their upbringing, must be regarded as being of an equally important, if not controlling, consideration in adjusting the right of custody as between parents in ordinary cases.’ ” [Citation omitted.] In the 1970’s the United States Supreme Court wrestled with a series of cases that, although not always directly concerning custody issues, continued to recognize the importance of the rights of parents. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-58 , 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1210-16 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the Court was considering an Illinois statute that mandated that, upon the death of a mother, the unmarried [to that mother] natural father had no right to a hearing on custody. The statute mandated that in such cases the children of the deceased mother automatically became dependents of the state.

The Court said: “Stanley presses his equal protection claim here. The State continues to respond that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children and that it is unnecessary to hold individualized hearings to determine whether particular fathers are in fact unfit parents before they are separated from their children. We granted certiorari, to determine whether this method of procedure by presumption could be allowed to stand in light of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers — whether divorced, widowed, or separated — and mothers — even if unwed — the benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise their children. “The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children ‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking ³³⁵ when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.’ “The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of family.

The rights to conceive and raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ Meyer v. Nebraska, ‘basic civil rights of man,’ Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 , 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113 , 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), and ‘[r]ights far more precious ... than property rights,’ May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 , 73 S.Ct. 840, 843 , 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953). ‘It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’ Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 , 64 S.Ct. 438, 442 , 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). “Despite Bell and Carrington, 9 it may be argued that unmarried fathers are so seldom fit that Illinois need not undergo the administrative inconvenience of inquiry in any case, including Stanley’s. The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.

Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing con ³³⁶ cern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. “We have concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody.” [Footnote added.] [Footnoted omitted.] [Some citations omitted.] Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-32 , 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532-42 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) while primarily concerning religious issues (Amish parents challenging a state requirement that their children go to school until they were sixteen), was also based in part on the fundamental rights of parents to raise their children. The Court stated: “Thus, a State’s interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce [v. Society of the Sisters ], ‘prepare [them] for additional obligations.’ “Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible competing interests of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding in which the power of the State is asserted on the theory that Amish parents are preventing their minor children from attending high school despite their expressed desires to the contrary. Recognition of the claim of the State in such a proceeding would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in this Court’s past decisions.... “The State’s argument proceeds without reliance on any actual conflict between the wishes of parents and children. ³³⁷ It appears to rest on the potential that exemption of Amish parents from the requirements of the compulsory-education law might allow some parents to act contrary to the best interests of their children by foreclosing their opportunity to make an intelligent choice between the Amish way of life and that of the outside world. ... “Indeed it seems clear that if the State is empowered, as parens patriae, to ‘save’ a child from himself or his Amish parents by requiring an additional two years of compulsory formal high school education, the State will in large measure influence, if not determine, the religious future of the child.... [T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children. The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.

This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. [The Court then cited to Pierce and Meyer].” [Emphasis added.] [Some alteration added.] In the exclusionary zoning case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-508 , 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935-40 , 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), a case involving an attempt to restrict residency requirements to immediate family as opposed to extended family, the Court noted: “When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, neither Belle Terre[ v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 , 94 S.Ct. 1536 , 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974) ] nor Euclid[ v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) ] [seminal zoning cases] governs; the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate. ‘This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ A host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer ... have consistently acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’ Of course, the family is not beyond regula ³³⁸ tion. But when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation. “Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural. Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion in Moore , joined by Justice Marshall, further noted: “In today’s America, the ‘nuclear family’ is the pattern so often found in much of white suburbia.

The Constitution cannot be interpreted, however, to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of us of white suburbia’s preference in patterns of family living. The ‘extended family’ that provided generations of early Americans with social services and economic and emotional support in times of hardship, and was the beachhead for successive waves of immigrants who populated our cities, remains not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under the goad of brutal economic necessity, a prominent pattern — virtually a means of survival — for large numbers of the poor and deprived minorities of our society. For them compelled pooling of scant resources requires compelled sharing of a household.” [Citations omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 829-40 , 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2101-07 , 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), 10 while decided on procedural grounds, did ³³⁹ involve third parties but in respect to the position of the state. There was an unusual twist.

Foster parents formed several organizations to challenge the procedures New York used to reunite foster children with their natural parents and in the process attempted to assume the stature of “psychological parents.” In the opinion reference is also made to the interests of natural parents. In discussing the various issues the Court opined: “The provisions of the scheme [the state process for reunification] specifically at issue ... come into play when the agency ... determines to remove the foster child from the foster home, either because it has determined that it would be in the child’s best interests to transfer him to some other foster home, or to return the child to his natural parents in accordance with the statute or placement agreement. “From the standpoint of natural parents, such as the appellant intervenors here, foster care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion into the family life of the poor. It is certainly true that the poor resort to foster care more often than other citizens.... Minority families are also more likely to turn to foster care ....

This disproportionate resort to foster care by the poor and victims of discrimination doubtless reflects in part the greater likelihood of disruption of poverty-stricken families.... The poor have little choice but to submit to state-supervised child care when family crises strike. “The intervening natural parents of children in foster care ... also oppose the foster parents, arguing that recognition of the procedural right claimed [the right to a hearing for the foster parents if they were deemed to be psychological ³⁴⁰ parents and the equivalent of natural parents] would undercut both ... and their constitutionally protected right of family privacy, by forcing them to submit to a hearing and defend their rights to their children before the children could be returned to them.” [Citations omitted.] [Footnote omitted.] After discussing that the relationship of foster parents were based on the contracts between them and the state, the Court opined further: “A second consideration related to this is that ordinarily procedural protection may be afforded to a liberty interest of one person without derogating from the substantive liberty of another. Here, however, such a tension is virtually unavoidable.... It is quite another to say that one may acquire such an interest in the face of another’s constitutionally recognized liberty interest that derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human right-an interest [the interest of the natural parent] the foster parent has recognized by contract from the outset.

Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.” Smith, 431 U.S. at 846-47 , 97 S.Ct. at 2110-11 (footnote omitted). Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 , 98 S.Ct. 549 , 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), was a factually unusual case, and is one of, if not the only, case in which the Supreme Court upheld the sole use of the “best interests” standard in regard to the third-party placement of children, although at the same time it opined that if a parent were fit it would generally be constitutionally prohibited to take custody from that parent on the basis of the “best interest of the child.” First, the father had never wed the mother and the child had been raised by her mother and stepfather; second, it was an adoption case; third, it was the stepfather who was seeking to adopt the child and the stepfather had been married to the child’s mother for the nine years ³⁴¹ prior to the petition for adoption; and fourth, the natural father only sought the power to veto the adoption unless he was first declared to be unfit which had not happened and he did not want custody for himself. It appears under those circumstances that the Court almost considered that the natural father had waived or forfeited his constitutional rights as a natural father, although the Court did not specifically so state. The father also claimed that the law in Georgia that permitted a natural father who had been wed to the mother to veto adoptions, but did not afford the same veto right to a natural father who had not been married to the mother, was unconstitutional in that it denied him the equal protection of the law.

Because the trial court had used “best interests” language that was then used by the state appellate court opinion, that language also ended up in the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court opined: “The trial court denied appellant’s petition, and thereby precluded him from gaining veto authority, on the ground that legitimation was not in the ‘best interest of the child’; appellant contends that he was entitled to recognition and preservation of his parental rights absent a showing of his ‘unfitness.’ Thus, the underlying issue is whether, in the circumstances of this case and in light of the authority granted by Georgia law to married fathers, appellant’s interests were adequately protected by a ‘best interest of the child’ standard. “We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.’ But this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child. Nor is this a case in which the proposed adoption would place the child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived. Rath ³⁴² er, the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant.

Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the ‘best interests of the child.’ ” Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254-55 , 98 S.Ct. at 554-55 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Interestingly, a year later the Court addressed a similar issue as to equal protection significantly differently, also in an adoption case, albeit based upon gender discrimination claims. In the case of Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381-94 , 99 S.Ct. 1760, 1763-69 , 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979), the Court stated: “The appellant, Abdiel Caban, challenges the constitutionality of [the relevant section of the adoption statute of New York], under which two of his natural children were adopted by their natural mother and stepfather without his consent. We find the statute to be unconstitutional, as the distinction it invariably makes between the rights of unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers has not been shown to be substantially related to an important state interest. “Absent one of these circumstances, an unwed mother has the authority under New York law to block the adoption of her child simply by withholding consent.

The unwed father has no similar control over the fate of his child, even when his parental relationship is substantial — as in this case. He [under the statute ] may prevent the termination of his parental rights only by showing that the best interests of the child would not permit the child’s adoption by the petitioning couple. “Despite the plain wording of the statute, appellees [the natural mother and stepfather] argue that unwed fathers are not treated differently under [the statute] from other parents. According to appellees, the consent requirement ³⁴³ of [the statute] is merely a formal requirement, lacking in substance, as New York courts find consent to be unnecessary whenever the best interests of the child support the adoption. Because the best interests of the child always determine whether an adoption petition is granted in New York, appellees contend that all parents, including unwed fathers, are subject to the same standard. “Appellees’ interpretation ... finds no support in New York case law.

On the contrary, the New York Court of Appeals has stated unequivocally that the question whether consent is required is entirely separate from that of the best interests of the child.... Accordingly, it is clear that [the statute] treats unmarried parents differently according to their sex. “The question before us, therefore, is whether the distinction in [the statute] between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers bears a substantial relation to some important state interest. Appellees assert that the distinction is justified by a fundamental difference between maternal and paternal relations — that ‘a natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer relationship with her child ... than a father does.’ “In sum, we believe that [the statute] is another example of ‘overbroad generalizations’ in gender-based classifications. The effect of New York’s classification is to discriminate against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child.

Id. at 381-94 , 99 S.Ct. at 1768-69 (alterations added) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The Court then stated in a footnote: “Because we have ruled that the New York statute is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, we ... express no view as to whether a State is constitutionally barred from ordering adoption in the absence of a determi ³⁴⁴ nation that the parent whose rights are being terminated is unfit.” Id. at 394 , 99 S.Ct. at 1769 . Even in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2159-60 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981), a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the denial of legal representation for indigent parents in state generated termination cases, the Court nevertheless, recognized the fundamental and constitutional rights of parents to raise their children: “This Court’s decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’ Here the State has sought not simply to infringe upon that interest but to end it. If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of deprivation.

A parent’s interest in the accuracy and injustice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one.” [Citations omitted.] In a case involving the correct evidentiary standards to apply in cases where the State attempts to terminate parental rights, the Court held that a preponderance of the evidence standard was not sufficient and that “at least clear and convincing evidence” was required. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-67 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1391-402 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the Court discussed the importance of the fundamental rights of parents: “Today we hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands more than this [the preponderance standard]. Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.” The Court went on to give its reasons, reasons based upon the fundamental rights of parents: ³⁴⁵ “The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.

If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protection than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. “At the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are adversaries. After the State has established parental unfitness at that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional [this emphasis in original], stage that the interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge.... But until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.

Thus, at the factfinding, the interests of the child and his natural parents coincide to favor use of error-reducing procedures. “The [state] court’s theory assumes that termination of the natural parents’ rights invariably will benefit the child. Yet we have noted above that the parents and the child share an interest in avoiding erroneous termination. Even accepting the court’s assumption, we cannot agree with its conclusion that a preponderance standard fairly distributes the risk of error between parent and child. Use of that standard reflects the judgment that society is nearly neutral between erroneous termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights.

For the child, the likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is ³⁴⁶ preservation of an uneasy status quo. For the natural parents, however, the consequence of an erroneous termination is the unnecessary destruction of their natural family. “ ‘[T]he State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents.’ ” [Citations omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.] [Some emphasis added.] Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 , 103 S.Ct. 2985 , 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), was another unique case. The unwed natural father had not received notice of an adoption case in respect to his child and accordingly did not appear and thus never proffered any testimony as to his contact with the children. Based only on the appellee’s evidence, the Court held that because the natural father had never established a significant relationship with the child, the failure of the lower court to give him notice of the adoption proceedings, even though the state had knowledge of his whereabouts, did not violate his constitutional rights, since the natural father could have guaranteed receipt of notice by sending a postcard to some registry.

Justice White, dissenting, with Justices Marshall and Blackmun joining, pointed out that the majority was making assumptions as to the nature of the father’s relationship with the child, without the father ever having had a chance to present evidence in respect to that relationship. Even in holding against the father, the majority nonetheless recognized the importance of parental rights, quoting from its cases, supra, before, in essence, nullifying his status as the natural father because it found that he had not established a sufficient relationship with the child. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 294-304 , 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1444 , 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993), involved the increasingly serious problems of what to do with minor illegal aliens who have no natural parents or legal guardians in this country. Detained minor aliens who were subject to deportation by INS, by reason of certain statutes, were treated differently than de ³⁴⁷ tained minors held for “exclusion.” Apparently, the deportable minor aliens were not swiftly turned over to others, but rather kept in detention for extended periods of time. 11 The Court described the issue: “Over the past decade, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or Service) has arrested increasing numbers of alien juveniles who are not accompanied by their parents or other related adults.

Respondents, a class of alien juveniles so arrested and held ... contend that the Constitution and immigration laws require them to be released into the custody of ‘responsible adults.’ ” Id, at 294, 113 S.Ct. at 1443 . In resolving the issue, the Court compared the situation to the matters of custody in respect to natural parents of citizens. Perhaps, as dicta, given the nature of the particular case, the Court stated: “Although respondents [the alien minors] generally argue for the categorical right of private placement discussed above, at some points they assert a somewhat more limited constitutional right: the right to an individualized hearing on whether private placement would be in the child’s ‘best interests’ — followed by private placement if the answer is in the affirmative. It seems to us, however, that if institutional custody (despite the availability of responsible private custodians) is not unconstitutional in itself, it does not become so simply because it is shown to be less desirable than some other arrangement for the particular child. ‘The best interests of the child,’ a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody.

But it is not traditionally the sole criterion — much less the sole constitutional criterion — for other, less narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their interests conflict in varying degrees with the interests of others. Even if it were shown, for example, that a particular couple desirous of adopting a child would best provide for the child’s welfare, the child would nonethe ³⁴⁸ less not be removed from the custody of its parents so long as they were providing for the child adequately. Similarly, ‘the best interests of the child’ is not the legal standard that governs parents’ or guardians’ exercise of their custody: So long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves.” Id. at 303-04 , 113 S.Ct. at 1448 (citations omitted). In M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 , 117 S.Ct. 555, 564 , 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996), the Court reversed a Mississippi case which had upheld a state statute that required certain fees to be paid before an appeal could be taken.

The appellant, an indigent mother, had her appeal of the termination of her parental rights dismissed because she lacked the money to pay the fees. The issue was whether the fundamental rights of parents were sufficiently strong, making the statute, or its application to an indigent parent, unconstitutional. The Court found for the mother. Justice Ginsburg writing for the Court stated that: “Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in our society,’ rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.

M.L.B’s case, involving the State’s authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond demands the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association so undeniably important is at stake. “Although both Lassiter and Santosky yielded divided opinions, the Court was unanimously of the view that ‘the interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’ It was also the Court’s unanimous view that ‘[f]ew conse ³⁴⁹ quences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties.’ ” [Alteration original.] [Citations omitted.] [Footnote omitted.] In the recent case of Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), the Court reaffirmed its principles, in a challenge to a third-party visitation statute in the state of Washington. Accordingly, we shall also examine it. In Troxel , a mother desired to limit her children’s visitation with the parents of their deceased father, a man to whom she had never been married. The paternal grandparents invoked a Washington statute that permitted any person to petition the superior court for visitation rights of any child at any time, and gave discretion to the court to grant visitation when in the best interest of the children, without regard to any change in circumstances.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60 , 120 S.Ct. at 2057 . After the trial court ordered visitation with the grandparents in excess of the mother’s desires, she appealed to Washington’s intermediate appellate court, which reversed the lower court, stating that the grandparents lacked standing unless a custody action was pending. Id. at 62 , 120 S.Ct. at 2058 . The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding the non-parental visitation statute invalid, but based its decision on substantive due process grounds.

Id. at 63 , 120 S.Ct. at 2058 . The grandparents appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed, holding that the statute on which the superior court had based its order awarding visitation to the paternal grandparents unconstitutionally interfered with the mother’s “fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her” children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72 , 120 S.Ct at 2063 . In criticizing the trial court’s “slender findings” in support of its visitation order, the United States Supreme Court faulted the statute’s failure to accord sufficient deference to the parent’s interests, and, as the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in a decision issued less than a month after Troxel , further critiqued: “that the [trial court] decision placed the burden on the parent to prove that grandparent visitation was not in the ³⁵⁰ child’s best interest; and that there was no requirement that the parent be shown to be unfit.

The Court expressly-declined, however, to reach the question of whether parental unfitness was always a prerequisite in order to justify intervention in decisions concerning custody and visitation.” Gestl v. Frederick, 133 Md.App. 216, 242 , 754 A.2d 1087, 1101 (2000) (alteration added). In addition, Troxel observed that the trial court did not order non-parental visitation based upon “any special factors [i.e., exceptional circumstances] that might justify the State’s interference with [the mother’s] fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her [children]” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 , 120 S.Ct. at 2061 (alterations added); see also Gestl, 133 Md.App. at 243 , 754 A.2d at 1101 . As we have said, Troxel involved a Washington statute. We note, in respect to custody, that no specific statute has been invoked by the parties in the case sub judice. 12 There is, however, significant insight to be gleaned from Troxel’s discussion of the fundamental rights of parents to rear their children.

Moreover, Judge Wilner, for the Court, recently observed in Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100 , 840 A.2d 114 (2003), in respect to the Troxel plurality opinion, that “there is nothing in any of the Opinions announcing or concurring in the judgment to suggest that the Constitutional proscription against State interference with a fit parent’s right to make basic decisions for his/her child is limited to issues of visitation, and, indeed, the cases relied on by the various Justices involved other areas of interference as well.” Id. at 124 , 840 ³⁵¹ A.2d at 128 (citations omitted). We discussed several of the cases discussed in Troxel in Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204 , 721 A.2d 662 (1998), stating: “The United States Supreme Court has upheld the rights of parents regarding the care, custody, and management of their children in several contexts, including child rearing, education, and religion. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (overturning a mandatory schooling law in the face of Amish claims of parental authority and religious liberty); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (discussing the right of parents to raise their children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 , 64 S.Ct. 438, 442 , 88 L.Ed. 645, 652 (1944) (observing that ‘the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents’); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 , 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113 , 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660 (1942) (stating the right to rear a child is encompassed within a parent’s ‘basic civil rights’); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct. 571 , 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (sustaining parents’ authority to provide religious schooling against State requirements of public school attendance); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S.Ct. 625 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (upholding parental authority to have children taught in languages other than English).” Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 217-18 , 721 A.2d 662, 668 . Petitioner reads Troxel as requiring a threshold showing of harm or potential harm to the child where third parties seek custody.

Although the Washington Supreme Court did address the harm or potential harm issue, the plurality opinion in Troxel , as we have already noted, did not address the issue in respect to the granting of visitation — the issue in Troxel : “[W]e do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court — whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation stat ³⁵² utes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 , 120 S.Ct. at 2064 (alteration added). Instead, the Troxel decision affirmed the Washington Supreme Court’s invalidation of a state statute because the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to “infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 , 120 S.Ct. at 2064 . Accordingly, Troxel is further instructive as to this case insofar as it recognizes the parent’s fundamental right to direct his or her children’s care, custody and control, see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 , 120 S.Ct. at 2060 , and it impliedly rejects the substitution of a judge’s opinion that a particular child would be better raised in a situation a trial judge prefers. 13 Our courts have left little doubt of the importance placed on the parent-child relationship. As this Court recently stated in Shurupoff v. Vockroth: “The Supreme Court has long recognized the right of a parent to raise his or her children as a fundamental one protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See cases beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S.Ct. 625 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), extending, among other intermediate cases, through Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 , 64 S.Ct. 438 , 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 92 S.Ct. 1208 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. ³⁵³ 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), to, most recently, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000).” Shurupoff, 372 Md. at 650 , 814 A.2d at 550 . The circumstances of the case sub judice illuminate a complexity in the “best interests of the child” standard that governs, inter alia, custody disputes between parents. In a situation in which both parents seek custody, each parent proceeds in possession, so to speak, of a constitutionally-protected fundamental parental right. Neither parent has a superior claim to the exercise of this right to provide “care, custody, and control” of the children.

See Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2004 Supp.), § 5-203(d)(2) of the Family Law Article. 14 Effectively, then, each fit parent’s constitutional right neutralizes the other parent’s constitutional right, leaving, generally, the best interests of the child as the sole standard to apply to these types of custody decisions. Thus, in evaluating each parent’s request for custody, the parents commence as presumptive equals and a trial court undertakes a balancing of each parent’s relative merits to serve as the primary custodial parent; the child’s best interests tips the scale in favor of an award of custody to one parent or the other. Where the dispute is between a fit parent and a private third party, however, both parties do not begin on equal footing in respect to rights to “care, custody, and control” of the children. The parent is asserting a fundamental constitutional right.

The third party is not. A private third party has no fundamental constitutional right to raise the children of others. Generally, absent a constitutional statute, the non-governmental third party has no rights, constitutional or otherwise, to raise someone else’s child. ³⁵⁴ B. Best Interests of the Child in the Absence of Parental Unfitness and Extraordinary or Exceptional Circumstances The arguments and outcome of the instant case in no way alter the “best interests of the child” standard that governs courts’ assessments of disputes between fit parents involving visitation or custody. We have frequently and repeatedly emphasized that in situations where it applies, it is the central consideration.

See Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 214 Md. 80, 84 , 133 A.2d 423, 425 (1957) (stating succinctly and conclusively in regard to the best interests standard, that “[i]t seems unnecessary to cite additional authority in support of this firmly established rule”). So critical is the best interests standard that it has garnered superlative language in the many cases in which the concept appears: This Court labeled it “of transcendent importance” in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945), as the “ultimate test” in Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 24 , 248 A.2d 890, 894 (1969), and as the “controlling factor” in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994). See also Hoffman, 280 Md. at 175, n. 1 , 372 A.2d at 585 n. 1 (providing a more complete survey of the various descriptions of the best interest standard). Although the child’s well-being remains the focus of a court’s analysis in disputes between fit parents, “[t]he best interests standard does not ignore the interests of the parents and their importance to the child.

We recognize that in almost all cases, it is in the best interests of the child to have reasonable maximum opportunity to develop a close and loving relationship with each parent.” Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 220 , 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998) (alteration added). C. Standards for Custody Determination When considering the application of the “best interests of the child” standard it is essential to frame the different situations in which it is attempted to be applied. First, and certainly the most important application of the standard, is in disputes between fit natural parents, each of whom has equal constitutional rights to parent. In those cases the dispute can ³⁵⁵ be resolved best if not solely, by an application of the “best interests of the child” standard.

This situation most often arises in marriage dissolution issues between natural parents and it is necessary to resolve the matters of custody and visitation between two constitutionally equally qualified parents. Although the Court is unaware of any compilation of numbers, it can reasonably be supposed that the vast majority of cases throughout the country in which the “best interest of the child standard” is applied, or sought to be applied, are of this nature. When these cases are subtracted from the total universe of custody and visitation cases, there remains a much smaller number of cases. The second most frequent situation in which that standard has been applied is, we believe, in the various types of state proceedings in which the states are injecting themselves into the parenting situation in the exercise of their generally recognized power to protect the child.

In various jurisdictions, and sometimes in different cases within the same jurisdiction, the standard applied, after recognizing the power of the state to intervene in the case by reason of unfitness or circumstance, is an avoidance of harm to the child or a “best interest” standard, and often both standards. Most often the best interest standard becomes applicable after a finding that it is necessary to protect the child who is being exposed to harm by the parental unit. When these numerous eases are subtracted from the total number of custody and visitation dispute cases, the remainder of the cases fit into an even smaller category. This category is generically referred to as “third-party” custody disputes, i.e., persons other than natural parents or the State attempting, directly or indirectly, to gain or maintain custody or visitation in respect to the children of natural parents.

In some states, third-party issues arise in actions involving those states’ use of guardianship, i.e., custody actions appear to be titled sometimes as guardianship actions although they are in essence custody actions. In some states the actions are titled as habeas corpus actions, in some states the third party seeks custody through intervention in a domes ³⁵⁶ tic action between the natural parents (as in the present case), and in some states the third party initiates a separate action titled in some other manner. Even within the third-party subset of custody actions there are further differences. Some states have conceptualized the idea of physiological parents, third parties who have, in effect, become parents and thus, the case is considered according to the standards that apply between natural parents.

This further reduces the number of pure third-party cases. The pure third-party cases are further narrowed in some jurisdictions by “failure of adoption” cases, in which, upon the “failure of adoption,” a “best interest” standard may be applied. In still other pure third-party cases, in respect to the standard to be used, all parties seeking custody of children are designated as third parties. In that situation there are no constitutional rights involved (although in some cases constitutional claims are made using terms such as “psychological parent” and the like) and the “best interest” standard is generally applied.

There are also those cases which we would otherwise call pure third-party cases, except that the natural parents did not raise the issue of their fundamental constitutional right to parent in that particular case and the courts accordingly did not address it. These cases further reduce the body of cases that we shall discuss. Indeed, other types of situations may further reduce the number of pure third-party cases. In any event, in comparison with the total number of cases in which attempts are made to utilize the “best interest” standard, or it is used, the number of pure third-party cases, such as the present case, is relatively small.

It is on these remaining cases throughout the country, that we primarily focus our attention. 15 We have been able to separate the cases (and the states) into three categories. First, those that utilize, as the ultimate determining factor, the “best interest” standard (which ap ³⁵⁷ pears to be the minority view). Second, those cases (and the states) that appear to use some type of hybrid standard or have utilized language in the opinions that support both the “best interest” standard and the “unfit parent” and/or “extraordinary circumstances” standard. We shall refer to these cases as the hybrid view.

The third category of cases, which appear to be the majority of the cases and the states, hold that, in this limited class of pure third-party custody cases (the category of the present case), that the “best interest” standard is inappropriate unless the finder of fact first finds that the natural parents are unfit, the natural parents by their conduct have waived or lost their “constitutional protections,” or there is a finding of extraordinary, exceptional, or compelling circumstances that require the court to remove the child from the natural parents in order to protect the child from harm. It is only if the parents are unfit, or if there is some exceptional circumstance exposing the child to harm, that the child may be removed from the custody of the parents. If a preliminary finding of parental unfitness or extraordinary circumstances is made, the court is then faced with what to do ■with the child. In only that context, then, after such preliminary findings are proved, may the custody of the child be based on a “best interest” standard.

This last standard appears to be the majority view in the United States and, until very recently, likely was the Maryland position, albeit the language of our cases over the years has not been altogether clear. To the extent we may not have explicitly previously adopted the majority view in third-party custody cases in this state, we do so now. We shall discuss, for the most part, only the pure third-party cases since the early 1970’s — the era when the Supreme Court, in various types of cases, re-emphasized the constitutional rights of parents. 1. Minority View We start with what we consider to be the minority view: the states that apply the “best interest” standard, and generally only, or ultimately, this standard, in spite of some dicta in the ³⁵⁸ cases to the contrary. 16 These states appear to be Colorado, Illinois, 17 Pennsylvania and West Virginia (although there are contrary cases in West Virginia). 18 In 1981 the Supreme Court of Illinois, in In re Custody of Townsend, 86 Ill.2d 502 , 56 Ill.Dec. 685 , 427 N.E.2d 1231 (1981), overturned the granting of custody to a third party (the sister of the child) over the protest of the child’s natural father who had not been married to the natural mother. 19 Although the court considered the father’s presumptive rights, it included language which, it can be argued, place Illinois in the minority column: ³⁵⁹ Id. at 508 , 56 Ill.Dec. 685 , 427 N.E.2d at 1234 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

See also In re the Estate of K.E.S. and J.M.S., Minors, 347 Ill.App.3d 452, 461 , 283 Ill. Dec. 76 , 807 N.E.2d 681, 688 (2004), decided on somewhat different grounds, but stating nonetheless, that “[t]he most important consideration in child custody disputes is the best interest of the child” (alteration added). The intermediate appellate court relied primarily on its own cases, but did cite at one point to the Illinois Supreme Court’s Townsend decision. But see In re Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468 , 208 Ill.Dec. 268 , 649 N.E.2d 324 (1995), a failure of adoption case which contains some contrary language and In re Custody of Peterson, 112 Ill.2d 48 , 96 Ill.Dec. 690 , 491 N.E.2d 1150 (1986), which sets the standard in Illinois that applies where the children in a nonparent/parent custody dispute are not in the custody of the natural parent.

It requires a nonparent first to establish that the child is not in the custody of the natural parent before the custody dispute is determined based upon the “best interest” test. ³⁵⁸ “In child-custody disputes it is an accepted presumption that the right or interest of a natural parent in the care, custody and control of a child is superior to the claim of a third person. The presumption is not absolute and serves only as one of several factors used by courts in resolving the ultimately controlling question of where the best interests of the child lie. A court need not find that the natural parent is unfit or has forfeited his custodial rights before awarding custody to another person if the best interests of the child will be served.” 20 ³⁵⁹ We include in the minority line of cases the very unusual West Virginia case of Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S., 214 W.Va. 750 , 591 S.E.2d 308 (2003), even though the third party seeking visitation was the half-sister of the child and was asserting her own alleged constitutional rights as a sibling. The child’s natural father (who was not the father of the half-sister) objected, based upon his fundamental rights as a parent.

The case had been dismissed below because the trial court had found that “there was no legal right of visitation with a minor half-sibling.” The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held: “[W]e now conclude that Lindsie [the half-sister seeking visitation] may have a right to continued visitation with her half-sibling.” Id. at 754 , 591 S.E.2d at 312 . It then remanded the case to the trial court for it first to “hear and determine whether or not visitation with her half-sister, Cassandra, is in the best interests of Lindsie [the half-sister seeking visitation] ... [and] also hear and determine whether such visitation is in the best interests of Cassandra [the sister with whom visitation was sought]. In making this determina ³⁶⁰ tion there is a presumption that [the natural father] is acting in the best interests of Cassandra.” Id. at 756 , 591 S.E.2d at 314 (alterations added). In In re the Custody of A.D.C., Child., 969 P.2d 708, 710 (Colo.App.1998), that court awarded custody to grandparents as against the natural mother.

The court first described the pertinent issue: “[The natural] Mother further argues that due process and the legal presumption in favor of the biological parent require that a parent be awarded custody unless it is shown by clear and convincing proof that the child would suffer emotional or physical harm by such an award. Again, we disagree. “Under [a Colorado statute] the determination of custody is expressly based upon the best interests of the child. Furthermore, due process does not require a showing of unfitness before custody may be awarded to a non-parent.” [Alterations added.] [Citations omitted.] The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Charles v. Stehlik, 560 Pa. 334, 341-42 , 744 A.2d 1255, 1258-59 (2000), reaffirmed a prior decision when it opined: “Next, Appellant [natural father] argues that Appellee [stepfather] should have been required not only to prove that there were convincing reasons as to why [the child] should remain with Appellee, but also that Appellant was an unfit parent. “In Albright v. Commonwealth, 491 Pa. 320 , 421 A.2d 157, 161 (1980), we stressed that the biological parent’s prima facia right to custody ‘is not to be construed as precluding a custody award to a non-parent, absent a demonstration of the parent’s dereliction. We again emphasize that the standard seeks only to stress the importance of parenthood as a factor in determining the best interests of the child.

However, other factors which have significant impact on the well ' being of the child can justify a finding in favor of the non- ³⁶¹ parent, even though the parent has not been shown to have been unfit.’ “We see no reason to abandon our Albright holding. As noted supra, ‘the cardinal concern in all custody cases is the best interest and permanent welfare of the child.’ ” [Alterations added.] 2. Hybrid View 21 Next we discuss the cases that contain language, that supports, so to speak, a composite of the majority and the minority views. In some instances it is difficult to determine where these particular states are in respect to the various views.

In some of the cases, such as those from Vermont, the language also would support that state as being among the majority view that we shall later discuss. These states that we consider to be somewhere in the middle include the states of Oregon, Connecticut, Vermont, Washington, Missouri, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, Arkansas, Nebraska, Texas, perhaps California and, currently, perhaps this state. In some of the states the cases are intermediate appellate court cases, and in some of the states various intermediate appellate decisions differ. In some, both positions are found within the same opinion.

This is perhaps a result of the confusion that the term ‘best interests’ can generate when applied in differing contexts. Although the court in the Vermont case of In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294 , 553 A.2d 1078 (Vt.1988), actually decided that an unmarried father of a child born out of wedlock did not enjoy the parental presumption of fitness, it utilized language that indicated that its position emphasized the “best interest” standard. In essence, it first found that under Vermont law a father (not married to the mother) of a child was not consid ³⁶² ered to be the natural father and thus not entitled to the presumptions afforded a natural parent. Thus, it considered the dispute as between two third parties [to which the best interests test always applies].

The Vermont Supreme Court first noted: “The instant case is novel because it is presented as a custody fight between a father of a child born out of wedlock, and a person who is neither the spouse of that party nor a parent of the child over- whom custody is sought. As none of our modern cases involve parties of either of these classes, the presence of both as adversaries in a single case requires us to break substantial new ground.” Id. at 298-300 , 553 A.2d at 1081 . At this point the Vermont court noted in a footnote that: “Our one precedent on the respective custody rights of parents and third parties was decided in 1926. Although the child in [that case] was in the care of a grandparent, the custody order awarded custody to the child’s father.

Two recent cases have involved proceedings to award guardianship of a child to a third party because the parent is ‘unsuitable.’ ” Id. at 300 n. 1, 553 A.2d at 1081 n. 1 (alteration added) (citations omitted). After first noting that the unmarried father of a child born out of wedlock was, according to Vermont law and to the common law, not presumed to be a parent, that court stated: “There is no per se statutory preference in favor of the natural father of a child born out of wedlock, and the statute does not impose on third parties seeking custody the initial burden of proving the father to be incompetent or unsuitable. ■ “For the above reasons, the statute does not prevent a grandparent from competing on an equal footing with a biological father for the guardianship and custody of an ³⁶³ illegitimate child. If the statute alone controlled, we would have to reverse the judgment for the father .... ” “Because the father in Lehr 22 had not come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, he had no cognizable due process interest.... “However, to deny such status to a biological father who has developed the requisite custodial, personal or financial relationship with the child denies equal protection of the law to the biological father under the principles set forth in Lehr . “We conclude therefore that granting guardianship to a third person in preference to a parent who has demonstrated a commitment to parenthood based solely on a judicial determination of the best interests of the child — without first requiring the third party to demonstrate that the parent is unfit — denies the natural parent due process of law.” S.B.L., 150 Vt. at 301-05 , 553 A.2d at 1083-85 (footnote added). While the case appears to be distinguishable from the minority and perhaps deserves instead to be in the majority category in which the New Jersey Supreme Court has placed it, a later Vermont case, Boisvert v. Harrington, 173 Vt. 285 , 796 A.2d 1102 (2002), which, although involving an effort to revoke the granting of a motion to terminate guardianship and decided under Vermont case law in respect to such revocations, contains language that may be consistent with the minority category.

The court said: “Moreover, the parental preference doctrine is only that — a preference — an advantage given to parents over other persons. It does not answer the question of what is in the child’s best interests. ³⁶⁴ ‘The day is long past in this State, if it had ever been, when the right of a parent to the custody of his or her child, where the extraordinary circumstances are present, would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the child, on the theory solely of an absolute legal right. Instead, in the extraordinary circumstance, when there is a conflict, the best interest of the child has always been regarded as superior to the right of parental custody. Indeed, analysis of the cases reveals a shifting of emphasis rather than a remaking of substance.

This shifting reflects more the modern principle that a child is a person, and not a subperson over whom the parent has an absolute possessory interest.’ ” Boisvert, 173 Vt. at 291 , 796 A.2d at 1107-08 (emphasis added). To the extent Vermont requires extraordinary circumstances before best interests are considered it belongs to the majority category; to the extent it does not, it is consistent with the minority view. We place it in the middle — the hybrid view. The natural mother in the case of In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous) v. Commissioner of Children and Youth Services, 177 Conn. 648 , 420 A.2d 875 (1979), 23 was to an extent suffering physical and emotional (depression) problems evolving from attempting to parent the child while at the same time earning a living for her family.

Her husband was paralyzed from an accident and could not work and the mother was trying to avoid going on welfare. While receiving treatment she was involuntarily committed to a state hospital and later she was committed to another treatment center. She spent approximately four months in the two institutions. While she was committed, her child was cared for first by a baby-sitter, and ultimately was adjudicated an “uncared for” child and ³⁶⁵ placed with the Commissioner of Children and Youth Services, which in turn, placed the child with the same baby sitter for care.

Later, after sufficient recovery, the mother began efforts to regain custody of her child by filing suit against the Commissioner. Thereafter, the appropriate authorities determined that she was then fit to be a parent. Nonetheless, after further skirmishes, the Commissioner filed a separate petition to terminate her parental rights. Accordingly, this opinion is not a pure third-party case in that the state was the petitioning party.

In spite of the Maine (she had undergone recovery at her parent’s house in Maine) authorities confirming that she was fit, the trial court ultimately denied the natural mother’s petition for revocation, terminated her parental rights and designated the Commissioner as a statutory parent for the purpose of placing the child for adoption with the babysitter and her husband. In its opinion the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated that it was the position of the Commissioner that the department “disputed and still disputes, however, that return of the child to her mother was or is in the child’s best interests because of the intervening attachment that formed between the child and her foster family during her mother’s illness.” Id. at 657 , 420 A.2d at 880 . The trial court had found for the Commissioner on that basis. In respect to the revocation of the child’s commitment to the Commissioner, the court noted the statutory requirements and stated: “While it is certainly true ... that parents have no natural right to the custody of their children that can prevail over a disposition effecting the child’s best interests, parents are entitled to the presumption, absent a continuing cause for commitment, that revocation will be in the child’s best interest unless the state can prove otherwise. “We must reject the claim of so-called ‘parental rights’ theory under which ‘the parent has rights superior to all others except when he is proved unfit.’ ” ³⁶⁶ Id. at 659-61 , 420 A.2d at 881-82 .

The Connecticut Supreme Court then cited to several United States Supreme Court cases, including Stanley, supra, and in language that appears to contradict the earlier language noted: “The termination of parental rights is defined as ‘the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent.’ It is ‘a most serious and sensitive judicial action. Although that ultimate interference by the state in the parent-child relationship may be required under certain circumstances, the natural rights of parents in their children “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.” ’ “In contrast to custody proceedings [presumably between natural parents], in which the best interests of the child are always the paramount consideration and in fact usually dictate the outcome, in termination proceedings the statutory criteria must be met before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun.” Juvenile Appeal, 177 Conn, at 671-72, 420 A.2d at 886 (alteration added) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Nebraska has propounded a series of cases in which the standard approved is sometimes unclear. 24 Gomez v. Savage, 254 Neb. 836 , 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998), was a case in which third parties were attempting to adopt two children over the natural father’s objection and over the objection of the natural mother who was attempting to revoke her consent to the adoption. When she had consented to the adoption she lied when she stated that she did not know who the father was and thus the natural father, Gomez, neither received notice nor consented to the adoption.

The natural parents, although not married, had sporadically lived together and during those periods the natural father had partly sup ³⁶⁷ ported the child. The natural father had married another woman by the time of the proceeding. Id. at 848 , 580 N.W.2d at 533 . The children were subsequently placed with the Savages.

Gomez contested the adoption by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the return of his children. In the action “Gomez conceded that if he were found to be unfit [to have custody] it was in the best interests of the children that they remain [ ] [in the custody of] the Savages.” Id. at 852 , 580 N.W.2d at 535 (alterations added). The trial court found him to be unfit. The appellate court opined, almost in conflicting terms: “Where the custody of a minor child is involved in a habeas corpus action, the custody ... is to be determined by the best interests of the child, with due regard for the superior rights of a fit, proper, and suitable parent. “A court may not properly deprive a parent of the custody of a minor child unless it is affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit to perform the duties imposed by the relationship, or has forfeited that right. “The right of a parent to the custody of a minor child is not lightly to be set aside in favor of more distant relatives or unrelated parties, and a court may not deprive a parent of such custody unless he or she is shown to be unfit or to have forfeited his or her superior right to such custody. “[A]nd the State is not required to show harm to the children before parental rights can be terminated. “Having determined that Gomez is unfit, we find ... [that] it is in the best interests of the children to remain in custody of the Savages.” Id. at 848-52 , 580 N.W.2d at 533-34 (alterations added) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

See also Uhing v. Uhing, 241 Neb. 368, 373-74 , 488 N.W.2d 366, 370-71 (1992) (“[a]l- ³⁶⁸ though ... the ‘question present in every habeas corpus case is the best interests of the child,’ we cannot overlook or disregard that the ‘best interests’ standard is subject to the overriding recognition that ‘the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected[.]’ ... The courts may not properly deprive a parent of the custody of a minor child unless it is affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit ... or has forfeited that right”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). There are several other Nebraska cases which contain similar language, or merely find the natural parent unfit and go from there based upon the “best interests” standard. In some cases the state is involved in the process and thus, at least technically, they are not pure third-party cases.

Three other states, through their intermediate appellate courts, have rendered opinions that allow us to place them in the hybrid category of cases. In In re Custody of Shields, 120 Wash.App. 108, 120-28 , 84 P.3d 905, 911-12 (2004), a post Troxel case, the intermediate court, in a stepparent/natural parent custody dispute, attempted to apply a standard it had created prior to Troxel to the post-Troxel case. The court stated: “Prior to 1987, parent and nonparent custody actions were governed by [a specific Washington statute], which required courts to determine custody based on the best interests of the child. However, courts determining nonparent custody cases were reluctant to apply the best interests standard when determining custody as between a parent and a non-parent.

See In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash.App. 637 , 626 P.2d 16 (1981). “The Allen court concluded that courts determining custody between a parent and nonparent must apply a more stringent balancing test to protect both the parents’ constitutional rights to privacy and the family entity. Allen held that the state may interfere with the parents’ constitutional rights only if (1) the parent was unfit, or (2) ‘the child’s growth and development would be detrimentally affected by placement with an otherwise fit parent.’ Significantly, the Allen court proposed the detriment to the child standard as ³⁶⁹ a ‘middle ground’ requiring a showing more than best interests, but less than parental unfitness. “In summary, we reaffirm our agreement with Allen .... Nevertheless the requisite showing under Allen is substantial. While the detriment standard does not require a showing of parental unfitness, it does require a showing of actual detriment to the child’s growth and development.” [Alteration added.] [Some citations omitted.] See also In re Custody of S.H.B., 118 Wash.App. 71 , 74 P.3d 674 (2003), a contest for custody between two third parties (the paternal and maternal grandparents); In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash.App. 637 , 626 P.2d 16 (1981); In re Welfare of Schulz, 17 Wash.App. 134 , 561 P.2d 1122 (1977) (a termination case in which the court rejected grandparents’ claim to custody).

An intermediate appellate court in Missouri in the case of M.P.M. v. Williams, 611 S.W.2d 274 (Mo.App.1980), determined that the natural father was entitled to custody over the claim of a stepfather. The court found both fathers to be fit. It stated: “It is well established that the parent has the superior right to the custody of his or her minor children as against third persons. This right will not be denied ... unless it is established that the parent is an unfit person or is unable to care properly for the minor children.” Id. at 277-78 (citations omitted).

See also In re Marriage of Campbell, 685 S.W.2d 280 (Mo.App.1985), where a different Missouri intermediate appellate court found a father unfit and awarded custody to a third party stating the same standard as M.P.M. In Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449 (Tex.App.2004), a Texas intermediate appellate court, in a case where a third-party grandparent intervened in a divorce case seeking to have a conservatorship created in respect to the children of the marriage, stated: “For the court to award managing conservatorship to a non-parent ... the non-parent must prove ... that appoint ³⁷⁰ ing the parent as a managing conservator would result in serious physical or emotional harm to the child. There must be evidence to support the logical inference that some specific, identifiable behavior or conduct of the parent will probably cause that harm. “Further, it is wholly inadequate to simply present evidence that a non-parent would be a better choice as custodian of the child. “Thus, the grandparents here had to establish either (1) it was not in the children’s best interest for Liliana to be appointed as a managing conservator because it would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development; or (2) Liliana voluntarily relinquished actual care, control, and possession of the children to the grandparents for a least one year .... ” Id. at 458-59 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). There are several intermediate appellate decisions from various California courts in which a California visitation statute was challenged on constitutional grounds. At least one of the appellate circuits has held the statute constitutional, but that case notes that “at least four California appellate opinions have found section 3102 unconstitutional .... ” Fenn v. Sherriff, 109 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 (2003).

The four opinions in which the statute was declared unconstitutional were from different appellate circuits. Our state may belong in either, or both, of the other categories. For that reason we have placed it with the hybrid states for the purposes of this opinion. All the language of the Maryland cases stress “best interest of the child” language, but often do so in a manner that can be construed, in respect to third-party disputes, as just another way of ascribing to the majority view.

In other words, some language, sometimes in the same case, supports both views. All of the adoption cases seem to stress the “best interest” language, exclusively; as do, of course, the cases between natural parents and those between only third parties. Likewise, the language is used extensively where the State is involved in actions affecting the natural parents’ ³⁷¹ rights. While the same language is always used in third-party cases involving attempts to assert rights over natural parents, other language in some of those cases appears to support the majority position, albeit always including “best interest” language as well.

For example, in one of our seminal cases involving third-party/natural parent contests, Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 175-79 , 372 A.2d 582 (1977), we noted: “The best interest standard controls when the dispute ... is between his biological father and mother. It also controls when the dispute over custody is between a biological parent and a third party.... In parent-third party disputes, however, there is a twist to the application of the best interest standard. “Nevertheless, there persists in this State in a contest over the custody of a child, but always subject to the best interest standard, that part of the common law concept which declares that the right of either parent is ordinarily superior to that of anyone else.... In Ross v. Pick, supra, 199 Md. [341] at 351[, 86 A.2d 463 (1952) ], we set out this principle in the form of a presumption....

In Ross v. Pick, supra, 199 Md. at 351 , 86 A.2d 463 , we pointed out that the ordinary entitlement of parents to the custody of their minor children ... is not an absolute one and declared that the right ‘may be forfeited where it appears that any parent is unfit to have custody of a child, or where some exceptional circumstances render such custody detrimental to the best interests of the child.’ “To recapitulate: the best interest of the child standard is always determinative in child custody disputes. When the dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, it is presumed that the child’s best interest is subserved by custody in the parent. That presumption is overcome and such custody will be denied if (a) the parent is unfit to have custody, or (b) if there are such exceptional circumstances as make such custody detrimental to the best interest of the child. Therefore, in parent-third party disputes over custody, it is only upon a determination by the equity court that the parent is unfit or that there are exceptional circum ³⁷² stances which make custody in the parent detrimental to the best interest of the child, that the court need inquire into the best interest of the child in order to make a proper custodial disposition.” 25 [Bolding added.] [Cita- . tions omitted.] [Emphasis added.] The language of Hoffman that we have emphasized and bolded, when compared with the rest of the language as to the “best interest” standard appears to create a conundrum of sorts.

If the custody is always to be ultimately determined by what is in the “best interests” of the child then the parents’ fitness or extraordinary circumstances have no place in the discussion. In our view, the “best interest” language of Hoffman , with the presumptions and conditions attached to it, can be interpreted as consistent with the majority view, i.e., in third-party cases there must first be a finding of parental unfitness or extraordinary circumstances before custody can be transferred to a third party based on a “best interest” analysis. Numerous of this state’s appellate cases since Hoffman , if not all of them, can be traced back to that case. For instance, the Ross v. Hoffman language was discussed extensively in the Court of Special Appeals case of Lipiano v. Lipiano, 89 Md.App. 571, 577-78 , 598 A.2d 854, 857 (1991), where that court stated: “The principles governing the judicial resolution of child custody disputes between biological parents and other persons were set forth in Ross ....

Summarizing its several conclusions, the Court there held, at 178-79[, 372 A.2d 582 ]: ‘To recapitulate: the best interest of the child standard is always determinative in child custody disputes [here that court quotes the same language from Ross we have quoted above].’ “The language used by the Ross Court is clear and precise. It does not envisage there being degrees of third ³⁷³ parties — ‘natural’ parents who are not biological parents, ‘equitable’ parents, and others. Certainly, the closeness of the relationship between the child and the non-biological parent is of considerable importance, but that importance relates to whether there are exceptional circumstances which would make an award of custody to the biological parent detrimental to the best interest of the child.” [Alteration added.] In a true “best interest” jurisdiction, the standard would be applied directly to the child as it is in the minority jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, Colorado, perhaps Oregon and other states. Hoffman has been extensively cited throughout our most recent case of Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639 , 814 A.2d 543 (2003), in which we quote most of the above language from Hoffman .

We also stated in that case, addressing evidentiary standard issues, but also noting the language problem we have previously discussed, that: “To some extent, these differences may account for some of the language used by the courts in describing the standard of proof applicable in those cases. Maryland law is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, Maryland Code, § 5-203(a)(2) of the Family Law Article, provides that a parent is the sole natural guardian of his or her minor child if the other parent dies, abandons the family, or is incapable of acting as parent. On the other, we have not viewed custody disputes between a surviving parent and a third party as in the nature of legal guardianship proceedings, but, subject to the Ross v. Hoffman analysis, as like any other custody case. “Some States, as petitioner notes, have, indeed, adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard in parent/third party custody cases (or in cases that the court found equivalent to a custody dispute).

Other States have adopted that standard in cases ... upon rationales that are inconsistent with the Maryland experience and approach.... “We are aware of no case in which a State Supreme Court has concluded that the clear and convincing evidence stan ³⁷⁴ dard is required in pure custody disputes between a parent and third party as a matter of Constitutional law---- “We do not regard an order granting custody of a child to a third party, subject to modification and with appropriate visitation privileges reserved to the parent, as the equivalent of terminating parental rights .... ” Shurupoff, 372 Md. at 655-57 , 814 A.2d at 553-54 (citations omitted). At the conclusion of the Shurupoff opinion, we announced an interpretation of Hoffman’s main holding by stating that we, in Hoffman , “should have stopped there. Instead, we continued, in the very next sentence: ...” and we proceeded to describe the qualifying language from Hoffman . Our Shurupoff opimon stated: “Having first announced that the best interest of the child ‘is always determinative in child custody disputes,’ we did muddy the waters a bit by stating that, unless the trial court finds unfitness or exceptional circumstances that would make custody in the parent detrimental to the child’s best interest, it need not ‘inquire into the best interest of the child in order to make a proper custodial disposition.’ ” Shurupoff, 372 Md. at 661-62 , 814 A.2d at 557 .

We then continued by stating, without overruling the language from Hoffman , that “[t]he court must always, necessarily, inquire into what is in the child’s best interest, for that is the ultimate, determinative factor.” Shurupoff, 372 Md. at 662 , 814 A.2d at 557 . With that additional language, if it stands, Maryland has gone from, questionably, the majority view in this country as to private third-party custody actions to clearly the minority view. That was not the intention of the Court. We shall hold, as we indicated in the beginning of our opinion, that, generally, in private actions in which private third parties are attempting to gain custody of children of natural parents over the objection of the natural parents, it is necessary first to prove that the parent is unfit or that there are extraordinary circumstances posing serious detriment to ³⁷⁵ the child, before the court may apply a “best interest” standard.

With this clarification, Maryland will be consistent with the majority view in this country. It appears, as we now view it, that the original qualifying language in Hoffman as to third-party cases, is closer to, although not squarely within, the majority view than to the minority view. 3. Majority View We now discuss the majority view, ie., because of the presumption that natural parents are fit to raise their children and/or because natural parents have a fundamental constitutional right to raise their children, or both, there must first be a finding that the natural parents are unfit, or extraordinary circumstances detrimental to the welfare of the child must first be determined to exist, before the “best interest of the child” test may be applied when private third-parties dispute custody with natural parents. The majority view, in one manifestation or another, prevails in at least the following states: New Jersey, Iowa, Ohio, New York, Wisconsin, Nevada, Arkansas, Maine, Alaska, Kansas, South Dakota, North Dakota, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, Kentucky, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Georgia, Virginia, Florida, Indiana, Utah, probably Idaho, and until, arguably, recently, Maryland.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey would also place Arizona, Missouri, California, Washington and New Hampshire in the majority category. With the case sub judice, Maryland returns to the majority category. 26 Because it has furnished a comprehensive view of the case law on the issue of the rights of natural parents vis-a-vis third parties, we shall commence this discussion with a relatively recent case from the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Watkins ³⁷⁶ v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 248-53 , 748 A.2d 558, 565-68 (2000). There the court discussed the varying views: “The standard that we articulate today has been applied, either in whole or in part, in most jurisdictions that have been confronted with the issue. Like this Court, they have created a presumption in favor of a parent that may be rebutted by proof of parental unfitness, neglect, or ‘exceptional circumstances.’ See, e.g., C.G. v. C.G., 594 So.2d 147, 149 (Ala.

Civ.App.1991) (quoting McLendon v. McLendon, 455 So.2d 861, 862 (Ala.Civ.App.1984) 27 ) (requiring ‘clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit or unsuited for custody and that the best interest of the child will be served by granting custody to the third person’); Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-05141, 173 Ariz. 634 , 845 P.2d 1129, 1136 (Ariz.App.1993) (stating parental presumption can only be overcome by stringent standard requiring showing of unfitness or neglect); In re Guardianship of D.A. McW, 460 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1984) (stating parental presumption can be rebutted only if ‘detrimental to the welfare of the child’ based on an exceptional circumstances test); Carvalho v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 94 , 274 S.E.2d 471, 472 (1981) (applying unfitness or ‘compelling circumstances’ test and noting ‘[a] court is not allowed to terminate a parent’s natural right because it has determined that the child might have better financial, educational, or even moral advantages elsewhere’); Stockwell v. Stockwell, 116 Idaho 297 , 775 P.2d 611, 613 (1989) (requiring unfitness, abandonment, or that ‘the child has been in the nonparent’s custody for an appreciable period of time’); In re Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468 , 208 Ill.Dec. 268 , 649 N.E.2d 324, 334-35, 339 (1995) (stating nonparent only has standing to petition for custody of child if parent voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished custody, ³⁷⁷ or upon a finding of unfitness); In re Guardianship of Williams, 254 Kan. 814 , 869 P.2d 661, 669 (1994) (requiring unfitness, neglect, or highly unusual or extraordinary circumstances ‘even though the trial court might feel that it would decide otherwise if free to consider only the “best interests” apart from the benefits to be derived from the love and care of the natural parent’); Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky.1989) (requiring unfitness or abandonment and noting that failure to provide essential care only qualifies when based on reasons other than poverty alone); Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076, 1086 (1994) (requiring unfitness or exceptional circumstances); White v. Thompson, 569 So.2d 1181, 1183-84 (Miss.1990) (requiring abandonment, unfitness, or immorality); Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998) (requiring unfitness, abandonment, or ‘extraordinary circumstances’); In re Guardianship of K.M., 280 Mont. 256 , 929 P.2d 870, 873 (1996) (requiring voluntary relinquishment); Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1 , 568 P.2d 177, 181 (1977) (requiring unfitness, neglect, or delinquency); Locklin v. Duka, 112 Nev. 1489 , 929 P.2d 930, 933 (1996) (requiring unfitness or extraordinary circumstances); In re Adoption of J.J.B., 119 N.M. 638 , 894 P.2d 994, 1008 (1995) (requiring unfitness or extraordinary circumstances); Merritt v. Way, 58 N.Y.2d 850 , 460 N.Y.S.2d 20 , 446 N.E.2d 776, 777 (1983) (requiring surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect, or other extraordinary circumstances); In re Woodell, 253 N.C. 420 , 117 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1960) (quoting James v. Pretlow, 242 N.C. 102 , 86 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1955)) (stating natural parent has right to child which may only be interfered with ‘for the most substantial and sufficient reasons and ... only when the interests and welfare of the children clearly require it’); In re E.J.H., 546 N.W.2d 361, 364 (N.D.1996) (requiring a finding of exceptional circumstances ‘to trigger a best-interest analysis’); In re Guardianship of M.R.S., 960 P.2d 357, 361-62 (Okla.1998) (quoting Alford v. Thomas, 316 P.2d 188 (Okla.1957)) (requiring unfitness or ‘circumstances of great weight and importance connected with the ³⁷⁸ necessary welfare of the child); Ryan v. DeMello, 116 R.I. 264 , 354 A.2d 734, 735 (1976) (stating ‘the Family Court may award the custody of a child to a relative ... if there has been a judicial determination that the child is delinquent, wayward, neglected, or otherwise comes within the purview of the Family Court Act’); Moore v. Moore, 300 S.C. 75 , 386 S.E.2d 456, 458 (1989) (requiring unfitness unless parent temporarily relinquishes custody and then extraordinary circumstances); D.G. v. D.M.K., 557 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D.1996) (requiring gross misconduct, unfitness, or ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond ‘a simple showing’ of best interests); In re Adoption of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tenn.1995) (stating parent cannot be deprived of custody unless there has been a finding of substantial harm to the child); Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96 , 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1986) (quoting Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 214 Va. 395 , 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1973) (requiring unfitness, abandonment, voluntary relinquishment or ‘ “special facts and circumstances ... constituting an extraordinary reason for taking a child from [a] parent” ’); In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294 , 553 A.2d 1078, 1082 (1988) (requiring unfitness or extraordinary circumstances); Snyder v. Scheerer, 190 W.Va. 64 , 436 S.E.2d 299, 304 (1993) (requiring unfitness, neglect, abandonment or waiver). “Four states rely on harm to the child, which is part of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ exception. See, e.g., Carter v. Novotny, 779 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Alaska 1989) (requiring unfitness or that parental custody would be ‘clearly detrimental to the child.’); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal.App.3d 831 , 279 Cal.Rptr. 212, 214-15 (1991) (requiring a showing that ‘award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child’); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) (requiring unfitness or ‘that no strong mutual bond exists, that the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and welfare for the child’s, and that the parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents generally’); In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash.App. ³⁷⁹ 637, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (1981) (holding that something more than the ‘best interests of the child’ is required to show ‘actual detriment to the child,’ but not requiring unfitness). “A small minority of jurisdictions apply a hybrid of the child’s best interest test and the ‘exceptional circumstances’ exception. See, e.g., Freshour v. West, 334 Ark. 100 , 971 S.W.2d 263, 266 (1998) (recognizing preference for parent, but noting child’s best interest is controlling); Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Minn.1989) (noting presumption exists unless parent is unfit or ‘grave and weighty’ reasons exist that ‘custody otherwise would not be in the best welfare and interest of the child’); Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 124 N.H. 138 , 467 A.2d 249, 251 (1983) (recognizing parental presumption, but making ultimate determination depend on child’s best interests); Charles v. Stehlik, 560 Pa. 334 , 744 A.2d 1255, 1257 (2000) (same); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 823 (Wyo.1970) (requiring unfitness or best interest of child, but ‘in proceedings involving children of tender years it is only in very exceptional circumstances that a mother should be deprived of the care and custody of her children’). “One reason the overwhelming majority of states do not apply simply the child’s best interests standard, or the ubiquitous, amorphous standard urged by the dissenters, is fear ‘that if taken to its logical conclusion, application of [that] standard “could lead to a redistribution of the entire minor population among the worthier members of the community.” ’ Vanessa L. Warzynski, Termination of Parental Rights: The ‘Psychological Parent’ Standard, 39 Vill. L.Rev. 737, 759 (1994) (quoting Helen Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of His Parents, 39 O. Det.

L.Rev. 347, 355 (1962)). We have applied the parental preference to avoid ‘the danger of giving courts the power to award custody ... to [nonparents] solely on the grounds of best interests. If [that] is the only criterion, then a judge may take children from their parents because the judge personally [disapproves of] the parents’ limited means.’ Turner v. ³⁸⁰ Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Alaska 1975) 28 (citing with approval In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 444 , 523 P.2d 244 (1974)). “The standard we adopt today is designed to reduce or minimize judicial opportunity to engage in social engineering in custody cases involving third parties. In contrast, under the standard urged by Justice Stein, custody would be awarded to a third party if the child’s growth and development would be ‘detrimentally affected’ by placement with a parent.

Post at 290, 748 A.2d at 589 (Stein, J., dissenting). It appears that he is urging a camouflaged child’s best interest standard. The use of such a standard to decide custody disputes between a fit parent and a third party will evolve into a ‘fitness contest’ whose outcome will depend on the whims of the trial court. Application of Justice Stein’s ‘detrimentally affected’ standard to this case reveals only that it might be detrimental to Chantel to be raised by Larry when compared to the Nelsons.

He then concludes that the Nelsons might possibly be better parents than Larry. The danger inherent in that approach is that it permits reallocation of children by the judiciary — a system that would undoubtedly victimize poor people. See Carolyn Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Between Foster Parents and Biological Parents, 16 Colum. J.L. & Soc.

Probs., 149 , 155 (1980). The standard that we adopt has as its benchmark the welfare of the child while at the same time protecting parental rights.” The New Jersey court then stated the majority view, holding: “To recapitulate, it is the relationship of the child to the person seeking custody that determines the standard to be used in deciding the custody dispute. When the dispute is between two fit parents, the best interest of the child standard controls.... But, when the dispute is between a fit parent and a third party, only the fit parent is presumed to ³⁸¹ be entitled to custody....

Viewed in that context, in custody determinations between a fit parent and a third party, as opposed to claims made between two fit parents, the child’s best interests become a factor only after the parental termination standard has been met, rather than the determinative standard itself. “The standard that controls a custody dispute between a third party and a parent involves a two-step analysis. The first step requires application of the parental termination standard 29 or a finding of ‘exceptional circumstances.’ “If either the statutory parental termination standard or the ‘exceptional circumstances’ prong is satisfied, the second step requires the court to decide whether awarding custody to the third party would promote the best interests of the child.... That said, the point to be emphasized is that the best interest of the child cannot validly ground an award of custody to a third party over the objection of a fit parent without an initial court finding that the standard for termination of the rights of a non-consenting parent or the ‘exceptional circumstances’ prong has been satisfied. Any contrary expressions in reported decisions are disapproved.” Watkins, 163 N.J. at 253-55 , 748 A.2d at 568-69 (footnotes added) (some emphasis added).

See also P.B. v. T.H., 370 N.J.Super. 586, 598 , 851 A.2d 780, 787 (App.Div.2004) (“Unless the neighbor can first establish psychological parent status ... the best interests test is never reached. Strangers may not compete with fit parents on the basis that they might be a ‘better’ parent.”); Zack v. Fiebert, 235 N.J.Super. 424 , 563 A.2d 58 (App.Div.1989). In the third party case of In re Marriage of Halvorsen, 521 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa 1994), a stepparent was attempting to gain custody over a child from the natural mother during a divorce case. The Supreme Court of Iowa, held for the natural mother, opining: ³⁸² “If Bob is considered to be a biological parent, we would apply the best interests of the child standard [the standard in contests between natural parents] ... rather than using the more difficult burden of proof required to grant custody to a nonparent over a parent. “A court may only grant a nonparent custody of a child over a parent when the nonparent proves that the parent ... is not suitable to have custody.

We have observed on more than one occasion that ‘[c]ourts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another home offers more advantages.’ “Bob is not the biological parent of [the child]. Therefore, he is a nonparent.... To succeed he must prove that [the natural mother] is an unsuitable custodian for [the child].” Id. at 728-29 (alterations added) (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals of New York, in a succinct opinion in the case of In the Matter of Merritt v. Way, 58 N.Y.2d 850, 853 , 460 N.Y.S.2d 20 , 446 N.E.2d 776, 777 (1983), summarized the law in that state: “In a custody contest between parent and nonparent, the question of best interests is not reached absent a showing of surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect or other extraordinary circumstance” (citation omitted).

New York’s lower courts still adhere to the Merritt majority view. See Sean H. v. Leila H., 5 Misc.3d 315, 783 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup.Ct.2004) (“The state may not deprive a parent of the custody of a child absent ‘surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness or other like, extraordinary circumstances.’ ” See also Campbell v. Brewster, 9 A.D.3d 620 , 779 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666 (2004) (“Only if such extraordinary circumstances are proven will the court examine the best interests of the child”) (citation omitted); In the Matter of Rudy v. Mazzetti, 5 A.D.3d 777 , 774 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (2004) (“Once there is a finding of extraordinary circumstances, a best interests determination is triggered ”) (citations omitted) ³⁸³ (emphasis added); In the Matter of Vann v. Herson, 2 A.D.3d 910, 912, 768 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (2003) (“In the event the threshold of extraordinary circumstances is satisfied, a court then proceeds to determine custody through application of the best interest standard”) (citations omitted). Several other intermediate appellate court holdings in New York are consistent with Merritt. The Maine case of Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me.2000) involved the issue of the constitutionality of Maine’s “Grandparents Visitation Act” in light of the Troxei decision of the Supreme Court finding that the Washington third party visitation act was unconstitutional.

The Maine court found its statute to be constitutional because it was sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. In the process it noted: “The Troxei opinion does, however, provide us with clear guidance on important points. First, ‘The liberty interest at issue in this case — the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this court.’ The fundamental right of parents to direct the care and upbringing of their children does not disappear in the face of a third party’s request for visitation with the children. Second, the best interests of the child standard, standing alone, is an insufficient standard for determining when the state may intervene in the decision making of competent parents.

And finally, because of the ‘presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children,’ trial courts must accord special weight to parents’ decisions and objections regarding requests for third-party visitation. “ ‘Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make ³⁸⁴ the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.’ “We agree with the trial court, however, that something more than the best interest of the child must be at stake in order to establish a compelling state interest. “The State, therefore, has an urgent, or compelling, interest in providing a forum for those grandparents having such a ‘sufficient existing relationship’ -with their grandchildren. “The court may not simply consider the best interest of the child, but must also consider and give significant weight to the parents’ position, thus preventing the court from intervening in a fit parent’s decision making simply on a best interests basis. “Again, the court must focus its attention, not solely on the determination of the best interests of the child, but also on how the visitation would affect the parent’s relationship with that child. If the court determines that visits with a grandparent will significantly interfere with the parent-child relationship, that determination precludes any further intrusion into the parent’s decision.” Id. at 297-303 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis.2d 549, 551, 553-54, 568 , 348 N.W.2d 479, 482-83, 489 (1984), a third-party custody dispute, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated: “In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the circuit court stated that it was applying the best interests of the child criteria but also stated that there were compelling reasons for not awarding custody of Michael to his mother. We conclude that the ‘best interests of the child’ is not the proper standard in custody disputes between a natural ³⁸⁵ parent and a third party and also that the record does not support a conclusion of compelling reasons for denying custody to Michael’s mother. “Other jurisdictions have had occasion to analyze the legal and social forces at work when courts have been called upon to steer the frail bark of a child’s ‘best interest’ through the cross-currents of parent-grandparent relationships, where the whirlpools of love and attachment may pull powerfully in opposite directions. “When a parent is young, the physical, financial and even emotional factors may often appear to favor the grandparents.

One cannot expect young parents to compete on an equal level with their established older relatives. So the ‘best interest’ standard cannot be the test. If it were we would be forced to conclude that only the more affluent in our society should raise children. To state the proposition is to demonstrate its absurdity. “We conclude that the rule to be followed in custody disputes between parents and third parties is that a parent is entitled to custody of his or her children unless the parent is either unfit or unable to care for the children or there are compelling reasons for awarding custody to a third party.

Compelling reasons include abandonment, persistent neglect of parental responsibilities, extended disruption of parental custody, or other similar extraordinary circumstances that would drastically affect the welfare of the child. If the court finds such compelling reasons, it may award custody to a third party if the best interests of the children would be promoted thereby.” [Citation omitted.] [Emphasis added.] [Footnote omitted.] See also Howard M. v. Jean R., 196 Wis.2d.16, 539 N.W.2d 104 (1995). In Schuh v. Roberson, 302 Ark. 305, 306 , 788 S.W.2d 740, 741 (1990), the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed a case in ³⁸⁶ which the trial court had granted custody to a third party, a grandparent who had intervened in a divorce action and in a later paternity action, over a parent’s objection. The court noted that the natural parent was claiming that she had not been found unfit and accordingly the trial court should not have granted custody to the grandparent.

The court opined noting that, “when a third person seeks to deprive a parent of custody, she cannot do so without first proving that the parent is not a suitable person to have the child” (emphasis added). Later, in an opinion consistent with Schuh , in an intermediate appellate court case in which the state sought to terminate parental rights in favor of the grandparents, Robbins v. State, 80 Ark.App. 204, 208 , 92 S.W.3d 707, 710 (2002), 30 that court opined, “As a general rule, there must be a finding of unfitness of the natural parents in order to give custody to a third party.” A different Arkansas intermediate appellate court appears to have departed somewhat from the Schuh holding. In Dunham v. Doyle, 84 Ark.App. 36, 40 , 129 S.W.3d 304, 307 (2003), the court stated, inter alia that, “While there is a preference in custody cases to award a child to its biological parent, that preference is not absolute. Rather, of prime concern, and the controlling factor, is the best interest of the child” (citation omitted).

We presume the controlling law in Arkansas is its Supreme Court’s Schuh opinion, albeit it is fifteen years old. The Nevada high court opined, in at least two earlier cases, Norris v. Graville, 95 Nev. 71 , 589 P.2d 1024 (1979) and Cole v. Dawson, 89 Nev. 14 , 504 P.2d 1314 (1973) that, “the policy of this state is to award custody to a parent, in preference to a nonparent, unless the parent is found to be unfit.” Norris, 95 Nev. at 73 , 589 P.2d at 1025 . 31 ³⁸⁷ In two separate