McNeil v. State

HOLLANDER, Judge. In this appeal, we shall construe Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”) § 12-302(c)(3) (1957, 1996 RepLVol.), which permits the State to lodge an interlocutory appeal challenging a trial court’s suppression of evidence. Anthony McNeil, appellant, was charged with armed robbery and attempted murder. When the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted appellant’s motion to suppress his confession, the State noted an appeal.

After the State sought to withdraw its appeal, the case proceeded to trial. A jury convicted McNeil of attempted second degree murder and armed robbery, for which he was sentenced to a total of 40 years imprisonment. On appeal, McNeil presents the following questions: I. Does the State’s abandonment of an interlocutory appeal require dismissal of the underlying prosecution?

II

Does the State’s abandonment of an interlocutory appeal require exclusion of any evidence acquired during the pendency of that appeal?

III

Does a trial court lack jurisdiction to try a criminal case while a State’s interlocutory appeal is pending, under C.J. 12-302? ⁴⁴² IV. Did the trial court deny the defendant his rights to confront and cross examine the witnesses against him, by improperly limiting his cross-examination? For the reasons that follow, we shall remand for further proceedings concerning the first and second questions. We shall answer the remaining questions in the negative.

Factual Summary Anthony McNeil and Blaise McNeil 1 were charged with the armed robbery and attempted murder of Pamela Mills. The State alleged that, on May 10, 1994, the two men stole money and drugs from the townhouse shared by Mills and her boyfriend and, during the robbery, McNeil shot Mills three times. On September 22, 1995, the court held a hearing on McNeil’s motion to suppress his confession. The court granted the motion, concluding that the confession was “tainted” by police questioning before McNeil was advised of his constitutional rights.

Trial was rescheduled for September 27, 1995. On that date, the State noted an appeal from the suppression order, pursuant to C.J. § 12-302(c)(3). In accordance with the statutory requirements, it certified that the appeal was not taken for purposes of delay and that the confession was material to the case. The State never paid the filing fee for the appeal, however. 2 Also on September 27,1995, the State moved to continue the trial and, because of the appeal, asked the court to find good cause for the postponement. 3 The court (Missouri, J.) ⁴⁴³ granted the continuance, but declined to find good cause for the postponement.

Instead, the court instructed counsel to obtain a new trial date consistent with statutory speedy trial requirements, and noted that “if the Court of Special Appeals is still tied up with the case, at that time then I will consider granting good cause.... ” Consistent with the court’s instructions, trial was rescheduled for November 6, 1995. On that date, Blaise pleaded guilty to assault with intent to murder. McNeil’s case was “trailed” until November 7th, apparently because his lawyer was involved in another matter. On November 7,1995, the court (McKee, J.) advised McNeil that he had received from the prosecutor a notice to withdraw the State’s appeal.

McNeil objected, asserting that the State had improperly attempted to dismiss the appeal under Md. Rule 8-203(a) and that, in any event, the State could not dismiss an appeal taken under C.J. § 12-302(c)(3). As the appeal was still pending, he also contended that the court did not have jurisdiction to try the case. The following colloquy is relevant: COURT: The record should indicate that just moments ago the State handed to me a notice of withdrawal of appeal pursuant to Rule 8-203(a) and it’s accepted by the Court. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, that rule is not the correct rule.

That is the rule for striking of a notice of appeal by the court. Now, 8-601, that being Maryland 8-601 does appear on [sic] an appellant to dismiss appeal at any time before an opinion of the court is announced by filing a notice of dismissal. But it specifies that it must be filed in the Court of Special Appeals and then a copy must be placed in the court file in the Circuit Court, if the Circuit Court still has possession of the file. ⁴⁴⁴ I point that out because the Court right now doesn’t have the jurisdiction to try this case until the State actually files it in the Court of Special Appeals. And that has two consequences.

COURT: You walk downstairs to the resident appellant [sic] judge’s chambers and a fellow down there known as Judge Chasanow, then you would have filed it with the Court of Appeals. THE STATE: The State will do that. COURT: And you’re going to do that. McNeil further asserted that the State had taken the appeal in bad faith, in order to delay the trial and gather evidence against him.

Additionally, he complained that he was not prepared for trial because he had anticipated a good cause hearing, and not a trial, on November 6, 1995. Consequently, McNeil moved to dismiss the case or exclude evidence that the State had obtained during the pendency of the appeal. In response, the prosecutor, Lloyd Johnson, explained that Kenneth Eichner, the prosecutor who had handled the suppression hearing, had resigned from the State’s Attorney’s office, and McNeil’s case had been reassigned to him. Johnson denied any “bad faith” by the State and said that he decided to withdraw the appeal after reviewing the file and determining that the appeal would be “counter productive”.

He also claimed that the filing of the appeal did not preclude the State from continuing its investigation. The court denied McNeil’s motion, and the case was reset for trial the next day. A docket entry for November 7, 1995 indicates: “Notice withdrawing the appeal to be filed by the State.” That same day, the . police reinterviewed Wayne Bishop, a special police officer in the District of Columbia, who was the fiance of McNeil’s sister. 4 Bishop had previously told police that he had accepted a shotgun as a gift from McNeil on the night of the robbery, but that he did not know anything about ⁴⁴⁵ the robbery. During the second interview, which the prosecutor attended, a police detective told Bishop that he could either talk or he would be “read his rights”.

Bishop gave the police a second statement in which he said that McNeil and Blaise had confessed to him that they had shot a woman, and that he had seen them with a woman’s purse and a large sum of money at his home. On November 8, 1995, the State filed in the circuit court a Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal. The notice, captioned “IN THE MARYLAND COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS,” requested that the State’s appeal be stricken. On the same day, the court (Spellbring, J.) heard additional argument concerning McNeil’s objections to the State’s effort to withdraw the appeal.

McNeil also formally filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief, alleging, inter alia, that it would be contrary to public policy to permit the State to benefit from its abuse of C.J. § 12-302(e)(3). Appellant conceded that the statute seems to permit the State to continue its investigation during the pendency of the appeal. But, if the State is permitted voluntarily to withdraw an appeal, he reasoned that its decision might turn on the result of its investigation, effectively encouraging the State to be dilatory in pursuing the appeal, which the statute clearly prohibits. McNeil argued that the following facts established the State’s bad faith: 1) the State never paid the filing fee for the appeal; 2) three days after the appeal was filed, the State subpoenaed at least one witness, Bishop, for the November 7, 1995 court date, evidencing its intent not to pursue the appeal; 3) the State used the delay to obtain evidence against him; 4) the State failed to advise appellant of its intention to abandon the appeal prior to the court date of November 7th; and 5) the prosecutor participated in the interview in which Bishop was told he could either talk or have his “rights read”.

The defense requested the following relief: A. Hold a full evidentiary hearing upon this motion, with testimony from all participants, such as Kenneth Eichner, Esq., Lloyd Johnson, Esq., Vickie Janof, Appeals Clerk, and Linda Anderson, Court Reporter; ⁴⁴⁶ B. Continue trial herein until such an evidentiary hearing can be held; C. Exclude from any subsequent trial any of the evidence gained by the State since the filing of the interlocutory appeal; D. Dismiss the instant matter for prosecutorial misconduct. The State responded that November 6, 1995 was intended as a trial date. The prosecutor submitted an inter-office memorandum to the court, authored by Eichner, dated October 5, 1995, which noted that the C.J. § 12-302(c)(3) appeal had been filed, but did not indicate that the November 6, 1995 date was for any purpose other than trial. Again, McNeil’s motion was denied.

The court said: I will deny the defense motion to continue this trial date. I will not consider the motion for appropriate relief ... and the supplemental memorandum in support of a motion for appropriate relief on the basis, I believe, these issues have already been handled by Judge McKee on November 7____ I will deny having any further good cause hearing other than what has already been held placed [sic] on the record before Judge McKee and me. 5 McNeil’s trial began on November 8, 1995, and he was convicted on November 14,1995. On the same day, this Court issued its mandate with respect to the State’s appeal, which said: JUDGMENT: November 7, 1995: Notice of Withdrawal of . Appeal filed by counsel for appellant.

Appeal dismissed. November 14,1995: Mandate issued. On November 22, 1995, McNeil moved for a new trial, again alleging that the State abused C.J. § 12-302(c)(3) by not diligently pursuing the appeal and by taking thé appeal for the purpose of delay. He also asserted that the prosecutor lacked ⁴⁴⁷ authority to withdraw the appeal, because only the Attorney General has the power to do so under the Maryland Constitution.

Additionally, he contended that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try McNeil, because this Court had not yet issued its mandate for the appeal. On November 28, 1995, McNeil also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the withdrawal of the appeal rendered final the issue on appeal, and the mandate from this Court constituted an affirmance of the suppression order. The State countered that McNeil’s allegation that the State pursued the appeal in bad faith was “unsubstantiated.” At sentencing, the court considered McNeil’s post-trial motions. The parties submitted a Stipulation, stating that if Eichner were called to testify, he would say that, when he “filed the appeal, he never intended to put Anthony McNeil to trial until the interlocutory appeal had been decided”, and that the court date of November 6, 1995 was intended as a trial date only if this Court had by then decided the appeal.

The trial court rejected McNeil’s argument that the prosecutor lacked authority to withdraw the appeal. It also concluded that the issuance of the mandate was not necessary to vest the trial court with jurisdiction, because the State had voluntarily dismissed its appeal. Further, the court determined that, because the appeal only challenged the suppression order, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the remainder of the case. With respect to the attack on the State’s good faith, the court stated: “I don’t find that the record supports factually the arguments made by the defense, and at this point and for that reason, I will deny the motion for new trial on that point.” The court also denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that C.J. § 12-302(c)(3) required the State to dismiss the charges against McNeil only if an appellate court affirmed the suppression order, not if the State withdrew its appeal.

We shall include additional facts in our discussion of the issues. ⁴⁴⁸ Discussion I. At common law, the State did not have a right to appeal an order granting a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. 6 Lohss v. State, 272 Md. 113, 117 , 321 A.2d 534 (1974); State v. Barshack, 197 Md. 543 , 80 A.2d 32 (1951); State v. Adams, 196 Md. 341 , 76 A.2d 575 (1950). Generally, any right to appeal that the State enjoys is grounded in a statutory provision. Adams, 196 Md. at 347-49 , 76 A.2d 575 . Prior to 1982, the State had no statutory right to appeal a suppression order, because such orders are not final judgments. 7 State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 148 , 422 A.2d 1021 (1980) (citing Neal v. State, 272 Md. 323, 324-25 , 322 A.2d 887 (1974); Pearlman v. State, 226 Md. 67, 70 , 172 A.2d 395 (1961)).

In 1982, however, the General Assembly enacted C.J. § 12-302(c)(3), which authorizes an interlocutory appeal of a suppression order under certain circumstances. While the statute provides a mechanism by which the State may obtain prompt appellate review of a trial court’s decision to suppress evidence, it does not address whether the State may withdraw an appeal. Therefore, we must resolve whether the State may withdraw an interlocutory appeal and, if so, under what circumstances. The statute provides: (i) In a case involving a crime of violence as defined in § 643B of Article 27, and in cases under §§ 286 and 286A of Article 27, the State may appeal from a decision of a trial court that excludes evidence offered by the State or re ⁴⁴⁹ quires the return of property alleged to have been seized in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Maryland, or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

(ii) The appeal shall be made before jeopardy attaches to the defendant. However, in all cases the appeal shall be taken no more than 15 days after the decision has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted. (iii) Before taking the appeal, the State shall certify to the court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence excluded or the property required to be returned is substantial proof of a material fact in the proceeding. The appeal shall be heard and the decision rendered within 120 days of the time that the record on appeal is filed in the appellate court.

Otherwise, the decision of the trial court shall be final. (iv) If the State appeals on the basis of this paragraph, and if on final appeal the decision of the trial court is affirmed, the charges against the defendant shall be dismissed in the case from which the appeal was taken. In that case, the State may not prosecute the defendant on those specific charges or on any other related charges arising out of the same incident. (v) Pending the prosecution and determination of an appeal taken under paragraph (1) or (3) of this subsection, the defendant shall be released on personal recognizance bail.

If the defendant fails to appear as required by the terms of the recognizance bail, the trial court shall subject the defendant to the penalties provided in Article 27, § 12B. (vi) If the State loses the appeal, the jurisdiction shall pay all the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal. McNeil contends that the State may not withdraw its appeal under C.J. § 12-302(c)(3), because the statute does not expressly authorize the State to do so. He argues that the restrictions that govern the appeal and the adverse conse ⁴⁵⁰ quences to the State that follow an unsuccessful appeal establish the Legislature’s intent to discourage the State from taking an appeal, in the absence of extreme circumstances.

He further argues that the State’s withdrawal evidences that it improperly appealed to obtain a delay, so that it could use the delay to gather additional incriminating evidence against him. The State counters that Maryland Rule 8-601 allows the State to dismiss an appeal any time before the appellate court issues its decision. 8 Therefore, it claims that it was permitted to dismiss the appeal. As this case requires us to construe C.J. § 12-302, we shall begin our analysis by setting forth the applicable principles of statutory construction. The cardinal rule in statutory construction is to determine and effect the intent of the Legislature.

Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995); Mayor of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88 , 656 A.2d 757 (1995); Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738 , 580 A.2d 188 (1990). The primary source for determining the Legislature’s intent is the statute itself. Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 332 Md. 279 , 631 A.2d 77 (1993); State v. Patrick A., 312 Md. 482 , 540 A.2d 810 (1988); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398 , 535 A.2d 471 (1988). To ascertain the legislative intent, we consider the words of the legislation in their “‘ordinary and popularly understood meaning, absent a manifest contrary legislative intention.’” State v. Brisker, 321 Md. 86, 92 , 581 A.2d 9 (1990) (quoting In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 520 , 471 A.2d 313 (1984)); see also Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523 , 636 A.2d 448 (1994) (finding that to determine ⁴⁵¹ the legislative intent, “the Court considers the language of an enactment and gives that language its natural and ordinary meaning”). “Giving the words their ordinary and common meaning ‘in light of the full context in which they appear, and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence,’ normally will result in the discovery of the Legislature’s intent.” Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946 (1993) (internal citations omitted).

The statute’s legislative history, and its relationship to earlier legislation, are “external manifestations of intent” which the court may consider in determining the purpose of the legislature. Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351 , 643 A.2d 906 (1994); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Pearce, 329 Md. 602 , 620 A.2d 941 (1993). Further, “[t]hat which necessarily is implied in the statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.” Soper v. Montgomery County, 294 Md. 331, 335 , 449 A.2d 1158 (1982) (citing Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Insurance Comm’r of Maryland, 293 Md. 629, 643 , 446 A.2d 1140 (1982); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dep’t., Inc. v. Board of County Comm’rs for Prince George’s County, 247 Md. 373, 377 , 231 A.2d 60 (1967); Restivo v. Princeton Constr.

Co., 223 Md. 516, 525 , 165 A.2d 766 (1960)). In analyzing the statute’s language, however, “we seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994); see also State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 8 , 629 A.2d 731 (1993) (stating that the court must reach an interpretation of a statute that is compatible with common sense). Moreover, absent a clear manifestation to the contrary, a statute should be read so that no word, sentence or section is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. Buckman, 333 Md. at 523-24 , 636 A.2d 448 ; State v. 149 Slot Machines, 310 Md. 356, 361 , 529 A.2d 817 (1987); Board of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63 , 453 A.2d 1185 (1982).

On the other hand, the rules of statutory interpretation do not permit us “under the guise of construction, to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute, or to insert exceptions not made by the Legisla ⁴⁵² ture.” Amalgamated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529, 535-36 , 212 A.2d 311 (1965). See also Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 227 , 592 A.2d 1090 (1991).

Finally, courts strictly construe statutes in derogation of the common law. Bruce v. Dyer, 309 Md. 421, 431-32 , 524 A.2d 777 (1987); James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 335 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980); MacBride v. Gulbro, 247 Md. 727, 729 , 234 A.2d 586 (1967). The purpose of C. J. § 12-302 is to permit the State to seek immediate review of a trial court’s decision suppressing evidence, in order to avoid having to proceed to trial without material evidence. 9 But the statute imposes a harsh consequence if the suppression order is upheld; the State must dismiss all charges against the defendant and cannot pursue further charges arising from the same incident. By imposing the harsh consequence of mandatory dismissal, the Legislature made clear its intent that the State should pursue appeals under the statute only in a limited number of cases, when the ⁴⁵³ suppressed evidence is important to the prosecution and the State truly believes that the trial court erred.

While the statute imposes certain restrictions on the State and the case must be dismissed if the State loses the appeal, it is readily apparent that the statute does not expressly prohibit withdrawing the appeal. Moreover, as the Court noted in Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 166-67 , 577 A.2d 14 (1990), since at least 1825, Maryland has permitted an appellant to withdraw an appeal before the appellate court issues its opinion. See Edelmann, 320 Md. at 166 , 577 A.2d 14 (citing Diffenderffer v. Hughes, 7 H. & J. 3, 4 (1825), and Newson’s v. Douglass, 7 H. & J. 417, 454 (1826)). Practical considerations also make it unlikely that the Legislature intended to bar the State from withdrawing its appeal.

The statute requires the State to decide quickly whether to lodge an appeal; an appeal must be taken within 15 days of the suppression order. Fifteen days may be insufficient time for the State to obtain and review a transcript of an evidentiary suppression hearing, in order to determine if the State has a meritorious claim to justify the risk of losing on appeal. Nor is there any basis to conclude that the Legislature intended to preclude any reconsideration by the State of its decision to appeal. Yet that would be the inevitable result if we were to adopt appellee’s position that an appeal may not be withdrawn.

Further, if, as appellant contends, only the Attorney General may act in the appellate courts, the appellate oversight provided by that office, and its interest in developing uniform policy and caselaw, would be completely frustrated if it were unable to withdraw appeals that it determined were ill advised. We also disagree with McNeil that the withdrawal of an appeal constitutes an inherent abuse of the statute. McNeil concedes that the statute contemplates that the State will continue to investigate its case, since presumably, if the State prevails in its appeal, the case will go forward. If, during the pendency of the appeal, the State uncovers new evidence that renders the suppressed evidence unnecessary to the prosecu ⁴⁵⁴ tion, the State, understandably, might opt not to incur the risk of losing on appeal.

To force the State to pursue an appeal under such circumstances would defeat the statute’s salutary purpose. McNeil argues, too, that the State’s withdrawal of the appeal should have the effect of an affirmance of the trial court’s decision, thus requiring the State to dismiss the charges against him. This argument ignores the essential purpose of the statute. The State must dismiss the charges under the statute only if the appellate court ultimately agrees with the trial court’s decision on the suppression issue.

While the withdrawal of an appeal and an affirmance by the appellate court achieve the same result, in the sense that the trial court’s suppression decision stands, they do not merit the same result under the statute. We conclude that, when an appeal is noted pursuant to C.J. § 12-302, the State is not automatically barred from withdrawing the appeal. We disagree with the State, however, that the General Assembly intended to permit the State to withdraw its appeal based on Maryland Rule 8-601. Maryland Rule 8-601 was not in effect at the time the General Assembly enacted C.J. § 12-302(c)(3).

See Board. of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63 , 453 A.2d 1185 (1982) (stating the courts presume the Legislature is aware of the existing law concerning the subject matter of a new law under consideration); see also Equitable Trust Co. v. State Comm’n on Human Relations, 287 Md. 80, 88 , 411 A.2d 86 (1980); Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 127 , 389 A.2d 341 (1978).

II

McNeil contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him because the appeal was still pending. Therefore, he asserts that his conviction is invalid. He posits two grounds for this argument. First, he asserts that since we did not issue our mandate until after the trial ended, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the case.

Second, he argues that, even if the State is entitled to withdraw its appeal, its attempt ⁴⁵⁵ to do so here was invalid because only the Attorney General is authorized to conduct proceedings in the appellate courts on behalf of the State; a prosecutor’s attempt to withdraw the appeal is not valid. As to the mandate, McNeil relies on Md. Rule 8-606, which states, in part: (a) To Evidence Order of the Court. — Any disposition of an appeal, including a voluntary dismissal, shall be evidenced by the mandate of the Court, which shall be certified by the Clerk under the seal of the Court and shall constitute the judgment of the Court. :Je sfc 4! (e) Effect of Mandate. — Upon receipt of the mandate, the clerk of the lower court shall enter it promptly on the docket and the lower court shall proceed in accordance with its terms____ While subsection (e) directs the trial court to proceed in conformity with the mandate, the rule does not expressly require the trial court to receive the mandate, or that the mandate be docketed, before proceeding with the case. In Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md.App. 620 , 675 A.2d 596 (1996), we held that the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to conduct proceedings in accordance with instructions on remand, when the trial court and the parties had received our mandate but the clerk had not yet docketed it.

Lemley is factually distinguishable because, unlike in McNeil's case, our mandate had been issued at the time the trial court proceeded. Nevertheless, Lemley offers us guidance as to the effect of Maryland Rule 8-606 on the trial court’s jurisdiction. There, we said: The mandate serves to evidence the action of the appellate court on the particular judgment appealed from and to direct the lower court to proceed according to the tenor and directions of the opinion. The docketing of the mandate is simply a clerical function.

As long as the proceedings are ⁴⁵⁶ conducted in accordance with the mandate, common sense dictates that the Rule is satisfied. Id. at 630 , 675 A.2d 596 (internal citations omitted). Further, it is the date of filing of the appellate court’s opinion that determines when the opinion is effective. First-man v. Atlantic Constr. & Supply Co., 28 Md.App. 285 , 294 n. 12, 345 A.2d 118 (1975). “The mandate ... serves to direct the lower court to proceed according to its tenor and directions...

The opinion announces the law; the decision is expressed in the opinion; the mandate is the order issued on the decision.” Id. See also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652 , 675 A.2d 1003 (1996) (holding that the court’s opinion may be an integral part of the court’s mandate when the mandate directs proceedings in conformance with the opinion or when the mandate is ambiguous). Similarly, in Stewart v. State, 287 Md. 524 , 413 A.2d 1337 (1980), the Court determined that even if a mandate had not yet issued from this Court, affirming a waiver of jurisdiction order of the circuit court, the actions of the circuit court in accepting a subsequent indictment returned by the grand jury were not a nullity. Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. at 166-67, 577 A.2d 14 , is also instructive.

Edelmann claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on a motion to rescind its decision in the absence of a mandate from this Court dismissing an appeal by the County. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It said: “Because we conclude that the appeal from the September 4 judgment had effectively been dismissed before the September 24 order of rescission was entered, we find no procedural impediment to the entry of that order.” Edelmann, 320 Md. at 166 , 577 A.2d 14 . The question here, then, is whether the State’s appeal was effectively dismissed by the prosecutor.

As we noted, the prosecutor originally attempted to withdraw the appeal under Maryland Rule 8-203(a), which permits the trial court, on motion or on its own, to strike a notice of appeal for, inter alia, failure of the appealing party to pay the ⁴⁵⁷ filling fee for the appeal. That withdrawal apparently was not docketed. Subsequently, the prosecutor sought to comply with the trial court’s suggestion to withdraw the appeal pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-601, which requires the filing of a dismissal of an appeal in the appellate court. The State concedes that the Maryland Constitution authorizes the Attorney General to conduct proceedings on behalf of the State in the appellate courts.

The Constitution provides: The Attorney General shall: (1) Prosecute and defend on the part of the State all cases pending in the appellate courts of the State, in the Supreme Court of the United States or the inferior Federal Courts, by or against the State, or in which the State may be interested, except those criminal appeals otherwise prescribed by the General Assembly. Md. Const. Art. V, § 3. The Constitution further states: It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and the Clerks of any intermediate courts of appeal, respectively, whenever a case shall be brought into said Courts, in which the State is a party or has interest, immediately to notify the Attorney General thereof.

Md. Const. Art. V, § 6. Caselaw supports the view that the State’s Attorney may act on behalf of the State only in the trial courts, and that the Attorney General must act on behalf of the State in the appellate courts. In Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475 , 348 A.2d 837 (1975), the Court considered the constitutionality of legislation that created a State Prosecutor to investigate certain crimes.

The Court struck the legislation, saying: “It seems clear to us that from and after the adoption of the Constitution of 1867, the General Assembly was without power to limit or modify the constitutional duties of either the State’s Attorneys or the Attorney General by transferring the duties of either of these offices to another officer created by statute.” Id. at 488 , 348 A.2d 837 . ⁴⁵⁸ After analyzing the constitutional powers of the Attorney General and the State’s Attorney, the Court concluded that the current Constitution, adopted in 1867, gives the State’s Attorney the “constitutional powers and duties relating to criminal prosecutions at the trial level....” Id. But the Court noted: “At the appellate level, the recreated office of Attorney General was given the constitutional duty of representing the State in carefully defined areas.” Id. Thus, Murphy suggests that the Constitution confers on the State’s Attorney the power to act in the trial courts, while the power to act in the appellate courts is conferred upon on the Attorney General. See also Hooper v. State, 293 Md. 162 , 169 n. 3, 443 A.2d 86 (1982) (when a case is pending in the appellate courts, “the Attorney General, rather than the State’s Attorney, ordinarily has the authority and responsibility to represent the State.”) The case of State v. Aquilla, 18 Md.App. 487 , 309 A.2d 44 (1973), is also instructive.

There, we considered whether certain Special Assistant State’s Attorneys were entitled to appear before the grand jury. We said: “The office of State’s Attorney, being unknown at common law, is possessed of no other powers than those prescribed by the constitutions and statutes of the State....” Aquilla, 18 Md.App. at 493 , 309 A.2d 44 . Further, we recognized that the “responsibility for prosecuting criminal eases at the trial level devolved upon the State’s Attorney by reason of his constitutional mandate as implemented by statute.” Id. (emphasis added).

These cases lead us to conclude that the State’s Attorney lacked the authority to withdraw the appeal under Maryland Rule 8-601. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the trial court