McRoy v. State

Garrity, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On April 1,1981, the appellant, James Henry McRoy, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of first degree rape, second degree rape and battery. ⁵¹⁷ The trial court merged the two lesser convictions into the first degree rape conviction and on June 2, 1981, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In an unreported per curiam opinion, McRoy v. State, No. 1014, September Term, 1981 (filed April 28, 1982), we held that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for first degree rape. We vacated that conviction.

However, we did hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the second degree rape conviction and remanded the case for resentencing on that conviction. We concurred with the trial judge that the battery conviction merged into the rape conviction. A hearing on remand was held on June 23, 1982, whereupon appellant was committed to the custody of the Division of Correction for a period of twenty years for the second degree rape conviction. It having been brought to the court’s attention that subsequent to the imposition of the original (now vacated) life sentence, appellant was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences for unrelated convictions, the trial judge directed that the twenty-year sentence be served consecutive to the three other life sentences. 1 On appeal, appellant contends that "the court below erred where, in imposing sentence after the case had been remanded, the court imposed the sentence to be served consecutively to other sentences.” We disagree.

Utilizing a convoluted system of logic, appellant contends that when considered in light of the date of his possible release, the sentence imposed at resentencing resulted in a harsher sentence and thus was violative of both state and federal principles. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 12-702(b).

In ⁵¹⁸ fact, however, a life imprisonment sentence for the first degree rape conviction was lessened by the twenty-year sentence imposed for the second degree rape conviction. In the instant case, appellant was sentenced for a different offense, i.e., second degree rape, than for his original sentence. The trial judge felt that this was an "initial sentencing” for the second degree rape conviction and had observed: I believe that sentence [for the first degree rape conviction] was vacated and that this case having been sent back, although it was denominated resentencing, that is perhaps correct, perhaps not. It is a sentencing on a second count that you’ve never previously been sentenced on and the prior sentence was indeed vacated.

It is not a question that I am modifying a sentence