Md. Classified Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. State

WILNER, Judge. The Maryland Classified Employees Association, Inc. (MCEA), Chapter 232 of that Association, and seven of the Association’s individual members, appellants here, filed an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the State of Maryland, the State Department of Human Resources, and three agencies within that Department, seeking a declaratory judgment that Chapter 491 of the 1995 Maryland Laws was unconstitutional. Appellants’ attack was on the provisions of Chapter 491 that created a four-year pilot program for the “privatization” of certain child support enforcement services in Baltimore City and Queen Anne’s County then being provided by the Department of Human Resources. Appellants contended (1) that the inclusion of those provisions into what was otherwise a “welfare reform” measure caused the bill to run afoul of the requirement in Article III, Section 29 of the Maryland Constitution that a law embrace but one subject, and (2) that, substantively, those provisions violated appellants’ Federal and State rights to due process of law.

In a Memorandum Opinion and Order, the court rejected appellants’ contentions and entered a declaratory judgment that the law did not violate Article III, Section 29 and did not deprive appellants of due process of law, under either the United States or Maryland Constitutions. We granted certiorari to consider appellants’ appeal before any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals and shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. I. INTRODUCTION One of the dominant issues of public policy facing both Congress and State legislatures in the past few years has been the fashioning of an appropriate response to popular demands ⁴ for “welfare reform”—calls for limiting entitlements to Government assistance, particularly under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and requiring competent recipients of such assistance to look to the job market, rather than to the Government, for sustenance. Caught up in that debate have also been a variety of measures to increase the effectiveness of public and private child support collection efforts, to assure that non-custodial parents are identified and made to provide regular and appropriate support for their children.

Those issues have been at the forefront of political debate in Maryland as well. They dominated the 1994, 1995, and 1996 sessions of the General Assembly. In the 1994 session, Governor Schaefer sponsored House Bill 482, authorizing a comprehensive pilot program of AFDC reform in three subdivisions of the State, but then vetoed the bill because of certain amendments added by the Legislature. See 1994 Maryland Laws at 3865.

In the 1995 session, 19 bills were introduced dealing, in one way or another, with public assistance programs, including four that were similar in nature to the vetoed House Bill 482, and 31 bills were introduced dealing with child or spousal support. We are most concerned here with two of those bills—Senate Bill 754, which was enacted as Chapter 491, and House Bill 1177, which was defeated by the Senate as a separate bill, but the provisions of which were then amended into Senate Bill 754. The sequel to the 1995 legislative activity came in 1996, when the General Assembly abolished the “welfare reform” pilot program enacted by Chapter 491 in favor of a different approach but left intact, for the remaining three years of its life, the separate pilot project of “privatizing” State child support collection efforts in Baltimore City and Queen Anne’s County, initially proposed in House Bill 1177 and then merged into Senate Bill 754. See 1996 Maryland Laws, ch. 351.

The thrust of appellants’ “single subject” attack on Chapter 491 arises from the engrafting of House Bill 1177, following its defeat in the Senate, on to Senate Bill 754. They see the two ⁵ bills as involving very different subjects, thereby causing the consolidated bill to embrace more than one subject. Particularly egregious, in their view, was the manner in which the consolidation was accomplished.

II

RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Senate Bill 754 was introduced on February 13, 1995. Designed to establish a pilot program of “welfare reform” in three subdivisions—Baltimore City and Anne Arundel and Prince George’s Counties—it followed closely the basic format of House Bill 482 from the 1994 session and was but one of several similar bills introduced into the 1995 session. See also Senate Bills 212 and 300 and House Bill 1 (1995). The basis and thrust of Senate Bill 754 were described in a preamble to the bill, which declared, among other things, that (1) for too many families, welfare had become a permanent way of life and that a system of continuous income maintenance not only destroys an individual’s incentive to become self-sufficient but also leads to intergenerational dependency; (2) the current welfare system did not reward work or efforts to seek and obtain a job but instead created an incentive to stay on welfare, that it created numerous disincentives for the maintenance of two-parent families, and that it largely ignored the role and responsibilities of the father; and (3) one of the priorities of the State was to achieve a significant reduction in the number of citizens enrolled in the AFDC program and to transform a system that fosters dependence, low self-esteem, and irresponsible behavior into one that rewards work and fosters self-reliance, responsibility, and family stability.

To help achieve those goals, the bill required the Secretary of Human Resources to establish a pilot program in Baltimore City and in Anne Arundel and Prince George’s Counties, under which the Department of Human Resources and recipients of AFDC who were not specifically exempted from the program would be required to sign an agreement imposing ⁶ certain mutual obligations. The details of the program were couched as eligibility requirements for AFDC assistance. In its initial form, the bill required AFDC recipients (1) to cooperate with their local child support enforcement office if the paternity of any of their children had not been established, (2) to participate in job search and life skills activities for one week, (3) to continue supervised job search activities for the ensuing 11 weeks, and (4) if that job search proved unsuccessful, to receive additional case management services, including a job skills assessment, job counseling, and job training. Recipients with children under three years of age would have been required to devote up to 20 hours a week to the training and work requirements; those with children over three years of age would have been required to devote up to 40 hours a week, both subject to the availability of adequate child care, which the recipient was obliged to take all reasonable steps to arrange.

Beyond the training and search provisions was an actual work requirement. The bill, as introduced, would have terminated AFDC payments after 18 months unless (1) the recipient could show good cause, in accordance with criteria set forth in the bill, for an extension, or (2) she or he fulfilled certain work requirements. The work requirement could be satisfied by working full time in either a subsidized or unsubsidized job, by doing community service interspersed with job search activities for a formulated number of hours a week, or by working at an unsubsidized job and performing community service for an aggregate of 30 hours a week. Non-compliance with these requirements would result first in temporary and then in permanent terminations of AFDC benefits.

Those features of the bill were limited to AFDC recipients in the pilot program which, as the bill initially read, was expected to include only 2,000 families—1,000 in Baltimore City and 500 each in Anne Arundel and Prince George’s Counties. See February, 1995 Fiscal Note to Senate Bill 754 prepared by Department of Fiscal Services. Other features of the bill were Statewide in application and were not limited to the pilot program. Among those features were (1) the re ⁷ quirement that AFDC recipients who were themselves minors, as a condition of eligibility, live with a parent, guardian, or other adult relative, or in an adult-supervised group living arrangement, and (2) a provision that made the parents of minor parents jointly and severally liable for the support of their grandchildren.

Senate Bill 754 was substantially amended in both the Senate Finance Committee and on the floor of the Senate. Most of the amendments dealt with the scope and conditions of the pilot program in the three subdivisions. One of the more significant amendments not keyed to the pilot program was added on the floor of the Senate on March 27, 1995. It required the Department of Human Resources to notify the Motor Vehicle Administration of persons who were obligated to pay child support to AFDC recipients and who were more than 60 days in arrears in their child support, and the Motor Vehicle Administration then, after notice and an opportunity for hearing, to suspend the driver’s license of such persons.

The amendment tracked the language of House Bill 248, which had passed the House of Delegates nine days earlier and was then sitting in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee. With its language added to Senate Bill 754, House Bill 248 died in the Senate committee. As amended, Senate Bill 754 passed the Senate on March 29 and was sent to the House of Delegates. While Senate Bill 754 was wending its way through the Senate, House Bill 1177 was being considered in the House of Delegates.

That bill, introduced on February 20, was referred to the Committee on Appropriations. The bill created a child support enforcement “privatization” pilot program within the Department of Human Resources and directed the Secretary of that Department (1) to designate Baltimore City and two counties as program areas, and (2) to adopt regulations requiring the transfer “of all aspects of child support enforcement” to one or more private contractors. The transfer was to include responsibility for locating absent parents, establishing paternities, establishing support orders, collecting and dis ⁸ bursing support payments, reviewing and modifying support orders, and enforcing support obligations. A hearing on House Bill 1177 took place in the House Appropriations Committee on March 13, 1995.

A bill analysis prepared as part of a Fiscal Note by the Department of Fiscal Services revealed that there was no centralized effort at child support enforcement in the State. In 19 counties, public child support enforcement was handled by the local department of social services—a unit within the Department of Human Resources; in two counties it was handled jointly by the county government and the local department of social services; in one eounty it was handled solely by the county government; and in one county it was handled by the clerk of the circuit court. In Baltimore City, the operation was run from the State Child Support Enforcement Administration headquarters. Administrative costs for this effort were funded by the State and Federal governments in 21 subdivisions and by Federal and local funds in three others.

See Fiscal Note on House Bill 1177 prepared by Department of Fiscal Services. The Fiscal Note also revealed the comparatively low level of recovery and high administrative cost in Baltimore City. It showed that in FY 1994, the Child Support Enforcement Agency collected $50.6 million in child support in Baltimore City, which was only 11% of total child support obligations for the City, and it spent $11. 1 million to collect that $50.6 million.1 In that one year, approximately $420 million in child support obligations went uncollected in Baltimore City. The Committee was obviously distressed by this record.

In its Floor Report on the bill, the Committee declared the rate of collection in Baltimore City “absolutely intolerable.” The Committee was presumably aware that, under Maryland Code, Family Law Article, § 10-111, the Child Support Enforcement Administration had existing authority to enter into agree ⁹ ments with public and private agencies with respect to establishing paternity, establishing liability for support, collecting support, and enforcing support orders. The Fiscal Note informed the Committee that, pursuant to that authority, the Department had recently been contracting out collection activities for cases in which there was a 60-day delinquency. Substantial opposition, in the form of both testimony and letters, was offered from the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, from employees of the Department of Human Resources, from MCEA, and from members of the public. In response to some of that opposition, the bill was amended by the Committee in a number of respects.

The program was limited to Baltimore City and one county; a contractor was required to offer employment, on terms deemed by the Secretary to be fair and equitable, to employees affected by the transfer and to retain employees accepting the offer for at least two years, subject to dismissal for cause, at a benefit level comparable to the contractor’s other similarly situated employees; and the Secretary was required to select a “demonstration site” in which the Department’s child support enforcement unit was to “compete against privatized jurisdictions in providing child support enforcement services.” One additional amendment added by the Committee, that did not seem to be in response to any recorded opposition, followed precisely the floor amendment made to Senate Bill 754: the provisions of House Bill 248, requiring suspension of the driver’s licenses of persons in default of their child support obligations to AFDC recipients, were added on to House Bill 1177. To that extent, the two bills were then parallel. The Department of Fiscal Services estimated that, through that sanction, $25.6 million in delinquent child support could be collected in the first year, of which $13.6 million would be AFDC related. As the bill reached the House floor, therefore, with that last amendment, it dealt with more than just a pilot program of “privatizing” child support enforcement, but included as well the driver’s license suspension sanction.

In its Floor Report, the Appropriations Committee observed: ¹⁰ “As amended, the bill has three main purposes. First, the bill creates a pilot child support enforcement privatization program in Baltimore City and one other county. Second, the bill creates a demonstration program in one other county to serve as a public sector competition site to the two privatized jurisdictions. Third and lastly, the bill includes the provisions of House Bill 248 to create one omnibus child support enforcement bill.” (Emphasis added.) The broader scope of the bill effected by these amendments was also reflected in the title to the bill, the caption of which was amended from “Child Support Enforcement—Privatization Pilot Program” to simply “Child Support Enforcement.” The bill, as amended, passed the House of Delegates on March 23 and was referred to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee.

By letter to the Chairman of that Committee, however, the President of the Senate suggested that, in light of the potential fiscal impact of the bill, the Committee might wish to consult with the Budget and Taxation Committee. He also noted that the Welfare Reform Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee had “considered this issue during its debate on welfare reform” and that “[i]n light of this legislation’s potential impact on the delivery of social services in Maryland and the Finance Committee’s interest in this matter,” the Judicial Proceedings Committee might also wish to consult with the Finance Committee. The Judicial Proceedings Committee held its hearing on April 5, 1995—just five days before the end of the 90-day session. As in the House, substantial opposition was offered by MCEA, this time joined by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, by several State’s Attorney’s Offices, by the Attorney General, and by individual citizens who may or may not have been Department of Human Resource's employees or connected with one of the labor organizations.

Senator Hoffman, Chair of the Budget and Taxation Committee, though supporting “the concept of privatization,” indicated that too little was known about the effect of ¹¹ “privatizing” all aspects of child support enforcement in Baltimore City and therefore recommended a delay. On the other hand, evidence was received that a child support enforcement “privatization” program in the Tidewater area of Virginia had resulted in a saving of 25% in operational costs. The contractor in Virginia reported increased collections of 11% and 12% in two areas in which it operated, compared with only a 7% increase achieved by the public agencies. The Judicial Proceedings Committee made two principal amendments to the bill.

It limited the program to Baltimore City and Queen Anne’s County, and it required that any State employee who was hired by a private contractor and who remained employed by the contractor when the pilot program was terminated could return to State service (1) at a grade and step comparable to that which the employee would have attained but for the pilot program and (2) without any diminution of benefits or seniority rights. With those amendments, it reported the bill favorably. The amendments added by the Judicial Proceedings Committee were approved by the Senate on second reading of the bill, but, on April 8, by a vote of 24 to 23, the bill was defeated on third reading. Although House Bill 1177 was dead, its provisions were not.

Senate Bill 754, with the driver’s license suspension feature taken from House Bill 248 added to it, had passed the Senate on March 29 and was then residing in the House Appropriations Committee. On April 8—-the same day on which House Bill 1177 was defeated in the Senate—the Committee made a number of amendments to the bill and, as amended, reported it favorably. Some of the amendments related to the AFDC pilot project authorized for Baltimore City and Anne Arundel and Prince George’s Counties. One substantial amendment, Statewide in application, added a controversial “family cap” provision that had been deleted from the 1994 bill (that deletion being one of the articulated reasons for the Governor’s veto).

Under that provision, subject to various conditions, an AFDC recipient would receive no increase in benefits ¹² by reason of the birth of a child 10 months or more after (1) the initial application for benefits or, (2) for current recipients, the effective date of the Federal waiver required to implement the State law. Finally, and most significantly for purposes of this case, the Committee added on to the bill the child support enforcement “privatization” provisions that had been included in House Bill 1177. On the evening of April 10—the final day for legislative action—the House approved the Appropriations Committee’s amendments, adopted a number of additional floor amendments, and passed the bill on third reading with a vote of 120 in favor and 19 opposed. Because of the House amendments, the bill was returned to the Senate for concurrence.

At 10:50 p.m., the Senate concurred in the House amendments and Senate Bill 754, as amended, passed the Senate by a vote of 46 to 1. On May 25, the enrolled bill was signed into law by the Governor as Chapter 491 of the 1995 Laws of Maryland. 2 III. DISCUSSION A. Article III, § 29 Article III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “every Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title.” As is evident from its very language, this provision contains two distinct, though related, requirements. We are concerned here only with the first—that a law embrace but one subject.

No claim has been made by appellants—nor could one legitimately be made—that the “subject” of Chapter 491 of which they complain is not adequately described in its title. We explored the history and purpose of the single subject requirement most recently in Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, ¹³ 318 Md. 387 , 568 A.2d 1111 (1990), and State v. Prince Georgians, 329 Md. 68 , 617 A.2d 586 (1993). The provision was added to our Constitution in 1851. Its purpose has been described in a number of cases, but perhaps the clearest expression came in Parkinson v. The State, 14 Md. 184, 193 (1859).

Our predecessors there noted: “It cannot be doubted, that this restriction upon the Legislature, was designed to prevent an evil which had long prevailed in this State, as it had been done elsewhere; which was the practice of blending, in the same law, subjects not connected with each other, and often entirely different. This was not infrequently resorted to for the purpose of obtaining votes, in support of a measure, which could not have been carried without such a device. And in bills of a multifarious character, not inappropriately called omnibus bills, provisions were sometimes smuggled in and passed, in the hurry of business, toward the close of a session, which, if they had been presented singly would have been rejected.” See also Allied American Co. v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 614 , 150 A.2d 421, 426 (1959), Whiting-Turner Contract. Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 361 , 499 A.2d 178, 189 (1985), and Porten Sullivan Corp., supra, 318 Md. at 402 , 568 A.2d at 1118 , summarizing the objective of the clause as “prevent[ing] the combination in one act of several and distinct incongruous subjects.” The