Miller v. Ratner

CATHELL, Judge. In 1945, the Legislature abolished the cause of action for breach of promise to marry. In the fifty-one years since, there has been no Maryland reported case in which the abolishment of that cause of action has been at issue. This, then, shall be the first.

In the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Judge Martha G. Kavanaugh granted Warren Ratner’s and Dennis Ratner’s, 1 appellees’, motions for summary judgment against Lonnie Miller, appellant. In the posture of this ease, we must presume the accuracy of all factual allegations made by appellant, the party against whom the motion was granted. Accordingly, we shall recount some of the factual matters presented to the trial judge as if true, with the realization that their truthfulness has not been litigated. Our discussion may, therefore, include some of appellant’s allegations of atrocious conduct on the part of appellees.

While, as we have said, for the purpose of this appeal, we shall presume them to be true, we will be relying on just that presumption, not proven facts. Ms. Miller and appellee, Warren Ratner, began to live together, apparently at his request. Appellant, at his request, substantially altered her lifestyle. After living with appellee for approximately three years, appellant became seriously ill with breast cancer.

He initially supported her, but later rejected her and ordered her to leave his house. She refused. ²² She alleges that Warren, and his brother Dennis, then conspired to inflict emotional distress upon her in order to cause her to vacate Warren Ratner’s house (and his life). She alleges that, while she was ill from undergoing radiation treatments, Warren repeatedly woke her up in the middle of the night admonishing her to leave. She alleges that Warren’s brother Dennis, also an appellee, telephoned her during the same period, calling her “bitch,” “whore,” and a “one-breasted woman.” He told her that his brother “deserves a whole woman, not a one breasted woman.” He told Ms. Miller on at least one occasion, “fuck you.” She further alleges that Warren repeatedly told her she was a financial burden and that she was going to die.

She proffered that Warren threatened her with bodily harm if she did not leave his house and told her that if she did not voluntarily vacate his house, he would have her put out by the ‘Woodridge boys.” Eventually, she moved out. Thereafter, she obtained a job with Universal Debit Credit. She alleges, even then, that appellees “continued to torment her” by causing her not to get the business of The Hair Cuttery, an entity owned by appel-lees or by a corporation evidently controlled by them. She also alleges that Warren filed a false claim in the bankruptcy proceedings she ultimately was forced to file.

Appellant presents twelve questions: 1. Was the contract Plaintiff and Defendant Warren Ratner entered into a contract to marry? 2. Was illicit sexual intercourse consideration for the contract the Plaintiff and Defendant Warren Ratner entered into? 3. Was Defendant Warren Ratner acting adversely to Creative Hairdressers, Inc. or within the scope of his' authority when he interfered with the Plaintiff’s prospective advantage? 4.

Was Defendant Warren Ratner’s conduct toward the Plaintiff intentional or reckless? 5. Was Defendant Warren Ratner’s conduct toward the Plaintiff extreme and outrageous? ²³ 6. Was there a causal connection between Defendant Warren Ratner’s wrongful conduct and the Plaintiffs emotional distress? 7. Did the Plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress due to Defendant Warren Ratner’s conduct? 8.

Did Defendant Warren Ratner conspire with Defendant Dennis Ratner to commit an unlawful act? 9. Was Defendant Dennis Ratner’s conduct toward the Plaintiff intentional or reckless? 10. Was Defendant Dennis Ratner’s conduct toward the Plaintiff extreme and outrageous? 11. Was there a causal connection between Defendant Dennis Ratner’s wrongful conduct and the Plaintiffs emotional distress? 12.

Did the Plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress due to Defendant Dennis Ratner’s conduct? We shall respond only to those questions necessary to our resolution of the main issues. We begin by examining appellant’s Complaint and amended complaints. The original complaint provided in paragraph four that Warren Ratner asked her to move in with him.

In paragraphs five and six, appellant asserted that: 5. ... There was a mutual understanding that the defendant and the plaintiff were making a permanent commitment that would be followed by marriage. 6. The plaintiff relied upon the defendant’s promises and moved into what the defendant referred to as “our home.... ” In anticipation of their marriage, the defendant told [her] that he had “plenty of money” and that he would take care of her. [Emphasis added.] In Count I of the original complaint, Breach of Contract, the a foregoing provisions were incorporated “as if they were fully repeated and set forth again” therein. They were also, likewise, incorporated in Count II, Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage, and Count III, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Thereafter, appellant filed a Scheduling ²⁴ Conference Statement, in which she alleged, in part, that she and appellee Warren Ratner “were engaged to be married.” Subsequently, an Amended Complaint was filed. In that amended complaint appellant reiterated: 5. ... There was a mutual understanding that the defendant and the plaintiff were making a permanent commitment that would be followed by marriage. 6. The plaintiff relied upon the defendant’s promises and moved---- In anticipation of their marriage, the defendant told the plaintiff ... that he would take care of her. [Emphasis added.] Again, appellant incorporated those statements into each of her counts, stating, as she did in the original complaint, that the allegations were incorporated “as if they were fully repeated and set forth again herein.” Thereafter, appellant filed a Second Amended Complaint.

That complaint added an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress count, in which appellant incorporated, “as if fully set forth herein, the entire Amended Complaint, ” thereby adding the above statements about marriage promises to that new count. (Emphasis added.) Subsequently, appellant filed a Third Amended Complaint that added a civil conspiracy count. In it, she again incorporated “as if fully set forth herein, the entire amended complaint and Second Amended Complaint,” thereby incorporating into the civil conspiracy count the marriage promises we have above quoted. (Emphasis added.) Warren Ratner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Third Amended Complaint.

Count I was the Breach of Contract count against Warren, Count II was the Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage count against Warren, and Count III was the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress count against Warren. Count IV alleged a civil conspiracy by both Warren and Dennis Ratner to “inflict” severe emotional distress on Ms. Miller. In Warren Ratner’s motion, his counsel argued that appellant’s “claims” were, in substance, claims for breach of prom ²⁵ ise to marry and that these were barred under the law of Maryland; that her breach of contract claim was not actionable “because it [was] based on consideration for illicit sexual intercourse;” and that appellant was precluded from maintaining a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because she had not suffered a severely disabling injury from appellees’ conduct. Warren Ratner also disclaimed liability for tortious interference with prospective advantage as a matter of law.

Dennis Ratner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on his behalf as to the counts against him. He incorporated Warren’s position and arguments and further expounded upon them as deemed necessary. Ultimately, the trial judge granted both motions for summary judgments. She opined: Although I have sympathy for Ms. Miller [appellant], I fail to see how the Court would uphold this contract as enforceable when we do have a statutory scheme that is outlined in detail for married partners upon the dissolution of marriage, why this plaintiff would be able to come into court as an unmarried person and enforce this contract when it was never considered by the legislature to be valid.

As far as the intentional infliction of mental distress, I have reviewed the cases. I have looked at all the labor dispute ones, and I would agree with Mr. Brault [counsel for Warren Ratner] that every relationship that breaks up has emotional distress, but I do not believe that our Court of Appeals at this time is willing to, under these facts, uphold a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress. I think allowing this lawsuit to go forward would open the floodgates, and I am not -willing at this point to make this public policy. So, for that reason, I am going to grant summary judgment motions on all counts. [Emphasis added.] While the trial court’s comment can be construed to be a comment on the “palimony” issue, its comments, especially the comment as to an unmarried person enforcing a contract ²⁶ “never considered by the legislature to be valid” can be equally construed to be applicable to the law enacted by the Legislature in 1945 that then declared such contracts “absolutely void.” We shall affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees.

The Law In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, we are concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists. Arnold Developer, Inc. v. Collins, 318 Md. 259, 262 , 567 A.2d 949 (1990); Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 408 , 559 A.2d 365 (1989); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985); Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137, 170-71 , 607 A.2d 82 (1992). “A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.” King, 303 Md. at 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8 , 327 A.2d 502 (1974)). “A dispute as to a fact ‘relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment.’ ” Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md.App. 236, 242-43 , 603 A.2d 1357 (1992) (quoting Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 40 , 300 A.2d 367 (1973)). We have further opined that in order for there to be disputed facts sufficient to render summary judgment inappropriate, “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 244, 603 A.2d 1357 .

The Court of Appeals has stated that “the proper standard for reviewing the granting of a summary judgment motion should be whether the trial court was legally correct.” Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 592 , 578 A.2d 1202 (1990) (citations omitted). The trial court, in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-501(e), shall render summary judgment forthwith if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of ²⁷ law. The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact that is sufficiently material to be tried. See Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247 , 434 A.2d 564 (1981); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 304 , 413 A.2d 170 (1980).

Thus, once the moving party has provided the court with sufficient grounds for summary judgment, [i]t is ... incumbent upon the other party to demonstrate that there is indeed a genuine dispute as to a material fact. He does this by producing factual assertions, under oath, based on the personal knowledge of the one swearing out an affidavit, giving a deposition, or answering interrogatories. “Bald, unsupported statements or conclusions of law are insufficient.” Lowman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 68 Md.App. 64, 70 , 509 A.2d 1239 , cert. denied, 307 Md. 406 , 514 A.2d 24 (1986) (citation omitted; some emphasis added). With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case sub judice. We note again that if appellant’s representations are accurate and true, the actions and words of appellees were at the least reprehensible.

Appellant’s representations, however, may not be accurate. Because of the posture of the case, our function is to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment even if it, and we, assume appellant’s representations as to appellees’ conduct are true. In other words, if such vile conduct did occur, is it actionable. Can appellees be sued for it?

We shall break down our consideration of the case to (1) appellees’ assertions that this is really a case for breach of promise to marry, especially as to those counts that traditionally would constitute that type of cause of action or inferentially could, and (2) if necessary, to appellees’ assertion that whatever counts are not directly resolvable by the application of the Maryland bar against suits for a breach of promise to marry are otherwise unmaintainable under the circumstances here present. We look first to the statute that prohibits ²⁸ actions for a breach of promise to marry and the Legislature’s purpose in enacting it. The common-law causes of action for breach of promise to marry and for alienation of affections were first abolished in this State in 1945 by the enactment of Chapter 1010, House Bill 341. The prohibitions as to both causes of action have been codified together throughout all of the subsequent statutory history.

The original act included an express statement of public policy that was included in the first several reenactments, but not specifically included, although acknowledged, in later codifications. We include that original declaration of policy here in order to emphasize the importance that the General Assembly attached to the abolition of these causes of action. PROHIBITED ACTIONS 1. (Declaration of Public Policy of State.) The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of actions based upon alleged alienation of affections and alleged breach of promise to marry, having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims of circumstances and such remedies having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of crime and in many cases having resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the public policy of the State that the best interests of the people of the State will be served by the abolition of such remedies.[ 2 ] ²⁹ 1945 Md. Laws, Chap. 1010; Md.Code (1951), Art. 75C, § 1; Md.Code (1957), Art. 75C, § 1. ³⁰ We suspect that we would be hard pressed to find a stronger expression of a legislative entity’s attitude of repugnance towards a cause of action in statutory language.

Moreover, the legislature attempted to make sure that the causes of actions therein abolished could not thereafter be incidentally recreated or resurrected by subsequent act. It provided what we perceive to be an attempt to foreclose waiver and estoppel issues by limiting, perhaps us, and perhaps even itself, from undoing the effects of the legislation when it included a provision we do not recall seeing with any great frequency in other legislative acts. Chapter 1010 provided: 4. (Legal Effect of Certain Acts Hereafter Occurring.) No act hereafter done within this State shall operate to give rise, either within or without this State, to any of the rights of action abolished by this Article.

The Act declared, in very broad language (perhaps even broad enough had it survived to this date to foreclose efforts to create “palimony” actions 3 ), that certain contracts were void as against public policy: All contracts and instruments of every kind, name, nature or description, which may hereafter be executed within this State in payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise of any claim or cause of action abolished or barred by this Article, whether such claim or cause of action arose within or without this State, are hereby declared to be contrary to the public policy of this State and absolutely void. It shall be unlawful to cause, induce or procure any person to execute such a contract or instrument; or cause, induce or procure any person to give, pay, transfer or deliver any money or thing of value in payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise of any such claim or cause of action;[ 4 ] or to ³¹ receive, take or accept any such money or thing of value as such payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise. It shall be unlawful to commence or cause to be commenced, either as party or attorney, or as agent or otherwise in behalf of either, in any court of this State, any proceeding or action seeking to enforce or recover upon any such contract or instrument, knowing it to be such, whether the same shall have been executed within or without this State; provided, however, that this action shall not apply to the payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise of any causes of action which are not abolished or barred by this Article, or any contracts or instruments heretofore executed or to the bona fide holder in due course of any negotiable instrument which may be hereafter executed. It then went even further by providing criminal penalties for violations of the Act: 7.

(Penalties.) Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor which shall be punishable by a fine of not less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment for a term of not less than one (1) year not more than five (5) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court. 1945 Md. Laws, Chap. 1010. The statute also stated that it was intended to be remedial and to “be liberally construed to effectuate the objects and purposes thereof and the public policy of the State as hereby declared.” 1945 Md. Laws, Chap. 1010. The statute was later codified unchanged as Article 75C of the 1951 Annotated Code of Maryland. Subsequently, it was included relatively intact in the 1957 Annotated Code of Maryland, again as Article 75C.

In the subsequent recodification of several statutes into the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article by Chapter 2 of the 1973 Special Session Laws of ³² Maryland, Section 5-301, which barred actions for alienation of affections and breach of promise to marry, was created. There were, as related to the case sub judice, no substantive changes. The revisor’s note to this recodification stated: The specific declarations of public policy are not included in this section as it is believed they are well understood and the need for repeating them is minimal; nevertheless these considerations are still relevant, and there is no intention to affect them by the repeal of §§ 1-9 [of the previous statute]. Md.Code (1974), § 5-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Interestingly, this codification of the previous statute into the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article still retained the provisions making it a criminal offense, subject to fines of $500 and imprisonment for a minimum of one year and up to five years for anyone attempting to assert a breach of promise to marry or alienation of affection claim (except as to a pregnant plaintiff). See Md.Code (1974), § 5-301(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Subsequently, by Chapter 214 of the 1986 Acts, the provisions providing for criminal penalties were repealed. 5 The bar to actions for breach of promise to marry and alienation of affections was subsequently recodified in separate sections of the Family Law Article. See 1984 Md. Laws, Chap. 296.

Section 3-102 of the Family Law Article states that “[u]nless the individual is pregnant, an individual: (1) has no cause of action for breach of promise to marry; and (2) may not bring a cause of action for breach of promise to ³³ marry regardless of where the cause of action arose.” 6 The revisor’s note to the recodification in the Family Law Article provided: This section is new language derived without substantive change from the second sentence of former CJ § 5-301(a). In subsection (a) of this section, the language “has no cause of action for alienation of affections” is substituted for the former language that stated that the “cause of action for alienation of affections is prohibited” to clarify legislative intent to bar the right as well as to prohibit the remedy. 1984 Md. Laws, Chap. 296. We have included this rather extensive review of the predecessor statutes for two primary purposes: (1) to emphasize what we view as the extraordinarily strong statement of public policy that is evidenced by (i) the statement first found in the original enactment and repeated and/or reaffirmed since then, (ii) the initial effort by the General Assembly to forbid any future modifications (apparently by the judiciary) of its prohibitions, and (iii) the creation of a criminal offense with severe criminal sanctions for those attempting to ignore the proscription, including attorneys — criminal sanctions that remained intact until recently; and (2) to emphasize that the prohibitions against both breach of promise to marry and alienation of affections actions were originally enacted together under the same strong public policy statement and criminal penalty sanctions, and have remained together, if not as twins as close siblings, throughout all of the rest of the history of the statute. Accordingly, in our resolution of these issues, we shall remain cognizant of the strong statement of public policy and, until relatively recent times, the criminal character of attempts to circumvent the law.

We shall also consider closely those cases involving alienation of affections, as we perceive them to be so closely related as to have strong precedential value in respect to breach of promise to marry cases. ³⁴ As we previously noted, in the fifty-one years since the statute prohibiting cases for breach of promise to marry was enacted, there has, apparently, been no reported Maryland case construing it. 7 As we shall indicate later, our finite review of foreign jurisdictions indicates that there has not been developed a substantial body of law elsewhere relating specifically to the application of statutory proscriptions to breach of promise to marry cases, although there are several cases we will address. Most of the limited foreign consideration, like Maryland’s case-law treatment of this type of proscription, has been generally limited to cases involving the statutory prohibitions of alienation of affections actions and, to some extent, actions for criminal conversation. We shall rely for some guidance on the treatment of those causes of action given their close association with breach of promise to marry actions. We initially note that our late Chief Judge Gilbert briefly noted, as dicta, in the fraud case of Collection & Investigation Bureau of Maryland, Inc. v. Linsley, 37 Md. App. 66, 68 , 375 A.2d 47 (1977), the historical origins of the bar to breach of promise actions.

Speaking to the original enactment of the Statute of Frauds by the English Parliament during the reign of King Charles II, 1660-1688, Chief Judge Gilbert stated: Other provisions of § TV of the Statute [of Frauds] have been lifted from that act and are now codified in various articles of the Maryland Code annotated, or as in the case of suits for breach of promise barred as a cause of action, unless the plaintiff is pregnant. [Citing then section 5-301(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article; footnote omitted.] It appears that the bar has been a part of English jurisprudence since the 1600’s. If so, Maryland’s prohibition was somewhat belated. The earliest mention in Maryland cases we have found of the statutory prohibition of breach of promise to marry and ³⁵ alienation of affections suits occurred in the deceit case of Babb v. Bolyard, 194 Md. 603, 607-08 , 72 A.2d 13 (1950), in which the Court of Appeals noted: The common law of torts, like the Statute of Frauds, reflects the public policy that the cause of justice should not be thwarted by a pursuit of abstract justice which does more harm than good. The same public policy is embodied and expressed in Chapter 1010 of the Acts of 1945, which abolishes rights of action for breach of promise to marry and for alienation of affections.

By mention of this act we do not intimate that any provision of the act is or is not constitutional. [Citation omitted.] Another of the few early mentions of the statutory proscription at issue here was in the defamation and criminal conversation ease of Di Blasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512 , 197 A.2d 245 (1964). In an earlier suit, Kolodner’s client, Rezek, (Ko-lodner was an attorney) brought suit against Di Blasio alleging that Di Blasio had “debauched and carnally knew” the client’s wife and had impregnated her. There were several counts in the original suit, all encompassed by the criminal conversation allegations. Di Blasio, in the original suit, moved for judgment on the ground that the criminal conversation action was really an alienation of affections action and that such actions had been abolished.

Rezek asserted that it was a criminal conversation action, which had not been abolished. Subsequently, while the criminal conversation suit was pending, Di Blasio sued Rezek and Kolodner for libel based on their allegations against him in the original action. The Court, in the second action, found it necessary to discuss the statute abolishing actions for alienation of affections and breach of promise to marry. The Court first discussed parts of the Legislature’s public policy statement that we have heretofore recounted.

It then noted that alienation of affections and criminal conversation are separate, though closely related, torts. Following the lead of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and citing that court’s cases, the Di Blasio Court held that the tort of criminal conversation had not been abolished. The Court, in doing so, and in ³⁶ comparing the public policy statements of the Pennsylvania and Maryland statutes, noted that “our public policy is declared only as to the causes of action mentioned [breach of promise and alienation of affection].” The Court (albeit probably as dicta in that it was describing a statute it was holding did not apply to its case) then opined: We find no reason for holding that the General Assembly did not mean exactly what it said — no more and no less— with regard to the kinds of causes of action which it undertook to abolish. It will be observed that even as to one of such causes of action which it did undertake to abolish generally — breach of promise to marry — it carefully made an exception “in cases wherein pregnancy exists.” Our Art. 75 C says nothing whatever about causes of action for criminal conversation, and we think that they are not abolished by it.

See Antonelli v. Xenakis [ 363 Pa. 375 , 69 A.2d 102 (1949) ]. Our reading of Art. 75 C as covering only the two causes of action specifically mentioned in it is in accord with Judge Markell’s description of its scope in Babb v. Bolyard, supra. We cannot read into § 9 of Art. 75 C, which provides for liberal construction to effectuate the objects and purposes of the Article and the public policy of the State thereby declared, any broadening of the statute so as to make it operative beyond the field which it undertakes to cover. See Franklin v. Franklin, 1 Md. Ch. 342, 344 , holding that remedial statutes are “to be construed liberally to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief,” but are “not to be so expanded as to comprehend cases altogether beyond their purview[.]” Di Blasio, 233 Md. at 519-20 , 197 A.2d 245 .

The Di Blasio Court then discussed whether, given that the statute had abolished alienation of affections (and breach of promise) actions, Rezek’s allegations in the original complaint as to alienation of affections, would, considering the language of the statute, enjoy any privilege in the defamation case. The Court, after noting that words spoken in litigation must be relevant in order to be privileged, stated: ³⁷ The authorities which we have referred to earlier in this opinion in considering whether causes of action for criminal conversation have or have not been abolished make clear the close relationship between alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Indeed, the appellant’s argument is that the connection is so close that the abolition of the one carried with it the abolition of the other. That the allegations of alienation of affections were ordered to be deleted does not destroy that relationship and hence does not destroy the privilege.

The appellant urges that to uphold the privilege here would circumvent the legislative purpose embodied in Art. 75 C. We note, however, that the Legislature itself has provided sanctions for violation of the statute, which it apparently deemed sufficient and which do not include abolition of the privilege, if the Legislature desires to remove the privilege, it can easily amend the statute. Di Blasio, 233 Md. at 523 , 197 A.2d 245 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals later abolished the tort of criminal conversation in Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585 , 414 A.2d 929 (1980). It noted the statutory prohibitions of Chapter 1010 of the Acts of 1945: An examination of the judicial and legislative history of this cause of action in Maryland shows that in 1945 the Legislature enacted chapter 1010, Laws of Maryland 1945, which abolished, among other things, the cause of action for alienation of affections.

That action, which arose when a person induced a married woman to leave her husband or otherwise interfered with the marital relationship, even though no act of adultery was committed, was recognized long ago as separate and distinct from the action for criminal conversation. See Annarina v. Boland, 136 Md. 365, 374 [ 111 A. 84 ] (1920); Callis v. Merrieweather, 98 Md. 361, 363, 365 [ 57 A. 201 ] (1904). In 1964, this Court held that the Legislature, assumably aware of our decisions, Supervisor of Assessments v. Southgate Harbor; 279 Md. 586, 591-92 [ 369 A.2d 1053 ] (1977); Herbert v. Gray, 38 Md. 529, 532 (1873), did not abolish the separate and distinct action for ³⁸ criminal conversation when it abolished the action for alienation of affections. Di[]Blasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 520 [ 197 A.2d 245 ] (1964).

In 1976, this Court recognized that the husband’s action for criminal conversation was related to the State’s special interest in the domestic relations of its citizens and remained viable. Geelhoed [v. Jensen], 277 Md. [220,] 233 [ 352 A.2d 818 (1976)]. As recently as 1977, the Legislature, again assumably aware of our decisions, rejected House Bill 170 which expressly provided that the action for criminal conversation be abolished. Journal of Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, Regular Session 1977, pp. 3034, 3514; Journal of Proceedings of the House of Delegates of Maryland, Regular Session 1977, pp. 162, 2397, 2904.

Kline, 287 Md. at 590 , 414 A.2d 929 . The Kline Court, after noting the passage in 1977 of Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Maryland’s “Equal Rights Amendment,” commented that the action of criminal conversation could only be brought by and against men and therefore any “previous implicit approval by this Court ... is eradicated.” 287 Md. at 593, 414 A.2d 929 . The Court then abolished the action. In Kline , the Court there additionally opined as to the reasons for abolishing the action of criminal conversation.

These reasons are similar to those given by several authorities, for abolishing actions for breach of promise to marry and alienation of affections: The action for criminal conversation is notorious for affording a fertile field for blackmail and extortion because it involves an accusation of sexual misbehavior. Criminal conversation actions may frequently be brought, not for the purpose of preserving the marital relationship, but rather for purely mercenary or vindictive motives. An award of damages does not constitute an effective deterrent to the act of adultery, and it does not effectively help to preserve or restore a marital relationship in which adultery has already occurred. Indeed, a contested trial may destroy a ³⁹ chance to restore a meaningful relationship.

In addition, this action, which eliminates all defenses except the husband’s consent and which imposes liability without any regard to the quality of the marital relationship, is incompatible with today’s sense of fairness. Most important, today’s sense of the increasing personal and sexual freedom of women is incompatible with the rationale underlying this action. For all of these reasons, this harsh cause of action has been considered to be unreasonable and anachronistic. Id. at 588-89 , 414 A.2d 929 (footnote and citations omitted).

The more recent case of Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642 , 584 A.2d 69 (1991), was one of the few cases in which the Court permitted an action similar to alienation of affections to be maintained, but only because of a professional relationship upon which the cause could be separately and independently grounded. It involved an action brought for professional negligence against a psychologist who had treated a husband and wife. The husband and wife alleged that Nickel, the psychologist, committed malpractice by advising the husband to be distant from and not to have sexual relations with his wife, while at the same time, Nickel was having sexual relationships with the woman. Nickel argued that the act he had committed was either criminal conversation or alienation of affections, or both and that these causes of action had been abolished in Maryland. 8 Nickel argued that the complaint against him was a mere “refitting of the abolished actions into other forms.” Refusing to find the action to be prohibited, the Court of Appeals focused on the professional relationship of the parties that was independent ⁴⁰ of Nickel’s personal relationship with the wife.

The Court noted: We do not agree with Nickel’s contention that the affair was his private concern wholly separate from his professional practice. The trier of fact may find it was professional malpractice for a psychologist engaged in marriage counseling to maintain a sexual relationship with his patient’s spouse. See Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C.App. 170 , 300 S.E.2d 833, 838 , petition for discretionary review denied, 309 N.C. 192 , 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983). We doubt that the standard of care exercised by a reasonable psychologist permits the practitioner to treat a patient in the confines of the office and then undermine that treatment outside the therapy session....

At trial, Torres [the husband] should be given the opportunity to establish likewise that a psychologist’s duty to his patient does not stop at the office door. See also Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me. 1986).... On the surface, the allegations of improper sexual conduct set forth in Torres’ complaint may constitute criminal conversation;[ 9 ] however, if in addition, the sexual activity violated the professional standard of care which Nickel owed to Torres, it is sufficient to support a cause of action for professional negligence. [Emphasis added.] Figueiredo-Torres, 321 Md. at 650-51 , 584 A.2d 69 . We have examined closely and extensively the record forwarded. to us for any indication that Ms. Miller’s cause of action is based on anything other than her previous personal relationship with Warren Ratner that was, according to the averments of her complaints — made by her applicable to all counts — and her subsequent deposition testimony, based on their “permanent commitment that would be followed by marriage” and “promises ... [i]n anticipation of their marriage.” At one point, a document proffered by her contained her assertion that she and Warren were engaged to be ⁴¹ married.

We have found no indication of any other fundamental relationship between the parties or other basis for the actions filed. What appellant attempts to do in this case is similar to what the plaintiff attempted to do in Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367 , 533 A.2d 1358 (1987), cert. denied, 311 Md. 718 , 537 A.2d 272 (1988). That case involved an action by a husband against a marriage counselor, who the husband asserted had caused a divorce by having sexual relations with the husband’s wife. The husband sued the counselor and the counselor’s employer, Lighthouse, Inc., for breach of their contractual obligation to “help the plaintiff and his wife solve the marital difficulties”; malicious breach of contract; breach of fiduciary duty; two counts of negligence; intentional infliction of emotional distress; malicious interference with the marriage contract of the husband and his wife; and loss of consortium.

We noted that the question there before us was whether “a husband can do indirectly what he cannot do directly” — ie., bring a suit that was, although not in those terms, for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Id. at 370, 533 A.2d 1358 . After noting that the abolition of actions for criminal conversation and alienation of affections did not preclude traditional contract and tort actions, we stated: What is precluded, however, is the refitting of the abolished actions into other forms. One cannot sue to recover for injuries arising from “defilement of the marriage bed” or from an interference with the marriage by simply casting the defendant’s conduct as a breach of contract, or negligence, or some other intentional tort.

It is that kind of sham that the case law prevents. See, in general, Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.App. 35 , 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968); Destafano v. Grabrian, 729 P.2d 1018 (Colo.Ct.App.1986); Goldberg v. Musim, 162 Colo. 461 , 427 P.2d 698 (1967); Lund v. Caple, 100 Wash.2d 739 , 675 P.2d 226 (1984); Arnac v. Wright, 163 Ga.App. 33 , 292 S.E.2d 440 (1982); Harrington v. Pages, 440 So.2d 521 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983). ⁴² Gasper, 73 Md.App. at 372 , 533 A.2d 1358 . After disposing of several of the counts, we looked at the real basis for the professional malpractice counts: Counts IV and V sound in professional malpractice. Such an action may well lie against a marriage counselor who fails to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his or her calling.

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A. But, as with the breach of contract action, we have to examine not merely the form of the action but its real basis. It is clear from the incorporation of the underlying allegations and the absence of any other articulated negligence that the sole basis of these actions was Derby’s cuckolding activity. It is therefore precluded.

Destafano v. Grabrian, supra, 729 P.2d 1018 . Likewise Count VI. Lund v. Caple, supra, 675 P.2d 226 , and cf. Harrington v. Pages, supra, 440 So.2d 521 . Gasper, 73 Md.App. at 373-74 , 533 A.2d 1358 (emphasis added); see also Homer v. Long, 90 Md.App. 1, 17 , 599 A.2d 1193 (affirming trial court’s dismissal of negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims brought by nonpatient husband against psychiatrist who was treating husband’s wife and having sexual relations with her “because ... the real injury for which recovery is sought is either the adultery or the breakup of the marriage”), cert. denied, 326 Md. 177 , 604 A.2d 444 (1992).

Likewise, in the case sub judice, each and every count contained in appellant’s complaints incorporated that her action was, at least in part, based upon “a permanent commitment ... followed by marriage” and “promises” and that Warren Ratner “[i]n anticipation of their marriage ... would take care of her.” For us to reverse the grants of summary judgment in favor of appellees would require this Court to ignore the underlying bases, proffered by Ms. Miller herself, for all of her claims. The statute, by its very terms, was intended to be and is remedial and is to be construed liberally to effectuate that remedial purpose. The Court of Appeals broadly construed provisions of the Intrastate Detainer Act, Md. Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 616S, in the ⁴³ criminal case of State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195 , 328 A.2d 737 , aff'g, 20 Md.App. 262 , 315 A.2d 117 (1974). The Court recognized that the defendant’s attorney argued “that the provisions of both the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Md.Code (1957, 1971 RepLVoL), Art. 27, §§ 616A-616R] and intrastate acts are remedial in nature, are in pari materia, are identical ‘as to purpose and rationale,’ and that both should be liberally construed to effectuate the objects of the legislation.” 273 Md. at 204, 328 A.2d 737 .

Although the Court did not entirely agree, it commented: Nor do we believe that the failure in § 616S to provide that the statute shall be “liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose,” as is provided in § 616J, is here material since both statutes at the time of enactment were common in derivation and purpose, were remedial in nature, designed to correct existing law, to redress existing grievances and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good; as such they are to be liberally construed in order to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief. See Fisher v. Bethesda Discount Corp., 221 Md. 271 [ 157 A.2d 265 ] (1960); Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115 [ 48 A.2d 754 ] (1946); Ordway v. Central National Bank, 47 Md. 217 (1877). ... Relating as they both do to the same general subject matter and directed at attaining the same basic results, the provisions pertaining to both interstate and intrastate detainers are in pari materia and should be construed together so that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general object and scope. See Board of Fire Comm’rs v. Potter, 268 Md. 285 [ 300 A.2d 680 ] (1973); Valle v. Pressman, 229 Md. 591 [ 185 A.2d 368 ] (1962); May v. Warnick, 227 Md. 77 [ 175 A.2d 413 ] (1961); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti 227 Md. 8 [ 174 A.2d 768 ] (1961); Baltimore Transit Employees Credit Union v. Thorne, 214 Md. 200 [ 134 A.2d 84 ] (1957).

Barnes, 273 Md. at 208-09 , 328 A.2d 737 (emphasis added); see also Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 77 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986) (“In view of [the statute’s] clear remedial ⁴⁴ purpose, a liberal construction of the statute is required.” (citation omitted)); Culotta v. Raimondi, 251 Md. 384, 389 , 247 A.2d 519 (1968) (“There is no impropriety in putting a liberal construction on a remedial clause____”). But see In re Roger S., 338 Md. 385, 393 , 658 A.2d 696 (1995) (“Even a remedial statute should not be construed so broadly as to create ... ‘ “results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense.” ’ ” (citations omitted)); University of Maryland Medical Sys. Corp. v. Erie Ins.

Exch., 89 Md.App. 204, 215 , 597 A.2d 1036 (1991) (A remedial statute should not be interpreted “more broadly than is necessary to accomplish [its] purpose.”). In a case in which the plaintiff was attempting to extend loss of consortium claims to persons who were engaged, we rejected the claim and commented on the prohibition at issue in the case sub judice. Judge Bloom, writing for the Court, noted in Gillespie-Linton v. Miles, 58 Md.App. 484, 496 , 473 A.2d 947 (1984): We also note that the General Assembly has abrogated the right to sue for breach of a promise to marry. Md. Cts. & Jud.

Proc.Code Ann. § 5-301. “It would be anomalous to permit a[n engaged] person to recover for the loss of consortium yet deny that