Moore v. Moore

HOLLANDER, J. This case requires us to construe a provision in a marital separation agreement with respect to the husband’s alimony obligation. We must determine whether the provision obligating Edwin Gibbons Moore, III, appellant, to pay alimony to ²⁹⁴ Suzanne Gibbs Moore, appellee, terminated upon appellee’s remarriage, when the agreement expressly specified that alimony was “non-modifiable” and payable for a fixed term, but did not expressly state that it would continue upon appellee’s remarriage. The parties were divorced on March 13, 2000, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In connection with the divorce proceeding, they executed a Voluntary Separation and Property Settlement Agreement (“Separation Agreement” or “Agreement”), dated March 2, 2000, which was incorporated but not merged into the Judgment of Absolute Divorce.

A few months later, on September 2, 2000, appellee remarried. As a result, appellant immediately ceased his alimony payments. Consequently, in January 2001, appellee filed a “Request for Entry of Money Judgment,” to recover the unpaid alimony and attorney’s fees. The. court granted appellee’s request on June 28, 2001, and entered judgment against appellant for $8333.33, a sum equal to the alimony arrearages.

The court subsequently awarded appellee attorney’s fees of $750 on August 20, 2001. Appellant timely noted his appeal and presents two issues for our review: I. Whether the Appellant’s obligation to pay alimony terminated when the Appellee remarried under the terms of the parties’ Agreement and Family Law Article Section 11-108?

II

Whether the trial court was clearly erroneous and/or abused its discretion by awarding counsel fees? For the reasons that follow, we answer question one in the negative and question two in the affirmative. FACTUAL SUMMARY 1 The circuit court executed a Judgment of Absolute Divorce on March 3, 2000, which was docketed on March 13, 2000, ²⁹⁵ granting appellee a divorce from appellant. As noted, the parties’ Separation Agreement of March 2, 2000, was incorporated but not merged into the divorce decree.

The Separation Agreement provided, in relevant part: 8.0 ALIMONY 8.1 The husband shall pay to the wife non-modifiable alimony in the amount of $833.33 per month commencing on April 1, 2000 and payable on the 1st day of each month thereafter for eighty-four consecutive months or until the payment due on April 1, 20007 [sic]. The parties expressly covenant and agree pursuant to Section 8-101 through Section 8-103 of the Family Law Article Annotated Code of Maryland, that no court shall have the power to modify this agreement with respect to alimony, support or maintenance of either spouse except as provided herein. (Emphasis added). After appellee remarried on September 2, 2000, appellant immediately ceased payment of alimony.

Accordingly, appellee sought to recover a money judgment against appellant, equal to his arrearages, plus attorney’s fees. By Order of June 28, 2001, the court entered judgment against appellant for $8,333.33, representing the amount of accumulated alimony arrearages. By Order of August 20, 2001, the court also awarded appellee attorney’s fees in the amount of $750.00. In their Agreed Statement of the Case, the parties state that the court awarded attorney’s fees “based solely upon the amount requested by Appellee’s counsel over the Appellant’s objection.” DISCUSSION I. We begin our analysis with a review of the relevant statutory provisions contained in the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code (1984,1999 Repl.Vol.). ²⁹⁶ Title 11 of the Family Law Article concerns alimony.

F.L. § 11-101 provides, in part: § 11-101. Award—In general. * * * (c) Effect of agreement.—If a final disposition as to alimony has been made in 'an agreement between the parties, the court is bound by that agreement as the agreement relates to alimony. F.L. § 11-107 is also pertinent. It states, in part: § 11-107.

Extension of period; modification of amount. * * * (b) Modification of amount.—Subject to § 8-103 of this article and on the petition of either party, the court may modify the amount of alimony awarded as circumstances and justice require. (Emphasis added). F.L. § 11-108, central to appellant’s position, provides: § 11-108. Termination of alimony.

Unless the parties agree otherwise, alimony terminates: (1) on the death of either party; (2) on the marriage of the recipient; or (3) if the court finds that termination is necessary to avoid a harsh and inequitable result. (Emphasis added). Title 8 of the Family Law Article pertains to deeds, agreements, and settlements between spouses, as well as matters pertaining to disposition of property. F.L. § 8-103(c) provides: § 8-103.

Modification of deed, agreement, or settlement. (c) Certain exceptions for provisions concerning alimony or support of spouse. ²⁹⁷ The court may modify any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement with respect to alimony or spousal support executed on or after April 13, 1976, regardless of how the provision is stated, unless there is: (1) an express waiver of alimony or spousal support; or (2) a provision that specifically states that the provisions with respect to alimony or spousal support are not subject to any court modification. (Emphasis added). F.L. § 8-105 is also pertinent.

It states: § 8-105. Power of court to enforce or modify provisions. (a) Enforcement by power of contempt.—(1) The court may enforce by power of contempt the provisions of a deed, agreement, or settlement that are merged into a divorce decree. (2) The court may enforce by power of contempt or as an independent contract not superseded by the divorce decree the provisions of a deed, agreement, or settlement that contain language that the deed, agreement, or settlement is incorporated but not merged into a divorce decree.

(b) Modification.—The court may modify any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement that is: (1) incorporated, whether or not merged, into a divorce decree; and (2) subject to modification under § 8-103 of this subtitle. (Emphasis added).

II

Appellant asserts that the “express terms of Family Law Article Section 11-108 require the termination of alimony upon the recipient’s remarriage, unless ‘the parties otherwise agree’....” He contends that his contractual obligation to pay alimony to appellee ceased upon appellee’s remarriage, be ²⁹⁸ cause the parties did not agree otherwise in their Separation Agreement. In his view, “the complete silence of the Agreement regarding the effect of the Appellee’s remarriage on alimony ... is a failure of the parties to ‘agree otherwise’ and requires termination [under F.L. § 11-108] of the Appellant’s obligation to pay alimony.” He adds: “The parties did not have to expressly agree that alimony terminates upon remarriage for the remarriage of the recipient to cause a termination of alimony under the terms of [F.L.] Section 11-108.” Put another way, appellant maintains that the failure of the parties expressly to provide that alimony shall continue in the event of appellee’s remarriage necessarily means that the alimony obligation terminated when appellee remarried. Appellant also argues that F.L. § 8-103 is not applicable to the case sub judice, because it pertains only to modification of alimony, and not termination of alimony upon remarriage, which is governed by F.L. § 11-108. He considers it significant that F.L. § 11-107, concerning modification of the amount of alimony, refers to F.L. § 8-103, while F.L. § 11-108, concerning termination of alimony, does not refer to F.L. § 8-103.

Thus, he argues: Termination of alimony for death or remarriage is not a modification because Family Law Article Section 11-108 makes no reference to Family Law Article Section 8-103.c ] As a result, the unambiguous language of that code section without limitation to Family Law Article Section 8-103 means that termination due to remarriage is mandated “[u]nless the parties agree otherwise.” The non-modifiability clause in the parties’ Agreement is irrelevant to the termination caused by the Appellee’s remarriage. Conversely, relying on F.L. §§ 8-103(c), 8-105(c)(2), and 11-107, appellee maintains that her remarriage did not entitle appellant to terminate his alimony payments. She observes that the Agreement expressly provided that appellant’s alimony obligation was “non-modifiable,” and expressly stated that no court could alter the terms of alimony. In addition, it specified a precise date on which alimony payments are to end.

Moreover, even if appellant’s argument as to F.L. § 11- ²⁹⁹ 108 were generally correct, she contends that the parties have, indeed, “agreed otherwise,” because they agreed that appellant’s alimony obligation is non-modifiable. Because the case involves the interplay of various statutory provisions and contractual terms, principles of both contract and statutory construction are important. We turn first to consider the principles of statutory construction. A “ ‘cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’ ” Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417 , 722 A.2d 887 (1999)(quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995)); see State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 81 , 785 A.2d 1275 (2001); Webster v. State, 359 Md. 465, 479 , 754 A.2d 1004 (2000). “‘The primary source of legislative intent is ... the language of the statute itself.’ ” State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133 , 669 A.2d 1339 (1996) (citation omitted); see Adamson v. Correctional Med.

Servs., 359 Md. 238, 251 , 753 A.2d 501 (2000); Huffman v. State, 356 Md. 622, 628 , 741 A.2d 1088 (1999). In this regard, we give the words of a statute “their ordinary and natural meaning.” Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672 , 659 A.2d 1347 (1995); see Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128 (1998). When “the General Assembly has enacted an unambiguous statute, we cannot, and will not, divine a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or judicially insert language to impose exceptions, limitations or restrictions not set forth by the legislature.” Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 515 , 784 A.2d 1086 (2001). To the contrary, “if the plain meaning of the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and consistent with both the broad purposes of the legislation, and the specific purpose of the provision being interpreted, our inquiry is at an end.” Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 473 , 784 A.2d 569 (2001).

Thus, “[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in a forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s ³⁰⁰ meaning.” Taylor v. Nationsbank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645 (2001); see Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Assoc. v. Public Service Comm’n of Md., 361 Md. 196, 203-04 , 760 A.2d 1087 (2000) (recognizing that “we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in a forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning”). Indeed, so long as “the language [of a statute] is clear and unambiguous, there is usually no need to look further.” Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 521 , 671 A.2d 495 (1996); see Adamson, 359 Md. at 251 , 753 A.2d 501 . But, the plain meaning rule is “elastic, rather than cast in stone[,]” and if “persuasive evidence exists outside the plain text of the statute, we do not turn a blind eye to it.” Adamson, 359 Md. at 251 , 753 A.2d 501 (citing Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513-14 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987)). Therefore, “in determining a statute’s meaning, courts may consider the context in which a statute appears, including related statutes and legislative history.” Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning & Plumbing v. Brennen, 366 Md. 336, 350-51 , 783 A.2d 691 (2001). “We may also consider the particular problem or problems the legislature was addressing, and the objectives it sought to attain.” Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dep’t of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28, 40 , 522 A.2d 382 (1987). “This enables us to put the statute in controversy in its proper context and thereby avoid unreasonable or illogical results that defy common sense.” Adamson, 359 Md. at 252 , 753 A.2d 501 .

Of significance here, we are required to construe statutory provisions as a whole, so that all provisions are considered together and, to the extent possible, reconciled and harmonized. Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 172 , 638 A.2d 93 (1994). In Office of People’s Counsel v. Maryland PSC, 355 Md. 1 , 733 A.2d 996 (1999), the Court said: We are ... required to interpret the statute as a whole, for ‘[w]here the statute to be construed is a part of a statutory scheme, the legislative intention is not determined ³⁰¹ from that statute alone, rather it is to be discerned by considering it in light of the statutory scheme.’ Moreover, neither the words in the statute nor any portion of the statutory scheme should be read ‘so as to render the other, or any portion of it, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous, or nugatory.’ Id. at 22 , 733 A.2d 996 (quoting Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Com’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 , 630 A.2d 713 (1993)); see Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523-524 , 636 A.2d 448 (1994).

It is also well settled that, when construing various provisions of a statute that involve the same subject matter, a harmonious interpretation of the statutes is “strongly favor[ed].” Maryland State Police v. Warwick Supply & Equip. Co., 330 Md. 474, 483-84 , 624 A.2d 1238 (1993); see Department of Natural Resources v. France, 277 Md. 432, 461 , 357 A.2d 78 (1976)(stating that, “[wjhere two statutory provisions are neither irreconcilable nor mutually repugnant, they should be construed in harmony with their respective objects and -tenor”) (citations omitted). It is noteworthy here that a statutory provision should not be viewed in isolation. Rather, “[ajll relevant parts ... should be read together and, to the extent possible, construed in harmony.” Curry v. Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Servs., 102 Md.App. 620, 628 , 651 A.2d 390 (1994), cert. dismissed, 340 Md. 175 , 665 A.2d 1038 (1995).

In addition, when two provisions, one general and the other specific, appear to cover the same subject but seem to conflict, the specific provision is controlling, and prevails over the general enactment. France, 277 Md. at 461-62 , 357 A.2d 78 (“‘Where there is a specific enactment and a general enactment which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.’ ”) (citation omitted; internal quotations omitted). In other ³⁰² words, when reconciling a specific and a general provision of a statute, a court should give effect to the specific provision in its entirety, while retaining as much of the general provision as is reasonably possible. See 1A Norman L. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 23.06, 23.09, 23.16 (5th ed.1993); see also Farmers & Merchants National Bank of Hagerstown v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 63 , 507 A.2d 172 (1986)(holding general enactment impliedly repealed by specific enactment); Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Insurance Comm’r., 302 Md. 248, 268 , 487 A.2d 271 (1985)(“[W]here one statutory provision specifically addresses a matter, and another more general statutory provision also may arguably cover the same matter, the specific statutory provision is held to be applicable and the general provision is deemed inapplicable.”); Criminal Injuries Comp.

Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 495 , 331 A.2d 55 (1975). When the parties reach an agreement as to alimony, the statutory scheme is quite clear in emphasizing the significance of the parties’ agreement. As has been noted, “unless the parties agree otherwise,” F.L. § 11-108(2) provides for the termination of alimony upon “the marriage of the recipient.” Moreover, F.L. § 8-103(c) limits the right of the court to modify an agreement of the parties with respect to alimony. Additionally, under F.L. § 8-105 and F.L. § 11-107, a court may modify the terms of an alimony agreement, subject to the limitations of F.L. § 8-103.

In Langston, 366 Md. at 503 , 784 A.2d 1086 , which concerned retroactive modification of alimony, the Court noted the statutory significance of an agreement between the parties pertaining to alimony. There, the Court recognized that F.L. § ll-101(c) “mandates that the court is bound by the terms of a separation agreement entered into by the parties ...,” adding that the statute permits “parties to customize their separation agreements to suit best their personal needs and circumstances.” Id. Further, the Langston Court characterized F.L. § 8-103(c) as “an additional restriction upon the general rule