Moran v. O'Brien

Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the 18th day of May, 1909, Elizabeth Moran, the then owner of a lot of ground in Baltimore City known as 1615 Aisquith Street, conveyed the same to her son, Charles A. ²²² Moran, by a deed which on its face is a fee simple deed. The appellee in this case, Mary A. O’Brien, daughter of Elizabeth Moran and sister of the appellant Charles A. Moran, filed her bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, in which she prayed the court to decree that while the aforesaid deed is in the usual form of a fee simple conveyance, nevertheless, in fact, her brother Charles A. Moran received this property not as his fee simple property but as trustee for the complainant. The bill also prayed for an injunction restraining the appellant from the further prosecution of an ejectment suit against the appellee, which had theretofore been instituted in the People’s Court of Baltimore City.

An answer ho the bill was filed, and testimony taken in open court. The chancellor by his decree sustained the contentions of the plaintiff and granted the relief prayed for. It is from that decree the appeal is prosecuted. This court has on numerous occasions declared its policy to be not to reverse in equity cases findings of fact made by the chancellor, especially where the testimony was taken in open court, whereby opportunity was afforded the court to- observe the appearance, demeanor and manner of testifying of the various witnesses produced, or, in other words, to obtain the atmosphere of the case, which, of course, is denied to this tribunal on appeal; unless we are convinced that such findings are clearly not warranted by the evidence contained in the record.

After giving full effect to the above stated policy, and critically examining the evidence, we find ourselves unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the chancellor. Before commenting upon the testimony and its effect, it is to be noted that the bill does not contain any allegation of fraud on the part of the appellant, or any undue influence exercised by him upon his mother, the grantor in the deed. Neither does the testimony disclose the slightest evidence of either fraud or undue influence. The appellee’s case is based upon alleged declarations made by the appellant to the appellee after the death of their mother, to the effect that the property 1615 Aisquith Street belonged to the appellee, which, together with other circumstances, it is contended, is ²²³ sufficient to establish that Charles A. Moran, while holding a deed for the property in fee simple, nevertheless took it not as his own property but as trustee for his sister.

The record contains testimony on the part of the appellee and one or two other witnesses to the effect that Mrs. Moran, the mother, on several occasions made declarations that the property in question here was to become the property of the appellee, hut that she could not leave it in her daughter’s name for the reason that the daughter’s husband, to whom it is shown she liad an antipathy, might have an interest in it, and therefore she would have to convey it to her son Charles to hold for the daughter. These alleged declarations were made out of the presence of the appellant, and, upon exception duly taken to this testimony, the chancellor ruled it out. Wo are of the opinion that such ruling was correct. As stated, there is nothing in the pleadings or evidence which indicates that the attack in this case upon the deed is made by reason of fraud, duress, undue influence, or want of mental capacity.

The admission is that the deed was made nearly a year before Mrs. Moran’s death, when she was mentallly capable and not subjected to' any undue influence, duress, or fraud practiced upon her; the contention being that, while she made the deed, it was her intention that it be given a legal effect different from and at variance with the terms employed in the deed. The evidence is that the deed was prepared by an attorney of the Baltimore bar, now deceased, of experience and integrity, at the direction of Mrs. Moran; the only connection the son Charles A. Moran having with the preparation and execution of the deed being that, at his mother’s request, about two weeks before the deed was executed, he told the attorney that his mother desired to see him, and that he was present at the execution of the deed, which took place in the parlor of the mother’s home, 1615 Aisquith Street. The preparation and execution of the deed, so far as the record discloses, is the only business about which Mrs. Moran desired the services of this attorney. Mrs. Moran died in February, 1910, and these alleged declarations made by her, as to her intention in respect to giving the property to her ²²⁴ daughter were made prior to the execution of the deed.

We are unable to- bring ourselves to the point of beliéving that, if it had been Mrs. Moran’s intention to convey 1615 Aisquith Street to- her son, as trustee for her daughter, she would not have mentioned that fact to- her attorney at the time he was receiving instructions for the preparation of the deed; and if she had, it is inconceivable that an experienced and honest attorney would have adopted the form which the deed took, to carry out such an intention. Again, it is most improbable that if the mother wanted to constitute- the- son trustee for her daughter, she would not have acquainted him with that fact; and there is no evidence on the part of any witness for the complainant that the mother ever said that such was her intention in the presence of the son, and the son testifies that she never did in any way convey to him knowledge that, while the deed was to be a fee simple one to him, she intended thereby to- constitute him a trustee for her daughter. This view is strengthened by another- fact disclosed by the record. Mrs. Moran had a deceased son Joseph, who had left, upon his death, two children; and in 1904, abo-ut six years prior to her death and five years prior to- the making of the deed in question, she had executed a will and placed it, together with the sum of $250 or $300, in the hands of Mgr.

F'oley. This will was produced in evidence, and by its terms the property 1615 Aisquith Street was devised to her son Charles A. Moran, the appellant, subject to the- payment of $600 by Charles, in semi-annual payments, to- her- two grandchildren. The will then proceeded to bequeath certain personal property to her son, and other personal property to the daughter, and contained a residuary claifse leaving all the rest and residue of her property equally to the son and daughter. It will thus be seen that the two- acts of Mrs. Moran which are beyond dispute indicate her intention to be that her son Charles was to receive the 1615 Aisquith Street property.

She is not here to testify, and if we- were to permit testimony as to alleged declarations made by her in respect to- the disposition of this property, which are at total variance with the intention expressed by her, both in the deed and in the will, the door ²²⁵ would be always open for an attack upon a deed executed and recorded in accordance with law, after the decease of the party making it. There may be, and are, instances where courts of equity will grant the relief prayed for here, but to warrant such a decree, the evidence must have every indication of truth and must be of the clearest and most convincing kind. It is true that the deed here conveyed practically all of the mother’s property to the son, to the exclusion of the daughter; and while this act may be unusual, and not in accordance with what customarily is done by parents, yet she had the undoubted legal right to do what she did; and because her act may not coincide with what the court would have done, or thinks ought to have been done under the circumstances, it affords no ground for setting aside the deed, for to do so would be to substitute the court’s will and purpose in place of that of the grantor. There will always be efforts on the part of disappointed heirs and representatives of deceased persons to strike down instruments by which property is disposed of; and many recent cases in this court indicate a growing tendency on the part of living persons to have the courts strike down their acts evidenced by deeds.

Usually these attacks are upon allegations of fraud, mental incapacity, duress, or undue influence; and even in such eases, to enable them to succeed