Motor Vehicle Administration v. Aiken

BARBERA, J. We are called upon in this case to construe, once again, the provisions of Maryland Code (2009 RepLVol.), § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article (“TR”), Maryland’s so-called “implied consent, administrative per se law” (hereinafter, the “Statute”). 1 The Statute provides for automatic suspension of a driver’s license to drive if, inter alia, a test of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration produces a “result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing[.]” TR § 16-205.1(b)(l)(i)(l.). The Statute entitles a driver to challenge the order of suspension at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). At that hearing, the MVA must present a prima facie case for suspension of the license. The question we decide in the present case is whether, as part of that prima facie case, the MVA must establish the validity of the test by providing evidence that the test was administered by a “qualified person,” as that term is defined and employed in Maryland Code (2009 RepLVol.), § 10-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP), and that the testing equipment was approved by a State toxicologist.

For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Statute does not require the MVA to present such evidence at the administrative hearing as part of its burden to present a prima facie case for suspension. I. At 12:48 a.m. on July 23, 2008, Maryland State Trooper Kolle stopped Respondent, Brittany Faith Aiken, for traveling ¹⁷ 77 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone on northbound 1-270. Trooper Kolle, upon talking to Respondent, detected a strong odor of alcohol on her breath. He conducted field sobriety tests, which Respondent failed.

Trooper Kolle arrested Respondent on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol and transported her to the State Police barracks in Rockville. When, as in the present case, an officer who has “stop[ped] or detain[ed]” a person whom the officer “has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,” the officer is authorized under the Statute to request the driver to submit to a chemical breath test. See TR § 16-205.1(b)(2). Trooper Kolle made that request of Respondent and informed her, also pursuant to the Statute, see id., of her right to refuse to submit to the breath test and, if she did, the resulting administrative sanctions.

Trooper Kolle gave Respondent Form DR-15, titled “Advice of Rights DR-15,” which also sets out this information and other rights afforded a driver under § 16-205.1. 2 Respondent agreed to submit to a chemical breath test and signed the DR-15 form. Sergeant Bowling of the Maryland State Police administered the breath test. The result of the test indicated Respondent’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.16 at the time of testing. Consequently, Trooper Kolle issued Respondent an ¹⁸ Order of Suspension, in accordance with subsection (b)(3) of the Statute. 3 Trooper Kolle and Sergeant Bowling then completed and signed Form DR-15A, titled “Officer’s Certification and Order of Suspension.” By signing the form, the troopers affirmed under penalty of perjury that, inter alia: Trooper Kolle had reasonable grounds to believe that Respondent was operating her vehicle while impaired; Sergeant Bowling had explained to Respondent the testing procedures and found her to be cooperative; Sergeant Bowling administered the test using Intox EC/TR equipment; and, based on the test, Respondent’s blood alcohol concentration was shown to be 0.16 at the time of testing.

Trooper Kolle and Sergeant Bowling made those sworn statements pursuant to subsection (b)(3)(vii) of the Statute. 4 Also pursuant to that subsection, the State Police ¹⁹ forwarded to the MVA Respondent’s driver license, the completed Form DR-15, and the completed Form DR-15A. The show cause hearing Respondent exercised her right to request a hearing before an ALJ, see TR § 16-205.1(b)(3)(v)(l.), “to show cause why [her] driver’s license should not be suspended ... for test results indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing[.]” Respondent was represented by counsel at the hearing. The MVA appeared through its paper record, which consisted only of Form DR-15 and Form DR-15A. The MVA did not supply two documents that, we surmise from comments of counsel, the ALJ, and, later, the Circuit Court, are often included in such proceedings.

We refer to the Maryland State Police Form 33 (“MSP Form 33”), titled “Notification to Defendant of Result of Test for Alcohol Concentration,” which contains, inter alia, (1) a certification that the testing equipment is approved, and (2) the Intox EC/IR testing strip produced during Respondent’s test, which includes information related to the timing of the test and the identification of the testing instrument. The Statute expressly circumscribes the issues that can be litigated at the administrative hearing. The Statute provides in subsection (f)(7)(i) that “[a]t a hearing under this section ... the only issues shall be”: 1. Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous ²⁰ substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; 2.

Whether there was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous substance; 3. Whether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised, as required under subsection (b)(2) of this section, of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed; 4. Whether the person refused to take the test; 5. Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing; 6.

Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of testing; or 7. If the hearing involves disqualification of a commercial driver’s license, whether the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle or held a commercial driver’s license. (Emphases added.) The General Assembly has authorized the MVA to adopt rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the Statute. 5 Among those regulations are two that pertain to administrative hearings conducted pursuant to the Statute. COMAR 11.11.03.07 (Subpoena) permits a party to the administrative hearing to request issuance by the ALJ of “a subpoena to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents,” which the ALJ has the discretion to refuse “if the testimony or evidence to be offered: (1) Is immaterial, irrelevant, or unduly repetitious; or (2) Does not ²¹ pertain to a genuine issue in the contested case.” COMAR 11.11.03.08 (Hearing) provides in part B (Evidence) the following, pertinent to the present case: (5) For the purpose of determining the accuracy of the test result indicating the alcohol concentration of the licensee, the following breath testing instruments shall be deemed reliable indicators of the alcohol concentration of a person: (a) Breathalyzer Model 900; (b) Breathalyzer Model 900A.; (c) Intoximeter 3000; and (d) Intox EC/IR.

(6) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the test result of a test of blood or breath indicating the alcohol concentration of the licensee is accurate. (7) The reliability of breath testing instruments approved in § B(5) of this regulation and the presumption established in § B(6) of this regulation may not preclude a licensee from demonstrating that the specific breath testing instrument used to test the alcohol concentration of the licensee was malfunctioning at the time of testing, or that human error caused the test result to be inaccurate. Respondent did not request, prior to the hearing, issuance of a subpoena for either Sergeant Bowling or any of the MVA documents generated in her case. Furthermore, during her testimony at the hearing, Respondent did not contradict the certifications of Trooper Kolle and Sergeant Bowling contained on the completed Form DR-15A.

Respondent nevertheless made a motion for “No Action.” Respondent argued in support of the motion that the MVA’s failure to produce the MSP Form 33 and the Intox EC/IR testing strip precluded a finding that the MVA had established a prima facie case for administrative suspension of her license. Respondent argued that the sworn statement of Sergeant Bowling on the Form DR-15A did not reflect “that the ECIR was working properly,” that “it hasn’t been shown that there were two tests that was [sic] run,” and that the DR-15A form ²² also “doesn’t show when the twenty minute observation period was done or conducted, at all, which is obviously step one of the test, at least according to the Regulations of the Toxicologist.” Respondent also pointed out that “[t]he test strip [which the MVA did not make part of the administrative record][ 6 ] shows the twenty minute observation period; it shows the time when the observation period started.... And we can’t tell from what’s give[n] here whether the test was administered properly.” Respondent asserted that the MSP Form 33 would “certif[y] that the equipment is approved by the toxicologist. The certification that the MVA submitted here says nothing about the testing equipment....

And it doesn’t say here which test this technician gave to my client.... It just says ECIR. It doesn’t give model number.” Respondent argued that it cannot be known from the DR-15A whether the arresting officer, rather than the test technician, had conducted the twenty-minute observation period, if one even was conducted. Finally, Respondent argued that “there’s no certification in the record that the ... administrator of the test is qualified under [§] 10-304 [of the CJP]” and no certification of the machine.

Respondent relied on subsection (a)(2) of the Statute to argue that the MVA’s prima facie case must include evidence of compliance with sections 10-302 through 10-309 of the CJP. Subsection (a)(2) provides in pertinent part that “[a]ny person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway ... in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol.,” The ALJ stated for the record, and Respondent’s counsel agreed, that the motion for “No Action” was being requested “because of the failure of the [MVA] to include the notice to ²³ defendant [of] a test result (i.e., the MSP Form 33) and the test strip.” The ALJ denied the motion, reaffirming his ruling earlier in the hearing that “the failure, if there was one, would be an affirmative defense and you would have to show if it wasn’t complied with.” We infer that the ALJ was referring to Respondent’s failure to present any such evidence, notwithstanding that the regulations provided Respondent with the means to do so. The decision of the ALJ also reflects his reliance on subsection (f)(7)(ii) of the Statute, which states: The sworn statement of the police officer and of the test technician or analyst shall be prima facie evidence of a test refusal, a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing, or a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of testing. The ALJ, noting that he “[hadn’t] heard anything which makes me believe that [the relevant provisions of the CJP] weren’t followed,” ruled that “completion of the certification [on Form DR-15A] is prima facie that there’s been a following of the rules.” The ALJ concluded that the completed DR-15A form satisfied the prima facie case because the form indicated that Respondent had been advised properly of her rights and the alcohol concentration test was administered in accordance ■with relevant regulations.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ complied with the requirements of the Statute that certain findings be made. 7 ²⁴ In particular, the ALJ found that an “officer requested that the Licensee take a test as defined in Maryland Transportation 16-205.1(a)(l)(iii) and that she scored a .16 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.” As provided by subsection (b)(l)(i)(2) of the Statute, the ALJ suspended Respondent’s driver’s license for 90 days. Judicial review in the Circuit Court Respondent filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a petition for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. See Md.Code (2009 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article. Respondent reduced the arguments she made before the ALJ to the single contention that the MVA failed to make a prima facie case for license suspension because there is no evidence in the record either that a “qualified person” administered the test or that the testing equipment had been approved by a State toxicologist, as provided in CJP § 10-804.

That section provides that a breath test “shall be administered by a qualified person with equipment approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission,” and defines “qualified person” as “a person who has received training in the use of the equipment in a training program approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission.... ” Respondent argued that, because the DR-15 and DR-15A forms the troopers signed in the present case contain no such express certifications, the ALJ should have sustained the motion for “No Action.” The MVA, which was represented by counsel before the Circuit Court, disagreed with Respondent’s interpretation of the Statute. The MVA directed the court to the language of TR § 16 — 205.1(f)(7)(ii) (providing in pertinent part that the “sworn statement” of the officer and test technician shall be prima facie evidence of a test result indicating an alcohol ²⁵ concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing) and argued that the DR-15A form that was presented to the ALJ sufficed to establish a prima facie case for administrative license suspension. The Circuit Court agreed with Respondent’s view that the MVA’s prima facie case must include evidence that a qualified person administered the test and that testing equipment approved by the State toxicologist was used. The court reversed the decision of the ALJ, ruling that there was not “substantial and competent” evidence of those facts in the administrative agency record.

The MVA filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Aiken, 409 Md. 47 , 972 A.2d 861 (2009), to address the following question: Where the evidence presented to the ALJ included prima facie evidence of a test result in the form of a sworn statement by a test technician or analyst that a driver had a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more, as provided in TR § 16 — 205.1(f) (7) (ii), did the circuit court err in finding a lack of competent material and substantial evidence to support suspension of the driver’s license on the ground that the record did not also include various other evidence that is not required by the statute, specifically, (a) a certification that the approved test equipment was used and that the technician or analyst is a ‘qualified person’; (b) the actual test strip used in the test; and (c) corroboration of the test results on a separate form, MSP-33?

II

The MVA asks us to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court on the ground that, contrary to that court’s ruling, there exists substantial evidence supporting the administrative suspension of Respondent’s license. The MVA identifies the crux of the issue before us as whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record of an un-rebutted prima facie case for suspension of Respondent’s driver’s license. In arguing ²⁶ that the record presents a prima facie case, the MVA takes the position that “the sworn statement at the bottom of the form [DR-15A] satisfies the statutory requirement [of the prima facie case] under § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii).” The MVA finds support for that position in the plain language of the Statute, its legislative history, the statutory scheme of which it is a part, and this Court’s cases on the subject. Respondent counters with the arguments she made to the ALJ and the Circuit Court.

She argues that more is required of the prima facie case for administrative license suspension under the Statute than was presented by the MVA in this case; specifically, the MVA is obligated to present evidence (not included in the currently worded DR-15A certification) that the test technician is a “qualified person,” as defined in CJP § 10-304(a)(3), and the breath test was performed on “equipment approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission,” as provided in CJP § 10-304(b)(1). Respondent relies in support of that argument on the reference in subsection (a)(2) of the Statute, which states in pertinent part that the driver’s consent to the test is “subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” For the reasons we shall explain, the MVA has the better part of the argument.

III

Judicial review of administrative decision-making “is constrained.” See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 14 , 997 A.2d 768, 775 (2010) (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243, 256-57 , 941 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2008)); see also Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(h)(3) of the State Government Article (“SG”). 8 The role of ²⁷ the courts in administrative agency review can be summarized by the following: A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court decides whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record. A reviewing court must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; ... the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and ... it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and to draw inferences from that evidence.

Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our opinions, a court’s task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency. Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency. Shea, 415 Md. at 14-15 , 997 A.2d at 775-76 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This case involves the ALJ’s interpretation and application of the Statute, which the MYA administers.

Accordingly, we will review the ALJ’s decision for legal correctness, giving appropriate weight to the MVA’s interpretation of the Statute. ²⁸ IV. The legal question we decide in this case requires us to discern the intent of the General Assembly in enacting the Statute. That undertaking begins with the language of the statute as the primary source of legislative intent. When the language is clearly consistent with the apparent purpose of the statute and the result is not absurd, we have held that no further inquiry into legislative intent is required.

Beyond plain meaning, the purpose of the statute may be ascertained by examining the Legislature’s statement of a statute’s purposes, and courts may consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence” indicating the legislative intent. The language of a statute cannot be divorced from its context. [Thus], even where the language of the statute is plain, its meaning is controlled by its context. In short, the statutory language must be construed in light of and governed by its context within the overall statutory scheme. An appellate court may consider evidence such as a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the Legislature, and its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation to ascertain the Legislature’s goal in enacting the statute.

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 57 , 821 A.2d 62, 73-74 (2003) (citations omitted). Before addressing the particular question of statutory interpretation at issue here, we restate the legislative purpose behind the Statute. That purpose is “ ‘to reduce the incidence of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests; the [S]tatute [is] not meant to protect drivers.’ ” Shea, 415 Md. at 15-16 , 997 A.2d at 776 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255 , 923 A.2d 100, 108 (2007) (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 374 , 739 A.2d 58, 68 (1999))); accord Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 179 , 844 A.2d 388, 397 (2004). The Statute is remedial in nature, and its purposes, stated more particularly, ²⁹ are, first, to help effectuate the administrative goals of the MVA in ridding Maryland roadways of drunk drivers and, second, to encourage both general compliance with Maryland law as well as specific fulfillment of the consent to taking a properly requested chemical breath test implied by a motorist’s entry upon and usage of this State’s roads.

Richards, 356 Md. at 374 , 739 A.2d