Motor Vehicle Administration v. Loane

BARBERA, J. This case presents yet another opportunity to construe provisions of § 16-205. 1 of the Maryland Transportation Article (“T.R.”), known as Maryland’s “implied consent, administrative per se law” (hereinafter “the Statute”).1 Pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of the Statute, “[a]ny person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented ... to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol----” Should the driver refuse to submit to such testing, the Statute provides for automatic suspension of the person’s driver’s license. See T.R. § 16-205.1(b)(1)(i)(3)(A). A driver may seek review of that suspension at a “show cause” hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), at the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). The precise question we consider here is whether suspension of the driver’s license hinges on proof by the Motor ²¹⁵ Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) at the show cause hearing that the driver was stopped on a highway or private property used by the public.

For the following reasons, we answer “no” to that question. I. On May 17, 2009, Officer Karsmith of the Ocean City Police Department stopped Respondent Frank William Loane, Jr. for failing to obey lane directions. After detecting an odor of alcohol on Respondent’s breath, Officer Karsmith administered field sobriety tests. Respondent failed to complete those tests.

Officer Karsmith asked Respondent to submit to a chemical breath test, as authorized by T.R. § 16-205.1(b)(2). 2 Officer Karsmith informed Respondent of his right to refuse to submit to the breath test and, if he did, the resulting administrative sanctions. Officer Karsmith provided Respondent Form ²¹⁶ DR-15, entitled “Advice of Rights,” which explains the administrative process and the rights afforded a driver under the Statute. Respondent refused to submit to the breath test and signed Form DR-15. That form included a “No-Alcohol concentration test refused” check box, which was marked to indicate Respondent’s refusal.

In accordance with § 16— 205.1(b)(3), Officer Karsmith confiscated Respondent’s driver’s license and issued him a temporary license and an Order of Suspension. 3 Officer Karsmith completed and signed Form DR-15A, entitled “Officer’s Certification and Order of Suspension.” ²¹⁷ Officer Karsmith indicated on the form that he was a member of the Ocean City Police Department and had stopped Respondent for “failing to follow lane directions.” Within the section of the form labeled “Location (Specify county or Baltimore City and Address),” Officer Karsmith wrote that the stop occurred in “Wor.,” evidently referring to Worcester County. The exact address of the stop was not provided. Officer Karsmith affirmed under penalty of perjury, however, the truth and correctness of all information on Form DR-15A, which included the following pre-printed certification containing a statement that the stop occurred on a highway or private property that is used by the public in general: I, the undersigned officer, had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver described and named above had been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of Section 16-813 of the Maryland Vehicle Law. The language of the certification is identical in material respects to the “sworn statement” required by subsection (b)(3)(viii) of the Statute. 4 ²¹⁸ Officer Karsmith forwarded to the MVA Respondent’s driver’s license, the completed and signed Form DR-15, and the completed and signed Form DR-15A.

See T.R. § 16-205.1(b) (3)(viii). The Show Cause Hearing Respondent filed a timely request for an administrative hearing to “show cause why [his] driver’s license should not be suspended concerning the refusal to take the test....” See T.R. § 16-205.1(b)(3)(v)(l). Respondent was represented by counsel at the hearing. The MVA, as typically is done, appeared through its paper record, consisting of Form DR-15 and Form DR-15A.

Respondent did not present evidence or testimony to rebut the information contained on Form DR-15A. Nor did Respondent avail himself of COMAR 11.11.07.07 (entitled “Subpoena”), pursuant to which he could have requested issuance by the ALJ of a subpoena to require Officer Karsmith’s attendance at the hearing. ²¹⁹ Instead, Respondent moved for “no action.” He argued that his license could not be suspended unless the MVA first proved where the stop occurred, whether on a highway or private property used by the public in general. Respondent based that argument on the prefatory language contained in subsection (a)(2) of the Statute, which provides that “[a]ny person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented ... to take a test....” That language, claimed Respondent, limits application of the Statute to those persons who at the operative time were driving or attempting to drive on a highway or private property used by the public in general. Respondent argued that the Form DR-15A used in his case “gives us no identifiable information whether [the stop occurred on] a public roadway or a private roadway used by the public in general.” 5 Respondent further argued that the pre-printed “Certification of Police Officer” was insufficient because it “merely recit[ed] the statutory language” of T.R. § 16-205.1(b)(3)(viii)(l).

The ALJ evidently believed, or at least assumed for the sake of argument, that the MVA was required to prove the precise location of the stop. The ALJ, though, rejected Respondent’s argument that the MVA failed to prove the location. The ALJ explained her reasoning: “Taking this entire [Form DR-15A] into consideration, I know [the stop occurred] in Maryland ... and that the officer has certified that the person was driving on a highway.... So, I find that the fact that the officer did not give me a specific address is not [a] sufficient basis to take no action in this matter.” The ALJ made additional findings pursuant to subsection (f)(8)(i) of the Statute.

That subsection directs the ALJ to suspend a person’s driver license if: ²²⁰ 1. The police officer who stopped or detained the person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; 2. There was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous substance; 3. The police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised, as required under subsection (b)(2) of this section, of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed; and 4.

A. The person refused to take the test; or B. A test to determine alcohol concentration was taken and the test result indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing. The ALJ found that Officer Karsmith had reasonable grounds to detain Respondent, there was evidence Respondent had used alcohol, and Respondent refused to submit to the test after being fully advised of the sanctions for refusal. The ALJ then suspended Respondent’s driver’s license for 120 days, pursuant to subsection (b)(l)(i)(3) of the Statute. Circuit Court Judicial Review Respondent filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a petition for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.

See Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article (“S.G.”). At the hearing on the petition, Respondent repeated the argument he had made before the ALJ. The MVA, relying on Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Jones, 380 Md. 164 , 844 A.2d 388 (2004), countered that the location of the stop is not an issue that may be raised at the adminis ²²¹ trative hearing because it is not listed among the issues set forth in T.R. § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i). That subsection provides that, at the administrative hearing, “the only issues shall be:” 1.

Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; 2. Whether there was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous substance; 3. Whether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised, as required under subsection (b)(2) of this section, of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed; 4. Whether the person refused to take the test; 5.

Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing; 6. Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of testing; or 7. If the hearing involves disqualification of a commercial driver’s license, whether the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle or held a commercial driver’s license. T.R. § 16—205.1(f)(7)(i).

The MVA further maintained that, even if the location of the stop may be raised at the administrative hearing, there was sufficient evidence before the ALJ—namely the information contained within Officer Karsmith’s sworn statement—to support the ALJ’s finding that the ²²² stop of Respondent occurred on a highway or private road used by the public in general. The Circuit Court agreed with Respondent that subsection (a)(2) of the Statute requires the MVA to prove that the stop occurred on a highway or private property that is used by the public in general. The court determined, moreover, that the issue may be raised at an administrative hearing. The court reasoned that the term “person,” as used in subsection (f)(7)(i)(l) of the Statute, incorporates the language of subsection (a)(2) and thereby requires the MVA to present evidence that the “person [ ] drove or attempted to drive on a public highway or on public use private property.” Looking to the record before the ALJ, the court determined that there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the stop occurred on a public highway or on publicly-used private property.

The court reversed the decision of the ALJ and remanded the case to the OAH with directions to reverse the suspension of Respondent’s license. The MVA filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted to address the following question: Did the administrative law judge correctly conclude that the implied consent statute, Md.Code Ann., Transp. II § 16-205.1(f), does not require the MVA to prove the exact location when a suspected drunk driver was detained after driving on a “highway or private property used by the public in general,” before suspending the motorist’s license for a test refusal? II. “Judicial review of administrative decision-making ‘is constrained.’ ” Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Aiken, 418 Md. 11, 26 , 12 A.3d 656, 664 (2011) (citation omitted); Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 14 , 997 A.2d 768, 775 (2010); S.G. § 10-222(h)(3). 6 We look through the judgment of the Circuit ²²³ Court and focus on the agency’s decision.

People’s Counsel for Baltimore County v. Loyola College in Maryland, 406 Md. 54, 66 , 956 A.2d 166, 173 (2008). Our review of that decision is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court decides whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record.

A reviewing court must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; ... the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and ... it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and to draw inferences from that evidence. Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our opinions, a court’s task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency. Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency. Aiken, 418 Md. at 27 , 12 A.3d at 665 (quoting Shea, 415 Md. at 14-15 , 997 A.2d at 775-76 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Moreover, “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by the reviewing courts.” Shea, 415 Md. at 15 , 997 A.2d at 776 . ²²⁴ This case involves the ALJ’s interpretation and application of the Statute, which the MVA administers. We therefore shall “review the ALJ’s decision for legal correctness, giving appropriate weight to the MVA’s interpretation of the Statute.” Aiken, 418 Md. at 27 , 12 A.3d at 665 .

III

The task of statutory interpretation requires us to begin[ ] with the language of the statute as the primary source of legislative intent. When the language is clearly consistent with the apparent purpose of the statute and the result is not absurd, we have held that no further inquiry into legislative intent is required. Beyond plain meaning, the purpose of the statute may be ascertained by examining the Legislature’s statement of a statute’s purposes, and courts may consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence” indicating the legislative intent. The language of a statute cannot be divorced from its context. [Thus], even where the language of the statute is plain, its meaning is controlled by its context.

In short, the statutory language must be construed in light of and governed by its context within the overall statutory scheme. An appellate court may consider evidence such as a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the Legislature, and its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation to ascertain the Legislature’s goal in enacting the statute. Id. at 28 , 12 A.3d at 665 (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 57 , 821 A.2d 62, 73-74 (2003) (citations omitted)). The question before us is whether, at a license suspension hearing conducted pursuant to the Statute, the MVA must establish and the ALJ must find that the officer stopped the driver on a highway or publicly-used private property.

Respondent concedes that “absent from the literal wording of [subsection (f)(7)(i)(l) of the Statute] is any mention that the location of where the licensee was driving is to be addressed ²²⁵ [at an administrative hearing].” Respondent nonetheless contends that subsection (a)(2) of the Statute “clearly establishes that the Implied Consent Law only applies on a highway or private property used by the public in general. As such, when the phrase ‘drive or attempt to drive’ is used in [subsection (f)(7)(i)(l) of the Statute], it is an implicit requirement that the person be driving or attempting to drive on a highway or private property used for the public in general.” The MVA disagrees with Respondent’s interpretation of subsection (a)(2). The MVA asserts that the reference in subsection (a)(2) to “highway[s] or any private property that is used by the public in general” relates only to the “consent” to testing that drivers impliedly give in return for the privilege to drive on Maryland’s roadways. The MVA further argues that the Statute applies regardless of whether the driver is stopped on a highway, a publicly-used private road, or purely private property; in other words, the Statute does “not ... preclude suspension if a motorist is detained somewhere other than on a highway” or private property used by the public in general.

The Statute, when viewed in its entirety, supports the MVA’s arguments. We begin with subsection (a)(2), the provision upon which Respondent rests his argument. That provision states in relevant part: Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol.... Subsection (a)(2) contains two references to driving or attempting to drive.

The first is found within what we shall label the “implied consent” clause, which establishes that “[a]ny person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the ²²⁶ public in general in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test____” T.R. § 16-205.1(a)(2) (emphasis added). The second reference is found within what we shall call the “applicability clause,” which provides that submission to the breath test is required “if the person [is] detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol.... ” Id. (emphasis added). If, as Respondent advocates, the General Assembly had intended through the implied consent clause to limit applicability of the Statute only to those situations in which the motorist is driving on a highway or a publicly-used private roadway, it would have been unnecessarily repetitive to refer to “driving or attempting to drive” within the