Motor Vehicle Administration v. Richards

RAKER, Judge. Following a hearing before the Motor Vehicle Administration on January 15, 1998, an Administrative Law Judge suspended the driver’s license of Respondent, David Walter Richards, Jr., for a period of 120 days. Respondent’s license suspension was based upon his refusal to take a chemical breath test as requested by an officer of the Maryland State Police after the officer had stopped Respondent while driving his pickup truck in Carroll County during the early morning hours of October 24, 1997. Respondent seeks to challenge the validity of his driver’s license suspension through constitutional scrutiny of the officer’s initial stop.

Our task is to determine whether such a challenge is legally viable. More specifically, we must decide in this appeal whether the exclusionary ³⁵⁸ rule of the Fourth Amendment applies in a civil administrative driver’s license suspension proceeding conducted pursuant to § 16—205.1(f) of the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code. We shall hold that the rule does not apply and shall therefore reverse the judgment rendered by the Circuit Court for Carroll County in the present case. I. Shortly after midnight on October 24, 1997, Trooper F.W. Quisay, Jr. of the Maryland State Police was driving through Carroll County on the northern edge of the town of Westminster. 1 As he was patrolling the area and traveling north, the trooper “looked up on Naugahyde Drive and ... observed a vehicle’s tail lights either stopped or close to stopping in the middle of the road right there towards the end of the road.” Aware that “Carroll County ha[d] been experiencing a rash of vehicle thefts and night time burglaries ... in the area of Westminster and north of Westminster,” and noting that there were no houses in the vicinity where the vehicle had slowed or stopped, Trooper Quisay “decided to turn around and check the vehicle to see where [the driver] might be going and see if he was going into one of the houses [on the street].” Trooper Quisay followed the vehicle, a dark green pickup truck with a “dealer tag,” onto Naugahyde Drive.

Knowing this road to be a dead end street, the officer surmised that the driver “either lived there or he had no real business there.” The pickup truck “went all the way to the dead end of Naugahyde Drive, turned around and came back out ... without stopping at any of the houses.” Thereupon Trooper Quisay stopped the vehicle: because it was “12:30 in the morning I just felt that was a little odd so I decided to stop the car and check on the driver and see what business he may have had in the neighborhood.” When Trooper Quisay spoke to the driver, later identified as Respondent, he immediately “detected a strong odor of an ³⁵⁹ alcoholic beverage.” Trooper Quisay asked Respondent to step out of the pickup truck and proceeded to administer field sobriety tests. Based on Respondent’s performance on the tests, Trooper Quisay arrested him and took him to the police barracks. At the barracks, Respondent refused Trooper Quisay’s request to take a chemical breath test for blood-alcohol content. Upon Respondent’s refusal, the trooper issued an order suspending Richards’s driver’s license pursuant to this State’s “administrative per se ” statute, codified under Maryland Code (1977, 1999 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article. 2 Pursuant to § 16-205.1(f), Respondent requested a hearing to determine whether his driver’s license was properly suspended.

The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “the ALJ”) concluded that Respondent’s license was suspended properly as a result of his refusal to take the chemical breath test requested by Trooper Quisay: the trooper had reasonable grounds to believe that the Respondent was driving while intoxicated based upon the odor of alcohol and Respondent’s poor performance of the field sobriety tests. As to the propriety of the initial stop, the ALJ stated that he had no jurisdiction over the legality of the stop other than to determine whether the stop was made in good faith, which he found to be true in Respondent’s case. In that regard, the ALJ stated: The stop itself was a good faith stop. It doesn’t matter whether the stop was made because of suspicion of drinking or not.

What matters is that the stop be made just as a good faith stop, in other words, that people aren’t stopped just because they’re a different color or whatever or that there’s some kind of personal animosity or whatever. In this case it’s clear that the officer had grounds to believe that there was suspicious activity based on what was going on so he had a grounds to stop the car. Once he did stop ³⁶⁰ the car, then the question becomes did he have a reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Richards had been driving while intoxicated. He notes a moderate odor of alcohol on his breath.

He gave him field sobriety tests, which he failed, all of which mean that the officer’s process was correct---- The ALJ ordered Respondent’s license suspended for 120 days for refusing to take a breath test when properly requested to do so. On judicial review of the administrative proceeding, the circuit court reversed the judgment of the ALJ and held that the suspension of Respondent’s license was improper because Trooper Quisay did not have any justification to stop Respondent’s vehicle. In announcing its decision, the court stated: . Well, I guess good faith is equating to articulable suspicion or maybe something less than articulable suspicion, but there is a constitutional right to not be capriciously or arbitrarily pulled over by any police officer and questioned about anything, and there’s a freedom of movement, ... a citizen has a right to be on the public streets---- $ * # * $ * ... [E]ven though perhaps the Administrative Law Judge does not feel he can consider the legality of the stop, I think somewhere the constitution has to come into play and to follow his reasoning, as I say, any officer could stop any other officer, and we have very restrictive procedural matters, particularly when it comes to things like roadblocks and stopping all the people that come down the road.

So I think, on those grounds, there was absolutely no right of Trooper Quisay, at that point. He followed this vehicle far enough that he could have developed any—any articulable suspicion that there was someone driving under the influence of alcohol.... So, although we don’t get into the legality of the stop too often, I think this is pretty blatant. I don’t think there was any justification for the stop of the person in the first place and, of course, anything after that, I think, would not be chargeable to the Defen ³⁶¹ dant.

So, I’m gonna reverse the ... Administrative Law Judge. The Motor Vehicle Administration (hereinafter “the MVA” or “the State”) petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the circuit court’s ruling. We granted certiorari to consider whether the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment (1) applies in the civil administrative driver’s license suspension proceeding provided for under § 16-205.1(f) and (2) thus bars introduction of evidence based on a purportedly unlawful motor vehicle stop, when an administrative law judge has found that the officer conducting the stop had a good faith basis for taking that action.

As the petitioner in this case, the MVA argues that the license suspension proceeding under § 16-205.1(f) does not fall within any exception to the general rule that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to civil proceedings. The MVA further contends that the marginal benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to this proceeding are far outweighed by the substantial social costs its application would impose. Respondent counters that regardless of legislative enactments or administrative rule-making, the exclusionary rule applies to “refusal hearings” under § 16-205.1 because of the nature and purpose of those hearings: Since the refusal to take the test is the crux of the refusal hearing, is inadmissible in the criminal proceeding[ 3 ] and clearly does not provide any evidence of intoxication vel non, the administrative sanction is clearly punitive. As a ³⁶² purely punitive measure, the refusal hearing is more in the nature of a quasi-criminal proceeding such as in One 1995 Corvette ....

Respondent’s Brief at 7. The case to which Respondent refers, One 1995 Corvette v. Baltimore, 353 Md. 114 , 724 A.2d 680 (1999), is a recent decision by this Court in which we held the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applicable in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings. See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 , 85 S.Ct. 1246 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965).

II

Central to this case are the purpose, legal effect and constitutional ramifications of Maryland’s “implied consent, administrative per se ” motor vehicle law, codified as § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article. In 1988, the General Assembly established a Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving “because ‘the problem of drunk and drugged driving is of continuing concern to the citizens of the State of Maryland.’ ” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 347 , 643 A.2d 442, 444 (1994) (quoting Joint Resolution No. 15 of the Acts of 1988). As we reiterated last year, Among the several matters studied by that task force were (1) an administrative per se law, making both the refusal to take an alcohol test and the taking of such a test that revealed 0.10 or greater alcohol concentration an administrative offense that would lead to the rapid and mandated suspension of the offender’s driver’s license, and (2) a criminal per se law, that would make driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more a per se criminal offense. See Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving Minutes, September 13, 1988, September 27, 1988, October 13,1988.

Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 304 , 711 A.2d 1319, 1329 (1998). The Task Force issued a report during the 1988 legislative interim which “addressed the possibility of establishing an administrative per se law to provide immediate suspension of a ³⁶³ driver’s license of a person detained by police on the suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated or under the influence.” Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Bill Analysis for Senate Bill 398, at 3 (1989). During .the 1989 legislative session, the General Assembly acted upon the Task Force’s recommendation and enacted an implied consent, administrative per se statute. 4 The first two subsections of the statute establish that (1) by driving on a Maryland public roadway a person impliedly consents to taking a test to determine breath or blood alcohol concentration if reasonably requested to do so and (2) although a motorist may refuse to take such a test, such a refusal entails a suspension of the license to drive. 5 Specifically, those subsections provide as follows: § 16-205.1. Suspension or disqualification for refusal to submit to chemical tests for intoxication.

(a) Definitions; implied consent to chemical test.— ^ (2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have ³⁶⁴ consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-802 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a [breath or blood specimen] test [to determine alcohol concentration] if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title. (b) No compulsion to take chemical test; consequences of refusal.—(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person may not be compelled to take a test. However, the detaining officer shall advise the person that, on receipt of a sworn statement from the officer that the person was so charged and refused to take a test, or was tested and the result indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the Administration shall: (i) In the case of a person licensed under this title: % # 5-C # # 2. For a test refusal: A. For a first offense, suspend the driver’s license for 120 days; or B. For a second or subsequent offense, suspend the driver’s license for 1 year....

The portion of the statute immediately succeeding those above provides that “if a police officer stops or detains any person who the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been” driving or attempting to drive while impaired by alcohol and/or drugs, “the police officer shall ... [d]etain the person; ... [r]equest that the person permit a test to be taken; and ... [a]dvise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test ....”§ 16-205.1(b)(2). The statute then designates that if a motorist licensed to drive in Maryland refuses to submit to the requested test, the officer is obligated, inter alia, to ³⁶⁵ confíscate the Maryland driver’s license, serve an order of suspension, issue a temporary 45-day license, and advise the motorist of the right to request an administrative hearing to review the propriety of the license suspension. See § 16-205.1(b)(3). The prerequisites and scope of such a hearing are specified by subsection (f), as follows: (f) Notice and hearing on refusal to take test; suspension of license or privilege to drive; disqualification from driving commercial vehicles. —(1) Subject to the provisions of this subsection, at the time of, or within 30 days from the date of, the issuance of an order of suspension, a person may submit a written request for a hearing before an officer of the Administration if: (i) The person is arrested for driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated, while under the influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; and (ii) 1.

There is an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing; or 2. The person refused to take a test. (7) (i) At a hearing under this section, the person has the rights described in § 12-206 of this article, but at the hearing the only issues shall be: 1. Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; ³⁶⁶ 2.

Whether there was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous substance; 3. Whether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed, including the fact that a person who refuses to take the test is ineligible for modification of a suspension or issuance of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(l) and (2) of this section; 4. Whether the person refused to take the test; 5. Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing; or 6.

If the hearing involves disqualification of a commercial driver’s license, whether the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle. At the conclusion of the hearing, the MVA is required to suspend the Marylánd driver’s license of the motorist for 120 days for a first offense if it has been shown that the investigating officer complied with the mandates and duties under the statute, there was use by the motorist of alcohol and/or drugs, and the motorist refused to submit to the properly requested test. See § 16-205.1(f)(8). 6 As we explained in Janes , the General Assembly made a deliberate effort in drafting § 16-205.1 to keep the criminal and administrative proceedings resulting from a suspected drunk-driving incident wholly separate. See id., 350 Md. at ³⁶⁷ 304, 711 A.2d at 1328 .

Moreover, subsection (f)(7) makes paramountly clear that the constitutionality of the stop giving rise to the test request is not one of the issues to be presented at the hearing, nor is the possible exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence. 7 Accordingly, Respondent concedes that the language of the statute itself gives him no relief in the ³⁶⁸ present matter. Rather, the core thrust of his appeal is an attack upon the ALJ’s interpretation and application of the statute as not affording exclusion, under the Fourth Amendment, of his refusal to take the test from the evidence presented at his license suspension hearing. Fleshed out more fully, Respondent’s central contention is that whereas the officer’s reasons for requesting the test that he refused to take resulted from a constitutionally invalid stop, those reasons should not be available to demonstrate that the officer had “reasonable grounds” to believe a test was called for.

III

The United States Supreme Court just over a year ago revisited the possibility of extending the operation of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment beyond the criminal trial context and, once again, declined to do so. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 ,-, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 2020 , 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998). The majority summarized the Court’s historical approach to the applicability of the exclusionary rule as follows: We have emphasized repeatedly that the State’s use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 , 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-3412 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3046-3047, 3048-3049 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).

Rather, a Fourth Amendment violation is “ ‘fully accomplished’” by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or administrative proceeding can “ ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.’ ” United States v. Leon, supra, at 906, 104 S.Ct., at 3412 (quoting Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540, 96 S.Ct., at 3074 (White, J., dissenting)). The exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 620 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). As such, the rule does not “proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or ³⁶⁹ against all persons,” Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486, 96 S.Ct., at 3049 , but applies only in contexts “where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620 ; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 , 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3032 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (“If ... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted”).

Moreover, because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its “substantial social costs.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S., at 907 , 104 S.Ct., at 3412 . Recognizing these costs, we have repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials. Id., at 909 , 104 S.Ct., at 3413 ; United States v. Janis, supra, at 447, 96 S.Ct., at 3028-3029. Id. at-, 118 S.Ct. at 2019 .

Prior to Scott , the proceedings outside a criminal trial to which the Supreme Court had refused to extend the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment included grand jury proceedings, see Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; federal civil tax proceedings, see Janis, 428 U.S. 433 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 ; and civil deportation proceedings, see I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 , 104 S.Ct. 3479 , 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984). It thus remains true in the wake of Scott that “[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the [exclusionary] rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state.” Janis, 428 U.S. at 447 , 96 S.Ct. at 3029 . 8 In each case in which the Supreme ³⁷⁰ Court has considered so extending this remedy, “the Court determined that the potential benefit of applying the exclusionary rule was outweighed by the resulting cost to societal interests.” Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo.1999) (en banc). This Court has also been called upon several times to determine the applicability of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to civil proceedings in various contexts. In only one case have we held the exclusionary rule applicable to a proceeding other than a criminal trial.

See One 1995 Corvette v. Baltimore, 353 Md. 114 , 724 A.2d 680 (1999) (following Supreme Court’s holding in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 , 85 S.Ct. 1246 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965) and ruling exclusionary rule of Fourth Amendment applicable in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings, in part because of their “quasi-criminal” nature). In all other relevant cases we have rejected any extension of the rule to civil proceedings. See Sheetz v. City of Baltimore, 315 Md. 208 , 553 A.2d 1281 (1989) (holding exclusionary rule generally inapplicable in context of administrative employment discharge proceedings); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224 , 522 A.2d 1348 (1987) (holding as general rule that in revocation of probation proceedings, exclusionary rule does not apply to bar evidence illegally seized by police from probationer); 9 Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673 , 537 A.2d 250 (1988) (in construing Maryland Code Article 27, § 551, concluding that federal exclusionary rule not applicable to civil proceedings for return of seized property); Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368 , 514 A.2d 4 (1986) (generally rejecting application of exclusionary rule in public nuisance actions). ³⁷¹ We emphasized in Whitaker that although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Janis “cannot be said to stand for the proposition that evidence may never be excluded in a civil proceeding, it nonetheless severely undermined those cases in lower courts which applied the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings.” Id. at 382, 514 A.2d at 11 (citation and footnote omitted). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has unequivocally “established that the ‘prime purpose’ of the rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct.’ ” Janis, 428 U.S. at 446 , 96 S.Ct. at 3028 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 , 94 S.Ct. at 619 ); Whitaker, 307 Md. at 381 , 514 A.2d at 11 .

We have noted the marginal deterrent effect and the substantial costs of applying the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment beyond the context of criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. For example, in rejecting the application of the rule in public nuisance proceedings, we noted that “[a]