Motor Vehicle Administration v. Gaddy

KARWACKI, Judge. Joe Pritchard Gaddy was operating his automobile on April 22,1993, when he was stopped by Anne Arundel County Police Officer M. Edmonson. The officer certified that the stop was made because Gaddy’s vehicle had made a very wide turn and had crossed the center line several times. After noticing Gaddy’s bloodshot eyes, his poor balance, and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, the officer administered several field ³⁴⁴ sobriety tests, which Gaddy failed.

The officer then advised Gaddy of his rights under Maryland Code (1974, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1993 Cum.Supp.), § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article 1 and requested that he submit to a test of his breath for alcohol concentration (“a breathalyzer test”). 2 Gaddy refused. As required by the statute, the officer confiscated Gaddy’s driver’s license, issued him a temporary, 45-day license and forwarded the appropriate documents—including the form “DR-15A” 3 —to the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA). Gaddy requested a hearing, as was his right under § 16-205.1.

At the administrative hearing, which was held on June 8, 1993, Gaddy objected to the admission of the DR-15A certifi ³⁴⁵ cate. Citing § 16.205.1(f)(7)(ii), he argued that the certificate was not admissible as prima facie evidence that he had refused to take the breathalyzer test because it was not also executed by a “Test Technician or Analyst.” The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) overruled the objection. After no other evidence was offered by the MVA or Gaddy, the ALJ found by a preponderance of the evidence that Gaddy had refused to take the test. Thereafter, the ALJ imposed a 120-day suspension of Gaddy’s license pursuant to § 16-205.1.

The MVA granted a stay of the suspension pending judicial review by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The circuit court reversed the decision of the ALJ, holding that the certification signed by the arresting officer that Gaddy had refused to take the alcohol concentration test was insufficient to be admitted as evidence under § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii). The MVA petitioned this Court for certiorari, asserting that the circuit court’s interpretation of the statute is illogical. We have granted the petition, and we shall summarily reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and remand the case to that court for the entry of a judgment affirming the order of the MVA.

The issue before us is one of statutory construction. Maryland Code (1974, 1992 RepLVol., 1993 Cum.Supp.), § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii) of the Transportation Article reads: “§ 16-205.1. Suspension or disqualification for refusal to submit to chemical tests for intoxication. (f) Notice and hearing on refusal to take test; suspension of privilege to drive; disqualification from driving commercial vehicles. ³⁴⁶ [ (7) ] (ii) The sworn statement of the police officer and of the test technician or analyst shall be prima facie evidence of a test refusal or a test resulting in an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing.” The circuit court interpreted this statute to require the signatures of both the arresting officer and the test technician, even if no test was administered by the technician.

The court acknowledged that this section of the statute “is not a paragon of good legislative workmanship and wording,” but stated that, if it held otherwise, it would be forced “to ignore the conjunction ‘and’ so visibly placed in the statute.” In its petition for certiorari, the MVA argues that such a construction of § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii) leads to an absurd result. Under the circuit court’s interpretation, MVA asserts, it would be necessary for a certified test technician or analyst trained to administer and to interpret the results of chemical tests for intoxication to participate in every arrest of a driver whom an officer had reasonable grounds to suspect was impaired by alcohol. Gaddy, on the other hand, contends that the circuit court was correct and that the presence of the conjunctive “and” in the statute requires two signatures on the certification of refusal before the refusal may be admitted as evidence. We have stated time and again that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 462 , 597 A.2d 939, 943 (1991); Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 480 , 578 A.2d 761, 765 (1990). A statute is to be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the legislature reflected in that statute. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Vermeersch, 331 Md. 188, 194 , 626 A.2d 972, 975 (1993); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). Thus, when a particular statute is part of a statutory scheme, the legislative intent must be discerned from the entire statute, and not from a single part in isolation.

Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 16 , 616 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1992); Shrader, 324 Md. at 463 , 597 A.2d at 943 ; Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405 , 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988). ³⁴⁷ In any event, as we noted in Shrader , “results that are unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language, with the real legislative intention prevailing over the intention indicated by the literal meaning.” 324 Md. at 463 , 597 A.2d at 943 (quoting Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep’t, 309 Md. 347, 353 , 524 A.2d 61, 64 (1987), in turn quoting State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422 , 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 , 96 S.Ct. 1680 , 48 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976)). In order to determine whether the legislature intended to require two signatures on the certification of refusal or whether it intended a single signature to suffice, we must look at the specific provision in the context of the statutory scheme. In 1991, this Court reviewed the history of the drunk driving statute in Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader. We recognized there that the current § 16-205.1 came about as a result of the findings of the General Assembly’s Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving.

The Task Force had been established in 1988 because “the problem of drunk and drugged driving is of continuing concern to the citizens of the State of Maryland.” Joint Resolution No. 15 of the Acts of 1988. The General Assembly subsequently “enacted the administrative per se law recommended by the Task Force, rewriting § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article to allow a person’s driver’s license to be promptly suspended for suspected drunken driving if the person refused a test for blood alcohol concentration. Ch. 284 of the Acts of 1989 [House Bill 556].” Shrader, 324 Md. at 464 , 597 A.2d at 944 . The purpose behind the law is readily apparent, as was also noted in Shrader : “We have consistently recognized that the statutory provisions enacted to enforce the State’s fight against drunken driving ... were enacted for the protection of the public and not primarily for the protection of the accused.

State v. Moon, 291 Md. 463, 477 , 436 A.2d 420, 427 (1981); [State v.] Werkheiser, 299 Md. [529,] 536-37, 474 A.2d [898,] 902 [ (1984) ]. The General Assembly’s goal in enacting the ³⁴⁸ drunk driving