Motor Vehicle Administration v. Illiano

BATTAGLIA, J. Following a hearing before the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) on March 9, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Robert Barry suspended the driver’s license of Respondent, ²⁶⁷ Carmelina Illiano, 1 for one year under Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol), Section 16-205.1(b)(l)(i)(2)(B) of the Transportation Article, 2 for refusing to submit to a chemical breath test. 3 The Circuit Court for Carroll County subsequently found that the police officer who administered the breath test did not possess reasonable grounds to justify the detention of Illiano and reversed the decision to suspend her driver’s license. 4 Petitioner, the Motor Vehicle Administration, now presents us with the following question for review: ²⁶⁸ In determining the sufficiency of an officer’s sworn certification of reasonable grounds to request a chemical breath test under Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Section 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(l) of the Transportation Article,[ 5 ] did the administrative law judge err in considering evidence obtained by the officer after the motorist was initially detained, where the officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the motorist’s automobile, the motorist told the officer that she had been drinking and she should not be driving, and, after the initial detention, her performance in field sobriety tests exhibited further evidence of impairment? Motor Vehicle Administration v. Illiano, 387 Md. 465 , 875 A.2d 769 (2005). We hold that, pursuant to Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Section 16-205.1(b)(2) of the Transportation Article, the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that the police officer had reasonable grounds to detain Illiano and request a breath test was supported by substantial evidence and was not premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Circuit Court. I. Background At approximately two o’clock in the morning on October 30, 2003, Maryland Transportation Authority Police Officer J. ²⁶⁹ Marll was in a marked patrol car parked on the shoulder of Route 170 in Anne Arundel County operating a stationary radar unit when a Saturn pulled up approximately ten feet behind him and sat idling for a few minutes. Officer Marll decided to check on the well-being of the driver and backed his car alongside the Saturn, at which time the driver, Carmelina Illiano, rolled down her window. Officer Marll detected the smell of alcohol coming from the Saturn and decided to park behind it.

While Officer Marll was moving the police car, Ms. Illiano alighted from the Saturn and switched positions with the passenger. After approaching the passenger side window, Officer Marll asked Ms. Illiano why she had stopped on the shoulder to which she replied that she should not be driving because she had consumed one beer and one mixed drink. Observing that her eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that her speech was slurred, the officer requested Ms. Illiano’s driver’s license and asked her to perform various field sobriety tests. While she was getting out of her car, Ms. Illiano disclosed to Officer Marll that she was coming from Cancún Cantina and that her friend was taking over because Ms. Illiano realized that she should not be driving; Officer Marll further observed that Ms. Illiano leaned on the Saturn for balance while walking.

After Ms. Illiano failed the field sobriety tests, 6 Officer Marll placed her under arrest for Driving Under the Influence and read to her from the DR-15 Form. 7 Initially, Ms. Illiano ²⁷⁰ agreed to take a chemical breath test; she was taken to the Maryland State Police Barracks in Glen Burnie where the test was to be administered. When Ms. Illiano arrived, however, she changed her mind, refused to submit to the test and, thereafter, pursuant to Section 16 — 205.1(b)(3), 8 Officer Marll ²⁷¹ confiscated Ms. Uliano’s driver’s license, served her with an order of suspension for one year, 9 issued her a temporary license, and informed her of her right to a hearing and the required administrative sanctions. At the administrative show cause hearing held on March 9, 2004, Ms. Illiano, represented by counsel, contended that the officer never drove abreast of her car, but instead made a U-turn and immediately parked behind her; that she never told Officer Marll that she should not have been driving; that her difficulty performing the field sobriety tests was due to her poor grasp of the English language and her inability to understand Officer Marll’s directions and that she switched seats with the passenger because she was having difficulty driving due to a damaged tendon on the top of her foot. In his findings of fact, ALJ Barry stated: I do find by a preponderance of the evidence in this record that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the licensee was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or while impaired by alcohol....

I don’t have any problems finding Ms. Illiano in violation of Section ²⁷² 16-205.1. Frankly, I find Ms. Illiano’s version of events to be totally not credible, not even a close call in this matter. There’s a total — I mean as far as basically from the beginning, she admits that she’s out with her friend at a club. She’s indicated she only had this half a glass of bitter wine and a rum and Coke, and wants me to believe that all the problems here were not — the problems with the test didn’t have to do with the consumption of alcohol, but with this foot problem.

The evidence that I have on the foot problem is that the injury actually goes back to August of 2002, and the podiatrist, Dr. Seider, has indicated the nerve damage and [sic] may cause difficulty with ambulation and balance. But the evidence of the impairment in this case goes beyond that. We have the bloodshot, glassy eyes, the slurred speech, and I believe the licensee made the admissions to the officer. People driving up behind police when they’re intoxicated doesn’t shock me.

I’ve had cases where people have driven into the police station drunk to pick up their friend, who had been arrested earlier in the night, drunk. People do things when they’re intoxicated they wouldn’t ordinarily do when sober. I believe that Ms. Illiano was quite intoxicated that night, pulled over, decided not to drive for whatever reason, performed — couldn’t even stand up, basically. I believe very little of what Ms. Illiano said here today, so I do find her in violation of Section 16-205.1.

Accordingly, ALJ Barry upheld the one-year suspension of Ms. Illiano’s driver’s license. Ms. Illiano filed a Petition for Judicial Review of ALJ Barry’s decision in the Circuit Court for Carroll County pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), Section 10-222 of the State Government Article. Finding that Section 16-205.1(b)(2) “clearly requires that an officer have reasonable grounds for detaining someone for driving under the influence of alcohol,” the judge held that “any results of the field sobriety tests would be irrelevant in determining whether the officer had reasonable grounds to detain Petitioner to perform these tests,” and concluded: ²⁷³ In reviewing the record, the transcript, and specifically the ALJ’s decision, the ... decision was arbitrary and capricious. The fact that Petitioner admitted to attending a club and that she had one or two drinks is not sufficient to conclude that she was driving under the influence.

Nor is the fact that there was a strong odor of alcohol being emitted from the car, not any particular passenger, conclusive .... The Court further finds that there was no substantial evidence to conclude that the officer had reasonable grounds to detain Petitioner. The issue is not fairly debatable and must be reversed. In so doing, the court reversed ALJ Barry’s decision to suspend Ms. Illiano’s license and remanded the matter to the Motor Vehicle Administration for further proceedings in compliance with the order.

II

Standard of Review Section 10-222 of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Md.Code (1984, 2002 RepLVoL), § 10-222 of the State Government Article, delineates that a court, upon judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision, may decide to: 10 (1) remand the case for further proceedings; (2) affirm the final decision; or (3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision-maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; ²⁷⁴ (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary and capricious. In Maryland Aviation Administration v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571 , 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005), Judge Eldridge, writing for this Court, thoroughly examined the standard of review of an adjudicatory decision by an administrative agency, stating: A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow, United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 576 , 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994); it “is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” United Parcel, 336 Md. at 577 , 650 A.2d at 230 . See also Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article; District Council v. Brandywine Enterprises, Inc., 350 Md. 339, 349 , 711 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (1998); Catonsville Nursing v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 568-69 , 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998). In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court decides “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.” Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512 , 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978).

See Anderson v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 330 Md. 187, 213 , 623 A.2d 198, 210 (1993). A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record. CBS v. Comptroller, 319 Md. 687, 698 , 575 A.2d 324, 329 (1990). A reviewing court “must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; ... the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and ... it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence” and to draw inferences from that evidence.

CBS v. Comptroller, supra, 319 Md. at 698 , 575 A.2d at 329 , quoting Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 834-35 , 490 A.2d 1296, 1301 (1985). See Catonsville Nursing v. Loveman, supra, 349 Md. at 569 , 709 A.2d at 753 (final agency decisions “are ²⁷⁵ prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity”). Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our opinions, a court’s task on review is not to “substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency,” United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, supra, 336 Md. at 576-77 , 650 A.2d at 230 , quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., supra, 283 Md. at 513 , 390 A.2d at 1124 . Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency.

Thus, an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. Lussier v. Md,. Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 696-97 , 684 A.2d 804, 811-12 (1996), and cases there cited; McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 612 , 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989) (“The interpretation of a statute by those officials charged with administering the statute is ... entitled to weight”). Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field should be respected.

Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, 337 Md. 441, 455 , 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995); Christ v. Department of Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 445 , 644 A.2d 34, 42 (1994) (legislative delegations of authority to administrative agencies will often include the authority to make “significant discretionary policy determinations”); Bd. of Ed. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 792 , 506 A.2d 625, 634 (1986) (“application of the State Board of Education’s expertise would clearly be desirable before a court attempts to resolve the legal issues”). Id at 571-72, 873 A.2d at 1154-55 , quoting Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-69 , 729 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1999) (footnote omitted).

III

Discussion Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, also known as Maryland’s Implied Consent Law, which provides for the suspension of driving privileges when a driver refuses to ²⁷⁶ submit to a chemical breath test for intoxication, states in part: (a)(2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title. (emphasis added). Section 16-205.1(b)(2) 11 defines the process an officer is to follow before requesting that a driver submit to a chemical breath test: [I]f a police officer stops or detains any person who the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title, and who is not unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing to take a test, the police officer shall: (i) Detain the person; (ii) Request that the person permit a test to be taken; (iii) Advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test, including ineligibility for modification of a suspension or issu ²⁷⁷ anee of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(l) or (2) of this section. The MVA contends that AL J Barry was correct in concluding that Officer Marll acted on reasonable grounds in requesting that Ms. Illiano take a chemical breath test based upon his observations made after the initial stop and that the Circuit Court was incorrect in superimposing a requirement upon the officer that he have reasonable grounds to suspect Ms. Illiano of driving under the influence at the time of the initial stop.

The Circuit Court’s interpretation of Section 16-205.1(b)(2), the MVA submits, prohibits the consideration of any subsequent events, such as the results of field sobriety tests, that the officer may observe, after the initial detention in determining whether the officer had reasonable grounds to detain the driver for the purpose of administering a chemical breath test. The MVA asserts that the Circuit Court conflates the statutory criteria of Section 16-205.1 (b)(2) from “stop or detain” to “stop and detain,” whereas the statute in fact incorporates a two-part process whereby the officer initially stops the driver, then acquires reasonable grounds to believe a drunk driving offense has occurred and thereafter continues to detain the driver for the purpose of requesting a chemical breath test. Based on this interpretation, the MVA argues, there was more than sufficient evidence to establish that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect Ms. Illiano of driving while under the influence and to request that she take a chemical breath test. According to the MVA, the ALJ’s decision should, therefore, be affirmed.

The Circuit Court, in its opinion, stated that “the reviewing court may substitute its own judgment, if the decision was based solely on an error of law.” As a preliminary matter, we have previously disapproved of the use of the language that the reviewing court may “substitute the court’s judgment” to describe the analysis undertaken in judicial review of legal issues. See Noland, 386 Md. at 573 n. 3, 873 A.2d at 1155 n. 3, citing Banks, 354 Md. at 68-69 , 729 A.2d at 381 . As we have noted: ²⁷⁸ The “substituted judgment” language is misleading and inaccurate for several reasons. It suggests, with respect to legal issues, that no deference whatsoever is owed to the agency’s decision.

That is not the law.... [T]he agency’s interpretations and applications of the statutory or regulatory provisions “which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.” Noland, 386 Md. at 573 n. 3, 873 A.2d at 1155 n. 3, quoting Banks, 354 Md. at 68 , 729 A.2d at 381 . Even after giving that deference, it is ultimately for the court to determine whether an error of law was made. We still must decide, therefore, whether ALJ Barry’s determination that, under Section 16-205.1, an officer may stop a driver for any legitimate reason and then detain that individual to administer chemical breath tests, after developing reasonable grounds to believe that the driver was driving under the influence of alcohol was premised on an erroneous conclusion of law, because although we generally imbue the statutory interpretation of the agency with considerable weight, “when a statutory provision is entirely clear, with no ambiguity whatsoever, ‘administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, are not given weight.’ ” Noland, 386 Md. at 572 , 873 A.2d at 1155 , quoting Banks, 354 Md. at 69 n. 2, 729 A.2d at 381 n. 2. To determine whether ALJ Barry’s interpretation of Section 16-205.1 is erroneous, we must address the