Motor Vehicle Administration v. Mohler

ADKINS, Judge. These two cases, one tried in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and the other in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, both concern the interpretation of Maryland Code (1987 Repl.Vol.), § 16-206(a)(l)(ii) of the Transportation Article. We shall conclude that the circuit courts properly held that the appellees could not be considered “unsafe” drivers under that provision of the code. 1 Before explaining why we do so, we recount the somewhat different factual background in each case. I. Background A. No. 52 — MVA v. Mohler On 5 June 1986, a United States Magistrate, sitting in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, convicted Thomas Noble Mohler, III, (Mohler) of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of the provisions of former 36 C.F.R. § 50.28 (c). 2 The Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) thereafter conducted a hearing to determine whether to suspend or revoke Mohler’s motor vehicle operator’s license pursuant to § 16-206(a)(l), which permits the MVA to impose one of those sanctions “on a showing by [MVA’s] records or other sufficient evidence that the ... licensee ...

(ii) Is an unfit, ²²³ unsafe or habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle.” 3 The MVA hearing examiner suspended Mohler’s license for 15 days and placed him on a three-year alcohol restriction, tersely concluding that Mohler was “subject to” § 16 — 206(a)(l)(ii). On appeal to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the parties stipulated that the hearing officer based his decision “solely upon [Mohler’s] conviction of a violation of 36 Code of Federal Regulations 50.28(c).” They also stipulated that “[n]o other evidence concerning appellant’s fitness to drive, safety as a driver, or habitual recklessness or negligence was considered by the hearing examiner.” Judge Woods, of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, found “that the Administration could not reasonably conclude that one with a single conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol is [an] unfit, unsafe, or habitually reckless or negligent driver.” This Court granted the MVA’s petition for certiorari. B. No. 53 — MVA v. Tritaik On 27 June 1987, Kurt Dennis Tritaik (Tritaik) was on his way to Ocean City, Maryland. The weather was rainy and it was about 1:00 a.m.

He was travelling eastward in the westbound lane of Route 90 when he collided head-on with another car. The driver of the other car subsequently died as a result of the accident. Tritaik was convicted of violating Maryland Code (1987 Repl.Vol.), § 21-305 of the Trans ²²⁴ portation Article, for driving to the left of the center line of the road in an unauthorized manner. Following the conviction, the MVA charged Tritaik with being “an unfit, unsafe, or habitually reckless or negligent driver” under § 16-206(a)(l)(ii), and conducted a hearing on this charge on 1 February 1988.

Tritaik’s prior record was in evidence, 4 but the hearing examiner focused on the 27 June 1987 collision. Tritaik, who was severely injured in the collision, testified that he did not recall the sequence of events immediately prior to and during the accident. The accident report indicated that Tritaik was in the process of passing three cars when he collided with the oncoming car. The hearing officer noted that the accident report stated that Tritaik had been drinking.

Tritaik admitted to having two beers with dinner about 7:00 p.m. (six hours before the accident); no charges, however, were ever brought against Tritaik for the use of alcohol. There was evidence from two of Tritaik’s neighbors that Tritaik was not known to drink to excess and “was never observed in an intoxicated condition.” The hearing officer concluded that Tritaik was “involved in an accident in which there had to be a degree of recklessness because [he] did cross over into the next man’s lane and had a head-on collision.” The examiner also stated that he felt that Tritaik “operated that vehicle in [a] wanton and reckless manner.” He then revoked Tritaik’s license. Tritaik appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

Judge Goudy reversed and vacated the MVA’s decision. This Court issued a writ of certiorari to the circuit court at the request of the MVA.

II

Construction and Application of § 16-206(a)(l)(ii) A. Mohler’s Case The § 16-206(a)(l)(ii) issue in Mohler’s case is clear cut: Can a single conviction of driving under the influence ²²⁵ of intoxicating liquor serve, without more, as the factual predicate for a finding that a driver is “unsafe” within the meaning of the subsection? 5 We hold that Judge Woods construed and applied the statute correctly when he answered that question in the negative. As we have noted, § 16-206(a)(l)(ii) reads: (a)(1) The Administration may suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew the license of any resident ... on a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the applicant or licensee: ... (ii) Is an unfit, unsafe, or habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle. When construing a statute, the duty of the reviewing court is to determine the goal of the legislature and to effectuate that objective.

Rucker v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 315 Md. 559, 564 , 555 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1989). The court must divine the legislative goal or purpose by examining the language of the statute “in the context within which it was adopted.” Rucker, 315 Md. at 565 , 555 A.2d at 1063 . See State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613 , 566 A.2d 88, 92-93 (1989). The statute before us went through several metamorphoses before reaching its current form.

Under the 1918 Code of Maryland, the commissioner of Motor Vehicles could, at his discretion, suspend or revoke the license of a person holding a Maryland driver’s license who was “convicted of any violation of any of the provisions of this sub-title.” Md.Code (1918), Art. LVI, § 145. The statute also gave the commissioner the discretion to revoke or suspend an operator’s license “for any cause which he may deem sufficient.” Id. ²²⁶ The “unfit” and “unsafe” language appeared in 1947. The Department of Motor Vehicles retained the authority to revoke or suspend a license for any violation of the code and, in addition, could do so “for any other cause or reason which, in the opinion of the Department renders the holder of any such license ... an unfit or unsafe person.” Md. Code (1947 Cum.Supp.), Art. 66V2, § 95. This version of the statute deleted the broad language which gave the commissioner the power to revoke or suspend a license “for any cause which he may deem sufficient.” In 1970, the legislature again revised the provision.

The grounds for suspension or revocation became: a showing by [the department’s] records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee: (1) Is either an unfit or unsafe driver. (2) Has been convicted with such frequency of violations of the traffic regulations ... as to indicate an intent to disregard the traffic laws and the safety of other persons (3) Is an habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle; (4) Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle; (5) Has permitted an unlawful or fraudulent use of the license; (6) Has committed an offense in another state____ Md.Code (1970 Repl.Vol.), Art. 66x/2, § 6-206. This revision divested the department of its authority to revoke or suspend an operator's license for any violation of the code. In the 1977 code revision process, the revisors consolidated the language in former § 6-206.

Paragraphs (1) and (3) were combined, and paragraph (4) was deleted. Md.Code (1977), § 16-206 of the Transp. Art. Those changes put the provision in its current form. The evolution of § 16-206 reveals the legislature’s goal of limiting the department’s (now the MVA’s) discretion to revoke or suspend licenses.

The legislature first took away the commissioner’s (department’s) power to revoke or sus ²²⁷ pend a license for any reason that that official (it) found sufficient, and later took away the department’s power to revoke or suspend a license for any motor vehicle violation under the statute. The objective of these changes was to establish a tighter, more specific standard for revocation or suspension. Moreover, the statutory development shows that the legislature meant to attach distinct meanings to “unsafe,” “unfit,” and the two “habitual” categories. The 1977 re-visor’s note to § 16-206 advises that the “reference to an ‘incompetent’ driver [in former Art. I6V2, § 6-206 was] deleted as superfluous in light of the references to an ‘unfit,’ or ‘unsafe’ driver.” Ch. 14, Acts of 1977.

We may conclude that the legislature believed that “unsafe” and “unfit” together encompass the meaning of “incompetent” and “unsafe” and “unfit” are not intended to be synonyms; otherwise, the legislature would have deleted one of those words as well. Lack of fitness has to do with incompetence: physical or mental unsoundness for a particular purpose. See Random House Dictionary of the English Language at 2068 (2d ed. 1987); Oxford English Dictionary Vol. XIX at 19 (2d ed. 1989). “Unsafe” means, among other things, “exposing to danger.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 2509 (1976); Oxford English Dictionary Vol.

XIX at 180 (2d ed. 1989). An unfit driver may be an unsafe one, but an unsafe one is not necessarily an individual who is subject to a physical or mental condition that impairs his or her ability to drive. As we have said, we deal here with a driver found by the MVA to be “unsafe.” But the single conviction upon which the hearing examiner relied could not be the basis for that finding. We do not rule out the possibility that a single incident might, in some circumstances, provide a sufficient foundation for a finding of “unsafe.” But a conviction of driving under the influence is not even complete evidence of a single incident.

The surrounding circumstances are unknown. We do not know how Mohler was driving, to what ²²⁸ extent he was under the influence, his proclivity, if any, to drink or any other information that might bear upon his “unsafeness” as a driver. The hearing examiner must determine that the licensee is “unsafe” at the time of the hearing. The statute is a measure designed to keep unsafe drivers off the road, at least for a time.

Hence, it must be determined that the licensee is unsafe at the time of revocation or suspension. The statute’s history supports this reading of it. What is now § 16-206 traces back to § 6-206 of the Uniform Vehicle Code. See Uniform Vehicle Code (Revised 1962).

While the Maryland statutory provisions are not identical to those of the Uniform Code, and never have been, the purpose of both is the same. With respect to the physical or mental disability ground for sanction, it has been said that “[i]f any broad generalization is possible, it is that in order to support the administrative denial or withdrawal of driving privileges ... there must be competent, substantial evidence of the existence of some tangible disease or defect which bears, or could in the future bear, adversely upon the particular motorist’s capacity to drive safely.” 7A Am.Jur.2d. Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 116 at 284 (1980). In other words, where unfitness is the criterion, the unfitness must be a present one ... one that “bears, or could in the future bear,” upon the licensee’s “capacity to drive safely.” The same is true when “unsafe” is the criterion.

Thus, the “unsafe” standard requires the hearing examiner to determine whether the licensee possesses some characteristic that is likely to make him an unsafe driver. The focus is on the driver, not on the offense of which the driver was convicted. For this reason, MVA’s reliance on out-of-state cases that allow suspension or revocation when a driver has been convicted of a serious offense is not helpful. See, e.g., Crow v. Shaeffer, 199 N.W.2d 45 (Iowa 1972) (I.C.A. § 321.210(7) authorizing suspension of licensee who has “committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this state” allows suspension based on single conviction ²²⁹ of reckless driving, when details of reckless driving established); Ralston v. State, 60 Wash.2d 535 , 374 P.2d 571 (1962) (R.C.W. 46.20.290(4) authorizing suspension of license of one who “has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this state” permits suspension based on single drunk driving conviction).

Those statutes make the nature of the violation the test for suspension or revocation. Maryland, at least where § 16-206(a)(l)(ii) is concerned, looks to the characteristics of the driver, not just the gravity of the motor vehicle violation. To be sure, the nature of a violation may have some bearing on whether a driver may be considered unsafe, as may