Naill v. Maurer

Cochran, J., delivered the opinion of this Court. This bill was filed by the appellee for an allowance of dower in the real estate of which her husband, Paul Maurer, died seized. The appellants admit the material allegations ⁵³⁸ of the bill, but aver, by way of defence, that her right to dower was barred by an ante-nup'tial contract with her husband, a copy of which they exhibit with their answer. As both sides concede, the question to be decided depends upon the true operation and effect of that instrument.

We have considered, with much diligence and care, the circumstances under which this contract was executed, as well as the relations previously and then existing between the contracting parties; and we find, apart from those portions of the evidence covered by exceptions taken in the Court below, enough to satisfy üs that the contract was entered into in good faith, and with a Ml and clear understanding of the purpose contemplated by its terms. There is not the slightest evidence that its execution was induced by imposition or fraud, or that the appellee was, from any eause, incompetent to bind herself by its stipulation. The contract was made in contemplation of marriage, and, as clearly appears, was intended to-bar or prevent the acquisition thereby of any right by either in the property of the other, in order that the marriage proposed might take place. The main object in view was the consummation of the marriage, and it was to that end that the contract was executed.

It seemed almost impossible to view the contract as founded on any other consideration, although the reciprocal character of the stipulations might be held to- constitute one sufficient te make the contract binding and effective. But whether the marriage they proposed be expressly mentioned as a consideration or not, we think it must be regarded as such within the purview and meaning of the contract; and we accordingly hold that the contract cannot be avoided on that ground, nor can its legal operation be affected by the 289th section of Art. 93 of the Code. That is- a simple statutory declaration, that a settlement of property by jointure or otherwise, on a woman by ■ her husband, before marriage, shall bar her of dower in his hinds; but it goes no further, and camnct be said to deprive- ⁵³⁹ tier of tbe power to bar ber right to dower by any other form, of ante-nuptial contract. It amounts to nothing more than a declaration of the effect of the settlement in that class of cases.

This, however, is not the case of a settlement or jointure, but of a contract, by which the appellee has expressly relinquished all right to claim any estate or interest in the property of her deceased husband; a contract executed in good faith by parties legally competent, and, as we have said, sustained by a good consideration. ITer power to bind herself by such a contract, in equity, must be admitted, and we do not doubt that this contract constitutes an equitable