Nero v. State

JAMES R. EYLER, Judge. Appellant, James Herbert Nero, was charged with armed robbery and related offenses. He was tried with a co-defendant, Robert Milton Shuebrooks, by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Appellant was found guilty of two counts of armed robbery, four counts of first degree assault, four counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a ³³⁷ felony or crime of violence, two counts of reckless endangerment, and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery.

Appellant was sentenced to a total of one hundred years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed. Appellant presents the following issues for our consideration: I. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress; II. Whether the trial court erred in permitting a police officer to testify as to her opinion that some of the witnesses were certain of their photographic identifications of appellant and his co-defendant; III.

Whether the trial court erred in not admitting exculpatory evidence; IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for new trial; and, V. Whether the trial court committed plain error in its jury instructions. FACTUAL BACKGROUND At about midday on May 1, 1999, Robert White was working at the Finlay Fine Jewelry counter at a Hecht’s department store in Chevy Chase. Sandy Jones, a manager, was also working there that day.

White testified at trial that as he was assisting a customer, Caroline Neuman, he noticed an African American male whom he described as “maybe six feet” tall, with a “short hair cut,” and a “kind of long face.” The man was dressed in a “blue nylon, like a blue jacket, jeans maybe.” About five minutes after White first noticed the man, he saw another man grab Neuman and put a gun on the counter. The second man told White to start filling a bag with jewelry. White described the second man as being “around five 10 and a half or so” in height. White noticed that the man wore a blazer and pants and that the zipper on his pants was open and his shirt was “hanging through the zipper.” The man also wore “a wig like ³³⁸ dreadlocks or something like that and [a] Ca[r]go hat with a little flip button [on] the front.” White testified that the man had a scar on his eyebrow.

White filled the bag with jewelry. White then noticed that Jones was also filling a bag with jewelry and that the man he first noticed in the store was telling Jones what to put in the bag and to hurry up. When Jones was finished filling the bag with jewelry, the first man took the bag from Jones and the two men left the store together. White testified that he “stood there for a second and [ ] was still kind of in shock.” He then “ran and got a piece of paper and a pen and ran after the guys outside, I wanted to try to get their tag number or see which way they were going at least.” White testified that a Hecht’s security guard, Hurist Morgan, also ran after the two men as they left the store.

White and Morgan exited the Hecht’s department store onto Wisconsin Avenue and ran up a hill. According to White, when we got to about mid-way at the top of the hill, I saw [the two men] get into a white Jeep Cherokee so I started writing down the tag number and the guy—guy with the gun, as he was opening the door, he looked up and saw us, you know, coming down the hill and the door hit his hand that was holding the bag of jewelry which that dropped it on the ground, I guess he got mad and he pulled out the gun and he fired some shots at us and we dove into the bushes. White was able to crawl through the bushes and see the tag number of the Jeep Cherokee, which he wrote down and later gave to the police. At trial, White identified appellant and his co-defendant, Shuebrooks, as the men who were involved in the robbery at the Hecht’s department store on May 1,1999.

Jones testified at trial that, about ten minutes before the robbery took place, she noticed the shorter of the two defendants, later identified as Shuebrooks, looking at some watches while she was showing a lady some earrings. Jones stated that the man she noticed, Shuebrooks, was African American, ³³⁹ had long dreadlocks, and wore dark glasses and a suit jacket. While looking in a drawer for a gift box for a customer, Jones saw a man flip a bag over the counter. The man said “take this.” Initially, Jones thought the man wanted her to dispose of the bag in the trash, so she took the bag and started to walk off with it.

The man then flipped another bag over the counter, told White to fill it up, and showed Jones a gun. Jones eased over to the cash register, laid down her keys, and knocked the telephone off the hook. Shuebrooks told Jones to be quiet and go back over to where she was and to fill the bag with jewelry. He said that he wanted the diamonds out of the jewelry case.

Jones told him that she had to go back to the register to get her keys, and while she was at the register, she used the telephone to dial the number for security. She then returned to the jewelry case, opened it, and started putting the diamonds in the bag. As she was filling the bag, Shuebrooks reached over the counter and grabbed the bag out of her hand. Shuebrooks and appellant then turned and started walking away.

Jones witnessed White and the security guard chase after Shuebrooks and appellant. She then dialed 911. Officer Richard Grapes of the Montgomery County Police Department testified that, around noon on May 1, 1999, he received a call for “an armed robbery in progress where shots were fired.” Officer Grapes received information that the suspects were in a Jeep that had left the loading dock area of the department store and was traveling on Friendship Avenue. Officer Grapes found a wig and sunglasses on Friendship Avenue.

He roped off the area and secured the evidence. David McGill, a forensic services technician for the Montgomery County Police Department, was responsible for documenting the crime scene and collecting and preserving the evidence for future analysis. He recovered the wig and sunglasses found by Officer Grapes. He also collected three shell casings from the parking lot, assorted items of jewelry, and some fingerprints. ³⁴⁰ Montgomery County Police Detective Nancy Bond testified that she investigated the May 1, 1999 robbery at the Hecht’s department store.

She also investigated a March 5, 1999 robbery of a Lord and Taylor’s department store. Detective Bond stated that she obtained surveillance photographs that contained excellent pictures of the suspects of the Lord and Taylor’s robbery. A few days after the May 1, 1999 robbery at Hecht’s, Detective Bond showed the surveillance photographs of the suspects of the Lord and Taylor’s robbery to both White and Jones. At the suppression hearing, Detective Bond testified that there were a total of 9 surveillance photographs, but she could not recall which photographs she showed to White and which photographs she showed to Jones.

According to Bond, both White and Jones identified one of the suspects in the photographs as the individual who had had the gun in the Hecht’s robbery. At that time, Detective Bond did not know the name of the suspect in the surveillance photographs. Her purpose in showing the surveillance photographs to White and Jones was to determine if the same suspect was involved in both the Lord and Taylor’s and the Hecht’s robberies. Detective Bond further testified that during the course of her investigation, she read a newspaper article about another robbery that had occurred at the Uptown Movie Theater in the District of Columbia.

Detective Bond believed that the District of Columbia robbery may have been related to the May 1, 1999 robbery at the Hecht’s store. Detective Bond contacted an officer at the Metropolitan Police Department in the District of Columbia and arranged to be present when a search of appellant’s home in the District of Columbia was conducted, pursuant to a search warrant obtained by the Metropolitan Police Department in connection with their investigation of the theater robbery. Detective Dave Edelstein of the Metropolitan Police Department testified that on June 23, 1999, he and .other officers executed a search warrant for an apartment located at 723 Longfellow Street in Washington, D.C. Detective Bond was present for the search. During the search of the apartment, ³⁴¹ officers found papers and photographs connecting appellant to the apartment.

They also found jewelry, a jewelry tag, and pawn receipts in the apartment, which were seized and subsequently turned over to the Montgomery County Police Department. After receiving the pawn receipts and jewelry, Detective Bond put a stop on certain jewelry at area pawn shops and, eventually, identified certain items of jewelry as having been taken from the Finlay Fine Jewelry counter at the Hecht’s department store on May 1, 1999. Detective Bond prepared two photographic arrays, one of which included appellant’s photograph and one of which included Shuebrooks’ photograph. 1 Detective Bond testified that both White and Jones identified the photographs of appellant and Shuebrooks as the men who perpetrated the robbery. At trial, it was stipulated that appellant was in actual possession of a 9 millimeter handgun that was recovered by the Metropolitan Police Department on June 22, 1999, and admitted in evidence.

An expert witness testified that the casings found on the Hecht’s parking lot had been fired from that gun. It was also stipulated, inter alia, that appellant and Shuebrooks “lived in the same residential complex from 1993 to 1994.” We shall include additional facts as necessary in our discussion of the issues presented. DISCUSSION I. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Our review of the trial ³⁴² court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress is based solely on the record of the suppression hearing, and we do not consider the trial record.

Rowe v. State, 363 Md. 424, 431 , 769 A.2d 879 (2001); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282 , 753 A.2d 519 (2000). In Brown v. State, 124 Md.App. 183 , 720 A.2d 1270 (1998), cert. denied, 353 Md. 269 , 725 A.2d 1067 (1999), we set forth the standard for review of the denial of a motion to suppress as follows: In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we look only to the record of the suppression hearing, extend deference to the fact finding of the suppression judge, and accept those findings as to disputed issues of fact unless clearly erroneous. See Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 457-58 , 682 A.2d 248 (1996); Pryor v. State, 122 Md.App. 671 , 677 n. 4, 716 A.2d 338 (1998); Partee v. State, 121 Md.App. 237, 244 , 708 A.2d 1113 (1998). We also consider those facts that are most favorable to the State as the prevailing party on the motion.

Jones, 343 Md. at 458 , 682 A.2d 248 ; Partee, 121 Md.App. at 244 , 708 A.2d 1113 . We make our own independent constitutional appraisal based on a review of the law as it applies to the facts of the case. Jones, 343 Md. at 457 , 682 A.2d 248 . Brown, 124 Md.App. at 187-88 , 720 A.2d 1270 .

At the suppression hearing, Detective Edelstein of the Metropolitan Police Department testified that he obtained two search warrants, one for appellant’s house and another for appellant’s Jeep. When asked to describe the investigation that led up to getting the warrants, Detective Edelstein testified as follows: On June 22, 1999 there was an armed robbery at the Uptown Theater that’s located at 3426 Connecticut Avenue in Northwest, D.C. After the subject committed the robbery, he was chased by several employees and fired a handgun at them striking one of them in the foot and made good his escape into a Jeep Wrangler. A tag number was obtained by witnesses. We subsequently ran that tag number and got a listing of the vehicle and an address to go along with it. ³⁴³ The vehicle was identified as belonging to appellant and was listed at 728 Longfellow Street in Washington, D.C. According to Detective'Edelstein, police units were dispatched to the Longfellow Street address.

Officers saw a Jeep that matched the description of appellant’s being driven in the area. A vehicle pursuit ensued. During the chase, appellant, while driving the Jeep, fired a handgun at a marked police cruiser. The chase culminated when appellant crashed the Jeep into other vehicles and was apprehended by the police.

The search warrant obtained by Detective Edelstein for the Longfellow Street apartment authorized the seizure of “clothing, ammunition, firearms, and any other items believed to be evidence of a crime, personal papers showing residence, vehicle ownership or gun registration/ ownership.” There was nothing in the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant that •specifically mentioned jewelry store robberies or discussions with Detective Bond of the Montgomery County Police Department about the May 1, 1999 robbery at the Hecht’s department store. Both Detective Edelstein and Detective Bond were present, along with other officers, when the search of the Longfellow Street apartment was conducted. Among the items seized from the apartment were pawn receipts and jewelry. Some of the pawn receipts were for jewelry pawned by appellant’s girlfriend, Candice Lee, and others were for jewelry pawned by appellant.

According to Detective Edelstein, the pawn receipts showed appellant’s residence because they listed the Longfellow Street apartment as his address. At the suppression hearing, appellant argued that the language in the search warrant authorizing seizure of “any other items believed to be evidence of a crime” was overly broad in that it allowed seizure of evidence of other crimes. He also argued that there was bad faith on the part of Detective Edelstein in failing to disclose to the judge who signed the search warrant “that there was this ancillary investigation going on [and] that the police officer was going to use [the warrant] to bring somebody else in and investigate another ³⁴⁴ crime.... ” In addition, appellant argued that the language used in the search warrant was overly broad, and that there was no nexus between the items listed in the warrant and the items seized. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress, stating as follows: All right.

The question is whether or not the evidence seized in the execution of the search warrant on June 28, 1999 should be suppressed. The Detective Edelstein who obtained the search warrant has testified concerning the circumstances surrounding his obtaining of the search warrant, the affidavit, and support of an application for search warrant has been submitted along with the search warrant. The affidavit on its face contains probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, the search warrant was properly issued. The question is whether or not the Detective engaged in bad faith in the obtaining of this search warrant by failing to disclose information that he had in the application which then resulted in the seizure of additional items that were not contemplated by the search warrant.

The search warrant application states in the last paragraph that “it is requested that a Superior Court search warrant be issued for the entire premises for the seizure of all evidence and proceeds of criminal activities as well as any contraband discovery.” There is no limitation within the application or the search warrant itself as to who is to be present for the execution of the search warrant, there is nothing illegal or unlawful about the presence of Montgomery County police detectives during the course of the execution of the search warrant. I do not find that the affidavit by Detective Edelstein and the information that he had in his possession at the time that he obtained the search warrant constituted bad faith. There was ample probable cause based upon the information that he had, there is nothing that is incorrect or improper about the information that was presented to the judge, and it’s clear to me that the evidence that was seized ³⁴⁵ did constitute evidence and proceeds of criminal activities as authorized under the scope of the search warrant as issued. Accordingly, I deny the motion to suppress.

On appeal, appellant does not pursue his “bad faith” argument. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the warrant authorizing officers to search for “any other evidence relating to the commission of a crime” was not sufficiently particular with respect to the things to be seized and the warrant was, therefore, rendered fatally general in nature. He further contends that, although excessively broad language in a warrant may be limited by reference to the attached affidavit, there was nothing in the supporting affidavit submitted by Detective Edelstein to provide a basis for seizing the pawn receipts and the jewelry. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in furtherance of the expressed right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, provides that “... no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 “General warrants, of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976).

As the United States Supreme Court explained in Andresen , “[T]he problem [posed by the general warrant] is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.... [The Fourth Amendment ad ³⁴⁶ dresses the problem] by requiring a ‘particular description’ of the things to be seized.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). This requirement “ ‘makes general searches ... impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.’” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 , 85 S.Ct. 506 , 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965), quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. [192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74 , 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927) ]. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 .

In Andresen , the Supreme Court agreed with the earlier determination by our court that the phrase “together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime” did not authorize the executing officers to conduct a search for evidence of other crimes but only to search for and seize evidence relevant to the crime of false pretenses and a specific tract of real property that were at issue in that case. Id. See also United States v. Hoang Anh Thi Duong, 156 F.Supp.2d 564, 571-72 (E.D.Va.2001)(excessively broad language in a warrant may be limited by reference to the attached affidavit). In the instant case, the phrase “any other items believed to be evidence of a crime” that was contained in the search warrant, along with a list of particular items, authorized the executing officers to conduct a search for and seize evidence relevant to the robbery of the Uptown Theater in Washington, D.C. as described in the affidavit made by Detective Edelstein in support of his application for the search warrant.

Of course, the items' officers may reasonably seize under a constitutionally valid warrant and search pursuant thereto are not confined to those specifically designated in the warrant if a nexus exists between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Gerstein v. State, 10 Md.App. 322, 332 , 270 A.2d 331 (1970); Crawford v. State, 9 Md.App. 624, 627 , 267 A.2d 317 (1970)(citing Anglin v. State, 1 Md.App. 85, 88-90 , 227 A.2d 364 , and cases cited therein). Such a nexus is automatically provided in the case of fruits and instrumentali ³⁴⁷ ties of crime and contraband. Crawford, 9 Md.App. at 627 , 267 A.2d 317 .

In Crawford v. State, a search warrant was issued upon an affidavit showing probable cause that narcotic drugs and narcotic paraphernalia were being concealed in the subject premises. While executing the search warrant, the officers found narcotic paraphernalia and about 29 pawn tickets in a bedroom closet. One of the pawn tickets was for a radio that had been stolen in a breaking and entering, and it was this radio that Crawford was convicted of receiving. In finding that the seizure of the pawn tickets was reasonable and that the trial court did not err in admitting them, we explained: The pawn ticket for the radio was relevant and material to the charges in indictment 2156 as tending to establish that appellant had possession of goods stolen in the breaking.

It was properly admissible if legally obtained by the police. It was legally obtained if its seizure was reasonable. Its seizure was reasonable if made after fulfilling the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. “Mere evidence” may be so seized as well as fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 . “There must, of course, be a nexus-automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal behavior.” Id., at 307 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 .

If this nexus exists, the items the police may reasonably seize under a constitutionally valid warrant and search are not confined to those specifically designated in the warrant. Anglin v. State, 1 Md.App. 85, 88-90 , 227 A.2d 364 , and cases therein cited. We think that here the police had reason to believe that there was a nexus between the 29 pawn tickets and criminal behavior. The large number of pawn tickets, come by on a valid search, showed that it was necessary that appellant frequently required cash and it was probable, in the light of the narcotic paraphernalia found in his possession by a legal search, that the cash was used to ³⁴⁸ buy narcotic drugs, the possession and control of which are ordinarily unlawful.

Crawford, 9 Md.App. at 627-28 , 267 A.2d 317 . In State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189 , 367 A.2d 1223 (1977), the Court of Appeals considered whether the search for and seizure of certain serial numbers were lawful. As in Crawford , the warrant that was issued in the Wilson case mentioned only narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia. Wilson, 279 Md. at 194 , 367 A.2d 1223 .

During the course of the search, officers observed various electronic items including televisions, stereo equipment, and cameras. One of the officers wrote down the serial numbers of all of the items and later checked them against those stored in a national computer system that lists serial numbers of stolen equipment. One number matched, indicating that Wilson possessed a cassette tape recorder that had been stolen. The officer then referred the matter to another division of the police department.

Subsequently, officers returned to Wilson’s residence and were invited inside by one of Wilson’s housemates. One officer approached Wilson, advised him of his Miranda rights, and explained that stolen property had been observed in his home. The cassette tape recorder was seized and Wilson was arrested and charged with a number of crimes including burglary and receiving stolen property. At trial, Wilson objected to the introduction of the cassette tape recorder.

The trial court ruled that Wilson had consented to the seizure of the cassette tape recorder and, therefore, found that it was not necessary to rule on the legality of the seizure of the serial numbers. On appeal, we reversed. In affirming our decision, the Court of Appeals wrote as follows: The issue in controversy here is whether the search for the serial numbers and their seizure were lawful. To prevent the issuance of general warrants, the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant ‘particularly [describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’ The warrant which was issued here mentioned only ³⁴⁹ narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia.

Manifestly, then, the seizure of the serial numbers cannot be justified under the terms of the warrant. Moreover, ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ To sustain the seizure here, therefore, the State must shoulder the heavy burden of showing that one of the exceptions applies. Wilson, 279 Md. at 194 , 367 A.2d 1223 (citations omitted). In Wilson , the State argued that the seizure of the serial numbers was valid under the “plain view” doctrine enunciated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

The Court of Appeals rejected that argument because it was not immediately apparent to the police that they had evidence before them. The Court of Appeals explained that the police must have probable cause to believe the evidence is incriminating before they seize it. Wilson, 279 Md. at 195 , 367 A.2d 1223 . Quoting from United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352, 356 (6th Cir.1973), the Court of Appeals wrote: ‘[I]t must be ‘immediately apparent’ to the police that the object is in fact incriminating or the seizure of the object would be without probable cause and would turn the search into a general or exploratory one.’ Stated another way, to be subject to seizure, the object must be one for which the police could have obtained a warrant because they had probable cause.

Wilson, 279 Md. at 195 , 367 A.2d 1223 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals went on to discuss what information a police officer must possess before he or she can be said to have probable cause to seize evidence: In the context of another exception to the warrant requirement, the ‘hot pursuit’ doctrine, the Supreme Court has indicated what information a police officer must possess ³⁵⁰ before he can be said to have probable cause to seize evidence: ‘. There must, of course, be a nexus—automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband— between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Thus in the case of ‘mere evidence,’ probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.’ This standard has also been used to determine whether probable cause existed to seize articles in plain view.

In [Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) ], of course, the Court held that mere evidence, as well as fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband, may be seized under certain circumstances. Under the Hayden formulation, as long as police have probable cause to believe that what they see is contraband, or the fruit or instrumentality of some unspecified criminal activity, they may seize the object. Where, however, they possess probable cause to believe that the object is mere evidence, officers may seize it as an aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. These standards furnish guidelines to determine the ultimate issue, whether an officer of reasonable caution would be warranted in believing that an offense is being or has been committed and that the object is evidence incriminating the accused.

Whether we regard the cassette recorder as the “fruit of crime” or “mere evidence,” the record fails to support the State’s contention that the officer possessed probable cause to seize the serial numbers. In support of its claim, the State first urges that since drug users frequently deal in stolen goods to support their habit, the officer possessed probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen. This ‘nexus,’ standing alone, is too remote in this case to establish probable cause. The cases upon which the State relies are all distinguishable.

In each instance, either the same or a similar kind of criminal conduct was involved. ³⁵¹ The State also argues that the large quantity of equipment observed in appellee’s bedroom created probable cause. In our view, however, the record justifies no more than a mere suspicion that any of the goods were stolen. Wilson, 279 Md. at 195-98 , 367 A.2d 1223 . In the case sub judice, no exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.

We reject the State’s contention that the good faith exception is applicable because the officers were directed to seize “any other items believed to be evidence of a crime.” In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the Supreme Court first announced the good faith exception. This exception modifies the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule by providing for the admissibility of evidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid if the executing officers acted in objective good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467-68 , 701 A.2d 675 (1997); Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 729 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991). The test under Leon is not whether there was probable cause, but whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known the search was illegal, despite the authorization from the judge.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; McDonald, 347 Md. at 469 , 701 A.2d 675 ; Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 717 , 641 A.2d 214 (1994). In Braxton v. State, 123 Md.App. 599 , 720 A.2d 27 (1998), Judge Hollander, writing for this Court, set forth a detailed discussion of the good faith exception stating, in part, as follows: Notwithstanding the importance of the exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court determined that ‘suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.’ Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; McDonald, 347 Md. at 468 , 701 ³⁵² A.2d 675. In [Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) ], the Court added: ‘We refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him ... that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.’ To be sure, Leon made clear that there are circumstances when exclusion of evidence remains the appropriate sanction, even if an officer ‘has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms.’ Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 . This is because ‘the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination ... must be objectively reasonable, and it is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.’ 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (citations and footnotes omitted).

Braxton, 123 Md.App. at 634-35 , 720 A.2d 27 . See also Connelly, 322 Md. at 728-29 , 589 A.2d 958 (the good faith exception permits an officer generally to rely upon a warrant, but this reliance must be objectively reasonable). Detective Bond testified at the suppression hearing that when she became aware that a warrant was to be executed at appellant’s home in the District of Columbia, she asked one of the detectives from the Metropolitan Police Department if she could “go along with the warrant,” and she told him .that she was “looking for jewelry.” Neither the affidavit nor the warrant mentioned jewelry, and it is clear that the officers from the Metropolitan Police Department were not looking for jewelry specifically. Their search was related to the robbery of the Uptown Theater, which did not involve jewelry in any way.

Moreover, no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing to demonstrate the incriminating nature of the jewelry or of a jewelry tag that was also seized from appellant’s apartment. Clearly, Detective Bond’s reliance on the search