Williams v. State

Craig Williams v. State of Maryland, No. 13, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Greene, J. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – MARYLAND RULE 4-331(a) – MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL The Court of Appeals held that the error of supplying the jury with an instruction that was an incorrect statement of law was not harmless. The instruction was on the sole charge, first- degree child abuse, lodged against the Petitioner. We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict.

Therefore, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial. Circuit Court for Montgomery County IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Case No. 128680C Argued: October 3, 2018 OF MARYLAND No. 13 September Term, 2018 ______________________________________ CRAIG WILLIAMS v. STATE OF MARYLAND Barbera, C.J. Greene, *Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. Watts and Getty, JJ. dissent. ______________________________________ Filed: January 18, 2019 *Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the MD. Constitution, Article IV, Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act Section 3A, she also participated in the decision (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. and adoption of this opinion. 2019-05-21 10:46-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk In this case, we consider whether the trial court committed harmless error when it denied the Petitioner’s motion for new trial where the trial court gave a pattern jury instruction that erroneously omitted an element of the sole offense for which the petitioner was convicted. On November 21, 2016, a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County convicted Petitioner Craig Williams (“Mr. Williams”) of first-degree child abuse.

On December 1, 2016, Mr. Williams filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-331(a) (“Rule 4-331(a)”). The Circuit Court denied the motion on the grounds that the erroneous jury instruction did not have an impact on the defense’s theory of the case. The trial court found that it was not in the interest of justice to grant a new trial. Thereafter, Mr. Williams noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed his conviction.

The Court of Special Appeals held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the interest of justice did not require granting appellant a new trial.” Before us, Mr. Williams seeks a reversal of that judgment on the grounds that the erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial error and warranted a new trial. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Facts Leading to Charge of First-Degree Child Abuse Mr. Williams is the father of I.W., who was born on March 3, 2008 and was eight years old at the time of trial in November 2016. Breana Mapp (“Ms. Mapp”) is I.W.’s biological mother. Mr. Williams married Nicole Williams (“Mrs. Williams”), his current wife, after the birth of I.W. Mr. and Mrs. Williams have three sons together.

Mr. Williams, in addition to I.W., has another son from a previous relationship. Mrs. Williams has two children from a previous relationship. Altogether, Mr. and Mrs. Williams have seven children between them. For the first four years of the Williams’s marriage, all children except for I.W. lived with them.

In 2012, the Circuit Court for Washington County granted Mr. Williams sole physical and legal custody of I.W. because that court found that Ms. Mapp had sexually and physically abused I.W. Upon moving in with Mr. and Mrs. Williams, I.W.’s behavior showed signs of the sexual trauma and abuse he had suffered at the hands of his mother. For example, I.W. threw tantrums, hit himself and sexually attacked his siblings.1 Christopher Cofone (“Mr. Cofone”), a social worker, began working with I.W. in May of 2014. Monica Reaves (“Ms. Reaves”), a social worker with Child Protective Services, investigated the report that I.W. had sexually abused his younger half-siblings, but she never considered removing I.W. from the family home. On November 19, 2015, Mr. Cofone determined that he could no longer help I.W. and recommended that I.W. see a psychiatrist.

Although an appointment was scheduled for December 4, 2015, I.W.’s inappropriate behavior continued. According to Mr. Williams, on November 29, 2015, he first wrapped I.W. in plastic at night in an effort to stop I.W. from hurting himself and the other children. The following night, on November 30, 2015, Mr. Williams again wrapped I.W. in plastic wrap from his shoulder to the knee, but also secured I.W.’s hands with zip ties. The following morning I.W.’s wrists were chaffed and by the evening, I.W. had “puffy wrists, was drooling, and was not talking.” 1 I.W. would, among other things, insert objects into his rectum to force himself to defecate and then hide the feces throughout the house. 2 Mr. Williams took I.W. to Shady Grove Hospital where I.W. was subsequently transferred to the Children’s Hospital within Shady Grove.

There, doctors diagnosed I.W. with compartment syndrome2 and performed surgery on I.W.’s wrists. Facts Leading to Motion for New Trial On January 7, 2016, the grand jury for Montgomery County indicted Mr. Williams on one count of first-degree child abuse. A conviction of first-degree child abuse requires the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Williams abused I.W. and that the abuse resulted in “severe physical injury.” Maryland Code Ann., Criminal Law Article § 3- 601(b)(1)(ii) (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2018 Supp.) (“Crim.

Law Art.”). “Severe physical injury” is a physical injury that: 1. creates a substantial risk of death; or 2. causes permanent or protracted serious: A. disfigurement; B. loss of the function of any bodily member or organ; or C. impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Crim. Law Art. § 3-601(a)(5)(iii). For the jury instructions, at the request of both parties, the trial court instructed the jury using the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions (“MPJI-CR”).

The MPJI-CR defined “severe physical injury” in pertinent part as: [P]hysical injury that (a) causes a substantial risk of death, (b) permanent or protracted serious disfigurement, or (c) causes loss or impairment of a member or organ of the body or its ability to function properly. 2 Dr. Martin explained at trial that muscles, muscle groups, and accompanying nerves, which are surrounded by fascia, collectively constitute a compartment. According to Dr. Martin, compartment syndrome occurs when swelling in the compartment becomes so pronounced “that fascia, that thick covering, doesn’t expand and allow for more volume, the muscle can actually collapse on itself due to the pressure and can’t receive its appropriate blood flow, the muscles and the nerves.” 3 Maryland State Bar Ass’n, Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 4:07.1, at 472-73 (2016). After the jury found Mr. Williams guilty, Mr. Williams’s counsel concluded that the pattern instruction was incorrect because it did not make clear that the terms “permanent or protracted” applied to both loss of function and impairment as well as disfigurement. This error was confirmed by the Honorable Michael Mason, who was not the presiding judge but at the time served as the Chair of the Maryland State Bar Association’s Criminal Subcommittee of the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions Standing Committee.

In an email exchange between Mr. Williams’s counsel and Judge Mason, Judge Mason explained that the Criminal Subcommittee remedied the error by changing the pattern instruction on “severe physical injury.” Compare MPJI-CR 4:07.1, at 472-73 (2d ed. 2017)3 with MPJI-CR 4:07.1 at 472-73 (2d ed. 2016). There is no dispute between the parties that the instruction was erroneous. On December 1, 2016, Mr. Williams filed a motion for new trial and referenced the email exchange between his counsel and Judge Mason. At the close of that hearing, the trial judge denied the motion for new trial.

Appellate History On February 17, 2017, Mr. Williams noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in which he questioned whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying his motion for new trial. On January 23, 2018, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court decision in an unreported opinion, holding that the trial court did not abuse its 3 “Severe physical injury means: . . . (3) physical injury that (a) creates a substantial risk of death, (b) causes permanent or protracted serious disfigurement, or (c) causes permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 4 discretion in denying Mr. Williams’s motion for new trial. The Court of Special Appeals first cited the broad discretion that is given to trial courts in granting motions for new trial.

It then noted that the trial court “reviewed the erroneous instruction in light of the defense’s theory of the case and in conjunction with the evidence adduced at trial.” The intermediate appellate court, however, failed to apply the appropriate standard of review in this case, and mistakenly declared that the trial court properly weighed all factors in its interest of justice determination. This Court granted Mr. Williams’s petition for writ of certiorari on May 9, 2018. We granted certiorari to answer the following question: D[id the] circuit court abuse its discretion in denying a motion for new trial where the court gave a pattern jury instruction and, after the jury render[ed] its verdict, the court, prosecution, and defense all acknowledge[d] that the instruction erroneously omitted an element of the offense for which the defendant was convicted? 459 Md. 170 , 185 A.3d 63 (2018). DISCUSSION Mr. Williams moved for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331(a).

This Rule states that the court may, on motion filed by the defendant within ten days after the verdict, order a new trial if it finds that a new trial would be in the interest of justice. Md. Rule 4-331(a). In his motion, Mr. Williams asserted that the faulty jury instruction warranted the granting of a new trial because the instruction with regard to “severe physical injury” was unclear and therefore lowered the standard under which the jury could convict Mr. Williams. 5 Specifically, according to Mr. Williams, the jury instruction did not make clear the definition of “severe physical injury” as defined in Crim. Law Art. § 3-601.

Standard of Review At the outset, we observe that the parties disagree about the appropriate standard of review of the trial judge’s denial of the motion for new trial. Petitioner Mr. Williams argues that because the jury had been misled as to the elements of the crime, the Circuit Court’s discretion to deny the motion was non-existent. Mr. Williams also cites to Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17 , 785 A.2d 756 (2001), and contends that a harmless error standard is appropriate for appellate review. Ultimately, Mr. Williams maintains that under either an abuse of discretion or harmless error standard of review, the Court of Special Appeals and trial court should be reversed.

Respondent State of Maryland argues that the standard of review in this case should be abuse of discretion. Respondent concedes that “in all but a very [few] instances, none of which are present here, this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 4-331(a) new trial motion for an abuse of discretion.” Respondent’s argument that the abuse of discretion standard should apply in this case is primarily based on a claim that this Court’s Opinion in Merritt is flawed. According to Respondent, Merritt is flawed because the Court relied on cases that either had not been queued up by a motion for new trial or did not “review[] the trial court’s interest of justice determination.” Specifically, Respondent argues that Merritt’s references to Sherman v. State, 288 Md. 636 , 421 A.2d 80 (1980), Taylor v. State, 352 Md. 338 , 722 A.2d 65 (1998), State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998), Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201 , 711 A.2d 205 (1998), and Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19 , 702 A.2d 699 (1997) are inapposite 6 because the trial court in those cases “either found error when it did not exist or found that no error occurred when it had.” Abuse of Discretion Pursuant to Rule 4-331(a), a trial judge may order a new trial if the court finds it is in the interest of justice to do so. This decision is ordinarily reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, which this Court made clear in Buck v. Cam’s Broadloom Rugs, Inc. 328 Md. 51, 57 , 612 A.2d 1294, 1297 (1992) (“[A] trial court’s order denying a motion for a new trial will be reviewed on appeal if it is claimed that the trial court abused its discretion.

However, an appellate court does not generally disturb the exercise of a trial court’s discretion in denying a motion for a new trial.”) (quoting Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600 , 479 A.2d 1344 (1984)). Generally, abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard because the decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial under Rule 4-331(a) “depends so heavily upon the unique opportunity the trial judge has to closely observe the entire trial, complete with nuances, inflections, and impressions never to be gained from a cold record[.]” Buck, 328 Md. at 59 , 612 A.2d at 1298 . The abuse of discretion standard is largely deferential to the trial judge’s decision. To reverse the denial of a new trial on appeal, when utilizing the abuse of discretion standard, the reviewing court must find that the “degree of probable prejudice [was] so great that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a new trial.” Merritt, 367 Md. at 29 , 785 A.2d at 763 (quoting Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 420 , 470 A.2d 802, 809 (1984)). “Abuse occurs when a trial judge exercises discretion in an arbitrary or 7 capricious manner or when he or she acts beyond the letter or reason of law.” Campbell v. State, 373 Md. 637, 666 , 821 A.2d 1, 18 (2003) (citation omitted).

An Exception to the Abuse of Discretion Standard: Merritt v. State This Court in Merritt made an exception to the general rule that a trial court’s decision on a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 367 Md. at 30 - 31, 785 A.2d at 764 . Merritt explained: [W]hen an alleged error is committed during the trial, when the losing party or that party’s counsel, without fault, does not discover the alleged error during the trial, and when the issue is then raised by a motion for a new trial, we have reviewed the denial for the new trial motion under a standard of whether the denial was erroneous. . . . Also, in these criminal cases where we concluded that error did occur, the matter of prejudice was reviewed under the harmless error standard of [review]. Id. at 31 , 785 A.2d at 764 -65 (citing Taylor v. State, 352 Md. 338, 344, 354 , 722 A.2d 65, 68 , 72–73 (1998); State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 749 , 720 A.2d 323 , 330–331 (1998); Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201 , 217–218, 711 A.2d 205 , 213–214 (1998); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19 , 34–35, 54–55, 702 A.2d 699 , 706–707, 716 (1997)).4 Merritt queued up for this Court the question of whether the denial of a motion for new trial can be erroneous given “the fact that prejudicial documentary evidence which was never entered into evidence was erroneously submitted to the jury at the start of its deliberations.” 367 Md. at 23 , 785 A.2d at 760 .

In that case, the State discovered two days after the trial ended that an exhibit that had been marked for identification, but had not been admitted into evidence, was present in the jury room during the jury’s deliberations. Id. at 4 Respondent contends that Merritt does not apply in this case because “the trial court assumed the error and considered its effect on the balance of [Mr.] Williams’s trial.” 8 21-22, 785 A.2d at 759 . The exhibit “included the application for the search and seizure warrant for Merritt’s home, the warrant, the affidavit in support of the warrant, the inventory return, and a copy of Merritt’s taped statement to police[.]” Id. The presence of the exhibit in the jury room was the result of the courtroom clerk’s “erroneous belief that the exhibit had been admitted into evidence” and was not the fault of either party.

Id. at 22 , 785 A.2d at 759 . The trial court denied Merritt’s motion for new trial and concluded that there was “overpowering evidence” in the case to convict him. Id. at 23 , 785 A.2d at 760 . We reversed.

Id. at 35 , 785 A.2d at 767 . In analyzing our appellate review of rulings on motions for new trials, we observed that “sometimes a trial court has virtually no discretion to deny a new trial motion[.]” Id. at 30 , 785 A.2d at 764 . Merritt’s holding recognized the limitation of an abuse of discretion standard, such as in the situation where an error occurred at trial and was not discovered by either party until after the trial, neither party was at fault for not discovering the error, and the error was raised by a motion for new trial. We ultimately concluded in Merritt that “the result would be the same whether the denial of the motion for a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard or under an error standard.” Id. at 31-32 , 785 A.2d at 765 .

Maryland appellate courts have applied the Merritt standard in various contexts since 2001. Nero v. State, 144 Md. App. 333, 365-66 , 798 A.2d 5, 24 (2002) (“[T]he denial of appellant’s motion for new trial with respect to the police report should be reviewed under the standard of whether there was error committed and, if so, whether it was harmless error.”); Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 299 , 825 A.2d 1008, 1017 (2003) (“Thus, the 9 standards of review in Merritt and in this case are different. We will review the trial judge’s denial of petitioner’s motion for a new trial in the case sub judice under an abuse of discretion standard.”). Due to the high burden set by Merritt, our appellate courts have generally reviewed the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.

See id. Applying a Harmless Error Standard is Appropriate in the Present Case Here, there is no debate that an error, the delivery of the faulty jury instruction, occurred during the trial. Respondent and Mr. Williams agree that based on the MPJI-CR jury instruction that was given, the jury could convict Mr. Williams of first-degree child abuse as long as he “cause[d] loss or impairment of a member or organ of the body or its ability to function properly.” The instruction did not make clear that the loss or impairment must be either “permanent or protracted serious” as required by Crim. Law Art. § 3- 601(b)(1)(ii).

Thus, the trial court committed error when it gave the jury an instruction that effectively lowered Respondent’s burden for establishing Mr. William’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the harmless error standard of Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976), applied in Merritt, we next consider whether the losing party, without fault, did not discover the alleged error during trial. See Merritt, 367 Md. at 31 , 785 A.2d at 765 . Here, the erroneous jury instruction was “given at the behest of both parties.” Before us, Mr. Williams argues that he is not at fault because the use of pattern jury instructions is encouraged by this Court.

Additionally, Mr. Williams argues that he was not the only party to rely on the pattern jury instructions. This Court, in State v. Brady, noted that: 10 [T]he appellate courts of this State have often recognized error in the trial judge’s instructions, even when there has been no objection, if the error was likely to unduly influence the jury and thereby deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The premise for such appellate action is that a jury is able to follow the court’s instructions when articulated fairly and impartially. It follows, therefore, that when the instructions are lacking in some vital detail or convey some prejudicial or confusing message, however inadvertently, the ability of the jury to discharge its duty of returning a true verdict based on the evidence is impaired. 393 Md. 502, 507 , 903 A.2d 870, 873 (2006) (citing State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 204 , 411 A.2d 1035, 1039 (1980)).

In Brady, Terrell Brady (“Mr. Brady”) was charged with attempted murder and the court delivered an erroneous jury instruction on the doctrine of transferred intent. 393 Md. at 504-06 , 903 A.2d at 871-73 . On direct appeal, Mr. Brady challenged the jury instruction. Id. at 506 , 903 A.2d at 873 . We reversed Mr. Brady’s conviction and observed that the “responsibility for avoiding such circumstance rests with the trial judge who must advise the jury on every matter stemming from the evidence which is vital to its determination of the issues before them.”5 Id. at 507-08 , 903 A.2d at 873 .

As such, in the present matter, we do not ascribe any fault to either Mr. Williams or Respondent.6 5 The Dissenting Opinion suggests that “Maryland Rule 4-325(e) is devoid of any exception that alleviates the responsibility of a defendant’s counsel to object where a trial court employs a pattern jury instruction.” Yet, the last sentence in Rule 4-325(e) provides that “[a]n appellate court, on its own initiative or on the suggestion of a party, may however take cognizance of any plain error in the instructions, material to the rights of the defendant, despite a failure to object.” Although plain error is not an issue in this case, Brady is significant in its recognition of the court’s role in giving proper jury instructions. 6 The Dissenting Opinion contends that fault for the erroneous jury instruction must be placed with a particular party and that in this case, fault should be attributed to Mr. Williams. We maintain that fault need not be attributed in this case. If we were to assign fault, it should be placed with the trial court because this Court and the Court of Special (continued . . .) 11 The last element of the harmless error review under Merritt requires that the issue be raised in writing via a motion for new trial. Mr. Williams’s pleading fulfills this requirement.

Merritt provides a guide for when we will review “denials of new trial motions [] under a standard of whether the court erred rather than under an abuse of discretion standard.” 367 Md. at 30-31 , 785 A.2d at 764 . Three elements must be present: an alleged error occurred during trial that was not discovered during trial, the losing party was without fault for not discovering the error during the trial, and the error is raised in writing. Here, the three elements are present, and we, thus, review the trial court’s denial of Mr. Williams’s motion for new trial under the harmless error standard. Respondent contends that Merritt does not apply in this case because “the trial court assumed the error and considered its effect on the balance of Williams’s trial[.]” Alternatively, Respondent suggests that any reliance on Merritt would be misguided and argues that the analysis within Merritt is flawed.

Respondent points out factual differences between Merritt and the cases cited therein7 to support its proposition that harmless error review is inappropriate in the immediate instance. Respondent does not adequately explain why these factual differences amount to a flawed inferential step between the standard (. . . continued) Appeals have been steadfast in encouraging that trial counsel and our trial courts rely on the pattern jury instructions. See, e.g., Minger v. State, 157 Md. App. 157 , 161 n. 1, 849 A.2d 1058 , 1060 n.1 (2004) (“Appellate courts in Maryland strongly favor the use of pattern jury instructions.”). 7 Taylor v. State, 352 Md. 338 , 722 A.2d 65 (1998); State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998); Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201 , 711 A.2d 205 (1998); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19 , 702 A.2d 699 (1997). 12 applied in Merritt and the cases used to support it. We, nevertheless, explore the cases that we relied on in Merritt.

In Taylor, the defendant, Lisa Taylor (“Ms. Taylor”), was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and possession with intent to distribute. 352 Md. 338, 340 , 722 A.2d 65, 66 (1998). The jury raised questions while deliberating and the trial judge answered the questions out of the presence of the defendant, the State, and defense counsel. Id. The trial court deemed the error harmless and denied a new trial.

Id. at 344 , 722 A.2d at 73 . We reversed and stated that “if the record is silent as to prejudice resulting from a violation of the defendant’s right to be present, an appellate court will not ‘speculate’ as to harm; instead prejudice will be presumed, and the conviction will be reversed.” Id. at 349 , 722 A.2d at 70 . Additionally, we stated that “an ambiguous record does not affirmatively show anything and, consequently, cannot support an harmless error argument.” Id. at 351 , 722 A.2d at 71 . In Stanley, Larry D. Stanley (“Mr. Stanley”), was convicted of various assault- related crimes. 351 Md. 733, 737 , 720 A.2d 323, 324 (1998).

During a bench trial, the trial judge asked the State’s attorney if she had threatened the witness with perjury charges in order to chill the witness’s testimony. Id. at 740-41 , 720 A.2d at 325-26 . The State’s Attorney was not a sworn witness at the time of the judge’s inquiry. Id.

Mr. Stanley argued that this was error on the part of the trial judge and warranted a new trial. Id. at 740 , 720 A.2d at 326 . We noted that the State’s Attorney not being a sworn witness was irrelevant and therefore a “harmless error” because the trial judge accepted as true the witness’s 13 account of her conversation with the State’s Attorney. Id. at 749 , 720 A.2d at 331 .

The State’s Attorney’s unsworn statement therefore was not improper, “was a general admonition, not a threat,” and did not harm the defendant enough to warrant a new trial. Id. at 754 , 720 A.2d at 333 . In Pinkney, the trial judge erred in finding that the defendant, Eric Pinkney (“Mr. Pinkney”), had waived his right to be present at trial. 350 Md. 201, 205-06 , 711 A.2d 205 , 207 (1998). We held that there was error in not properly investigating why Mr. Pinkney had failed to appear for trial.

Id. at 223, 711 A.2d at 216 . Additionally, we held that the record must reflect that an adequate inquiry was made to ensure that a defendant’s absence was not in fact involuntary. Id. We could not presume from a silent record that a waiver had occurred.

Id. at 217 , 711 A.2d at 213 . In Ware, the defendant, Darris Ware (“Mr. Ware”), was convicted of first-degree murder. 348 Md. 19, 24 , 702 A.2d 699, 701 (1997). During the trial, a witness who was testifying against Mr. Ware had a sentence reconsideration motion pending. Id. at 32-33 , 702 A.2d at 705 .

The State did not disclose the pending sentence reconsideration and emphasized in closing that the witness had no reason to lie. Id. at 54 , 702 A.2d at 716 . We held that the potential impact of this non-disclosed information was sufficient to “undermine [the] confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. These four cases all provide an adequate foundation for the rule stated in Merritt and which we rely on today.

Although Respondent attempts to discredit Merritt and its progeny based on procedural differences in the cases, we reject this argument. Our review of error is not causally related to the procedural posture of the trial court’s decision. In 14 other words, we review error no differently when the error is presented in a motion pursuant to Rule 4-331(a) than we do in a case involving a direct appeal from a verdict. Although the four cases are procedurally distinct from the instant case, they all involve scenarios in which an error was committed and then determined either to be “harmless” or “prejudicial.” We determined that the error in Merritt was prejudicial.

Likewise, we review the prejudicial effect of the error in the present case. For these reasons, we are neither persuaded that our analysis in Taylor, Stanley, Pinkney, and Ware was improper, nor that the analysis in Merritt was flawed. Respondent also argues that Merritt is flawed in its reliance on Sherman v. State. In Sherman, the appellant, Robert Sherman (“Mr. Sherman”), was tried on five counts related to the unlawful and willful use of funds. 288 Md. 636, 637 , 421 A.2d 80, 80-81 (1980).

Despite the defendant’s objection, the jury had before it during deliberations Mr. Sherman’s indictment, which included two counts that he had been acquitted of at the close of evidence. Id. at 638 , 421 A.2d at 81 . The State first argued that the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review because only the “count” was referenced in the defense’s objection rather than the “indictment.” Id. at 640 , 421 A.2d at 82 . This Court determined that the issue was properly before it and that the availability of the indictment in the jury room was reversible error and remanded the case for a new trial.

Id. at 640, 642 , 421 A.2d at 82, 83 . In the present case, Respondent contends that “[t]he problem with the Court’s reliance on Sherman to apply a harmless error review to the trial court’s Rule 4-331(a) ruling, however, is that, in Sherman, the Court was not reviewing a trial court’s decision 15 on a new trial motion.” The Court in Sherman was “determining on direct appeal whether the jury’s review of a charging document containing ‘dead counts’ was erroneous in the first instance[.] Consequently, the Sherman Court only considered whether the error was harmless.” Respondent asserts that Sherman is not relevant because it fails to analyze harmless error in the context of a Rule 4-331(a) motion. Sherman never reached the interest of justice determination. According to Respondent, therefore, Merritt’s reliance on Sherman for an interest of justice analysis was flawed.

Because Respondent rejects the analysis in Merritt, it rejects Merritt’s application in the instant case. Respondent concludes that in the present case, a new trial is not warranted. We disagree. “When we have determined that the trial court erred in a criminal case, ‘reversal is required unless the error did not influence the verdict.’” Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 234 , 166 A.3d 1044, 1052 (2017) (quoting Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 333 , 941 A.2d 1107 (2008)). In other words, “an error is harmless only if it did not play any role in the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 234, 166 A.3d at 1052 (emphasis omitted).

As we do in all cases, where a party has alleged error, we look to see if there was error and inquire into whether the error prejudiced the defendant. If our answer is no, the inquiry ends. If we determine that the error prejudiced the defendant, we analyze how the error prejudiced the defendant. If, as in this case here, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

In the instant case, Mr. Williams was charged with, and the jury was instructed on, one crime, first-degree child abuse. For this reason, we are not persuaded that the error in the instruction in no way influenced the jury’s verdict of first-degree child abuse. 16 Furthermore, in reviewing Merritt, we emphasize that “See” citations were used for support of the holding in that case. A “See” citation indicates that “there is an inferential step between the authority cited and the proposition it supports.” THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 54 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). Although not procedurally identical cases, Merritt and Sherman were factually similar such that an inference was reasonable to support the holding in Merritt.

Specifically, Sherman applied the Dorsey standard and the Court was unable to “upon its own independent review of the record, declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict.” Sherman, 288 Md. at 641 , 421 A.2d at 82 . Whereas, Merritt considered whether an error that had occurred at trial was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if so, was the error prejudicial. The inference is that review of an error under Merritt is no different than review of an error under Sherman, i.e., the harmless error standard we applied in Dorsey. For the reasons explained herein, we re-affirm Merritt and hold that our review of the Circuit Court’s denial of the motion for a new trial in this case is subject to the harmless error standard.

The Dorsey Standard Having established that harmless error is the appropriate standard of review of the trial court’s denial of Mr. Williams’s motion for new trial, we must now determine whether the erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial. Dorsey provides the standard for determining whether an error is prejudicial or not: [W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a 17 belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced