Newbold v. Glenn

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In pursuance of an ordinance of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, “the trustees of the McDonough Educational Eund and Institute” bought of Jonathan Wolfenden, a lot of ground in said city, as a site for the proposed McDonough Institute. The price paid was $11,675.00, and after reciting the City ordinance, the deed from Wolfenden and wife conveyed the property therein described to the Mayor and City Council, “in trust for the uses and purposes, and subject to the trusts, limitations, powers and provisions imposed, expressed and declared in and by the ordinance.” The trustees in pursuance of an ordinance subsequently passed by the city authorities, sold at private sale the said lot of ground to William W. Glenn, and bought other property in the vicinity of Baltimore City, on which build ⁴⁹¹ ings.were erected, and where the McDonough Institute has for some time been in practical operation. The sale to Glenn was made on the 5th 'May, 1869, and on his death the property was conveyed by the Mayor and Oity Council to John Glenn, trustee, for the parties in interest.

This appeal is from a pro-forma decree upon a special case stated, under the 47th, 48th and 49th general rules of equity practice; and the questions are: 1st. Whether under the deed from Wolfenden, the Mayor and City Council acquired an absolute fee simplé title in the property thereby conveyed ? and 2ndly. Whether a valid fee simple title passed to John Glenn under the deed from the Mayor and City Council ? 1st. By the deed from Wolfenden and wife the property , is conveyed to the Mayor and City Council, and there are no words on the face of it indicating a purpose to limit or restrain in any manner the right of alienation on the part of the grantee.

Nor do we find anything in the conveyance to justify the, inference that the property was sold or conveyed on condition that it was to be used as a site for the McDonough Institute, and on the failure thus to use it, the title was to revert to the vendor. It was not conveyed in trust for such a use, “and to and for no other use, intent or purpose whatever,” as in Reed, Howard, et al. vs. Stouffer, et al., 56 Md., 236 ; and if such had been the intention, we must presume that it would have been expressed in clear and explicit terms, or in terms at least from which such intention could be fairly inferred. The deed recites, it is true, the ordinance in pursuance of which the property was bought, and the habendum is to hold the same upon the trusts declared in and by the ordinance. But this was for the purpose of showing the purpose for which the property was bought and the character in which it was held-, and not for the purpose of limiting the right of alienation on the part of the city