Nicholson v. Page

Barnes, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This personal injury and property damage case, in which the appellee, Leroy L. Page, plaintiff below, received a judgment of $1,500 as a. result of a verdict of the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City (Sodaro, J.), sitting without a jury, against the appellant William E. Nicholson, defendant below, as a result of a collision of the defendant’s automobile with that of the plaintiff, presents for our determination the question of whether or not the lower court erred in its application of the boulevard law in declining to grant the defendant’s motions for a directed verdict and later, his motion for a judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The collision occurred on March 7, 1966, a bright clear day with good visibility in all directions, at 4:40 P.M. at Carey and Ward Streets in Baltimore City. Carey Street is a boulevard highway.

It is a two-way street which allows vehicular traffic to proceed in one lane north and south, respectively. Ward Street is designated for one-way traffic going west. At the intersection of Ward Street with Carey Street there are two conventional stop signs which require a motorist proceeding on Ward Street to stop his vehicle before crossing Carey Street. The plaintiff, Page, a Police Officer of Baltimore City for some 12 years, was proceeding west in his automobile on Ward Street.

When he came to the intersection of Ward Street with Carey Street, he stopped his automobile in obedience to the stop signs. He observed that ⁶⁶¹ traffic northbound on Carey Street was backed up in a single lane from Washington Boulevard, which is one block north of Ward Street, but the intersection of Ward and Carey Streets was unobstructed because a Baltimore Transit Company bus had stopped south of Ward Street to allow the intersection to remain clear. The bus was stopped one foot east of the yellow line separating the northbound and southbound traffic lanes of Carey Street and slightly to the south of the intersection. Traffic was backed up behind the bus all the way to Hamburg Street to the south.

The operator of the bus waved the plaintiff on. The plaintiff then drove out into the northbound lane in front of the bus, and then looked north for southbound traffic. He saw nothing coming and then proceeded across the southbound lane. When he arrived at the southwest corner, the defendant’s automobile “curved in front of me out of nowhere.” The first time the plaintiff saw the defendant’s automobile, he appeared in front of the plaintiff’s car on the southwest side of the street, making a left-hand turn.

The right rear side of the defendant’s vehicle collided with the left front side of the plaintiff’s car causing the plaintiff personal injuries and damage to his automobile. The defendant testified that he had left his place of employment on Carey Street two blocks south of the place of the collision. He proceeded north in the northbound lane of Carey Street and stopped in a single lane of traffic 15 feet behind the bus. He pulled out into the southbound lane of Carey Street 1 to go around the bus and ⁶⁶² proceeded to Ward Street where he made a left-hand turn.

The collision then occurred. The investigating officer, who arrived at the scene of the accident five minutes after the collision and when the two automobiles were still at the scene of the accident, testified that the defendant had told him that he had pulled out from behind the parked bus “to make a left-hand turn because the traffic was backed up.” The investigating officer also stated that it was not “possible for auto traffic northbound to have gone around that bus without getting into the southbound lane.” Judge Sodaro, in announcing the verdict, stated in his letter to counsel for the parties, filed in the case: “Upon consideration of all of the testimony, the Court finds that the plaintiff has met the burden of proof by a fair preponderance of affirmative evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence in the operation of his automobile, which caused the accident in question on March 7, 1S66, at the intersection of Carey and Ward Streets in Baltimore City, without any negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributing thereto. The Court is satisfied that the proximate cause of the accident was solely due to the lack of due care exercised by the defendant, at the time and place of this accident. “In this case special damages in the amount of $542.59 were proven, which included loss of wages, medical expenses and damage to the plaintiff’s car. Upon consideration of the other elements of damages, I have concluded to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $1,500.00.” The defendant at the end of the plaintiff’s case and at the end of the entire case made motions for a directed verdict in his favor.

After the judgment, he moved for a judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a new trial. All of these motions were.denied by the trial court. ⁶⁶³ The defendant earnestly urged upon us (1) that assuming a violation by the defendant of Code (1957), Art. 661,4, § 217 (a), 2 requiring the operator of a motor vehicle to keep to the right-hand side of the highway and of Art. 66(4, § 225 (b), 3 in regard to the making of left turns, these violations were not the proximate cause of the collision and, in any event, (2) by virtue of Art. 6614, § 233, 4 and our decisions construing the application of the “boulevard rule,” the plaintiff, as the operator of the unfavored vehicle — not having granted the right-of-way to the defendant’s favored vehicle for the entire crossing of the boulevard — was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of lav/. We shall now discuss these contentions. (1) The defendant concedes that this Court, in considering the sufficiency of the evidence when asked to reverse the action of a trial court in denying a motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment n.o.v., must assume the truth of all evidence in favor of the plaintiff’s right to recover as well as all reasonable inferences which may ⁶⁶⁴ naturally be drawn therefrom which tend to support the plaintiff’s right to recover.

The facts already stated give effect to this rule and would support a finding that the defendant drove his vehicle from a stopped position, 15 feet behind a bus stopped in the northbound lane of Carey Street, crossed the yellow dividing line and drove north in the southbound lane of Carey Street, thus violating Art. 66J/4, § 217 (a) and, in making his left turn, violated Art. 66 1 /!, § 225 (b). These facts also, in our opinion, support a finding that this negligent conduct by the defendant was the proximate cause of the collision. The defendant correctly observes that the “mere violation of a statute will not support an action for damages, unless there is legally sufficient evidence to show the violation was a proximate cause of the injury complained of,” citing our decision to that effect in Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 248 , 213 A. 2d 549, 555 (1965). The plaintiff had no reason to anticipate that the defendant would drive his vehicle from its standing position 15 feet behind the bus in the northbound lane, cross the dividing line into the southbound lane and then attempt to make a left-hand turn into Ward Street.

But for these negligent, actions of the defendant, the collision would not have occurred and they are the proximate causes of the collision. In our opinion the finding of primary negligence of the defendant by the trial court was not erroneous. (2) The defendant argues that, in any event, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because of his failure, as the driver of an unfavored vehicle crossing a boulevard, to yield the right-of-way to the defendant’s favored vehicle. This Court (not without some dissent 5 ) has “vigorously” applied the “boule ⁶⁶⁵ vard rule.” As we recently stated in Cornias v. Bradley, 254 Md. 479, 496 , 255 A. 2d 431, 439 (1969): “We and our predecessors have vigorously applied the boulevard law and have held that the unfavored driver entering a boulevard must yield the right-of-way to all traffic he finds in the intersection during the entire time he is there.” (citing with approval and quoting from our opinion in Trionfo v. R. J. Hellman, Inc., 250 Md. 12, 17-18 , 241 A. 2d 554, 558