Norris v. Williams

⁷⁵ Delaplaine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit for specific performance was brought by T. Bayard Williams and William G. Lynch, trustees of the estate of John T. Grace, deceased, to compel George R. Norris and A. Margaret Norris, his wife, to comply with their agreement to purchase certain real estate in Dundalk. The contract of sale, executed on June 23, 3946, recites that the trustees bargain and sell to Norris and his wife the parcel of about one acre of land at the southwest corner of Dundalk and Baltimore Avenues for the sum of $45,000; that the purchasers made a partial payment of $2,500; and that the balance will be paid in cash within thirty days therefrom. The contract contains a proviso that in the event this property is not zoned for commercial use, or cannot be used as such for any other reason, then the contract shall be void and the deposit shall be refunded to the purchasers.

The record shows that Grace devised his estate to the trustees with direction to pay the income to his widow for life, and with power to sell and invest the principal. On the land is the house in which he resided until his death in 3923. His widow continued to live there for twenty-five years, and after her death the trustees found no one interested in buying the place for a residence. The land has been zoned by the Zoning Board of Baltimore County for commercial use.

But the purchasers refused to settle on account of the fact that the deed executed by Grace and his wife on February 34, 1937, conveying to the Eastern Land Company all of their fifty-acre tract of farm land except the parcel now in question, contains a covenant that for the period of fifty years the parcel excepted shall be used for residential purposes only. It was shown that the property is now located in the business section of Dundalk, and that the restriction cannot benefit any one. The chancellor accordingly ordered the purchasers to pay the balance of $42,500, with interest from the date of the decree, upon receiving a ⁷⁶ deed from the trustees conveying the property free and clear of the restriction. The appeal is from that decree.

The law is clear that where a grantor imposes a restriction upon land conveyed for the benefit of land which he retains, it will be binding upon the grantee and his successors in title; and likewise where a grantor imposes a restriction upon land retained for the benefit of land which he conveys, the restriction will be binding upon himself, his heirs and assigns. Wood v. Stehrer, 119 Md. 143, 148 , 86 A. 128 ; McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 174 Md. 118, 122 , 197 A. 580 . The Maryland Conveyancing Act provides that no estate above seven years shall pass or take effect unless the deed conveying the same shall be executed, acknowledged and recorded as therein provided. Code, 1939, art. 21, sec. 1.

This Act is applicable to covenants for easements in land, but it does not require that a covenant restricting the use of land shall be recorded in a separate instrument. The method of creating the restriction in this case was practical and appropriate, and was authorized by the statute as a means of safeguarding the substantial property right in the land reserved. Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 685 , 93 A. 216 . However, restrictions upon the use of land are in derogation of the natural right which an owner possesses to use and enjoy his property, and are repugnant to trade and commerce. .Consequently restrictive covenants are construed strictly against their establishment and effect, and liberally in support of the unrestricted use of the land.

Himmel v. Hendler, 161 Md. 181 , 155 A. 316 ; Ferguson v. Beth-Mary Steel Corporation, 166 Md. 666 , 172 A. 238 ; Baltimore Butchers’ Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117 , 17 A. 2d 130 ; Yorkway Apartments v. Dundalk Co., 180 Md. 647 , 26 A. 2d 398 ; Matthews v. Kernwood, Inc., 184 Md. 297, 305 , 40 A. 2d 522 ; Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 490 , 41 A. 2d 479 . It is. well settled that, where the duration of a restrictive covenant has not been expressly limited, it will be implied that some reasonable limitation adapted ⁷⁷ to the nature of the case was intended, and the restriction will be construed as extending for no longer period of time than the nature of the circumstances and the purposes of the imposition indicate as reasonable for the duration of its enforcement without undue prejudice to the property rights acquired by the grantee and his successors in title. Whitmarsh v. Richmond, 179 Md. 523, 529 , 20 A. 2d 161 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Levy, 181 Md. 488 , 30 A. 2d 740 . The land purchased by the Eastern Land Company from Grace was one of the tracts acquired during the First World War for the Dundalk Company to provide building sites for homes for war workers, particularly those employed at the plant of the