Ogle v. Reynolds

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The fourth clause of the will of the testatrix, out of which this controversy arises, is as follows: “Fourthly. I will, devise, and bequeath my four several ground-rents arising and payable out of the lots on the west side of North Eutaw street as follows, that is to say: “First. The one at the corner of Eutaw and Biddle streets, to pay my funeral expenses, and a tomb for Captain Hayden and myself. “Second.

The next, or second ground-rent, to be used to buy and put up a tomb for my father and mother Ogle, and James and Elizabeth Hayden. “Third. The next, or third ground-rent, is to be used for the same purposes as herein in this last clause mentioned, if the other two ground-rents should prove insufficient for the purpose.” The fourth ground-rent she devises to the building fund of Saint Luke’s Mission of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and about which there is no controversy. Under this clause, the executors named in the will, sold the reversionary interest of the testatrix in the three lots of ground out of which the rents issued, the total amount of sales being $1900. The sales were reported by them to the Orphans’ Court, to the ratification of which exceptions were filed by the purchasers.

The questions arising upon these exceptions are: First, ¹⁴⁹ did the testatrix mean that the reversionary interest in these lots should he sold, and the proceeds arising from the sale to be applied to the purposes mentioned in this clause, or did she mean that the annual rents themselves should he so applied? And, secondly, if the reversionary interest was to he sold, did she mean that the executors should make the sale? The answer to these questions depends upon the intention of the testatrix, and this intention is to he ascertained from the construction of the clause itself, taken in connection with the other clauses in the will, and the circumstances under which the will was made. The testatrix was a widow without any children, and was at the time of her death seized and possessed of valuable real and personal property.

In the first clause she directs her executors to sell her house and lot on Pennsylvania avenue, and to distribute the proceeds of sale among certain nephews and nieces therein named. In the second, she directs her executors to sell her leasehold property, No. 81 Greene street, and to distribute the proceeds between her three brothers and sisters. In the third she directs her executors to sell her interest in the country place known as “ The Widerners,” and the proceeds of sale she bequeaths to her brothers and sisters for life, and upon their death to their children. The fourth is the one out of which this litigation has arisen.

In the fifth and sixth clauses she gives all her furniture and clothing and personal effects to her three sisters, with the exception of her gold watch, which she gives to her nephew John Frances Hayden. ' She then appoints her brother Charles Ogle and her sister Mary Jane Des Forges, executors. She thus disposes of her entire property, real and personal, including her clothing; and it is clear beyond question that she did not mean to die intestate as to any portion of her property. And yet, if the contention of the appellees he sound, if she meant that the annual rents ¹⁵⁰ issuing out of these several lots of ground should he applied to the purposes specified in the fourth clause, there would he an intestacy as to the residuary interest in these lots, and this we cannot for a moment suppose she intended. Primarily